Blakes v. Baker et al
Filing
87
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 75 is GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot, a nd this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/9/2016. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 09 March, 2016 10:34:55 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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DR. THOMAS BAKER, et al.
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Defendants. )
MICHAEL BLAKES,
13-3307
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Western Illinois Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. The matter comes before this Court for
ruling on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc.
75). The motion is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
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non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
Plaintiff is incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center
(“Western”). Defendants were all medical personnel at the prison:
Defendant Baker was a physician; Defendant Bradbury and
Defendant Still were licensed practical nurses (LPN). Plaintiff
alleged that these defendants failed to provide medical treatment for
wrist and lower back pain.
Plaintiff was transferred from Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”) to Western on June 29, 2011. At an initial health
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screening, Plaintiff reported that he did not have any current or
acute conditions and was not receiving medications. (Doc. 76-4 at
48). The records indicate that Plaintiff required a follow-up
examination for a previously removed ingrown toenail. Neither the
medical records from Menard, nor this screening indicate that
Plaintiff complained of wrist pain.
The medical records disclose that Plaintiff was examined by
the Defendants on four (4) occasions between Plaintiff’s arrival at
Western and August 29, 2013 (date lawsuit was filed). Defendant
Baker examined Plaintiff on three (3) of those occasions. On August
16, 2011, and September 26, 2011, Defendant Baker examined
Plaintiff for his ingrown toenail condition. (Doc. 76-4 at 52-53).
Plaintiff was prescribed antibiotics and Tylenol during the August
2011 examination. Plaintiff requested a renewal of his low bunk
permit, but Defendant Baker found no medical need for a low bunk
permit. On October 12, 2011, Defendant Baker examined Plaintiff
for gastrointestinal complaints and a request for a soy-free diet.
(Doc. 76-4 at 58). The medical records do not indicate that Plaintiff
complained about his wrists during these examinations.
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Defendant Bradbury examined Plaintiff on November 4, 2011,
for complaints of wrist pain. (Doc. 76-4 at 59-60). Plaintiff
complained of wrist pain and stated he needed x-rays and to see the
doctor. Plaintiff stated the injury occurred “a year or two ago”
during the time he was incarcerated at Menard. Defendant
Bradbury noted that Plaintiff was able to flex his left wrist during
the interaction and that the medical records did not disclose a prior
wrist injury. Plaintiff thereafter refused treatment.
The only alleged interaction with Defendant Still occurred on
September 12, 2011. This interaction is not documented in the
medical records. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Still called
Plaintiff to nurse sick call, Plaintiff complained of wrist pain, and
Defendant Still did not refer Plaintiff to see the doctor or provide
treatment.
After Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, a non-defendant nurse
examined Plaintiff for complaints of wrist pain. (Doc. 76-4 at 64).
The nurse treated Plaintiff with a prescription for Tylenol and a cold
pack. The nurse noted Plaintiff had full range of motion in his
wrists. No abnormalities were noted. The nurse did not refer
Plaintiff to see the doctor.
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X-rays were done on Plaintiff’s wrists in December 2013. (Doc.
76-5 at 9-10). Defendant Baker compared these x-rays to Plaintiff’s
x-rays from 2010, prior to the time Plaintiff stated he sustained the
wrist injury now in dispute. Defendant Baker noted an old, small
fracture on Plaintiff’s wrist. The same fracture appeared in both xrays. According to Defendant Baker, no other fractures appeared.
ANALYSIS
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care, the Plaintiff must show that the prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint of wrist and back
pain does not amount to a serious medical need. “An objectively
serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). In evaluating the seriousness of a medical
condition, the court evaluates several factors: (1) whether failure to
treat the condition would result in further significant injury or the
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unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain; (2) whether a reasonable
doctor or patient would find the alleged injury worthy of comment
or treatment; (3) the existence of a medical condition that
significantly affects daily activities; and, (4) the existence of any
chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364,
1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff argues his wrist and back pain were significant.
Whether this pain rose to the level that could be considered a
serious medical need is a question for the jury. Plaintiff’s
statements regarding his pain, if believed, could support a finding
that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need. See Cooper v.
Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) (subjective complaints of
pain, if believed by the trier of fact, could support a finding of a
serious medical need even if no other objective symptoms exist).
Next, Plaintiff must show that the Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference is more than
negligence, but does not require the plaintiff to show that the
defendants intended to cause harm. Mayoral v. Sheehan, 245 F.3d
934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). Liability attaches under the Eighth
Amendment when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive
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risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff asserts that Western officials gave him the runaround:
when Plaintiff informed medical staff of his wrist and back pain
issues, he was told to sign up for sick call. When he requested to
be signed up for sick call, nonmedical prison officials refused to
assist him, or nurses refused to see him. Nonetheless, the records
disclose that Plaintiff was seen by healthcare staff on 23 occasions
for various medical and dental issues between his arrival at
Western and the filing of this lawsuit. Plaintiff does not dispute
that he was seen by healthcare staff on these occasions, only that
healthcare staff failed to acknowledge and document his persistent
complaints of wrist and back pain. Even if Plaintiff’s assertions are
true, which the Court assumes at this stage in the proceedings,
Plaintiff’s claims fail against Defendant Bradbury and Defendant
Baker.
Defendant Bradbury examined Plaintiff for complaints of wrist
pain on November 4, 2011. Plaintiff told Defendant Bradbury that
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he had suffered a wrist injury approximately one year prior while
incarcerated at Menard. Defendant Bradbury reviewed Plaintiff’s
medical records and did not find any indication of a prior wrist
injury. This is consistent with Plaintiff’s version of the facts that
prison officials failed to document his wrist injury and complaints of
pain. Nonetheless, Defendant Bradbury did not have any verifiable
information regarding Plaintiff’s alleged wrist injury or any
indication of the September 2011 examination by Defendant Still
(discussed below). In addition, Defendant Bradbury noted that
Plaintiff appeared to be able to move his wrists and Plaintiff refused
treatment. Accordingly, the Court finds that no reasonable juror
could conclude that Defendant Bradbury was deliberately
indifferent.
Defendant Baker examined Plaintiff on three occasions.
Plaintiff asserts that he informed Defendant Baker of his wrist and
back pain on several occasions, including during these
examinations. The medical records reflect a complaint of back pain
during the August 2011 examination, but otherwise do not confirm
Plaintiff’s complaints of pain.
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Because Defendant Baker is a medical professional, his
treatment decisions are a matter of professional discretion with
which the courts will not interfere unless the evidence suggests that
“‘no minimally competent professional would have so responded
under those circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95
(7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982,
988 (7th Cir. 1998)). In other words, a medical professional is
deliberately indifferent only if “the decision by the professional is
such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”
Id. (quoting same).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Baker’s refusal to provide him
with an x-ray, and later alleged refusal to provide stronger pain
medication, constitute deliberate indifference. At the times
Defendant Baker examined Plaintiff, there was no indication in the
medical records that Plaintiff had ever complained about wrist pain,
nor was there an indication of a prior wrist injury. Defendant
Baker prescribed Plaintiff Tylenol during the first examination for
Plaintiff’s other complaints. During the second examination, there
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were no other complaints of wrist or back pain other than Plaintiff’s
previous request for a low bunk permit noted in the records.
Finally, during the October 2011 examination (the last before
Plaintiff filed suit), the medical records disclosed that Plaintiff had
been seen by nurses in healthcare on 10 separate occasions since
the previous examination without indication that Plaintiff
complained of wrist and back pain. Even if Plaintiff had complained
of wrist and back pain each time Defendant Baker examined him,
the Court cannot say that Defendant Baker’s actions in this case
were outside the bounds of accepted professional judgment,
especially in light of Plaintiff’s testimony that the pain was
intermittent. See Pl.’s Dep. 17:2-5 (The wrist pain is “kind of off
and on.”); Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
decision to forego diagnostic tests ‘is a classic example of a matter
for medical judgment.’” (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107)); Snipes v.
DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (mere disagreement with
the course of treatment, standing alone, is not sufficient to attach
constitutional liability).
Moreover, with regard to the low bunk permit issued to
Plaintiff at Menard, Defendant Baker was “free to make his own,
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independent medical determination as to the necessity of certain
treatments or medications,” and deference to a prior doctor’s
diagnosis is not required to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063,
1074 (7th Cir. 2012). Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable
juror could conclude that Defendant Baker was deliberately
indifferent.
Only Defendant Still remains. The parties dispute the
occurrence of an examination on September 12, 2011. Defendants
rely on the medical records, while Plaintiff asserts that nurse visits
often occur on an impromptu basis and are not otherwise
documented. Plaintiff provides several affidavits in support of this
contention. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s assertions as true.
Even so, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Still fail for the
reasons previously stated. At the time Defendant Still examined
Plaintiff, Plaintiff had been prescribed pain medication and the
medical records did not disclose a previous wrist injury at Menard.
Plaintiff’s claims that this examination occurred negates any claim
that Defendant Still refused his requests for sick call. Under
Plaintiff’s version of the facts, Defendant Baker would have already
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examined Plaintiff for wrist pain at the time of Defendant Still’s
examination. Nurses must “defer to treating physicians’
instructions and orders in most situations . . . [unless] it is
apparent that the physician’s order will likely harm the patient.”
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has
not provided any evidence that Defendant Baker’s treatment
decision was likely to cause harm to Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court
finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant Still
was deliberately indifferent.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [75] is
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot,
and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their
own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00
filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
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v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:
March 9, 2016.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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