Estate of Dennis E. Adams v. Christian County, Illinois et al
Filing
148
OPINION: The Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be Allowed as to the Monell claims asserted in Counts VII, VIII and IX. The issue of damages as to those counts will be determined at trial. The Plaintiff's Motion for Parti al Summary Judgment will be Denied as to Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI. The jury trial will be bifurcated. Ergo, the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 131 is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. The Plaintiff's Motion is AL LOWED as to Counts VII, VIII and IX. The Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED as to Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI. The Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Strike 139 is DENIED AS MOOT. The Defendants' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Response to the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 142 is ALLOWED. The Defendants have filed the Amended Response [142-1]. The final pretrial conference remains set for April 7, 2017 at 2:00 p.m., in chambers. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION.) Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 3/9/2017. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 09 March, 2017 10:57:52 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ESTATE OF DENNIS E. ADAMS,
Deceased, By ANGELA DREW,
Administrator,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CHRISTIAN COUNTY,
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BRUCE KETTLEKAMP, in his
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official capacity as Sheriff of Christian )
County and in his individual capacity, )
and ANDREW NELSON, in his
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official capacity as Christian County
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Jail Administrator and in his
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individual capacity,
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Defendants.
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NO. 13-3300
OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
This is a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wherein the
Plaintiff alleges the Defendants committed a number of constitutional
violations arising from the incarceration and death of Dennis E. Adams at
the Christian County Correctional Center.
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.
For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiff’s Motion is Allowed in part
and Denied in Part.
I. FACTS
A. Background
The Plaintiff’s decedent, Dennis E. Adams, committed suicide while
incarcerated in the Christian County Jail on November 4, 2011. Dennis
Adams had been arrested on August 19, 2011, after he shot his wife, Jolene
Adams.
Throughout the time period relevant to this case, Defendant Andrew
Nelson was the Jail Administrator of the Christian County Sheriff’s Office
acting within the scope of his employment under color of law. On August
19, 2011, at approximately 7:51 a.m., Christian County Sheriff’s Deputies
responded to a call that a woman had been shot. Upon arrival, Officer
Miller was advised that Jolene Adams had been shot by Dennis Adams.
Jolene Adams told Officer Miller that she was getting into her vehicle,
which was parked in the driveway, when she was shot in the shoulder.
2
Dennis Adams fired several more times towards Jolene before leaving the
scene.
Dennis Adams was located approximately two hours later at 9:22
a.m., near the railroad tracks in the 100 block of South Baughman Road in
Taylorville, Illinois.
When Mr. Adams was found, he had a revolver
handgun to his head. The Illinois State Police Crisis Negotiator was called.
Numerous police officers from the Christian County Sheriff’s Office were
also present at the scene.
Defendant Andrew Nelson was aware that after an approximately
three hour long standoff, Dennis Adams was apprehended by Officer
Nation and Deputy Marron when Adams placed the revolver down to wipe
his forehead. Adams was arrested and transported to Taylorville Memorial
Hospital where he was treated for a small abrasion on his right forearm and
an old ankle injury.
According to the Christian County Mental Health Crisis Assessment
form dated August 19, 2011, Dennis Adams was evaluated for suicidal
tendencies at Taylorville Memorial Hospital by Barb Brauer of Christian
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County Mental Health. Ms. Brauer diagnosed Adams with depressive
disorder not otherwise specified. Andrew Nelson was given a copy of the
August 19, 2011 Christian County Mental Health Crisis form on or about
August 19, 2011.
According to the Taylorville Emergency Department Notes and the
Discharge Instructions, Dr. Matthew Yociss examined Dennis Adams. In
his discharge instructions, Dr. Yociss advised that Adams should be given
“suicide precautions.” Dr. Yociss instructed Adams that he should follow
up with Dr. McClintock “as needed” for follow up care. The Taylorville
Memorial Hospital Discharge Instructions were in the possession of the
Christian County Sheriff’s Office. No follow up care was ever given to
Adams.
B. Placement at Christian County Correctional Center
After his evaluation, Dennis Adams was transported to the Christian
County Correctional Center. Andrew Nelson was aware that Adams was
going to be taken to the Christian County Correctional Center prior to his
arrival.
4
The Christian County Correctional Center Padded Cell Report states
that Dennis Adams was placed into the “Padded Cell” at 1 p.m. on August
19, 2011. The reason Adams was placed into the Padded Cell of the
Christian County Correctional Center was because he was suicidal. The
placement was approved by Andrew Nelson.
Dennis Adams was placed on a 30-minute watch as opposed to the
standard 15-minute watch. When Adams arrived at the Christian County
Correctional Center, Correctional Officer Bill Hogan completed an intake
form. Nelson was given a copy of the intake form.
Dennis Adams was charged with two counts of Attempted First degree
Murder. On August 21, 2011, Adams’s bond was set at $2,000,000.
Adams was unable to post the requisite amount of bond money and
remained incarcerated at the Christian County Correctional Center.
On August 24, 2011, Mr. Adams’s court-appointed public defender,
Michael Havera, filed a motion for examination by psychiatrist. According
to the motion, Mr. Havera had a bona fide doubt as to Adams’s fitness to
stand trial or to plead guilty and be sentenced. Mr. Havera testified that
5
he visited Mr. Adams approximately every two weeks. Havera stated that
Adams was cooperative in his defense and at no time appeared suicidal.
However, the Plaintiff alleges the fact that Mr. Havera filed the motion
demonstrates that Havera noticed Adams had displayed psychiatric
problems.
On August 25, 2011, Dennis Adams was denied bond, meaning that
no amount of money would secure his release, while charges were pending.
The same day, Mr. Adams was re-evaluated by the Christian County
Mental Health Association.
The Christian County Mental Health
Association Crisis Assessment form dated August 25, 2011 provides that
Adams was reevaluated by Julie Chastain. Ms. Chastain recommended that
Adams remain in the Padded Cell because of suicidal tendencies and that
he needed to be re-evaluated on the morning of August 26, 2011. Ms.
Chastain diagnosed Mr. Adams with an adjustment disorder and
personality disorder not otherwise specified.
No evaluation occurred after August 25, 2011. There was no mental
health treatment at the Christian County Correctional Center during the
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time of Dennis Adams’s incarceration.
On August 30, 2011, Mr. Havera argued his motion for examination
by psychiatrist. The motion was granted. Subsequently, Dr. Terry Killian
of Killian and Associates in Springfield, Illinois was appointed to conduct
a psychiatric examination of Mr. Adams for the purpose of giving opinions
regarding Adams’s fitness to stand trial, his sanity at the time of his alleged
crimes and for possible psychiatric mitigation. Dr. Killian was not hired to,
nor did he, render any psychiatric or medical treatment to Adams.
The Defendants note that Dr. Killian did not mention in his report
that he felt Dennis Adams was suicidal or needed to be under suicide
watch.
Less than a month before Mr. Adams’s suicide, Dr. Killian
recommended that Adams be sent for an inpatient evaluation and
treatment in the Illinois Department of Human Services. The Defendants
allege that no action was taken by the court or the prosecutor to transfer
Adams to a facility. Moreover, the Defendants allege they had no control
over the court or prosecutor and were helpless to do anything at that time.
The following day, according to the Padded Cell History and Isolation
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Cell History, Dennis Adams was transferred out of the Padded Cell and
into the Isolation Cell. Andrew Nelson was given a copy of the August 25,
2011 Crisis Assessment prior to his decision to transfer Dennis Adams out
of the Padded Cell and into the Isolation Cell. This transfer was done at
the direction of Nelson. The transfer was also ordered without the aid,
direction, or consultation of any mental health professional and against the
recommendation of Julie Chastain on August 25, 2011.
The Isolation Cell is not suicide resistant and contains a number of
protrusions that were conducive to suicide attempts by hanging. These
include open-faced cell bars, clothing hooks and a towel bar attached to the
sink.
According to the letter written by Andrew Nelson to Christian County
Sheriff Bruce Kettlekamp dated December 2, 2011, Adams was transferred
out of the Padded Cell and into the Isolation Cell because another inmate,
Lacey Myers, was booked into the Christian County Correctional Center.
Christian County Correctional Center staff knew that Myers suffered from
mental health issues, including depression and anxiety, and was a suicide
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risk.
The Christian County Correctional Center has only one Padded Cell
and one Isolation Cell. According to the December 2, 2011 letter of
Andrew Nelson, “Christian County Correctional Center has only one
padded cell at its disposal and housing therein is based on immediate
need.”
According to the Padded Cell History, Inmate Myers was housed in
the Padded Cell from August 31, 2011 to September 1, 2011. The Padded
Cell was vacant from September 1, 2011 to September 6, 2011, while Mr.
Adams was housed in the Isolation Cell. Adams was housed in the Isolation
Cell from August 31, 2011 to September 13, 2011.
C. Transfer to Bullpen Area and suicide
According to his letter, Andrew Nelson ordered Dennis Adams
transferred from the Isolation Cell to the Bullpen Area on September 14,
2011.
The transfer was also ordered without the aid, direction or
consultation of any mental health professional and against the
recommendation of Julie Chastain on August 25, 2011. Nelson’s letter to
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Sheriff Kettlekamp provided that he ordered Adams transferred on
September 14, 2011, because another inmate incurred a disciplinary
infraction.
Nelson testified the decision may have been based on
information from Christian County Mental Health.
The Isolation Cell Report shows that the next inmate to enter into the
Isolation Cell was Aaron Matthews two days later on September 16, 2011.
The Bullpen Area of the Christian County Correctional Center is a general
population area. It has less restrictions and less monitoring than the
Padded Cell and Isolation Cell.
Dennis Adams remained in the Bullpen Area of the Christian County
Correctional Center until his suicide on November 4, 2011. On November
4, 2011, at approximately 5:30 a.m., Dennis Adams hung himself in his jail
cell. On November 4, 2011, Mr. Adams was due in court regarding the
divorce case which was filed by Jolene Adams. When asked whether the
court hearing that day could have been an impetus for Adams’s suicide, Dr.
Killian responded:
It could be or to make, certainly to make him more suicidal
than, I mean he had some suicidal thoughts already, but yes,
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that certainly can be. As I said a trigger at the last moment
something can happen and a divorce hearing for men is not a
rare event that might trigger suicidal thoughts.
Doc. No. 142, Ex. 8. P. 78. The Defendants allege it can be inferred that
Adams was not suicidal for much of his stay at the Christian County Jail,
but became so as his impending divorce case became imminent.
However, Dr. Killian testified he did not perform a suicide assessment
because he thought Dennis Adams was in a safe place where it would be
difficult to commit suicide. In fact, Dr. Killian testified he would not have
let him out of jail because he thought Adams was a suicide risk. Dr. Killian
testified it was not addressed in diagnoses because it was not a diagnosis.
Additionally, 78 days went by without a suicide attempt. Dennis
Adams was seen twice by a board certified psychiatrist and twice by
Christian County Mental Health. The Defendants assert that no one
suggested Adams be left in a padded cell. Jolene Adams testified she did
not believe Dennis Adams was ever suicidal, only homicidal.
While he was evaluated on August 19, 2011 and August 25, 2011 by
Christian County Mental Health, Mr. Adams never received any mental
11
health treatment from Christian County Mental Health. The Defendants
allege that Christian County Mental Health Association has no affiliation
with Defendant Christian County. Moreover, Christian County Mental
Health failed to make a follow up visit through no fault of the Defendants.
On November 4, 2011, the Isolation Cell and the Padded Cell were
both unoccupied. The Christian County Sheriff’s Office’s policy as it
related to the housing of suicidal inmates was “the Christian County
Correctional Center has only one Padded Cell at its disposal and housing
therein is based on immediate need.” The “immediate need” as defined in
their policy is determined by correctional officers, the jail administrator and
the chief deputy. No one in the Christian County Correctional Center was
a trained mental health professional.
All deputies must go through a 400-hour basic training course, which
includes mental health training. There are also mental health classes during
the year.
Dennis Adams was transferred out of the Padded Cell and into the
Isolation Cell pursuant to the above mentioned Christian County Sheriff’s
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Office policy. Adams was transferred out of the Isolation Cell and into the
Bullpen Area of the Christian County Correctional Center pursuant to the
above mentioned Christian County Sheriff’s Office policy. The Padded Cell
is a dry cell and has no sink, toilet, or bunk.
D. Plaintiff’s claims
There was no policy for the Christian County Sheriff’s Office as it
relates to the acquisition and procurement of mental health treatment
unless Christian County Mental Health initiated treatment.
The two
entities did not have a contract with one another. The Christian County
Sheriff’s Office was solely responsible for initiating contact with Christian
County Mental Health.
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Andrew Nelson was aware of all
of these facts concerning Dennis Adams’s mental health when decisions
were made as to where to place him at the Christian County Correctional
Center. Because Mr. Nelson knew of the medical and psychological needs
of Mr. Adams, the Plaintiff claims it is undisputed that Nelson acted with
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Adams.
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The Plaintiff further asserts it is undisputed Mr. Nelson’s actions were
done pursuant to the policies of the Christian County Sheriff’s Office.
Moreover, the policies were deficient and did not meet constitutional
standards.
The Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint alleges a number of civil
rights violations committed against Mr. Adams by the Defendants, as
follows: two Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement claims
(Counts II and IV) and a Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Provide
Medical Attention claim (Count VI) against Defendant Jail Administrator
Andrew Nelson in his individual capacity; two Fourteenth Amendment
Conditions of Confinement claims asserted against the Defendants in their
official capacities (Counts I and III), a Fourteenth Amendment Failure to
Provide Medical Attention claim against Sheriff Bruce Kettlekamp, Jail
Administrator Andrew Nelson and Christian County (Count V), and three
Monell claims (Counts VII-IX) against Sheriff Bruce Kettlekamp in his
official capacity as the Sheriff of Christian County.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff claims that summary judgment is warranted
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as to liability and the case should be set for a trial on damages.
The Defendants deny that they violated any of Dennis Adams’s
constitutional rights. Moreover, the Defendants allege that they relied
upon Christian County Mental Health as well as Dr. Terry Killian in
placing and caring for Dennis Adams.
The Defendants further assert that, for 78 days of incarceration,
Dennis Adams never threatened or attempted suicide nor did any health
care provider suggest that he was a suicide risk after the first few days of
incarceration. Moreover, all jailers of Christian County received annual
training in suicide prevention and at no time during Dennis Adams’s 78
days of incarceration did any jailer observe anything which would suggest
that Adams was suicidal.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Estate of Dennis E. Adams contends it is entitled to summary
judgment for a number of reasons. First, the Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Andrew Nelson was deliberately indifferent to Dennis Adams’s conditions
of confinement when he transferred Mr. Adams out of the Padded Cell and
15
into the Isolation Cell on August 31, 2011 without the aid, consultation or
advice of a mental health professional. Second, the Plaintiff asserts Andrew
Nelson was deliberately indifferent to Dennis Adams’s serious medical
needs when he obtained no medical or mental health treatment when he
was incarcerated and he knew Mr. Adams had a serious medical need.
Third, the Plaintiff contends the Christian County Sheriff’s Office is liable
because of their unconstitutional policy as it relates to the transfer of
Dennis Adams. Fourth, the Christian County Sheriff’s Office had no policy
in place for the procurement of mental health and medical treatment at the
Christian County Correctional Center.
The Defendants dispute the Plaintiff’s allegations and claim that,
regardless of whether the Court employs an objective or subjective analysis,
there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the entry of
summary judgment.
A. Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly supported
and “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
16
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
Court construes all inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Siliven v.
Indiana Dept. of Child Services, 635 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2011). To
create a genuine factual dispute, however, any such inference must be based
on something more than “speculation or conjecture.” See Harper v. C.R.
England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Because summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit,”
a “hunch” about the opposing party’s motives is not enough to withstand
a properly supported motion. See Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479,
484 (7th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, there must be enough evidence in favor
of the non-movant to permit a jury to return a verdict in its favor. See id.
B. Individual capacity claims
(1)
In Count II, the Plaintiff alleges Dennis Adams was “incarcerated
under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to his health
or safety in that he was transferred out of the Padded Cell without the aid,
recommendation or advice of a mental health professional and against the
17
recommendation of Julie Chastain on August 25, 2011.” See Doc. No. 100,
at 11.
This deliberate indifference resulted in harm when Adams
committed suicide.
The parties dispute the standard that applies in analyzing the
individual capacity claims.
In considering a Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim, the United States Supreme Court recently held that
“a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly
used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). Although Kingsley involved an excessive
force claim and not inadequate conditions of confinement or failure to
provide medical care, as in the instant case, the claims in both cases arise
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges the
same standard should apply.
The Defendants contend the rule in Kingsley should be held to apply
only to excessive force claims and not deliberate indifference claims, as
alleged here. Under a subjective standard, “a plaintiff must put forth
evidence to establish that the defendant knew of a serious risk to the
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prisoner’s health and consciously disregarded that risk.”
Holloway v.
Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012). This
requires “more than negligence and it approaches intentional wrongdoing.”
Id. The subjective deliberate indifference standard is analogous to criminal
recklessness. See id.
The Court believes that, because the same language of the Fourteenth
Amendment would apply to either claim, it is likely that the rule in
Kingsley will be held to apply to medical care or conditions of confinement
cases such as this one. Even though Defendant Nelson does not allege that
qualified immunity applies, however, the Court does not believe it would
be appropriate to hold a Defendant sued in his individual capacity to a
standard that did not apply when he committed acts which are alleged to
violate one’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court believes that the
subjective standard is most appropriate in this case.
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Andrew Nelson was deliberately
indifferent to Dennis Adams’s conditions of confinement when he
transferred Adams out of the Padded Cell and into the Isolation Cell on
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August 31, 2011 without the aid, consultation or advice of a mental health
professional. The Plaintiff acknowledges that there was only one Padded
Cell at the facility. Another inmate, Lacey Myers, was placed in the Padded
Cell on August 31, 2011. Andrew Nelson testified it was Myers’s three
attempted suicides in the previous three months which caused him to view
her as more of a suicide risk than Adams. Nelson also testified that it was
his observations of Adams that led him to terminate his suicide watch. It
would not have been unreasonable for Nelson to believe that Adams was
less likely to commit suicide 12 days after he was first jailed (or 78 days
after he was jailed). See Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d 753, 757
(7th Cir. 2001) (“The likelihood of suicide is highest between 2 and 14
days of confinement.”).
Upon viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Defendant,
the Court cannot say that Nelson was deliberately indifferent when he
determined that it was appropriate to place inmate Lacey Myers in the
Padded Cell instead of Dennis Adams. The inmate who had made a
number of recent suicide attempts was placed in the single Padded Cell.
20
While an argument might be made that Adams should have returned to the
Padded Cell after Myers was removed and the cell became vacant on
September 1, 2011, the dry Padded Cell was not designed to hold inmates
for a long period of time. The Plaintiff’s transfer out of the Padded Cell on
August 31, 2011, is not related to his suicide more than two months later.
The Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on Count II.
(2)
In Count IV, the Plaintiff alleges Dennis Adams was “incarcerated
under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to his health
or safety in that he was transferred out of the Isolation Cell without the aid,
recommendation or advice of a mental health professional and against the
recommendation of Julie Chastain on August 25, 2011.” See Doc. No. 100,
at 13.
This deliberate indifference resulted in harm when Adams
committed suicide. It was on September 14, 2011 when Defendant Nelson
transferred Adams out of the Isolation Cell and into the Bullpen Area of the
Christian County Correctional Center. However, the Plaintiff alleges that
it does not matter whether Adams was in the Isolation Cell or the Bullpen
21
Area because neither was suicide resistant. The Plaintiff contends that
Nelson deliberately ignored the substantial risk of self-harm to Adams when
he placed him in the general population area.
The Plaintiff alleges the argument is nearly identical to the argument
relating to Count II. For the same reasons, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on Count IV.
(3)
In Count VI, the Plaintiff alleges Defendant Andrew Nelson was
deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of Dennis Adams when
Nelson failed to provide medical attention in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This deliberate indifference resulted in harm when Adams
committed suicide.
The Plaintiff asserts an individual claim against Andrew Nelson,
alleging he was deliberately indifferent to Dennis Adams’s serious medical
needs when he obtained no medical or mental health treatment while
incarcerated and Nelson knew Adams had a serious medical need. Nelson
never ordered or requested treatment for Adams throughout the time he
22
was housed at Christian County Correctional Center. The Plaintiff alleges
Nelson knew Adams was suicidal but did nothing to procure mental health
or medical treatment for Adams. This deliberate indifference resulted in
harm when Adams committed suicide.
The Plaintiff further asserts Defendant Nelson admitted it was his job
to “reach out to Christian County Mental Health” to have them provide
mental health. Nelson was aware that if inmates had medical issues, they
would need to go to Taylorville Memorial Hospital. Additionally, Nelson
was aware of the discharge instructions from Taylorville Memorial Hospital
as well as the two Crisis Assessments from Christian County Mental
Health. However, Nelson did nothing. Accordingly, the Plaintiff alleges
Nelson was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Dennis
Adams and summary judgment is appropriate as to Count VI.
The Court concludes there are genuine issues of material fact which
precludes the entry of summary judgment. The record shows that the
Defendants took certain measures when Adams was first incarcerated and
housed in the Padded Cell. The Plaintiff does not provide any evidence of
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an enhanced risk of suicide on November 4, 2011. The Defendants allege
Adams did not exhibit suicidal behavior in the days leading up to his
suicide. Moreover, they took reasonable measures in attempting to ensure
Adams’s safety. Cell checks were conducted in a timely manner and the
Defendants relied on staff observations, as well as Christian County Mental
Health Association’s approval, to conclude that cell checks be conducted
every 30 minutes, instead of every 15 minutes. The Defendants further
assert that court officials and the Christian County Mental Health
Association both had opportunities to further evaluate Adams or place him
in a mental health institution, but declined to do so.
For all of these reasons, there are factual disputes regarding whether
Andrew Nelson was deliberately indifferent in failing to provide medical
attention. Accordingly, summary judgment is not warranted on Count VI.
The Plaintiff’s motion as to Count VI will be denied.
C. Official capacity claims against Sheriff Bruce Kettlekamp
Counts I, III and V are claims against Sheriff Bruce Kettlekamp in his
official capacity. Counts I and III are conditions of confinement claims.
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Count V is a failure to provide medical attention claim.
In Count I, the Plaintiff asserts that the transfer of Dennis Adams out
of the Padded Cell without the aid, recommendation or advice of a mental
health professional violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count III, the
Plaintiff alleges Adams’s transfer out of the Isolation Cell violated the
Fourteenth Amendment for the same reasons. In Count V, the Plaintiff
asserts Sheriff Kettlekamp was deliberately indifferent to Adams’s health or
safety, which resulted in harm when Adams committed suicide.
“A suit against a governmental officer in his official capacity is really
a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent.” Franklin v.
Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 684 n.2 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, Ҥ 1983 suits
against sheriffs in their official capacities are in reality suits against the
county sheriff’s department.” Id. at 686. Accordingly, any claims against
Defendants Kettlekamp in his official capacity are actually claims against
the Christian County Sheriff’s Department.
It does not appear that the Plaintiff has specifically moved for
summary judgment as to Counts I, III and V. In any event, the claims
25
contained in those counts are duplicative of the individual capacity claims
asserted against Andrew Nelson in Counts II, IV and VI. For the reasons
discussed in considering those claims, the Plaintiff’s Motion as to Counts
I, III and V will be denied.
D. Monell claims and Christian County policy and transfer
In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the Supreme Court held that while municipalities can be found
liable under § 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable for § 1983 claims
based on a theory of respondeat superior. See id. at 690-91. To establish
it is entitled to summary judgment, the Plaintiff must show there is no
genuine dispute that the municipality was deliberately indifferent due to a
custom or policy which contributed to the injury. See Palmer v. Marion
County, 327 F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003).
“[T]here must be an
affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional
violation alleged.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823
(1985).
The Plaintiff notes that the entirety of the Christian County
26
Correctional Center’s “Jail Rules and Regulations” policy is as follows:
The Christian County Mental Health Center will be notified
immediately of any inmate who appears to be suicidal or in a
crisis state of mind. If an inmate is placed in suicide watch, the
types of supervision will be documented. A suicide watch can
only be terminated by the Jail Administrator, Chief Deputy or
Sheriff.
The Plaintiff also notes that both Sheriff Kettlekamp and Defendant
Nelson adopted the policy that “the Christian County Correctional Center
has only one Padded Cell at its disposal and housing therein is based on
immediate need.” The Plaintiff claims that this “immediate need” policy
is the inherent extension of the written policy which was found in the
Christian County Jail Rules and Regulations.
The Plaintiff alleges in Count VII that these policies were inadequate
and flawed and include a number of omissions. The written policy did not
address most of the basic components of a suicide prevention policy. The
inherent dangerousness of the policy is highlighted by the policy’s
allowance of the Jail Administrator, Chief Deputy or Sheriff to
independently assess suicidal inmates and determine when they were no
longer suicidal without ongoing assessment by medical and/or mental health
27
personnel. “Jail managers who decided to take no precautions against the
possibility of inmate suicide–to have no policy, for example no suicidewatch option–would be guilty of deliberate indifference in the relevant
sense.” Boncher v. Brown County, 272 F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 957 (1st Cir. 1992);
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 839 (11th Cir. 1990)). “[T]hey would be
ignoring a known and serious risk of death of persons under their control
for whose safety they are responsible.” Id. at 486.
The Plaintiff’s expert, Lindsay M. Hayes, states: “Jail staff should
never be placed in a position to determine when an inmate is no longer
suicidal and, consistent with the standard of care, such decisions should
only be made by medical and/or mental health personnel following an
assessment of suicide risk.”
Neither Jail Administrator Nelson, Chief
Deputy Bruce Engeling nor Sheriff Kettlekamp were mental health
professionals and qualified to determine whether or not an inmate was at
a continued risk for suicide. Moreover, Defendant Nelson had no prior
experience working in a correctional facility, nor did he have any prior
28
mental health training.
The Plaintiff further alleges that Christian County suicide prevention
policies and procedures were inherently dangerous because only one Padded
Cell and one Isolation Cell were designated to house suicidal inmates. The
Padded Cell had no sink, toilet or bunk. Mr. Hayes states that “the
standard of care is that, if utilized, a padded cell is normally intended for
use only up to a few hours until such time as the inmate can be moved to
another longer-term suicide-resistant cell.” Moreover, Dennis Adams was
housed in the Padded Cell from August 19 through August 31, 2011, which
was “an unconscionable length of time that required (because only one jail
officer was routinely on duty), a patrol officer from the street to return to
the [Christian County Correctional Center] and allow Mr. Adams to be
escorted out of the Padded Cell to use the toilet in another cell.”
The Plaintiff alleges the decision to only require two cells (one of
which is not suicide resistant) to house suicidal inmates created the
potential problem of determining other alternative housing placements if
more than one suicidal inmate was housed at the Christian County
29
Correctional Center.
That happened in this case when, according to
Defendant Nelson, Dennis Adams was removed from the Padded Cell on
August 31, 2011, because another suicidal inmate needed to be placed in
the cell. Nelson also removed Adams from the Isolation Cell on September
13, 2011 because another inmate needed to be placed in that cell for
disciplinary purposes. Regarding the August 31 relocation, Bruce Engeling,
the Chief Deputy, testified at his deposition that “[t]here’s no way to know
who’s the most suicidal out of two people. You’d have to do your best - your best judgment on it until Mental Health got there and they could
decide where - - who should be placed where.”
In Count VIII, the Plaintiff alleges that this policy, custom and/or
practice concerning the placement of inmates was the moving force behind
the death of Dennis Adams.
According to Lindsay Hayes, there were a number of omissions in
Christian County’s jail suicide prevention policy which deviated from the
standard of care, as follows:
[T]he policy failed to address required suicide prevention
training, as well as any description of topics to be addressed in
30
any suicide prevention training to its staff; failed to provide any
written procedure or guidance on which affirmative responses
to the intake screening process warranted referral to medical
and/or mental health personnel; failed to provide any written
procedure or guidance as to the suicide risk assessment process
utilized by either medical and/or mental health personnel, as
well as the reassessment process utilized by such personnel;
failed to provide any written procedure or guidance as to
whether the suicidal inmate should be placed in a suicideresistant cell; failed to provide any written procedure or
guidance regarding the multiple levels of observation utilized for
inmates commensurate with their level of suicide risk; failed to
provide any written procedure or guidance regarding those
personnel authorized to downgrade and/or discharge an inmate
from suicide precautions; failed to provide any written
procedure or guidance regarding treatment planning for suicidal
inmates, as well as follow-up assessments by medical and/or
mental health personnel following release from suicide
precautions; failed to provide any written procedure or guidance
regarding the proper emergency response to a suicide attempt
(including hanging); and failed to provide any written procedure
or guidance regarding the mortality review process following an
inmate suicide.
Mr. Hayes also noted that:
[T]he Christian County Sheriff’s Office had a contract to house
inmates for the U.S. Marshals Service. The U.S. Marshals
Service’s website has an abundance of listed resources to assist
contracting counties to establish and maintain a reasonable
suicide prevention program. It was apparent from this writer’s
review of the Christian County’s suicide prevention policy that
Defendant Christian County and Defendant Sheriff Bruce
Kettlekamp deliberately ignored the suicide prevention
31
guidelines as recommended by the U.S. Marshals Service.
The Plaintiff alleges nothing has changed since the death of Dennis Adams.
The Defendants still lack a suicide prevention cell. The hooks and other
protrusions are still present in the Isolation Cell.
The Defendants do not dispute the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
the constitutionality of the policy as it relates to the transfer of inmates and
specifically to the transfer of Dennis Adams in this case. They do not
respond to any of the opinions of the Plaintiff’s expert, Lindsay Hayes, who
stated that only medical or mental health professionals should determine
whether or not an inmate was a continued risk for suicide. Because the
Defendant has not responded to the Plaintiff’s allegations in Counts VII
and VIII which are based on Monell –and the Plaintiff has provided support
for those allegations–the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on
Counts VII and VIII.
E. Lack of policy for procurement of mental health/medical treatment
The Plaintiff alleges that the Christian County Sheriff’s Office had no
policy in place for the procurement of mental health and medical treatment
32
at the Christian County Correctional Center.
When a state imposes
imprisonment as a punishment for crime, it accepts the obligation to
provide persons in its custody with a medical care system that meets
minimal standards of adequacy. The “deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The jail’s obligation “included a duty
to provide psychiatric care” to a pretrial detainee as needed. See Rice ex.
Rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650, 671 (7th Cir.
2012).
The Plaintiff notes that the Christian County Sheriff’s Office relied
solely upon Christian County Mental Health to provide mental health
treatment to the inmates of the Christian County Correctional Center.
However, there was no contract between the Christian County Sheriff’s
Office and Christian County Mental Health. Moreover, the Christian
County Sheriff’s Office was solely responsible for initiating contact with
Christian County Mental Health.
In Count IX, the Plaintiff alleges that the policy was “grossly
33
inadequate and inherently flawed” in that it “failed to provide any written
procedure or guidance regarding treatment planning for suicidal inmates as
well as follow up assessments by medical and/or mental health personnel
following release from suicide precautions.” See Doc. No. 100, at 21.
Once again, the Defendants do not dispute the Plaintiff’s allegations with
respect to the lack of a policy in place for the procurement of mental health
and medical treatment at the Christian County Correctional Center. The
Plaintiff has supported its allegations with the opinion of Mr. Hayes, who
states that it was “reasonable to assume that policies and practices
deliberately allowing the jail administrator and other unqualified personnel,
including the Sheriff and Chief Deputy, to independently make decisions
regarding the discharge of an inmate from suicide precautions without
consultation or assessment from either medical or mental health staff was
inherently flawed and would ultimately result in suicide.” See Doc. No.
132-18, at 10-11. Because the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the lack of
or inadequacy of the policy as it related to the procurement of mental
health treatment at the Christian County’s Sheriff’s Office are not disputed
34
by the Defendants, the Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the
Monell claim against Christian County as alleged in Count IX.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment will be Allowed as to the Monell claims asserted in
Counts VII, VIII and IX. The issue of damages as to those counts will be
determined at trial.
The Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be Denied
as to Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI.
The jury trial will be bifurcated.
Ergo, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [d/e 131]
is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.
The Plaintiff’s Motion is ALLOWED as to Counts VII, VIII and IX.
The Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED as to Counts I, II, III, IV, V and
VI.
The Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Strike [d/e 139] is DENIED AS
MOOT.
35
The Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File an Amended Response to
the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [d/e 142] is ALLOWED.
The Defendants have filed the Amended Response [d/e 142-1].
The final pretrial conference remains set for April 7, 2017 at 2:00
p.m., in chambers.
ENTER: March 9, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge
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