Madrid v. Jackson et al
Filing
80
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 52 63 78 are GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/29/2016. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 30 March, 2016 09:13:10 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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HENRY JACKSON, et al.
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Defendants. )
LUIS MADRID,
14-3056
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought the present lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need and an Eighth Amendment claim for
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain arising from his
incarceration at Lincoln Correctional Center. The matter comes
before this Court for ruling on the Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment. (Docs. 52, 63, 78). Defendants’ motions are
granted.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Of the three motions for summary judgment now pending
before the Court, Plaintiff has only filed a response to the motion
Page 1 of 20
filed by Defendants Alexander, Brown, Carlock, Grady, Hamilton,
Perretton, Rhodes, Tripplet, and Wahls. (Docs. 52, 58). For the
other two pending motions, Plaintiff was sent a Rule 56 Notice that
advised him that failure to respond to the motions would result in
the Court accepting the Defendants’ statements of fact as true for
purposes of ruling on the motions. (Docs. 67, 79); FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e)(2) (if a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion
of fact, the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of
the motion). As Plaintiff is pro se the Court will consider Plaintiff’s
response to the first motion as applicable to all other pending
motions for summary judgment. To the extent that Plaintiff’s
response does not address a properly supported assertion of fact,
the Court will consider the fact undisputed.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
Page 2 of 20
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
At all times relevant, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Lincoln
Correctional Center (“Lincoln”). Defendants were all employed at
Lincoln in the following capacities: Defendant Charron was the
Assistant Warden; Defendant Stoldt was a correctional major;
Defendant Silas was a correctional officer; Defendant Wahl was a
physician; Defendant Johnson was the Director of Nursing; and, the
remaining Defendants (Carlock (a/k/a Claussen), Hamilton,
Tripplet, Rhodes (a/k/a Rose), Perretton (a/k/a Perrett), Grady,
Brown, and Alexander) were nurses.
Page 3 of 20
Prior to his incarceration in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, Plaintiff had been previously diagnosed with, and was
receiving treatment for, congestive heart failure, diabetes, asthma,
sleep apnea, and a condition in his legs that resulted in swelling
and varicose veins. Plaintiff’s pre-incarceration medications
included an anti-coagulent medication for his heart condition,
insulin and other medications to control blood sugar for his
diabetes, medication for his leg condition, and a CPAP machine for
sleep apnea.
Plaintiff arrived at Lincoln on March 15, 2013. Prison officials
conducted a medical screening at that time and noted Plaintiff’s
medical conditions, prescription medications, and other treatments.
(Doc. 54-1 at 2). The prescriptions for ongoing medications noted in
the initial screening were renewed at that time. Compare id., with
(Doc. 54-43 at 6). Prison officials did not provide Plaintiff with a
CPAP machine, but they made an appointment for Plaintiff to see
the doctor regarding this condition. (Doc. 54-1 at 2).
Only doctors at Lincoln can write prescriptions for
medications. Throughout the relevant time period, Plaintiff’s
prescriptions were renewed. Various pain killers (over-the-counter
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and narcotic) were also prescribed when necessary. Once
prescribed, nurses and other medical staff are responsible for the
distribution and administration of the medications. Each of the
nurse Defendants dispensed medication to Plaintiff at some point,
but Plaintiff alleges they did so with hostile attitudes.
Medical personnel document which medications are dispensed
to inmates in the inmate’s Medication Administration Record
(“MAR”). According to Plaintiff’s MAR, Plaintiff received daily insulin
as prescribed and was provided with a consistent supply of those
prescribed medications for his other conditions that he was allowed
to keep in his possession. Plaintiff was prescribed an albuterol
nebulizer for use as needed to treat his asthma, though the MAR
indicates that Plaintiff never used it.
On March 24, 2013, Plaintiff slipped on some ice, fell, and
complained of rib pain. (Doc. 54-1 at 5; 52-2). Shortly after it
happened, nearby prison officials requested emergency medical
treatment. Defendant Brown and another nurse transported
Plaintiff in a wheelchair to the healthcare unit. Prison staff notified
a non-defendant physician.
Page 5 of 20
Defendant Brown administered pain medication via a shot.
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that Defendant Brown had failed
to check his (Plaintiff’s) medical chart prior to administering the
medication. Pl.’s Dep. 81:22-82:1. As a result of this pain
medication, Plaintiff testified that his heart began to race. The
alleged condition passed and Plaintiff did not suffer additional
harm.
Plaintiff later complained of increased rib pain. Medical staff
notified the physician and Plaintiff was prescribed narcotic pain
medication (Vicodin). Plaintiff also complained of chest pain.
Medical staff offered to perform an electrocardiogram (EKG), but
Plaintiff refused and stated he could not lie down. Plaintiff testified
that as these events transpired, Defendant Grady was discourteous.
Pl.’s Dep. 82:10-14 (“[Defendant Grady] repeatedly said, ‘Quit your
bullshit, or I’ll send you to seg.’”).
Plaintiff’s requests to be transported to an outside hospital
were denied—first by Defendant Brown, then by Defendant Grady
and Defendant Stoldt. According to Plaintiff, he was not sent to an
outside hospital because Defendant Stoldt, a correctional major,
would not authorize it. According to Defendant Stoldt, medical
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personnel had not indicated that Plaintiff needed outside medical
attention. Even if they had, transport would have been near
impossible as a major snowstorm had shut down area roads.
Plaintiff was housed in the infirmary until the next day. During
this time, Plaintiff’s condition and vital signs were monitored, and
Plaintiff was provided with pain medication. Plaintiff was provided
with over-the-counter pain medication upon his discharge back to
general population.
At some point during this stay in the infirmary, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Alexander took his oxygen mask and turned off his
oxygen tank because Plaintiff was not wearing it properly. The
medical records do not disclose that Plaintiff was wearing an oxygen
mask, but the records do show that medical staff checked Plaintiff’s
blood oxygen saturation (SpO2) throughout the time period. The
results of this test were normal.
On March 27, 2013, Plaintiff was transported to an outside
hospital for complaints of lung congestion. X-rays showed
fractured ribs. Physicians at the hospital prescribed pain
medication, an albuterol inhaler, and an incentive spirometer to
assist with breathing. (Doc. 56-11 at 11; 56-12 at 1-4).
Page 7 of 20
Upon Plaintiff’s return to Lincoln, Plaintiff was housed in the
infirmary. Prison physicians ordered the same treatment as the
hospital doctors, except that Plaintiff was provided access to a
nebulizer instead of an inhaler. Compare (Docs. 56-11 at 10-11;
56-12 at 1) (hospital prescriptions), with (Doc. 54-44 at 3) (prison
doctor prescription). Nebulizers provide faster relief for asthma
than inhalers. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Charron
confiscated an ACE bandage that hospital employees provided to
Plaintiff for his ribs. Plaintiff testified that Defendant Charron told
him she took the bandage because she did not want Plaintiff to
puncture a lung. Pl.’s Dep 113:8-11.
While Plaintiff was in the infirmary, Plaintiff testified that
Defendant Silas kicked his bed while he was sleeping and told him
to sign something. Pl.’s Dep. 48:18-54:5. When Plaintiff did not
sign it, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Silas crumpled up the
paper and threw it at Plaintiff, striking him in the chin. Id. Plaintiff
testified that Defendant Silas did not kick his bed after Plaintiff
informed her that he had broken ribs. Id. 52:22-24.
Defendant Doctor Wahl (sued as Wahls) treated Plaintiff from
April 2, 2013 through August 21, 2013. During this time,
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Defendant Wahl continuously monitored Plaintiff diabetes and
adjusted Plaintiff’s insulin medications accordingly. Defendant
Wahl scheduled Plaintiff to attend a diabetes/hypertension clinic to
discuss his conditions with him, referred Plaintiff to an outside
cardiologist several times for his heart condition, and referred
Plaintiff to a radiologist when she discovered potentially cancerous
lumps on Plaintiff’s breast.
For Plaintiff’s sleep apnea, Defendant Wahl offered Plaintiff a
sleep study to assess the extent of the condition. (Doc. 56-13 at 5).
Medical records disclose that Plaintiff signed a refusal for the study
in September 2013, though Plaintiff later completed one and
received a CPAP machine. Pl.’s Dep. 140:21-141:5 (Plaintiff
received a CPAP machine approximately 20 months later); (Doc. 569 at 8) (signed refusal of sleep study).
When Plaintiff first complained about his leg condition,
Defendant Wahl authorized compression socks to relieve the
swelling. Several months later, Plaintiff complained again and
Defendant Wahl prescribed Gabapentin..
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 14, 2014.
Page 9 of 20
ANALYSIS
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care, the Plaintiff must show that the prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Deliberate indifference is more
than negligence, but does not require the plaintiff to show that the
defendants intended to cause harm. Mayoral v. Sheehan, 245 F.3d
934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). Liability attaches under the Eighth
Amendment when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s chronic medical
conditions (congestive heart failure, diabetes, etc.) constitute a
serious medical need. See King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018
(7th Cir. 2012) (“An objectively serious medical need is one that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Page 10 of 20
Defendants Charron, Silas, and Stoldt argue that Plaintiff’s rib
injury does not constitute a serious medical need because the
injury typically heals on its own. While Plaintiff’s rib injury healed
on its own, the medical records show that this type of injury
required treatment for management of the pain often associated
with it. Therefore, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could
conclude that Plaintiff’s rib injury constituted a serious medical
need. See also Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996)
(subjective complaints of pain, if believed by the trier of fact, could
support a finding of a serious medical need even if no other
objective symptoms exist).
Defendant Wahl
Defendant Wahl was Plaintiff’s treating physician and
therefore her treatment decisions are a matter of professional
discretion with which the courts will not interfere unless the
evidence suggests that “‘no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512
F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee
Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). In other words, a medical
professional is deliberately indifferent only if “the decision by the
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professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate
that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgment.” Id. (quoting same). Within these bounds, a
prison medical professional “is free to make his own, independent
medical determination as to the necessity of certain treatments or
medications,” and deference to a prior doctor’s diagnosis is not
required to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir.
2012).
Plaintiff does not allege that prison officials ignored his
requests for medical treatment, only that Defendant Wahl should
have prescribed him certain medications that he was receiving prior
to his incarceration. The medical records do not indicate that
Defendant Wahl was ignoring Plaintiff’s medical conditions, only
that she chose to provide a course of treatment different from that
pursued by Plaintiff’s previous physicians. A mere disagreement
with the course of treatment, standing alone, is not sufficient to
attach constitutional liability. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592
(7th Cir. 1996).
Page 12 of 20
In addition, the medical records indicate that Plaintiff’s
medication was consistently adjusted when Plaintiff’s condition
changed, and, thus, no inference exists that Defendant Wahl chose
to pursue a course of treatment known to be ineffective, or one that
fell outside the bounds of accepted professional judgment. When
Plaintiff needed medical treatment from outside specialists,
Defendant Wahl accommodated those needs. Therefore, the Court
finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant Wahl
was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
Nurse Defendants
Plaintiff argues that the nurse defendants treated him in an
unprofessional manner and had “hostile” attitudes towards him.
In DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh
Circuit held that “standing alone, simple verbal harassment does
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. at 612.
However, the definition of “simple” is elusive—what is simple “in the
sense of being brief, lucid, and syntactically simple,” can also be
devastating. Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015)
(stating as an example that lying to a prisoner by telling him he has
incurable brain cancer or that his family has been killed in a car
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crash is purely verbal, “yet as cruel…as in cases of physical
brutalization of prisoners by guards”). Nonetheless, whether simple
or complex, most verbal harassment by prison personnel does not
trigger constitutional scrutiny. Id.
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to show that the
actions of these Defendants were anything more than isolated
incidents, or that such incidents caused him harm. In this sense,
Plaintiff’s claims are distinguishable from those claims asserted in
recent Seventh Circuit decisions. See id. (prisoner alleged that
prison guard had subjected him to increased risk of sexual assault
and ridicule by making verbal sexual comments and repeatedly
urinating in front of the prisoner “while smiling”); Hughes v. Farris,
809 F.3d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 2015) (civil detainee stated claim upon
allegations that he lived in constant fear of violent attack because
officials berated him “with an onslaught of homophobic epithets,”
and encouraged inmates to harm Plaintiff because Plaintiff was
homosexual); see also Hughes v. Scott, __ F.3d __, 2016 WL
1127736, at *1 (7th Cir. 2016) (civil detainee stated First
Amendment retaliation claim after officials had allegedly ignored his
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grievances, called him names, and issued veiled threats that his life
would be better if he stopped complaining).
Furthermore, the recent Seventh Circuit cases cited above
involved review of the respective district court’s decisions to dismiss
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. At this stage in the proceeding, the
standard is different. See Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937
(7th Cir. 2010) (“Summary judgment is the put up or shut up
moment in a lawsuit. Once a party has made a properly-supported
motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not
simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary
materials that set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
Plaintiff does not allege that the actions of medical staff
caused other inmates to treat him differently, or that he lived in fear
as a result of their presumed unprofessional conduct. On the one
occasion where Defendant Grady threatened to send Plaintiff to
segregation, a correctional lieutenant quelled the threat almost
immediately. Pl.’s Dep. 82:20-83:9 (correctional lieutenant told
Grady decisions regarding segregation belonged to the correctional
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officers). Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that Plaintiff suffered a sufficient constitutional
deprivation.
Next, Plaintiff asserts a general claim that Defendants Carlock
(Claussen), Hamilton, Tripplet, Rhodes (Rose), Perretton (Perrett),
Alexander, Brown, Grady, and Alexander failed to dispense his
prescribed medications. Plaintiff does not identify any specific
instances and the medical records show that Plaintiff was given his
prescribed medications on a routine basis. To the extent that
Plaintiff sought medication that had not been prescribed (Metformin
and Gabapentin), nurses must “defer to treating physicians’
instructions and orders in most situations . . . [unless] it is
apparent that the physician’s order will likely harm the patient.”
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 443 (7th Cir. 2010). These
medications were not prescribed until after Plaintiff filed suit and
these Defendants had no authority to prescribe medication absent a
physician’s order.
With respect to Defendant Brown’s alleged actions on March
24, 2013, the alleged failure to check Plaintiff’s chart prior to
administering medication is, at best, negligence. As stated above,
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negligence is not sufficient to attach constitutional liability.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations that prison medical staff failed to
provide bandages for a small amount of blood resulting from a
routine finger prick does not amount to a sufficient deprivation.
See Cooper, 97 F.3d at 914 (“A prison’s medical staff that refuses to
dispense bromides for the sniffles or minor aches and pains or a
tiny scratch or a mild headache or minor fatigue—the sorts of
ailments for which many people who are not in prison do not seek
medical attention—does not by its refusal violate the
Constitution.”).
For these reasons, the Court finds that no reasonable juror
could conclude that these defendants were deliberately indifferent.
Remaining Defendants
Defendants Charron, Silas, and Stoldt were correctional
officers at Lincoln and not responsible for the medical care of
inmates at the prison. During the relevant time period, Defendant
Johnson was the Director of Nursing whose duties were primarily
administrative.
Nonmedical prison officials are generally not held
constitutionally liable in cases where the official deferred to the
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judgment of the medical staff. See Berry, 604 F.3d at 440
(nonmedical prison officials “are entitled to defer to the judgment of
jail health professionals” so long as the inmate’s complaints are not
ignored (citations omitted)); Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th
Cir. 2008) (no deliberate indifference where nonmedical prison
official investigated inmate’s complaints and referred then to
medical providers who could be expected to address the concerns);
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005) (no deliberate
indifference where nonmedical prison official referred inmate
complaints to medical providers). As the court in Greeno explained:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ... a
non-medical prison official will generally be justified in
believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This
follows naturally from the division of labor within a
prison. Inmate health and safety is promoted by dividing
responsibility for various aspects of inmate life among
guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a
non-medical prison official liable in a case where a
prisoner was under a physician's care would strain this
division of labor.
Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656 (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
236 (3d Cir. 2004)). In other words, “the law encourages nonmedical security and administrative personnel at jails and prisons
to defer to the professional medical judgments of the physicians and
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nurses treating the prisoners in their care without fear of liability
for doing so.” Berry, 604 F.3d at 440.
Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment were not ignored by
the medical staff. According to Plaintiff, he was examined by
physicians “[m]aybe over 40 times, 50 times.” Pl.’s Dep. 99:12-17.
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to show that Defendant
Stoldt disregarded an order to send Plaintiff to the hospital on
March 24, 2013, or that any of these Defendants otherwise ignored
orders. Nor can Plaintiff show that Defendant Charron acted with
deliberate indifference by confiscating his ACE bandage. By
Plaintiff’s own admission, Defendant Charron stated she was
attempting to help Plaintiff.
Finally, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that Defendant
Silas knew about Plaintiff’s injury prior to kicking his bed, nor has
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Silas’ actions caused an
unnecessary infliction of pain. Plaintiff testified that he did not
need any additional medical treatment as a result of incident, and
that Defendant Silas did not kick the bed after Plaintiff asked her to
stop. Pl.’s Dep. 168:6-9; 52:19-21. Therefore, the Court finds that
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no reasonable juror could conclude that these Defendants violated
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment [52][63][78]
are GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot,
and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their
own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00
filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:
March 29, 2016.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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