Bell v. Saddler
Filing
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MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 4/1/2014. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, d/e 2 is GRANTED. Based upon his inability to pay, no reduced filing fee will be assessed against Plaintiff. This case is now in the process of service. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 01 April, 2014 09:19:25 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
TIMOTHY BELL,
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) No.: 14-3046-SEM
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Plaintiff,
v.
MICHELLE R. B. SADDLER,
Defendant.
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Timothy Bell, proceeding pro se from his detention in
the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center (“Rushville”), seeks
leave to proceed in forma pauperis on his claims against Defendant
Michelle R.B. Saddler, the Secretary of the Illinois Department of
Human Services.
The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and
fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who,
within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without
legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster
v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972).
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Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma
pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in forma
pauperis only if the complaint states a federal claim.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts
must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation omitted).
Bell alleges that, after completing his prison sentence on
March 6, 2006, he was detained as a sexually violent person by the
Illinois Department of Human Services. On July 27, 2007, a jury
found Bell to be a sexually violent person pursuant to Illinois law,
and he was subsequently housed in Rushville.
Bell claims that, since being placed in Rushville, he has not
received any treatment for his condition.
Bell alleges that
Defendant Michelle R.B. Saddler, who is the Secretary of the Illinois
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Department of Human Services, is the person responsible for
ensuring that he receive treatment while in Rushville.
Bell has attempted to state a cause of action under the Eighth
Amendment for deliberate indifference, but because Bell is a civil
committee, his claim falls under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause because he is more akin to a pretrial detainee than a
prisoner. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The
Seventh Circuit has stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protections are “‘at least as great as the protections available to a
convicted prisoner under the Eight Amendment.’” Tesch v. County of
Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 1998)(quoting City of Revere
v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). However,
the Seventh Circuit has also stated that “there is little practical
difference between the two standards.” Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245
F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001)(internal quotation omitted).
The Court finds that Bell’s Complaint states a claim for
violating his due process rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has held that “due
process requires that the conditions and duration of confinement
under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
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which persons are committed.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265
(2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that involuntarily
committed mentally challenged persons have a substantive due
process right to “conditions of reasonable care and safety,
reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such
training as may be required by these conditions.” Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
And, the Seventh Circuit has extended and summarized
Youngerberg to include those individuals committed because they
are sexually violent: “(a) committed persons are entitled to some
treatment, and (b) what that treatment entails must be decided by
mental-health professionals.” Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882
(7th Cir. 2012(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the
Seventh Circuit has held that “Youngerberg holds that, under the
due process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs
designed using the exercise of professional judgment . . . .” Id. at
883.
Here, Bell has alleged that he did not receive any treatment
since being housed in Rushville. The Fourteenth Amendment
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requires that Bell receive some treatment. Therefore, Bell has
stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
According to Bell, Defendant Saddler is the person responsible
for ensuring that he receive treatment. This allegation is sufficient
to survive of this Merit Review.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
[2] is GRANTED. Based upon his inability to pay, no reduced filing
fee will be assessed against Plaintiff.
2.
Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds
that Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
against Defendant for failure to offer treatment during his
confinement at Rushville. Any additional claim(s) shall not be
included in the case except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a
party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.
3.
This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendant before
filing any motions in order to give Defendant notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
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Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4.
The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing
her a waiver of service. Defendant has 60 days from service to file
an Answer. If Defendants has not filed an Answer or appeared
through counsel within 60 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff
may file a motion requesting the status of service. After counsel
has appeared for Defendant, the Court will enter an Order
scheduling deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
5.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the
address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant
worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said
Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
6.
Defendant shall file an Answer within 60 days of the date
the waiver is sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an
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Answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate under
the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent pleadings shall be
to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer
sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed by
Defendant. Therefore, no response to the Answer is necessary or
will be considered.
7.
Once counsel has appeared for Defendant, Plaintiff need
not send copies of his filings to Defendant or to Defendant’s
counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff’s document
electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense
counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on
Defendant pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on
Defendant is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed
accordingly.
8.
Counsel for Defendant is hereby granted leave to depose
Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s place of confinement. Counsel for Defendant
shall arrange the time for the deposition.
9.
Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
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Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address
or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit with
prejudice.
IT
IS
FURTHER
ORDERED
THAT
THE
CLERK
IS
DIRECTED TO: 1) SHOW PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS [2] AS GRANTED; 2) ATTEMPT SERVICE ON
DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO THE STANDARD PROCEDURES;
AND 3) SET AN INTERNAL COURT DEADLINE 60 DAYS FROM
THE ENTRY OF THIS ORDER FOR THE COURT TO CHECK ON
THE
STATUS
OF
SERVICE
AND
ENTER
SCHEDULING
DEADLINES.
LASTLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT IF DEFENDANT FAILS TO
SIGN AND RETURN A WAIVER OF SERVICE TO THE CLERK
WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE WAIVER IS SENT, THE COURT
WILL
TAKE
SERVICE
APPROPRIATE
THROUGH
THE
STEPS
U.S.
TO
EFFECT
MARSHAL’S
FORMAL
SERVICE
ON
DEFENDANT AND WILL REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY THE
FULL COSTS OF FORMAL SERVICE PURSUANT TO
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(d)(2).
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ENTER:
April 1, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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