Johnson v. Goodman et al
Filing
57
OPINION (See Written Opinion): Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED 42 47 . The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of all Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings on the Court'scalendar are vacated. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should identify the issues Plaintiff will present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c). Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins on 5/26/2015. (VM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 26 May, 2015 01:37:47 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ELZIE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELI GOODMAN, et al.
Defendants.
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13-cv-3368
OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Centralia Correctional Center,
filed the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an Eighth Amendment violation
for inadequate medical care he received while incarcerated at Jacksonville Correctional Center.
Each Defendant subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 42, 47). The
motions have been fully briefed by each side, and the matter is now before the Court for ruling.
The motions are granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. SMS Demag Aktiengesellschaft v. Material Scis.
Corp., 565 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2009). All inferences drawn from the facts must be construed
in favor of the non-movant. Moore v. Vital Prods., Inc., 641 F.3d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 2011). To
survive summary judgment, the “nonmovant must show through specific evidence that a triable
issue of fact remains on issues on which he bears the burden of proof at trial.” Warsco v.
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Preferred Technical Grp., 258 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). If the evidence on record could not lead a reasonable jury to find for the
non-movant, then no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1997). At the
summary judgment stage, the court may not resolve issues of fact; disputed material facts must
be left for resolution at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a prisoner incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections. Doc. 1.
In October 2012, Plaintiff was transferred to Jacksonville Correctional Center (“Jacksonville”), a
prison facility where both Defendants are employed. Pl. Dep. 15:19-16:2. Defendant Goodman
is the medical director and the physician responsible for providing medical treatment to inmates
at the facility. Doc. 47-2 at 1, ¶ 3. Defendant Sudbrink is the Healthcare Unit Administrator.
Doc. 43-2 at 1, ¶ 1.
Prior to his transfer to Jacksonville, Plaintiff was prescribed medication to treat
hypertension, a condition more commonly referred to as high blood pressure. Pl. Dep. 13:7-11.
According to Plaintiff, he had been taking this medication for a long period of time. Id. 13:2-6.
Defendant Goodman first examined Plaintiff in January 2013 for flu-like symptoms. Doc. 47-2
at 3-4, ¶¶ 15-16. At that time, Plaintiff was admitted to the infirmary and his high blood pressure
medication was continued. Id. at 4, ¶ 16. In April 2013, Defendant Goodman discontinued
Plaintiff’s prescription for high blood pressure medication based upon three (3) consecutive
blood pressure readings indicating that Plaintiff’s blood pressure was within the normal range,
and had been for the previous three months. Id. at 5, ¶ 22. Furthermore, in April 2013, Plaintiff
denied symptoms of high blood pressure. Id. at 4, ¶ 21.
Page 2 of 7
Upon learning that his blood pressure medication had been discontinued, Plaintiff refused
further medical treatment from Defendant Goodman several times from May 2013 through
August 2013, including Defendant Goodman’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s blood pressure
be monitored closely immediately following the discontinuation of the medication. Doc. 48 at
16-29; Doc. 47-2 at 5, ¶ 27. Plaintiff, however, provided two blood pressure readings within that
timeframe, both times indicating that his blood pressure was within a normal range. Doc. 48 at
19, 26.
During the relevant timeframe, Defendant Sudbrink was the Healthcare Unit
Administrator at Jacksonville. Doc. 43-2 at 1, ¶ 1. She is not a physician. Id. at 1, ¶ 3. Her
responsibilities included overseeing the daily operations and functioning of the healthcare unit.
Id. ¶ 2. Defendant Sudbrink is not trained or licensed to diagnose patients, prescribe
medications, or discontinue a prescribed medicine. Id. In September 2013, Defendant Sudbrink
investigated concerns the Plaintiff had raised in a grievance regarding his medical care. Id. at 2,
¶ 5. As part of that investigation, Defendant Sudbrink reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and
saw nothing that would indicate that Plaintiff’s medical care was inadequate or inappropriate. Id.
¶ 6. Shortly thereafter, in October 2013, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit. Doc. 1.
ANALYSIS
To implicate a violation of the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical care, the
Plaintiff must allege that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). A medical condition is serious
“where the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373
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(7th Cir.1997) (citation omitted), “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention.” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted). Hypertension meets this definition, and the fact that Plaintiff had been
previously prescribed medication for this condition is enough for the Court to infer that Plaintiff,
at the time he came under Defendant Goodman’s care, suffered from an objectively serious
medical need. Nonetheless, according to the medical records submitted, Plaintiff’s blood
pressure fell within normal ranges on five (5) separate occasions over an 8 month period
beginning in January 2013, both before and after Defendant Goodman’s decision to discontinue
the prescription medication. Based on these records, Defendants argue that Plaintiff never
suffered from an objectively serious medical need. Even if Plaintiff did, the Defendants argue,
the Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The Court
agrees with the latter argument.
Deliberate indifference is more than negligence, but does not require the plaintiff to show
that the defendants intended to cause harm. Mayoral v. Sheehan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.
2001). Liability attaches under the Eighth Amendment when “the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The denial of prescription medication can give rise to a constitutional claim for deliberate
indifference. To prevail, a plaintiff must provide “evidence that the failure caused injury or a
serious risk of injury.” Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013). “[T]here is no
tort—common law, statutory, or constitutional—without injury, actual or at least probabilistic.”
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Id. The Court acknowledges that the failure to treat high blood pressure could have dire,
possibly fatal, consequences, but the evidence in this case shows that Plaintiff’s blood pressure
remained within a normal range after Defendant Goodman discontinued Plaintiff’s medications,
and Plaintiff suffered no ill effects thereafter. Any serious risk of harm that may have occurred
was mitigated by Defendant Goodman’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s blood pressure be
monitored during the time period immediately following the decision to adjust Plaintiff’s
treatment, a preventative step that Plaintiff refused.1
The real issue asserted by the Plaintiff is a disagreement with Defendant Goodman’s
decision to discontinue the prescription medication. See Pl. Dep. 55:11-12 (“All [Defendant
Goodman] had to do was prescribe the medication, and we probably wouldn’t be here today.”).
Insofar as Plaintiff disagrees with this decision, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that a mere
disagreement with the course of treatment, standing alone, does not constitute a claim for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir.
1996) (citations omitted). Outside of this disagreement, there is no evidence to suggest that
Defendant Goodman intentionally ignored a known risk of harm to the Plaintiff. Therefore,
based upon these facts, a reasonable juror could not find that Defendant Goodman acted with
deliberate indifference.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sudbrink was deliberately indifferent because she
failed to intervene with Defendant Goodman’s medical decisions. As mentioned above,
Defendant Sudbrink is not a physician. Courts in this Circuit have been reluctant to impose
constitutional liability upon nonmedical prison officials in cases where the official deferred to
the judgment of the medical staff. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010)
1
As Plaintiff explained: “I refused – When I got over to the health care unit, if it was Dr. Goodman that I had to
see, I was refusing [medical treatment]. If it was any treatment that he had ordered, I was refusing that, also.” Pl.
Dep. 47:18-21.
Page 5 of 7
(nonmedical prison officials “are entitled to defer to the judgment of jail health professionals” so
long as the inmate’s complaints are not ignored (citations omitted)); Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d
516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008) (no deliberate indifference where nonmedical prison official investigated
inmate’s complaints and referred then to medical providers who could be expected to address the
concerns); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (no deliberate indifference where
nonmedical prison official referred inmate complaints to medical providers). As the court in
Greeno explained:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ... a non-medical prison official
will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This
follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison. Inmate health and
safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various aspects of inmate life
among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a non-medical
prison official liable in a case where a prisoner was under a physician's care
would strain this division of labor.
Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)). In other
words, “the law encourages non-medical security and administrative personnel at jails and
prisons to defer to the professional medical judgments of the physicians and nurses treating the
prisoners in their care without fear of liability for doing so.” Berry, 604 F.3d at 440.
Defendant Sudbrink, as an administrator at the jail, was entitled to rely upon the medical
judgment of Defendant Goodman. There is no evidence that Plaintiff’s medical conditions were
ignored, nor is there any evidence to suggest that Plaintiff was denied treatment at any time.
Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could find that Defendant Sudbrink acted with
deliberate indifference.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and that both Defendants are entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Defendants’ respective Motions
for Summary Judgment are granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED [42][47]. The Clerk
of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of all Defendants and against
Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with
the parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings on the Court’s
calendar are vacated.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should identify the issues Plaintiff will present
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c).
ENTERED: May 26, 2015.
_____s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins______________
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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