Johnson v. Central Management Services

Filing 16

OPINION entered by Judge Richard Mills on 10/29/2014. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8 ) is DENIED. This action is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins for the purpose of scheduling a discovery conference. (DM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 29 October, 2014 02:54:43 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
CHERYL L. JOHNSON,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CENTRAL MANAGEMENT
SERVICES,
Defendant.

NO. 14-3001

OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Cheryl L. Johnson filed a Complaint wherein she has asserted
a number of employment discrimination claims. Pending before the Court
is the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
I.
Plaintiff Cheryl L. Johnson filed a Pro Se Complaint. Subsequently,
the Court appointed Counsel for the Plaintiff.
In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges she began her employment with
the Department of Central Management Services (CMS), the Defendant,
on November 1, 2006. The Plaintiff claims she experienced discrimination

based on her race and gender.

Therefore, she filed a charge of

discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) and
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on April 11, 2012.
The Plaintiff further asserts that on August 7, 2012, her employment with
CMS was terminated.
On October 17, 2012, she filed a charge of retaliation with IDHR and
EEOC. The Plaintiff claims that after filing the retaliation charge, she was
coerced into withdrawing her first EEOC charge when she was promised a
job at the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH). Despite her
withdrawal of the charge, the Plaintiff did not receive the promised job.
The Plaintiff alleges she would not have withdrawn the charge had she
known CMS would prevent her from obtaining a job with the IDPH.
The Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, alleging she was discriminated against based on her sex and race and,
further, that she was retaliated against for engaging in protected activity.
The Defendant contends the Plaintiff’s Complaint should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

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can be granted. Additionally, the Defendant alleges the Plaintiff has waived
her claims by signing an express agreement, which is attached to the
Complaint as a Resolution Prior to Arbitration.
The Defendant further asserts that any claim based on a contract
should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because such matters should
be brought in the Illinois Court of Claims. However, the Plaintiff states she
is not asserting a breach of contract claim.
II.
At this stage, the Court accepts as true all of the facts alleged in the
Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Virnich v.
Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011). “[A] complaint must provide
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, which is sufficient to provide the defendant with fair notice of the
claim and its basis.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Courts must consider whether the
complaint states a “plausible” claim for relief. See id. The complaint must
do more than assert a right to relief that is “speculative.” See id. However,

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the claim need not be probable: “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable,
and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” See Independent Trust
Corp. v. Stewart Information Services Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir.
2012) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
“To meet this plausibility standard, the complaint must supply ‘enough fact
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’
supporting the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id.
A. Sufficiency of facts
The Defendant first contends that the Complaint must be dismissed
because it consists entirely of conclusory allegations. She alleges no facts
linking an adverse employment action to her race or gender.
In her response, the Plaintiff notes that Defendant’s argument does
not address the documents which are attached to and are central to the
complaint. Specifically, the charge of discrimination she filed with the
EEOC states that Plaintiff was the only black female among her peers and
she received disparate negative treatment and was denied the same

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privileges as her white male peers in work assignments and disciplinary
matters.
Upon reviewing the attachments to the complaint and after
considering the Plaintiff’s pro se status at the time of its filing, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has alleged facts which are sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the motion will be denied to the extent the
Defendant seeks dismissal because the complaint includes only conclusory
allegations.
B. Waiver of claims
Next, the Defendant alleges the Plaintiff waived all claims against
CMS when she signed an agreement with the Defendant promising to
refrain from pursuing any state or federal lawsuits arising out of the
Plaintiff’s discharge or the circumstances that led to the filing of the instant
charges.
In construing a contract, a court must give effect to the intent of the
parties and does not disturb an unambiguous agreement. See Hampton v.
Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 2009). “Where a contractual

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release is clear and explicit, we must enforce it as written.” Id. The party
challenging the release must come forth with specific evidence which raises
a question as to the release’s validity. See id. at 716.
Attached to the Plaintiff’s complaint is a document entitled
“Resolution Prior to Arbitration” (“the Resolution”). Paragraph 5 of the
Resolution provides, “The Union and the grievant, Cheryl Johnson, agree
to refrain from initiating or pursuing against the Employer any other
grievance, administrative or other judicial proceedings, including state and
federal lawsuits, arising out of the discharge or the circumstances that led
to the filing of the instant charges.”

The document is signed by the

Defendant’s representative, a Union representative and the Plaintiff. The
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has not alleged she did not understand the
agreement, wherein she agreed not to file lawsuits such as the one now
before the Court.
The Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege
that Defendant breached the contract thereby rendering it null and void.
The Plaintiff claims she was coerced into withdrawing her EEOC charge

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with a promise of employment at the IDPH, stating in her complaint:
After I filed the charge of retaliation, I was coercised [sic]
into withdrawing my first EEOC charge. I was coercised [sic]
because I was promised I would receive a job at the Illinois
Department of Public Health if I withdrew the charge. After I
withdrew the charge CMS submitted information to the Illinois
Department of Public Health [which] resulted in me not
receiving the job. I would not have withdrawn the charge if I
would have known CMS was going to prevent me from getting
employment with the Illinois Department of Public Health.
The Defendant contends there is no basis for asserting that one state
agency could promise a person employment at a separate state agency.
Moreover, the Resolution specifies the agreement between the parties. It
contains no mention of employment at the IDPH or any other state agency.
Rather, the Defendant agreed to purge the Plaintiff’s personnel records of
any mention of the discharge and retain a copy of the Plaintiff’s voluntary
resignation. The Resolution was signed by the Plaintiff and dated October
31, 2012.
In her response, the Plaintiff contends she has alleged sufficient facts
to question the validity of the release. The Plaintiff claimed there were
promises of additional consideration in exchange for her execution of that

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document which were never delivered and, despite the language of the
Resolution, she understood she would be granted alternate employment in
another state agency.
Because this matter is pending on a motion to dismiss, the Court will
allow the case to proceed based on the Plaintiff’s allegations. Although the
Court is crediting the facts alleged by the Plaintiff in considering the
motion, the Plaintiff will need to produce evidence of these alleged promises
in order for the case to proceed past summary judgment.
Ergo, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [d/e 8] is DENIED.
This action is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom
Schanzle-Haskins for the purpose of scheduling a discovery conference.
ENTER: October 29, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge

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