Beasley et al v. Schuyler County et al

Filing 105

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION (See Written Opinion): Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED 82 91 . The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 9/22/2015. (VM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 22 September, 2015 08:28:55 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JERMAINE CARPENTER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SCHUYLER COUNTY, et al.
)
)
Defendants. )

13-3234

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Carpenter, along with three other plaintiffs, brought
the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
Fourteenth Amendment due process violations. Throughout the
course of this litigation, the other three plaintiffs have been
dismissed from this lawsuit and only Plaintiff Carpenter remains an
active litigant. The matter is before the Court for ruling on the
Defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 82,
91).
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Defendants Caraway and Jumper filed their motion for
summary judgment on February 24, 2015. (Doc. 82). Defendants
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Clayton, McAdory, and Williams filed their motion for summary
judgment on May 27, 2015. (Doc. 91). After several extensions of
time to do so, Plaintiff filed a response to the motion filed by
Defendants Clayton, McAdory, and Williams. (Doc. 103). Plaintiff
has not filed a response to the motion filed by Defendants Caraway
and Jumper. Because many of the undisputed facts alleged in the
Defendants’ respective motions are similar, the Court will consider
Plaintiff’s responses to those facts as applicable to both motions.
To the extent that Plaintiff does not address a fact alleged in the
motion filed by Defendants Caraway and Jumper, the Court will
consider the fact as undisputed pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (if a party fails
to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, the court may
consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion).
In addition, Defendant Ashby is currently an active defendant
in this matter, but neither party has filed a motion for summary
judgment as it relates to him. Upon review of the Complaint, the
only allegations against Defendant Ashby relate to the claims made
by Plaintiff Terry C. Johnson. As Plaintiff Johnson’s motion to
voluntarily dismiss himself (and his complaint) was granted in the
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Court’s Text Order dated June 13, 2014, there are no remaining
allegations against Defendant Ashby. Defendant Ashby should
have been dismissed at that time. Plaintiff Carpenter, the sole
remaining plaintiff in this matter, confirms in his deposition
testimony that he has no claims against Defendant Ashby. Pl. Dep.
122:13-123:8. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Ashby is dismissed. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 60(a) (the court, on its own motion, may correct mistakes
arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in the
record).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
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more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
Plaintiff Carpenter (“Plaintiff”) is civilly committed at Rushville
Treatment and Detention Facility (“Rushville” or “TDF”) pursuant to
the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Defendants
are or were employed at the TDF in various capacities. Plaintiff’s
remaining claims against the Defendants relate to Plaintiff’s
placement and status within the TDF from May 28, 2011 until July
27, 2011. All other claims were dismissed in the Court’s Merit
Review Opinion entered October 17, 2013. (Doc. 12).
On May 28, 2011, Plaintiff was placed on Temporary Special
Management status pending an investigation regarding his alleged
threats of physical harm (stabbing) towards staff. This action was
based upon information from an incident report authored by a TDF
official who is not a defendant in this action. Temporary Special
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Management status (“Temp Special”) is the most restrictive resident
status at Rushville and is required when a resident is perceived as a
threat to himself or others. Plaintiff was provided a mattress,
blanket, pillow, socks, boxers, soap, a shirt, and a jumpsuit. The
room was similar in size to his previous living quarters. According
to Plaintiff, he was initially allowed out of this room only for
showers every three days. Pl. Dep. 39:3-6.
Between May 28, 2011, and July 27, 2011, Plaintiff appeared
before the Behavioral Committee (“Committee”) on at least 11, but
possibly 18 separate occasions. As it relates to Plaintiff, Defendants
Caraway and Jumper served on the Committee during various
times throughout the relevant time period.
Plaintiff first appeared before the Committee on June 7, 2011,
after two appearances within that first week had been postponed
pending investigation into Plaintiff’s alleged threats. This hearing
was continued because Plaintiff was in possession of contraband
(ink pens). Plaintiff disputes the classification of the pens as such,
but admits he knew he was not supposed to have them. At any
rate, the Committee found Plaintiff guilty of “Threats and
Intimidation” on June 13, 2011, for the events occurring prior to
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May 28, 2011. Prior to these hearings, Plaintiff received adequate
notice of the hearings, an opportunity to identify witnesses, and an
opportunity to present a statement in his defense.
After the guilty finding, Plaintiff was placed on a modified
version of Special Management status. Generally speaking, Special
Management status is less restrictive than Temp Special and
includes increased privileges such as yard time and access to the
day room. Pl. Dep. 46:19-21. Under the modified version, Plaintiff
was to be allowed these additional privileges based upon his
compliance with TDF rules.
From the record, it does not appear that Plaintiff earned any
additional privileges until July 15, 2011, when he was allowed to
possess reading material and use the day room three times per
week. Until that time, Plaintiff’s compliance had been continuously
monitored and, on at least one occasion, a homemade “pool ball”
(an item made by peeling caulk of the window frame) was found in
Plaintiff’s possession. Despite this misstep, Plaintiff continued to
comply with the requirements of the program. He earned additional
time in the day room on July 15 and 19, 2011, respectively, as well
as the ability to wear his personal clothing on July 25, 2011.
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Plaintiff was removed from the modified Special Management status
on July 27, 2011. In his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that the
privileges he was allowed went above and beyond the minimal
requirements of TDF policy. Pl. Dep. 79:9-15.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff has a liberty interest in remaining free from
unreasonable restraint. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982). A person already confined, however, may not create a
federal claim “by citing small, incremental deprivations of physical
freedom.” Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2002).
Instead, Plaintiff’s liberty interest is balanced against the ordinary
incidents of his confinement. Id. Only those restrictions that
impose an “atypical and significant hardship” will trigger due
process concerns. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);
Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Disciplinary
measures that do not substantially worsen the conditions of
confinement of a lawfully confined person are not actionable under
the due process clause.”).
At its most restrictive, Plaintiff’s confinement required that he
stay inside his room for most of the day. He was provided basic
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items (mattress, blanket, clothing, soap, etc.) and allowed to shower
every three days. According to Plaintiff, his room did not have
electrical outlets, and Plaintiff, therefore, would not have been able
to use various electronic items even if they had been allowed.
As time progressed, Plaintiff was allowed greater privileges
based upon his behavior and compliance with TDF rules. Plaintiff
was allowed increased time outside his cell, yard time, and some
limited property. The Behavioral Committee monitored Plaintiff’s
compliance with this program on a continuous basis, and there is
no evidence that TDF officials took these actions for any reasons
other than the safety and security of those housed and employed at
the Rushville facility. On this record, the no reasonable juror could
conclude that Plaintiff suffered an atypical and significant
deprivation.
Even if Plaintiff could show a sufficient deprivation, there is no
evidence that he was denied his procedural due process rights.
Plaintiff was provided with sufficient notice of a disciplinary hearing
and an opportunity to be heard in front of the Behavioral
Committee. Rushville officials provided that hearing within a
reasonable timeframe given the allegations against Plaintiff, his
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possession of contraband while on Temp Special, and the pending
investigation. See Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir.
2005) (“[D]ue process was satisfied by providing process ‘within a
reasonable time after confining [the inmate] to administrative
segregation.” (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)).
There is no evidence to suggest that the Committee intended
Plaintiff’s more restrictive confinement to last indefinitely. To the
contrary, the Committee conducted hearings every few days for the
time that Plaintiff was housed in the Special Management wing and
continuously evaluated Plaintiff’s situation with the intention of
restoring his less restrictive status.
Therefore, the Court concludes that no reasonable juror could
find that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. As such, the
Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are
GRANTED [82][91]. The clerk of the court is directed to
enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against
Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and
this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own
costs.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
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entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:

September 22, 2015

FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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