Brown v Doe
Filing
61
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/24/2017. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 57 is DENIED. Defendants' renewed Motion for Summary Judgment 55 is GRANTED. This case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. Judgment to be entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff. If the Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 24 February, 2017 09:36:59 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants. )
OSCAR LEE BROWN, JR.,
v.
JOHN DOE, et al.
14-3003
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Sangamon County Jail, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging failure-to-protect from harm and deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. The matter comes before
this Court for ruling on the Defendants’ Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. 55). The motion is granted.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
In its Order entered September 15, 2015, the Court denied
Defendants’ original motion for summary judgment because the
record did not disclose that the Defendants had complied with the
Court’s Merit Review Opinion (Doc. 4) regarding disclosure of the
Page 1 of 12
identities of the Doe defendants. On the record then presented to
the Court, at least one potential defendant had not been identified,
and records to that end appeared readily available. Defendants
have since provided the relevant information.
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint. (Doc. 57). Leave to amend should be freely granted
“when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A district court,
however, may refuse to grant leave to amend where there has been
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue
of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
In his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks to impose
liability on several additional jail officials for the events surrounding
an attack he suffered at the hands of another inmate. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Durr, Strayer, and Williamson
failed to override his cell block assignment, that other jail officials
failed to adequately respond to the attack, and that jail officials
refused to get him a wheelchair when he was taken to the hospital.
Page 2 of 12
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
amendment would be futile. Therefore, Plaintiff motion is denied.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
Page 3 of 12
FACTS
Plaintiff was booked into the Sangamon County Jail (“jail”) on
January 30, 2013 after his arrest for murder and other charges.
Upon arrival, Plaintiff was housed in the booking area of the jail.
Jail officials asked Plaintiff a series of questions on a range of topics
including mental health/medical history, gang affiliation, prior
criminal history, and known enemies within the facility. (Doc. 32-1
at 1-7). According to booking records, Plaintiff denied that he was
receiving care for mental health issues, denied that he had any
enemies, and the officer conducting the interview noted that
Plaintiff did not exhibit any visible signs of distress. Plaintiff did
not have any person listed as a “keep separate from” at that time.
Plaintiff was assigned to D-block on January 31, 2013. He arrived
there at 6:16 p.m. (Doc. 46-2 at 1).
At 9:48 p.m., another inmate assaulted Plaintiff in Plaintiff’s
cell. From the time he entered D-block until the time of the assault,
Plaintiff testified that he did not have any problems with any other
inmates. Pl.’s Dep. 55:22-56:2. Plaintiff did not know who his
assailant was prior to the attack. Id. 35:8-11. A video Defendants
provided shows the assailant entering Plaintiff’s cell, closing the
Page 4 of 12
door, and leaving approximately 90 seconds later. The attack is not
shown on video. Plaintiff remained in his cell until 9:54 p.m. A
correctional officer arrives a minute later.
According to Plaintiff, his assailant’s motivation was
retribution as Plaintiff had been accused of killing the assailant’s
cousin. His assailant and the individual Plaintiff was alleged to
have killed had different last names, and Plaintiff testified that he
had no prior knowledge of a familial relationship between these two
individuals. Pl.’s Dep. 35:4-7; 36:10-13. Plaintiff also testified that
he did not know the name of his alleged victim at the time he was
booked into the jail. Id. 28:23-29:2.
Plaintiff testified that his assailant was taken off the cell block
shortly before the attack. Id. 45:1-8. Plaintiff has not identified the
officer who did this, and he does not know where his assailant
allegedly went. Records from the jail show that two officers were
assigned as “rovers” in the area of the jail where Plaintiff was
housed. (Doc. 46-2 at 9). Plaintiff names one of the officers (Officer
Bluhm) in his amended complaint, but Plaintiff does not allege that
Officer Bluhm was the guard who removed his assailant from the
Page 5 of 12
cell block. Plaintiff does not make any allegations regarding the
other officer.
After the assault, Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit, and
later the hospital. (Doc. 58-1 at 15). Plaintiff was treated for
lacerations on his face and diagnosed with an orbital fracture in his
left eye.
Analysis
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of these events.
His rights therefore arise under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment’s
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Burton v.
Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Pittman v. Cnty.
of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014)). The standards
under the respective amendments are essentially the same. Id.
(citing Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Failure-to-Protect
To succeed on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show
(1) “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm,” and, (2) prison officials acted with “deliberate
indifference” to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
Page 6 of 12
(1994). For purposes of satisfying the first prong, “it does not
matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple
sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an
excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all
prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id. at 843. A prison
official acts with deliberate indifference if he “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.” Id. A plaintiff “normally proves actual
knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to
prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” Pope v. Shafer,
86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting McGill v. Duckworth, 944
F.3d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991)). Liability attaches where “deliberate
indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by
allowing it to happen….” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir.
1996).
Plaintiff’s main contention is that Defendants Durr, Strayer,
and Williamson failed to use their authority to override his
assignment to D-block. In support of this argument, Plaintiff
Page 7 of 12
provides a copy of the administrative policies that grant jail officials
such authority. (Doc. 58-1 at 2). The policy notwithstanding,
Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence that suggests
Defendants were aware that he faced a substantial risk of harm at
the time he was assigned to D-block.
Plaintiff could not have informed jail officials of a specific
threat from his assailant because he did not know who his
assailant was, did not know the name of his alleged victim, and had
no prior knowledge of a relationship between these two individuals.
If jail officials had reviewed records from Plaintiff’s previous
incarceration at the jail, the records would not have suggested that
Plaintiff was vulnerable to an attack. Arguably, they would have
suggested the contrary. (Doc. 58-1 at 23) (“[Plaintiff] lost control of
his emotion[s,] started crying and throwing food trays. He stated
that he could [not] stay in jail any longer and he was ready to kill
someone.”).
Once assigned to D-block, jail officials could be held liable if
they acted with deliberate indifference towards a substantial risk of
harm that developed after Plaintiff’s arrival. To this end, Plaintiff
speculates that jail officials told his assailant about Plaintiff’s
Page 8 of 12
alleged crimes after taking his assailant off the cell block, which
ultimately resulted in the attack once the assailant returned.
Records from the jail do not disclose that Plaintiff’s assailant was
transported off the cell block during the relevant time period, but
Plaintiff correctly points out that the same records also do not
disclose that he was taken to the medical unit. Assuming Plaintiff’s
assailant was removed during that time, Plaintiff does not know
why his assailant was removed and he does not have personal
knowledge of any conversations that took place because he was still
in the cell block.
The relevant question is what information was available to the
guards monitoring Plaintiff’s cell block in the time period leading up
to the attack. The Court can reasonably assume that Plaintiff’s
assailant learned about Plaintiff’s alleged crimes at some point prior
to the attack. The video shows Plaintiff’s assailant talking on the
phone before the attack. Plaintiff testified that televisions in the cell
blocks could have disclosed his alleged crimes, and that inmates
were also talking about it. Any of these mediums could have been
the source of the information, but nothing in the record suggests
that any jail official was aware of the relationship between two
Page 9 of 12
individuals with different last names, none of whom were listed as
Plaintiff’s enemies. Plaintiff admitted that he did not have any
problems with inmates prior to the attack.
Accordingly, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that jail officials failed to protect Plaintiff from harm.
Medical Claims
Inmates are entitled to adequate medical care. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). To prevail, a plaintiff must
show that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. Id. at 105. Claims of negligence, medical
malpractice, or disagreement with a prescribed course of treatment
are not sufficient. McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir.
2016) (citing Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014), and
Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit shortly after the attack.
Plaintiff appears to have suffered a one-hour delay in being
transported to the hospital, but, during that time, the medical
records indicate that medical staff was attempting to contact one of
the jail’s physicians and stop Plaintiff’s wounds from bleeding. In
addition, Plaintiff has not shown how the one-hour delay
Page 10 of 12
exacerbated his injuries. See Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 71415 (7th Cir. 2007) (a plaintiff must show that the delay, and not the
underlying condition, caused harm).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the guards who escorted him to
the hospital should have provided him with a wheelchair. Plaintiff
may have preferred a wheelchair while walking into the hospital,
but nothing in the medical records provided shows that a
wheelchair was medically indicated at that time or that the guards
otherwise obstructed Plaintiff’s medical treatment. See Snipes v.
DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (prisoners have no right to
demand specific medical treatment).
Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that jail officials were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical needs.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
[57] is DENIED.
2) Defendants’ renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [55]
is GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot,
and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their
Page 11 of 12
own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00
filing fee.
3) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:
February 24, 2017.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 12 of 12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?