Walker v. Jumper et al
Filing
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MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 8/18/2014. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 3 is GRANTED. The Plaintiff is directed to file, within 14 days of the date of this Order, his trust fund ledgers f or the six months preceding the filing of this suit so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Failure to comply with the Court's Order could result in the Court denying the Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his confinement with IDHS. This case is now in the process of service.(MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 18 August, 2014 04:42:03 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
RONALD D. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHAN JUMPER, AMIEE WILCZYNSKI,
SHELLY GANZ, ANGIE GUSS,
TANISHA HANKERSON, KENNETH
QUEEN, NICOLE SANDFORD,
CARAWAY SHARIENE, AMY LOUCK,
and DR. SCHROEDER,
Defendants.
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) No.: 14-3029-SEM-TSH
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MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Ronald D. Walker, proceeding pro se from his
detention in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center
(“Rushville”), seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims
against Defendants.
The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and
fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who,
within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without
legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster
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v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972).
Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma
pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in forma
pauperis only if the complaint states a federal claim.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts
must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation omitted).
Walker alleges that he has been in the Illinois Department of
Human Services’ (“IDHS”) custody since 2003. During this time,
Walker alleges that he has received ineffective psychiatric treatment
for his condition. In fact, Walker contends that his treatment has
been so deficient that it amounts to no treatment at all. Without
effective treatment, Walker cannot progress through the IDHS
program and cannot be released from IDHS’s custody.
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Walker believes that Defendants’ actions in this regard are
purposeful because they and their employer, Liberty Healthcare,
receive millions of taxpayer dollars to operate the IDHS facility at
Rushville. Therefore, Defendants have an incentive to violate
Walker’s constitutional rights by refusing or failing to provide him
with mental health treatment, thereby extending his confinement
and continuing the flow of tax payer dollars. Accordingly, Walker
has filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants
have and are violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
To the extent that Walker is averring that Defendants are
violating his due process rights by providing him with mental health
treatment and counseling that he disagrees with or that he believes
is ineffective, Walker’s Complaint fails to state a cause of action
upon which relief can be granted. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a detainee who is
confined as a sexually dangerous person in Illinois does not have
the right to receive an alternative treatment of his own choosing.
Ambrose v. Godinez, 2013 WL 647292, * 2 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013);
Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir.2003)(sex offender group
therapy does not violate privilege against self-incrimination or due
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process rights). Accordingly, Walker cannot proceed on a claim
against Defendants that the treatment that he is receiving should
be more narrowly tailored to meet his own, personal needs. Levi v.
William, 2007 WL 2893647, * 1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2007)(“Plaintiff
states no constitutional claim about the group therapy or
Defendants’ refusal to provide individual therapy.”).
However, giving Walker’s Complaint a liberal reading, Walker
could be alleging that Defendants have, essentially, failed to provide
him with any mental health treatment whatsoever. To the extent
that this is Walker’s allegation, Walker’s Complaint states a cause
of action upon which relief can be granted.
The United States Supreme Court has held that “due process
requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the
Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons
are committed.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The
Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily committed
mentally retarded persons have a substantive due process right to
“conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive
confinement conditions, and such training as may be required by
these conditions.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
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And, the Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized
Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they
are sexually violent: “(a) committed persons are entitled to some
treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by
mental-health professionals.” Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882
(7th Cir. 2012)(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the
Seventh Circuit has held that “Youngerberg holds that, under the
due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs
designed using the exercise of professional judgment . . . .” Id. at
883.
Here, Walker has alleged that his treatment has been so
defective that it amounts to having received no treatment
whatsoever since being placed into the IDHS’s custody. The
Fourteenth Amendment requires that Walker receive some
treatment. Therefore, Walker has stated a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[3] is GRANTED. This Court has instituted a reduced payment
procedure for indigent plaintiffs who are institutionalized but who
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are not prisoners as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). A reduced
payment is assessed of 50% of such plaintiff’s average monthly
income for the six months preceding the filing of the complaint but
not to exceed the $350 filing fee. Income includes additions to the
plaintiff’s trust fund from any sources, including gifts. Although he
has submitted an affidavit in support of his motion, Plaintiff has not
submitted his trust fund ledgers so that the Court can determine
the amount, if any, of his reduced payment. Accordingly, Plaintiff is
directed to file, within fourteen days of the date of this Order, his
trust fund ledgers for the six months preceding the filing of this suit
so that the Court can determine the amount, if any, of his reduced
payment. Failure to comply with the Court’s Order could result in
the Court denying Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
2.
Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds
that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
against Defendants for failure to offer treatment during his
confinement with IDHS. Any additional claim(s) shall not be
included in the case except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a
party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.
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3.
This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before
filing any motions in order to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4.
The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing
each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from
service to file an Answer. If Defendants have not filed Answers or
appeared through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order,
Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
counsel has appeared for Defendants, the Court will enter an Order
scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
5.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the
address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant
worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
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addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
6.
Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the
date the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an
Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under
the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be
to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer
sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by
Defendants. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or
will be considered.
7.
Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff
need not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that
Defendant’s counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff’s document
electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense
counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on
Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on
Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed
accordingly.
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8.
Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose
Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants
shall arrange the time for the deposition.
9.
Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address
or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with
prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to: (1)
show Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [3] as
granted; (2) attempt service on Defendants’ pursuant to the
standard procedures; and (3) set an internal Court deadline 60
days from the entry of this Order for the Court to check on the
status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.
Lastly, it is ORDERED that, if a Defendant fails to sign and
return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the
waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshal’s Service on that
Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
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of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d)(2).
ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2014
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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