Connolly v. Clark et al
Filing
72
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: (1) Defendant Carter's Motion for Extension of Time 56 and Defendant Carters Motion to Drop Party 61 are GRANTED. Defendant Carter is dismissed from this lawsuit. Clerk is directed to terminate Defendant Carter. (2 ) Defendants' respective Motions to Strike 70 71 are DENIED. 3) Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 69 isDENIED. (4) Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 57 59 are GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions not addressed in this Order are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 fili ng fee. (5) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the Pla intiff will present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given an opportunity to s ubmit a statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district judge "can make areasonable assessment of the issue of good faith."); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an app eal that "a reasonable personcould supposehas some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 8/11/2016. (ME, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 15 August, 2016 01:03:46 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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GEORGIA CLARK, et al.
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Defendants. )
CARLOS CONNOLLY,
13-3361
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Danville Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need for events that allegedly occurred during his
incarceration at Logan Correctional Center. The matter comes
before this Court for ruling on the Supplemental Motions for
Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff and Defendants Clark and
Lercher (Docs. 58, 59, 69), and the Motion for Extension of Time
and Motion to Drop Party filed by Defendant Carter. (Doc. 62).
Page 1 of 11
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Defendant Carter’s Motions
Defendant Carter’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 56) is
retroactively granted. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, and
Defendant Carter filed the relevant document within the time frame
requested.
Defendant Carter filed a motion seeking the Court to drop him
as a party pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Doc. 62). Defendant Carter was added as a defendant
in this lawsuit because, at the time, he was the treating optometrist
at Plaintiff’s place of incarceration and the individual who could
ensure that any injunctive relief was carried out. See Text Order
entered March 14, 2014 (granting Plaintiff’s motion to add Dr.
Carter); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011)
(describing proper defendants where injunctive relief is sought).
Defendant Carter is no longer Plaintiff’s treating optometrist.
In addition, Plaintiff alleges in a subsequent motion that he has
since received the eyeglasses he sought through injunctive relief.
(Doc. 69 at 2). Accordingly, because any claim for injunctive relief
is now moot, Defendant Carter’s motion is granted.
Page 2 of 11
Defendants’ Motions to Strike
On March 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. 69). Defendants Clark and Lercher
filed respective motions to strike Plaintiff’s motion as untimely.
(Docs. 70, 71). By any interpretation, Plaintiff’s motion was filed
well after any dispositive motion deadline previously set in this
case. However, Plaintiff includes relevant information in his motion
that did not exist prior to the Court’s deadlines. Defendants’
respective motions to strike are denied. Plaintiff’s motion is
discussed below.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
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more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Logan
Correctional Center (“Logan”). Defendant Clark was a nurse at the
facility, and Defendant Lercher was the healthcare administrator.
Prior to arriving at the facility, Plaintiff had been prescribed
photochromic (transitions) lenses to treat his sensitivity to
extremely bright lights.
On October 26, 2011, Defendant Clark confiscated Plaintiff’s
wire-framed eyeglasses with photochromic lenses as they violated
prison security rules. Prior to taking the eyeglasses, Defendant
Clark confirmed that Plaintiff had another pair. Plaintiff later
requested and received an appointment with Dr. Davis, an
optometrist. Dr. Davis approved photochromic lenses in a plastic
frame on November 17, 2011. The decision to provide these lenses
Page 4 of 11
was referred to “collegial” review by another physician on December
23, 2011. On February 9, 2012, Dr. Davis opted to provide Plaintiff
with a “sun shield,” a thin piece of tinted plastic that fits inside
Plaintiff’s glasses, and indicated that the photochromic lenses were
no longer required. Defendant Clark issued Plaintiff the sun shield
on February 19, 2012.
R. Beard was a registered nurse at Logan Correctional Center
whose signature appears in the medical progress notes dated
November 17, 2011, December 23, 2011, and February 9, 2012. In
its Opinion entered September 16, 2015, the Court sought
clarification of R. Beard’s identity because it appeared that R.
Beard, not Dr. Davis, ordered photochromic lens for Plaintiff and
later opted for the sun shield eventually issued. As explained by
the Defendants, when a physician writes an order in the medical
records, the nurse executing the order will sign his or her name
under the physician’s signature to indicate that the order has been
carried out. Defendants identify the signature above R. Beard’s
name as belonging to Dr. Davis. Plaintiff does not dispute this.
Defendant Lercher’s name appears in the medical progress
notes on November 17, 2011 and February 9, 2012. Defendant
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Lercher asserts that her name was written in the notes by Dr.
Davis, but does not know why her name was included. Plaintiff
submitted a request regarding his eyeglasses to Defendant Lercher
on November 27, 2011. (Doc. 37 at 11). Plaintiff’s request was
forwarded to the eye clinic nurse for review.
The effectiveness of the sun shield as a substitute for
photochromic lens is unknown because Plaintiff refused to wear it.
Pl.’s Dep. 44:8-15. In February 2016, another optometrist at a
different facility issued Plaintiff a pair of eyeglasses with
photochromic lenses.
ANALYSIS
Inmates are entitled to adequate medical care under the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Id. at 105.
Claims of negligence, medical malpractice, or disagreement with a
prescribed course of treatment are not sufficient. McDonald v.
Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Pyles v. Fahim, 771
F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014), and Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d
675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)). Rather, liability attaches when “the
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official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Defendants argue first that Plaintiff did not suffer from an
objectively serious medical need. “An objectively serious medical
need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” King v.
Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations
omitted). Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his sensitivity to light and
the fact that Plaintiff was previously prescribed photochromic
lenses is sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Plaintiff
suffered from a serious medical need.
Defendant Lercher, as the healthcare administrator, was not
authorized to diagnose and treat patients, nor was she a physician.
Her role was administrative, and, therefore, she was entitled to
defer to the judgment of the medical staff with regard to Plaintiff’s
treatment. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010)
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(nonmedical prison officials “are entitled to defer to the judgment of
jail health professionals” so long as the inmate’s complaints are not
ignored).
Plaintiff alleges that he told Defendant Lercher about Dr.
Davis’ orders for plastic-framed eyeglasses, but Plaintiff does not
provide the dates of these conversations. Plaintiff made a request to
Defendant Lercher shortly after the plastic frames were prescribed
and that request was promptly forwarded to the eye clinic where
Plaintiff was receiving treatment. The medical records contain no
specific order that Defendant Lercher return Plaintiff’s wire-rimmed
eyeglasses or any indication that Defendant Lercher even had the
authority to do so. Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable
juror could conclude that Defendant Lercher was deliberately
indifferent.
Defendant Clark was the prison official who originally
confiscated Plaintiff’s wire-rimmed glasses. Plaintiff does not
dispute that the wire-rimmed glasses were considered contraband.
Pl.’s Dep. 49:4-6 (“I think in general now it’s becoming a thing
where [wire-rimmed eyeglasses are] considered probably
contraband in most facilities.”).
Page 8 of 11
At the time these eyeglasses were taken, the record does not
suggest that Defendant Clark was aware that Plaintiff faced a
substantial risk of harm if he did not have eyeglasses with
photochromic lenses, nor did Defendant Clark take the eyeglasses
without first confirming that Plaintiff had another pair. Once Dr.
Davis prescribed different eyewear, Defendant Clark was required to
follow Dr. Davis’ orders and, therefore, could not have returned
Plaintiff’s wire-rimmed frames. Berry, 604 F.3d at 443 (Nurses
must “defer to treating physicians’ instructions and orders in most
situations . . . [unless] it is apparent that the physician’s order will
likely harm the patient.”).
In addition, R. Beard was the nurse who indicated that Dr.
Davis’ orders had been followed on November 17, 2011, December
23, 2011, and February 9, 2012. Any failure to follow through on
Dr. Davis’ orders for plastic-framed eyeglasses with photochromic
lens, therefore, cannot be attributed to Defendant Clark. Defendant
Clark provided the sun shield to Plaintiff on February 19, 2012, per
Dr. Davis’ orders, but no plausible inference exists that she was
responsible for Plaintiff’s subsequent refusal to wear them.
Page 9 of 11
Accordingly, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that Defendant Clark was deliberately indifferent.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff alleges in his Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 69) that an optometrist at Danville has recently provided him
with eyeglasses with photochromic lenses. This event, however,
does not have any relevance to the issues presented as they relate
to Defendant Clark and Defendant Lercher.
Dr. Davis prescribed the sun shield to Plaintiff in lieu of
photochromic lenses. Defendants were then required to follow
those orders, though the medical progress notes show that R. Beard
indicated the orders were followed. Construed in the light most
favorable to the Defendants, no reasonable juror could conclude
that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
motion is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendant Carter’s Motion for Extension of Time [56] and
Defendant Carter’s Motion to Drop Party [61] are
GRANTED. Defendant Carter is dismissed from this
lawsuit. Clerk is directed to terminate Defendant Carter.
2) Defendants’ respective Motions to Strike [70][71] are
DENIED.
Page 10 of 11
3) Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [69] is
DENIED.
4) Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment [57][59] are
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed in this Order are denied as
moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear
their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the
$350.00 filing fee.
5) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:
August 11, 2016.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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