Jones v. Sangamon County Jail's Medical Unit

Filing 38

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION granting 28 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants. Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. Civil Case Terminated, with the parties to bear their owns costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 02/06/2017. (SKN, ilcd) Modified on 2/7/2017 (SKN, ilcd).

E-FILED

Tuesday, 07 February, 2017 09:09:26 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
EDDIE JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHERIFF NEIL WILLIAMSON,
Defendant.

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14-3014

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Forrest City Low FCI, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need for events arising out of his incarceration at Sangamon
County Jail. The matter comes before this Court for ruling on the
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 28). The motion
is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
At all times relevant, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Sangamon
County Jail (“jail”). Defendant Williamson is the Sheriff in
Sangamon County and the sole defendant in this matter. Plaintiff
originally named “Sangamon County Medical Unit” as a defendant.
Pursuant to the Court’s Merit Review Opinion, Defendant
Williamson was added as a defendant for purposes of identifying
those responsible for Plaintiff’s medical care. (Doc. 4). Plaintiff was
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advised that he would need to name as defendants those
individuals responsible for his medical care. Id. The Court’s
Scheduling Order also advised Plaintiff he must file a motion to
substitute defendants within 60 days. (Doc. 11 at 5, ¶ 19). Plaintiff
received the information in Defendant’s Rule 26 disclosures dated
August 21, 2015. (Doc. 28-2). No motion to substitute or add
defendants has been filed.
Plaintiff suffered from arthritis in his shoulders. Prior to
arriving at the Sangamon County Jail, Plaintiff received treatment
for arthritis, and other conditions, at the Veteran’s Administration
(“VA”) hospital. According to Plaintiff, he received three cortisone
shots in his shoulders in 2009 and 2010. Pl.’s Dep. 21:12-19. His
shoulders remained pain-free until January 2013. Plaintiff testified
he was then given a non-steroid shot at that time, but medical
records show that Plaintiff received a corticosteroid injection. Id.
23:5-7 (“Q. They gave you a shot in 2013? A. Yes, ma’am, but they
didn’t give me the steroid shot.”); (Doc. 28-14 at 12) (medical
records).
Medical staff at the jail obtained Plaintiff’s VA records, but
Plaintiff did not receive the shots while he was incarcerated at the
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jail. Instead, Plaintiff was prescribed over-the-counter pain killers.
Jail officials also authorized Plaintiff’s receipt of his VA prescription
for Meloxicam, a drug prescribed to treat arthritis, which was
provided by the VA according to a handwritten notation on
Plaintiff’s records. (Doc. 28-13 at 13); Mayo Clinic, Meloxicam (Oral
Route), available at: http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/meloxicam-oral-route/description/drg-20066928 (last
accessed Feb. 6, 2017) (“Meloxicam is a nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drug (NSAID) used to relieve the symptoms of
arthritis….”).
Plaintiff’s shoulder pain gradually improved once Plaintiff
started an exercise regimen that consisted primarily of standing
wall pushups. Pl’s Dep. 25:18-26:18. Eventually, Plaintiff’s pain
subsided to the point where he felt at least as good as he did when
he received the cortisone shots. Id. 48:14-17 (“Q. …And do you feel
better now than you did after you had gotten your shots at the VA
or about the same? A. About the same.”).
ANALYSIS
Inmates are entitled to adequate medical care under the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
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Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, however, his rights are
derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th
Cir. 2015) (citing Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775
(7th Cir. 2014)). The standards under the respective amendments
are essentially the same. Id. (citing Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d
752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013)).
To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105. Claims of negligence, medical malpractice, or
disagreement with a prescribed course of treatment are not
sufficient. McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citing Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014), and
Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)). Rather,
liability attaches when “the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
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Nonmedical jail officials, like Defendant Williamson, may be
held constitutionally liable for “intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care, or intentionally interfering with medical
treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 829 (7th Cir. 2009).
Defendant Williamson did not provide medical treatment to Plaintiff,
and the record does not suggest that Plaintiff’s access to medical
treatment was obstructed in any way. Furthermore, the grievances
in the record indicate that each time Plaintiff complained of pain, he
was scheduled to see medical staff. Defendant Williamson was
added solely to identify Plaintiff’s treatment providers. To the extent
that Plaintiff may seek to impose liability on this Defendant, the
Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant
Williamson was deliberately indifferent.
In his response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Abraham and Tracy Shea, a
nurse, should be held liable because they did not administer the
cortisone shots upon his request. An inmate has no constitutional
right to demand specific treatment. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,
592 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s disagreement with these individuals’
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apparent decision to not administer the cortisone shots, on its own,
is not sufficient to impose constitutional liability. Id.
Plaintiff claims that he had an active prescription for the
shots, but the medical records as recent as three months prior to
Plaintiff’s incarceration do not disclose one. (Doc. 28-11 at 41)
(Plaintiff’s active medications as of March 7, 2013). In addition,
Plaintiff does not dispute that medical staff provided him with
medication to treat his pain. Pl.’s Dep. 20:1-6. This medication
was later discontinued when jail officials discovered Plaintiff had
been hoarding it. (Doc. 28-11 at 21).
The recent decision in Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.
2016), summarized the circumstances under which a trier of fact
could infer a medical provider acted with deliberate indifference.
These instances include evidence that a treatment provider ignores
a request for medical treatment, disregards instructions from a
specialist, fails to follow existing protocol, persists in a course of
treatment known to be ineffective, chooses the “easier and less
efficacious treatment” without exercising professional judgment, or
inexplicably delays treatment. Id. at 728-731. The record now

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before the Court does not provide facts to support any of these
situations.
At best, Plaintiff could show that his previous treating
physicians would have administered the cortisone shots instead of
opting for the course of treatment chosen by the jail’s medical staff.
“[E]vidence that some medical professionals would have chosen a
different course of treatment is insufficient to make out a
constitutional claim.” Id. at 729. Either way, Plaintiff does not
dispute that both avenues of treatment led to the same result—a
reduction in pain. Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable
juror could conclude that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [28] is
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot,
and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their
own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00
filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
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determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:

February 6, 2017.

FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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