Kugler v. Roth
Filing
68
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: Defendant's Motion for Order for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal 57 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motions to Strike 65 66 are DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 55 is GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. All pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/9/2016. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 09 March, 2016 09:46:04 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JUDITH ROTH, et al.
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Defendants. )
DEVIN M. KUGLER,
14-3085
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently civilly committed at
Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, brought the present
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a Fourteenth
Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to a serious mental
health need. The matter comes before this Court for ruling on the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 55). The motion
is granted.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to File Document under
seal. (Doc. 57). Defendants seek to file a copy of Plaintiff’s mental
health records under seal. Plaintiff has not opposed this motion.
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Nonetheless, the Court must make its own determination as to
whether good cause exists for sealing the record. See Bond v.
Utreras, 585 F.3d 106, 1068 (7th Cir. 2009); Citizens First National
Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 944 (7th Cir.
1999) (court must makes its own determination whether good cause
exists for sealing the record, despite the parties’ agreement); CDIL
Local Rule 5.10(2) (“The Court does not approve of the filing of
documents under seal as a general matter. A party who has a legal
basis for filing a document under seal without a prior court order
must electronically file a motion for leave to file under seal.”). Upon
review, these records contain information regarding Plaintiff’s
mental health conditions, subsequent treatment, and describe the
details of the criminal offense that predicated Plaintiff’s
commitment pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act. Plaintiff has placed his mental health and
treatment at issue, but disclosure of this information into the public
realm would not serve the ends of justice. Therefore, Defendants’
motion is granted.
Plaintiff’s motions to strike are also before the Court. (Docs.
65, 66). In these motions, Plaintiff seeks to strike an affidavit
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attached as an exhibit to Defendants’ Reply brief. Plaintiff also
seeks to strike the Reply brief itself. In his motion, Plaintiff argues
against the veracity of the information contained in the affidavit,
but does not otherwise provide a legal basis for the Court to strike
the Defendants’ Reply or the exhibits contained therein. Plaintiff’s
motions are therefore denied.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
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of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
Plaintiff is civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and
Detention Facility (“Rushville” or “TDF”) pursuant to the Illinois
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
207/1 et seq. Defendant is a licensed clinical therapist and, at all
relevant times, the leader (supervisor) of Plaintiff’s treatment team.
Residents who consent to treatment at Rushville are assigned
to teams designated by color (e.g. blue team, orange team, etc.).
Each treatment team consists of a team leader and several clinical
staff members. Defendant is the orange team leader. As such, she
supervises the clinical staff on the orange team and works with
security staff to organize and provide treatment for residents on
that team.
Treatment at Rushville consists of five phases: (1) assessment;
(2) accepting responsibility; (3) self-application; (4) incorporation;
and (5) transition. Within these phases, there are different levels of
programming: engagement, disclosure, post-disclosure, and Phase
V group. At one end of the spectrum, engagement is designated for
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those residents who are new to treatment, or whose progress stalls
during the course of treatment. On the other end, Phase V group
prepares residents for release from the facility. Plaintiff’s claims
arise from his interactions with staff and other residents in his
post-disclosure group.
In late February 2014, Plaintiff’s participation in postdisclosure group was discontinued after Plaintiff admittedly
developed romantic feelings for one of the female facilitators of the
group who was also assigned as Plaintiff’s primary therapist.
Plaintiff admitted to this therapist that he was falling in love with
her, that he had had sexual fantasies about her, and had
masturbated to those fantasies. Pl.’s Dep. 30:22-31:1. Plaintiff
believed he had a future outside the facility with this therapist. Id.
33:6-9.
Aside from Plaintiff’s romantic feelings, several other events
contributed to Plaintiff’s removal from post-disclosure group. For
example, Plaintiff claimed that revenge, not sexual desire, motivated
his commission of the criminal offense underlying his civil
commitment. Therefore, Plaintiff claimed that certain treatment
goals, like acknowledgement of sexually deviant arousal, did not
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apply to him. Pl.’s Dep. 39:3-42:10. When confronted by therapists
and other resident group members about these beliefs, Plaintiff
reported that he felt harassed and bullied by the feedback. Pl.’s
Dep. 20:20-21:3. After Plaintiff directed derogatory language at
others present during a group session, Defendant informed Plaintiff
on February 12, 2014 that he would be excused from group
participation until the staff could meet to discuss Plaintiff’s issues.
(Doc. 59-1 at 32).
Later that day, Plaintiff was placed in a mental health
observation cell after security had thwarted his attempts to escape
the facility by walking out the front door. Defendant conducted a
mental health assessment. (Doc. 59-1 at 30-31). Plaintiff was
agitated, crying, and visibly distraught. Plaintiff denied that he had
previously met with Defendant earlier that day and stated that he
would kill staff members in order to get out of the facility. Plaintiff
threatened to physically harm any staff member who opened the
chuckhole on his cell. Plaintiff was placed on Mental Health Status
to monitor his condition.
Defendant met with Plaintiff over the course of the next week,
and Plaintiff’s condition gradually improved. Plaintiff attributed his
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behavior to issues related to his therapy group. On February 24,
2014, Plaintiff was assigned a new male therapist. On February 26,
2014, Defendant met with Plaintiff and outlined specific treatment
goals to focus on before Plaintiff returned to post-disclosure group.
Plaintiff became agitated, threatened legal action, and kicked the
door to his room.
Over the next month or so, Plaintiff continued to exhibit signs
of mood instability in his contacts with his primary therapist and
Defendant. Plaintiff’s treatment team recommended that Plaintiff
not return to post-disclosure group because of these issues. During
this time, Plaintiff also suffered a scrape on his wrist, allegedly selfinflicted by Plaintiff’s fingernail. Staff provided Plaintiff with a
bandage for the scrape.
ANALYSIS
As a civil detainee, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Mayoral v.
Sheahan, 245 F.2d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). Despite this
distinction, there exists “little practical difference between the two
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standards.” Id. (quoting Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
To prevail on a claim for inadequate medical care, the Plaintiff
must show that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105
(1976). Neither party disputes that Plaintiff has shown he suffers
from a serious medical/mental health need. See also Sanville v.
McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The need for a
mental illness to be treated could certainly be considered a serious
medical need.”).
Deliberate indifference is more than negligence, but does not
require the plaintiff to show that the defendants intended to cause
harm. Mayoral v. Sheehan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001).
Liability attaches when “the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff is entitled to humane conditions of confinement and
to adequate treatment for his serious mental disorder, as
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determined by an appropriate professional exercising professional
judgment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)
(decisions by professionals working at mental health institution are
afforded deference and violate the Constitution only if professional
judgment not exercised). Plaintiff is not entitled to dictate the
treatment he receives. Cf. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Constitution is not a medical code that mandates
specific treatment.”). Plaintiff’s constitutional rights are violated
only if the treatment decisions are a “substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment.” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 89495 (7th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff challenges his removal from post-disclosure group. In
support of this argument, Plaintiff states that he did not violate the
boundaries of his female primary therapist by professing his love for
her and admitting to his sexual fantasies. Defendant argues to the
contrary, but neither party has actually defined the boundaries
Plaintiff is alleged to have crossed. Even so, Plaintiff’s issues with
his post-disclosure group extended further than just his infatuation
with his primary therapist. Plaintiff provided several exhibits that
show he communicated to his treatment team his position that
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certain aspects of therapy did not apply to him, that he attempted
to commit self-harm by stabbing himself with a pen during a group
session, and that he wanted to kill another group member. (Doc.
61-4 at 4-6; 61-7 at 2-4). Several of these exhibits note Plaintiff’s
resistance to group feedback.
This information would have been available to Defendant at
the time Plaintiff’s treatment team recommended that he not return
to, or at least be suspended from, group therapy. Defendant also
had several personal contacts with Plaintiff while he was housed in
the mental health after his attempts to leave the facility. In light of
this information, and the fact that Plaintiff’s removal from postdisclosure group was not solely within Defendant’s discretion, the
Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant
acted outside the bounds of accepted professional judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendant’s Motion for Order for Leave to File Exhibits
Under Seal [57] is GRANTED.
2) Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike [65][66] are DENIED.
3) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [55] is
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot,
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and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their
own costs.
4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:
March 9, 2016.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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