Fifer v. Sangamon County Sheriff Office et al
Filing
39
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 08/19/2015. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED 33 . Clerk is directed to dismiss Defendants Hammitt, Abraham, and Williams from this case with prejudice. (2) The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Defendant Guy, the sole remaining defendant, as it relates to Plaintiff's claim of excessive force. Therefore, this case shall proceed to jury trial solely on that issue. (3) A final pretrial conference is scheduled for March 21, 2016 at 3 p.m. The Plaintiff shall appear by video conference and the Defendants' attorney(s) shall appear in person before the court sitting in Springfield, Illinois. The clerk is to issue a writ for the Plaintiff's participation in the video conference. (4) The Plaintiff and Defendants shall appear in person at trial. (5) A jury trial is scheduled for April 12-14, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. at the U.S. Courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. No writs to issue at this time.(DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 19 August, 2015 03:54:57 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MARCUS BRENT FIFER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SANGAMON COUNTY,
)
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al.
)
)
Defendants. )
13-3422
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Sangamon County Jail, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional violations for excessive force
and deliberate indifference to a serious medical care. The matter
comes before the Court for ruling on the motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants Abraham, Hammitt, and Williams.
(Doc. 33). The motion is granted.
FACTS
Plaintiff was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease and
chronic sciatica arising from a vehicle collision in 2008 and a fall in
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2012. Prior to Plaintiff’s incarceration, the back pain arising from
these injuries was treated with anti-inflammatory medication
(corticosteroids) and various forms of pain killers, including overthe-counter drugs and prescription narcotics. According to
Plaintiff, back surgery was recommended.
On or about November 18, 2013, Plaintiff was arrested and
jailed in the Sangamon County Jail. Between November 21, 2013
and December 7, 2013, Plaintiff was examined by medical staff at
the jail for complaints of back pain and other ailments on at least
three (3) occasions: November 21; November 23; and, November
26. At each of these visits, Plaintiff complained of back pain and
was prescribed either Motrin or Tylenol, common over-the-counter
medications, for the pain. (Docs. 33-7 at 10, 13, 15).
In the morning of December 7, 2013, Plaintiff submitted
several medical requests complaining of back pain and
psychological issues related to the back pain. The requests were
forwarded to the medical department. At approximately 11:45 a.m.,
Defendant Hammitt, a nurse at the jail, was called to Plaintiff’s cell
block after Plaintiff had pounded on the control room window and
then collapsed to the floor. Upon arrival, she observed Plaintiff
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lying on the floor complaining of severe back pain, though Plaintiff’s
vital signs and movements were not consistent with those usually
observed when someone is suffering from extreme pain. Based on
this, Defendant Hammitt opined that Plaintiff was malingering and
not experiencing the pain of which he complained. In addition,
Defendant Hammitt observed that Plaintiff’s range of motion and
reflexes were within normal limits. Nonetheless, Plaintiff was taken
to the high risk area of the jail for observation by mental health
staff given his self-disclosed history of psychological issues and
then-current complaints of psychological distress. No pain
medication was ordered.
Plaintiff was subsequently examined by Defendant Abraham, a
physician at the jail, on December 9, 2013. After the examination,
Defendant Abraham did not believe that pain medication was
necessary at that time based upon his examination and the notes
from December 7, 2013. Therefore, no pain medication was
ordered, but Plaintiff’s pre-incarceration medical files were ordered
for purposes of Defendant Abraham’s review. Defendant Abraham
did not interact with Plaintiff again until after the initiation of this
lawsuit on December 27, 2013.
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Plaintiff’s complaints of back pain continued. On December
17, 2013, Defendant Williams, a physician’s assistant, examined
Plaintiff. Despite Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, Plaintiff’s vital signs
remained within normal limits, and all physical signs Defendant
Williams observed were indicative of a person who was malingering.
Thus, Defendant Williams ordered that Plaintiff continue to be
observed, but did not order any pain medication. Defendant
Williams did not examine Plaintiff again until after Plaintiff filed this
lawsuit.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on December 27, 2013, alleging
that jail medical staff provided inadequate medical care during the
month of December 2013. Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend
his Complaint, and, therefore, the Court will consider only those
records relevant to the time period in Plaintiff’s Complaint for
purposes of this ruling. Furthermore, there is no dispositive motion
pending before the Court as it relates to Plaintiff’s allegations of
excessive force. Except as provided below, the Court will not
address those allegations.
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As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Mayoral v.
Sheahan, 245 F.2d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). Despite this
distinction, there exists “little practical difference between the two
standards.” Id. (quoting Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th
Cir. 2000)). To succeed on a constitutional claim for inadequate
medical care, the Plaintiff must show that the prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Deliberate indifference is more
than negligence but does not require the plaintiff to show that the
defendants intended to cause harm. Mayoral, 245 F.3d at 938.
Liability attaches when “the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not suffer from a serious
medical need because pain associated with Plaintiff’s condition did
not reach a level that could be considered serious and typically only
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occurs intermittently in patients with a similar condition. “An
objectively serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by
a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention.” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations omitted). In determining the seriousness of a
medical condition, the court evaluates several factors: (1) whether
failure to treat the condition would result in further significant
injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain; (2) whether
a reasonable doctor or patient would find the alleged injury worthy
of comment or treatment; (3) the existence of a medical condition
that significantly affects daily activities; and, (4) the existence of any
chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364,
1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff suffers from
degenerative disc disease. Although the disease is often
asymptomatic, Plaintiff was receiving consistent medical treatment
for this condition prior to his present incarceration, and Plaintiff
indicates that surgery was recommended by at least one treating
physician. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that Defendant
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Abraham recognized at least the possibility of surgical treatment in
his initial interaction with the Plaintiff. Pl. Dep. 104:15-17. Also,
Plaintiff consistently asserted that the pain he experienced was
constant, not intermittent. If all reasonable inferences are drawn in
a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could conclude
that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need.
With regard to medical professionals at the jail, the treatment
of that condition is a matter of professional discretion with which
the courts will not interfere unless the evidence suggests that “‘no
minimally competent professional would have so responded under
those circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th
Cir. 1998)). In other words, a medical professional is deliberately
indifferent only if “the decision by the professional is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”
Id. (quoting same). Within these bounds, a prison medical
professional “is free to make his own, independent medical
determination as to the necessity of certain treatments or
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medications,” and deference to a prior doctor’s diagnosis is not
necessary to survive constitutional scrutiny. Holloway v. Delaware
Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2012). Generally
speaking, nurses must “defer to treating physicians’ instructions
and orders in most situations . . . [unless] it is apparent that the
physician’s order will likely harm the patient.” Berry v. Peterman,
604 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010).
There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical
condition, even when considering the fact that Plaintiff did not
receive pain medication during the month of December 2013. At
the time that Defendant Hammitt examined Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s
prescription for pain medication had been expired for approximately
six (6) days. (Doc. 33-8 at 4-6) (Plaintiff’s medication records for
December 2013). During that time, there is no evidence to suggest
that Plaintiff had complained of pain, or otherwise requested
medical assistance or pain medication. Id. at 32-39 (Plaintiff’s
Inmate Request forms for December 2013). When considered in
light of Defendant Hammitt’s observations that Plaintiff’s vital signs
and range of motion were within normal limits and her assessment
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that Plaintiff’s movements were not consistent with an individual
suffering extreme pain, a reasonable juror could not conclude that
Defendant Hammitt’s actions to take Plaintiff to a high-risk,
frequently monitored area of the jail and then submit requests for
Plaintiff to be examined by a doctor was deliberately indifferent. In
addition, Defendant Hammitt, as a nurse, was not authorized to
prescribe pain medication. While she could have dispensed it if a
doctor, physician’s assistant, or advanced nurse practitioner had
ordered it, there were no such orders in effect.
Plaintiff was examined on two other occasions during
December 2013: by Defendant Abraham on December 9, 2013; and,
by Defendant Williams on December 17, 2013. During each
examination, Plaintiff’s vital signs were within normal limits and
atypical of an individual experiencing significant pain. Following
his examination, Defendant Abraham ordered Plaintiff’s medical
records for historical purposes and that Plaintiff remain in the high
risk area for observation. During Defendant Williams’ examination,
Plaintiff displayed physical signs indicative of an individual who
was malingering. Neither Defendant prescribed pain medication.
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The treatment of any injury often includes several variables,
including pain management, which the Court must view in the
totality of the circumstances. Cf. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,
591 (7th Cir. 1996) (removal of ingrown toenail involves several
minor medical decisions which must be viewed as a whole). These
decisions are a “classic example of matters for medical judgment.”
Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107). While a significant delay in
administering effective medical treatment could support a finding of
deliberate indifference, see Berry, 604 F.3d at 435, the delay must
be measured in light of the “seriousness of the condition and the
ease of providing treatment.” McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636,
640 (7th Cir. 2010). At the time the Defendants examined the
Plaintiff, they were still in the process of determining the
seriousness of Plaintiff’s condition and whether the pain that
Plaintiff alleged was caused by a physical or psychological malady.
Without Plaintiff’s historical medical records, the Defendants’
assessments were limited in scope to Plaintiff’s complaints of pain
and the physical observations that conflicted therewith. On this
basis, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that
the conservative course of treatment chosen fell outside the bounds
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of accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, especially
when there is no evidence in the record that the Defendants did not
actually base their decisions on such. While Plaintiff may have
disagreed with this treatment, a mere disagreement with the course
of treatment, standing alone, is not sufficient to attach
constitutional liability. Snipes, 95 F.3d at 592.
Therefore, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material
fact exists as to the claims of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need against Defendants Hammitt, Abraham, and Williams,
and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED [33]. Clerk is directed to dismiss Defendants
Hammitt, Abraham, and Williams from this case with
prejudice.
2) The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to Defendant Guy, the sole remaining
defendant, as it relates to Plaintiff’s claim of excessive
force. Therefore, this case shall proceed to jury trial
solely on that issue.
3) A final pretrial conference is scheduled for
March 21, 2016 at 3 p.m.
. The Plaintiff shall
appear by video conference and the Defendants’
attorney(s) shall appear in person before the court
sitting in Springfield, Illinois. The clerk is to issue a
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writ for the Plaintiff’s participation in the video
conference.
4) The Court will send out proposed jury instructions and
intends to ask the standard voir dire questions
published on the Court’s website
(ilcd.uscourts.gov/local rules and orders/orders and
rules by Judge/Judge Myerscough/General Voir Dire
Procedure). By
March 7, 2016
, the parties
shall file: 1) an agreed proposed pretrial order; 2)
alternate or additional jury instructions (no duplicates);
3) motions in limine; and, (4) additional voir dire
questions (not duplicative of the Court’s). All proposed
instructions shall be clearly marked, identifying the
party, the number, and whether the instruction is
additional or alternate (i.e., Pl.'s 1, additional; Pl.'s 2,
alternate to Court's 3).
5) The Plaintiff and Defendants shall appear in person at
trial. Inmates of the Sangamon County Jail or Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) who are not parties to
this case shall appear by video conference and
Sangamon County Jail employees who are not parties
may also appear by video conference at trial. Other
nonparty witnesses may appear by video at the court’s
discretion. Therefore, the proposed pretrial order must
include: (1) the name, inmate number and place of
incarceration for each inmate to be called as a witness;
(2) the name and place of employment for each
Sangamon County Jail employee to be called as a
witness; and, (3) the names and addresses of any
witnesses who are not inmates or employees for whom a
party seeks a trial subpoena. The party seeking the
subpoena must provide the necessary witness and
mileage fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45.
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6) A jury trial is scheduled for
April 12-14, 2016 at
9:00 a.m. at the U.S. Courthouse in Springfield, Illinois.
No writs to issue at this time.
ENTERED:
August 19, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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