Norris v. Ward et al

Filing 52

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED 40 . The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 5/27/2015. (MJ, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 29 May, 2015 03:31:14 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOHN V. NORRIS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SCOTT A. WARD, et al.
)
)
Defendants. )

13-3355

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings the present lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging claims for excessive force,
retaliation, and procedural due process. The matter is before the
Court for ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on
the grounds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata and
the statute of limitations. (Doc. 40). For the reasons discussed
below, the motion is granted on res judicata grounds.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 10, 2013. On December
18, 2013, the Court entered a text order requesting additional
documentation from Plaintiff for purposes of conducting a merit
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review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. When Plaintiff’s subsequent
incarceration made providing this information within a reasonable
amount of time impossible, the Court entered a merit review order
and allowed Plaintiff’s lawsuit to proceed on three alleged
constitutional violations: (1) excessive force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment; (2) retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment; and, (3) procedural due process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 7). After the Scheduling Order was
entered, the Defendants filed the Motion for Summary Judgment
now under consideration by the Court. (Doc. 40). The Plaintiff
subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 46), which the Court will interpret as a
response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon
review of the filings, the Court entered an Order dated March 5,
2015, requesting additional briefs on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s
claims were barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), as the applicability of the Heck doctrine could affect whether
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is now barred under res judicata. (Doc. 50).
Defendants filed a supplemental brief. (Doc. 51). The Plaintiff did
not.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
Plaintiff’s claims arise from a chain of events that occurred at
Logan Correctional Center (“Logan”) on or about August 9, 2011.
Plaintiff alleges he was issued a false disciplinary ticket after he
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threw a tray of food on the floor at Logan. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Simmons used excessive force after removing Plaintiff
from his cell. Plaintiff alleges that he was later convicted of the
charged disciplinary infraction, receiving a demotion to C-grade,
loss of privileges, and loss of good time credit. The punishment was
later reduced, and all of Plaintiff’s lost good time credit was
restored. After completing the prison grievance process, Plaintiff
sought expungement of the disciplinary tickets through a common
law writ of certiorari filed in Illinois state court in March 2012. The
writ was denied without oral argument on November 9, 2012.
Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on
October 10, 2013.
ANALYSIS
Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s claims are now barred under
the doctrine of res judicata because Plaintiff failed to bring his
§ 1983 claims contemporaneously with the state court Petition for
Common Law Writ of Certiorari. To determine the preclusive effect
of a state court decision, the federal courts must examine the law of
the state from which the decision arose. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
“Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give
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preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of
the State from which the judgment emerged would do so.” Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
Under Illinois law, “a final judgment on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions
between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of
action.” Hudson v. City of Chicago, 889 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ill. 2008)
(citation omitted). Res judicata bars claims that were actually
litigated, as well as, those which could have been, but were not. Id.
For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, three requirements must
be met: (1) there was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there was an identity of cause of
action; and (3) there was an identity of parties or their privies. Rein
v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334-35, 665 N.E.2d 1199,
1204 (1996) (citing Downing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 642
N.E.2d 456, 458 (1994)). A federal court, however, “can deny
preclusion if the state-court proceedings denied the parties a full
and fair opportunity to litigate by falling below the minimum
requirements for due process.” Garcia v. Village of Mount Prospect,
360 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2004).
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Plaintiff’s Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari
(“Petition”) filed in state court and the Complaint filed in federal
court reveal that both actions involve the same defendants, and,
thus, there exists an identity of parties. In addition, a final
adjudication was entered on the merits of Plaintiff’s state court
Petition on November 9, 2012. Neither party alleges that Plaintiff
appealed that decision.
With respect to the identity of causes of action, Illinois has
adopted the “transactional” test. Under this approach, “the
assertion of different kinds of theories of relief still constitutes a
single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to
the assertion of relief.” Id. at 637 (quoting River Park, Inc. v. City of
Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 891 (Ill. 1998). In other words, the
transactional approach “views claims in factual terms, focusing only
on the bounds of the transaction at issue, disregarding the number
of substantive theories, the variant forms of relief flowing from those
theories, and the variations in evidence needed to support those
theories.” Id.
In his Petition, Plaintiff provides a detailed account of the
events that transpired starting with the August 9, 2011 incident
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and continuing through the completion of the disciplinary hearing
and appeal to the Administrative Review Board. (Doc. 41-1).
Plaintiff’s Complaint filed in the present case contains a less
detailed description of the same events. (Doc. 1). Both pleadings,
however, specifically refer to disciplinary report no. 201103989/1PON as the footing upon which Plaintiff’s allegations now stand.
Compare (Doc. 41-1 at 3), and (Doc. 1 at 2). From there, in both
the Petition and the Complaint, the events Plaintiff describes differ
only in the level of specificity, the relief requested from each court,
and Plaintiff’s allegation in the federal complaint that the state
court issue was wrongly decided. Under the transactional approach
described above, these differences do not create a different cause of
action for res judicata purposes under Illinois law. Thus, all three
elements are present for res judicata to apply under Illinois law.
Illinois law “precludes the sequential pursuit not only of
claims actually litigated, but of those that could have been
litigated.” Garcia, 360 F.3d at 639 (citations omitted); Hudson, 889
N.E.2d at 213. So long as a plaintiff could have joined his claims
with the original cause of action, “then he had a full and fair

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opportunity to litigate those claims under Illinois law.” Garcia, 360
F.3d at 639.
As noted in this Court’s Order dated March 5, 2015, the
potential applicability of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, and
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644-48 (1997) (applying Heck to
prison discipline proceedings), could have affected the res judicata
analysis in the present case as Plaintiff’s causes of action under
§ 1983 would not accrue if a fact or the duration of Plaintiff’s
confinement were at issue and Plaintiff had not yet mounted a
successful challenge. Defendants concede, and the Court agrees,
the Plaintiff filed his Petition in state court at a time after Plaintiff’s
good time credits had been restored. Thus, Plaintiff was free to
bring his § 1983 claims at the time he filed his Petition for Common
Law Writ of Certiorari. Moreover, insofar as Plaintiff alleges causes
of action under both federal and state laws, nothing prevented the
Illinois courts from exercising jurisdiction over the federal claims.
See Garcia, 360 F.3d at 642 (claimant may join constitutional
claims under § 1983 with a request for administrative review in
circuit court); Alberty v. Daniel, 323 N.E.2d 110, 114 (Ill. Ct. App.
1974) (jurisdiction over § 1983 claims is not exclusive to federal
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courts). Here, Plaintiff made a decision to bring his claims in state
court, which he was free to do. But when strategic choices are
made, a plaintiff “must abide by the consequences of those
choices.” Garcia, 360 F.3d at 644 (citing Davis v. City of Chicago,
53 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 1995)). The Court finds that Plaintiff
could have joined his federal claims in his prior state court action,
but failed to do so. Therefore, under Illinois law, Plaintiff had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate his federal claims.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 40) is granted. Because Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by res judicata, the Court does not address the statute of
limitations issue.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
[40]. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment
in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is
terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs.
Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
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the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:

May 27, 2015

FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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