Jackson v. Young et al
Filing
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MERIT REVIEW OPINION: Plaintiff Martel E. Jackson has 21 days from the date of this Order to file an Amended Complaint that complies with the dictates of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint that complies with the dictates of this Order, the Court will dismiss this case for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 11/14/2013. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 14 November, 2013 11:37:29 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MARTEL E. JACKSON,
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) No.: 13-3367-SEM-BGC
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Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD YOUNG and
ASSISTANT WARDEN BROWN,
Defendants.
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court for a merit review, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of Plaintiff Martel E. Jackson’s claims.
I.
MERIT REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, the Court is
required to carefully screen a complaint filed by a plaintiff who
seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or a portion thereof, if the plaintiff has raised claims that
are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a
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defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The test for
determining if an action is frivolous or without merit is whether the
plaintiff can make a rational argument on the law or facts in
support of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A complaint fails to state a claim for relief if the complaint does not
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true and liberally construes them in plaintiff’s favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. July 3, 2013).
Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8;
Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st
Cir. 2012)(holding that, in order to determine if a complaint states a
plausible claim, the court must take non-conclusory, nonspeculative facts as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the
pleader’s favor, and isolate and ignore statements that simply
rehash claim elements or offer only legal labels and conclusions).
Instead, sufficient facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief
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that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d
418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation omitted).
II.
ANALYSIS
Jackson alleges that, for a period of ten days in June 2012,
the conditions of his confinement at the Western Illinois
Correctional Center in Mt. Sterling, Illinois constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of his Eight Amendment rights.
During this time, Jackson was placed in disciplinary segregation.
Jackson claims that, although the temperatures during this ten-day
period were in the 90 degrees range and although the heat index
was 100 degrees, Defendants Young and Brown refused to allow
Jackson to have his fan, failed to provide him with ice, and refused
to grant his request to be released from disciplinary segregation.
Brown claims that these conditions violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and he asks
the Court to award him compensatory damages of $20,000.00.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he
Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions;’
it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’” Farmer v. Brennan,
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511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This means that “an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did
not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as
an infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. Accordingly, “a prison
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. This type
of deliberate indifference “implies at a minimum actual knowledge
of impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable
refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant’s
failure to prevent it.” Duckworth v. Frazen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th
Cir. 1985). “[M]ere negligence or even gross negligence does not
constitute deliberate indifference,” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,
590 (7th Cir. 1996), and it is not enough to show that a prison
official merely failed to act reasonably. Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d
1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds, Haley v.
Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996).
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In the instant case, Jackson has failed to state a claim under
the Eighth Amendment upon which relief can be granted.
“[R]outine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society,” and so, “extreme deprivations
are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)(internal quotations
omitted). Indeed, “the Constitution . . . does not mandate
comfortable prisons.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). If
prison conditions are merely “restrictive and even harsh, they are
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 349 (1981). Thus,
prison conditions rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation
only when they “involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain.” Id. at 347.
Jackson has not alleged the type of conduct by Defendants
that has deprived him of the minimally civilized measure of life’s
necessities. Jackson alleged that the heat only lasted for a ten day
period in the summer of 2012. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1295 (11th Cir. 2004)(“[T]he Eighth Amendment is concerned with
both the ‘severity’ and the ‘duration’ of the prisoner’s exposed to
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inadequate cooling and ventilation.”); Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d
640, 643 (7th Cir. 1997)(“[I]t is not just the severity of the cold, but
the duration of the condition, which determines whether the
conditions of confinement are unconstitutional.”). Jackson does
not allege any harm resulting from the heat; instead, he only alleges
that, one day, he felt “woozy” and “light-headed.” Vasquez v. Frank,
2008 WL 3820466, * 2-3 (7th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008)(holding that
ventilation that allegedly caused dizziness, migraines, nasal
congestion, nose bleeds and difficulty breathing did not rise to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation); Jasman v. Schmidt, 2001
WL 128430, * 2 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2001)(rejecting a prisoner’s
complaint about poor ventilation where plaintiff failed to allege
harm caused by the ventilation). Those allegations are insufficient
to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. Chandler, 379 F.3d
at 1290-98 (citing cases and concluding that a ventilation system
that allowed summer temperatures to average eighty-five or eightysix degrees during the day and eighty degrees at night was not
sufficiently extreme to violate the Eighth Amendment where such
temperatures were expected and tolerated by the general public in
Florida).
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Jackson has alleged uncomfortable conditions, but he has not
alleged a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. E.g., Strope v.
Sebelius, 2006 WL 2045840, * 2 (10th Cir. July 24, 2006)(“Mr.
Strope claims that the prison lacks adequate ventilation, and that
fans are necessary to control the ‘excessively hot’ temperature and
to provide ventilation. He further asserts that the high
temperatures make it hard to sleep. Although these conditions are
no doubt uncomfortable, we conclude that Mr. Strope’s allegations
are insufficient to state a claim of violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”); Deal v. Cole, 2013 WL 1190635, * 2 (W.D.N.C. Mar.
22, 2013)(“Plaintiff’s allegations of cold air in his cell, without more,
are not sufficiently objectively serious to state a claim under the
Eighth Amendment.”); Cameron v. Howes, 2010 WL 3885271, * 9
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2010)(dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for failing to
allege extreme deprivation as a result of inadequate ventilation
causing high temperatures in the cells).
The Court cannot say at this point, however, that any
amendment to Jackson’s Complaint would be futile. Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 15. Accordingly, the Court will give Jackson 21 days within
which to file an Amended Complaint. Should Jackson fail to file an
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Amended Complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order and
fails to file an Amended Complaint that complies with the dictates
of this Order, the Court will dismiss this case for failure to state a
cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1)
Plaintiff Martel E. Jackson has 21 days from the date of
this Order to file an Amended Complaint that complies with the
dictates of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint
that complies with the dictates of this Order, the Court will dismiss
this case for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
ENTER: 11/14/2013
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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