Huddleston v. Springfield Police Department et al
Filing
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MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 4/7/2014. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 07 April, 2014 03:35:05 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JEFFREY HUDDLESTON,
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) No.: 14-3059-SEM-TSH
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Plaintiff,
v.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE
DEPARTMENT and DETECTIVE
STEVE WELSH,
Defendants.
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court for a merit review, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of Plaintiff Jeffrey Huddleston’s claims.
I.
MERIT REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, the Court is
required to carefully screen a complaint filed by a plaintiff who
seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or a portion thereof, if the plaintiff has raised claims that
are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fails to state a claim upon
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which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
The test for determining if an action is frivolous or without
merit is whether the plaintiff can make a rational argument on the
law or facts in support of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief if the
complaint does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009).
In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true and liberally construes them in plaintiff’s favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory
statements and labels are insufficient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Schatz v.
Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012)
(holding that, in order to determine if a complaint states a plausible
claim, the court must take non-conclusory, non-speculative facts as
true, draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor, and
isolate and ignore statements that simply rehash claim elements or
offer only legal labels and conclusions). Instead, sufficient facts
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must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.
2013)(internal quotation omitted).
II.
ANALYSIS
Huddleston alleges that on February 28, 2013, Defendant
Detective Steve Welsh and other members of the Defendant
Springfield Police Department searched his residence. Huddleston
was in Texas at the time of the search. Detective Welsh arrested
Huddleston upon Huddleston’s return to Illinois for various felony
offenses. Huddleston is currently in the Sangamon County
Detention Center awaiting trial.
Huddleston alleges that he has a personal history with
Detective Welsh that involves a woman named Lisa Kain.
Huddleston claims that this history caused Detective Welsh to
interfere with Huddleston’s attorney-client relationship and resulted
in his original attorney withdrawing from his criminal case. In
addition, Huddleston asserts that Detective Welsh was deliberately
indifferent in his actions toward Huddleston, especially in regard to
Detective Welsh’s professional obligations as a police officer.
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Huddleston seeks $300,000.00 in damages as a result of
Defendants’ actions toward him.
Huddleston is not entirely clear on his cause of action against
Defendants. Huddleston attempts to allege a claim under the
Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference, but Huddleston is a
pre-trial detainee. As a pre-trial detainee, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process protections apply to Huddleston rather
than the Eighth Amendment’s protections. Brown v. Budz, 398
F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has stated that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protections are “‘at least as great as the protections
available to a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment.’”
Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 1998)
(quoting City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,
244 (1983)). However, the Seventh Circuit has also stated that
“there is little practical difference between the two standards.”
Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001)(internal
quotation omitted).
Whether Huddleston’s claim arises under the Eighth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment is of no consequence
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because Huddleston’s claim is barred by the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In
Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 claim for damages that
“would necessarily imply the invalidity of [a plaintiff’s] conviction or
sentence” is not a cognizable claim. Id. at 487.
Huddleston has alleged that Detective Welsh is biased against
him, interfered with his criminal proceedings by interfering with
counsel of his choosing, and acted unprofessionally in seeing that
he is prosecuted. Huddleston seeks damages as a result of
Detective Welsh’s actions.
In order to prevail and obtain damages, however, Huddleston
will, by necessity, need to challenge his state criminal proceedings
because, in order to find that Detective Welsh violated his due
process rights, the Court would need to find that Detective Welsh’s
actions that constitute the evidence against Huddleston in
Huddleston’s criminal case were improper. Heck’s holding bars
such a suit. Id.; Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir.
2003)(“It is irrelevant that he disclaims any intention of challenging
his conviction; if he makes allegations that are inconsistent with the
conviction’s having been valid, Heck, kicks in and bars his civil
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suit.”); Ibarra v. Bailey, 2013 WL 6247430, * 5 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 2,
2013)(“Because prevailing on his assertion that he did nothing and
was attacked by James would undermine the Adjustment
Committee’s finding that he was the attacker, his case is barred by
Heck.”). Therefore, Huddleston’s Complaint fails to state a cause of
action upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff Jeffrey Huddleston’s Complaint is dismissed for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any further amendment to the
Complaint would be futile because Huddleston’s claim is not
cognizable.
2.
This dismissal shall count as one of Huddleston’s three
allotted “strikes” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
3.
If Huddleston wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must
file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis should set forth the issues he plans to present on
appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Huddleston does choose to
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appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.
4.
This case is, therefore, closed, and the clerk is
directed to enter a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58. The Clerk of the Court is directed to record
Plaintiff’s strike in the three-strike log. All pending motions
are DENIED as moot.
ENTER:
April 7, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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