White v. City of Springfield et al
Filing
15
OPINION: The Motion to Strike Defendants' Affirmative Defenses 6 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court does not strike Defendants Higginson and Cordes's affirmative defense of qualified immunity as to Count I, Count II, and Count III. The Court strikes both Defendant City of Springfield's defense of qualified immunity (Defense A) and defense under Monell (Defense B) as to Count IV with prejudice. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/22/2014. (ME, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 22 December, 2014 11:48:20 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LUCINDA WHITE,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, an Illinois )
Municipal Corporation, SGT.
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EDWARD HIGGINSON, Star #545, )
and OFFICER MARK CORDES,
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Star #688,
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Defendants.
)
No. 14-03087
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court is Plaintiff Lucinda White’s First Motion to
Strike Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses (d/e 6). The Motion is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court does not strike the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity asserted by Defendant Sgt. Edward Higginson
as to Count I and Count II and asserted by Defendant Officer Mark
Cordes as to Count III. The Court strikes Defendant City of
Springfield’s affirmative defense of qualified immunity as to Count
IV with prejudice because the defense of qualified immunity is not
available for claims against municipalities. The Court also strikes
with prejudice the City of Springfield’s affirmative defense under
Monell as to Count IV. Monell v. Department of Social Services of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Complaint’s factual allegations will be treated as true for
the purpose of deciding the present Motion to Strike. Though
these allegations may ultimately prove unsupportable, a proper
affirmative defense either expressly or impliedly treats them as
true but offers some other reason why no liability should attach.
See Bobbitt v. Victorian House, 532 F. Supp. 734, 736 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac.
& Proc. Civ. § 1270 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter Wright & Miller]).
On the afternoon of March 30, 2013, Plaintiff Lucinda White
called Springfield police for assistance with a minor automobile
collision involving her car in the parking lot of the Best Buy store
located at 3192 South Veterans Parkway in Springfield. The first
officer to respond (unnamed in the Complaint) called for assistance
from additional police officers, and Sergeant Higginson and Officer
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Cordes reported to the scene. According to White, despite the fact
that she was acting in a peaceful and non-threatening manner at
all times, and despite the fact that she was approximately eight
months pregnant at the time, Sergeant Higginson nevertheless
grabbed her, tasered her, and caused her to fall to the pavement.
Sergeant Higginson and Officer Cordes then arrested White, filing
charges of aggravated battery and resisting arrest.
In her arrest and subsequent detention at the Sangamon
County Jail, White sustained injuries including physical pain,
physical discomfort, humiliation, indignity, emotional distress, and
lost income. White filed suit against Sergeant Higginson and
Officer Cordes in their individual capacities1 and against the City
of Springfield, enumerating federal claims of excessive force,
White’s Complaint does not specify whether claims are brought
against Sergeant Higginson and Officer Cordes in their individual
or official capacity. Ordinarily, lawsuits filed against city officials
in their official capacity must be treated as suits against the city
itself. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. But White already brings
claims against the City of Springfield itself, so official-capacity
claims against the officers would be redundant. And in any event,
the Defendants’ asserted defense of qualified immunity is not
available against official-capacity claims. See Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980). Accordingly, all parties
appear to accept White’s claims as individual-capacity claims.
Therefore, the Court will assume that White brings her claims
against the officers in their individual capacities.
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1
unreasonable seizure, and a City policy or custom of excessive
force against pregnant arrestees, along with state claims of battery
and false imprisonment. Defendants answered briefly, asserting
defenses of qualified immunity for all Defendants as to all federal
claims and a defense under Monell for the City of Springfield as to
the claim of a policy or custom of excessive force against pregnant
arrestees.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
All pleadings, including defendants’ responsive pleadings,
must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(c). Rule 8(c)(1) lists several affirmative defenses,
including estoppel, laches, statute of limitations, and waiver. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). The list is not exhaustive, however. See Native
Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045 (N.D.
Ill. 2003); 5 Wright & Miller Civ. § 1271.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court may
strike from a pleading “an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Motions to strike
are generally disfavored because such motions often only delay the
proceedings. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc.,
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883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). But if a motion to strike
removes unnecessary clutter from the case, then the motion will
serve to expedite, not delay, the proceedings. Id.
Generally, a court will strike an affirmative defense only if the
defense is insufficient on its face. Heller Fin., 883 F.2d at 1294
(providing that a court will ordinarily not strike an affirmative
defense if it is sufficient as a matter of law or presents questions of
law or fact). Because affirmative defenses are pleadings, they are
subject to the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and must set forth a “short and plain statement” of that
defense. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
Although the Seventh Circuit has not addressed whether the
pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corporation v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009), applies to affirmative defenses, several courts in this
Circuit have found that they do. See Sarkis’ Café, Inc. v. Sarks in
the Park, LLC, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 12 C 9686, 2014 WL
3018002, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2014) (citing cases). These courts
have examined whether a defendant has stated an “affirmative
defense to relief that is plausible on its face.” SEC v. Sachdeva,
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No. 10-C-747, 2011 WL 933967, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. Mar. 16, 2011).
However, whether the Twombly–Iqbal pleading standard applies
likely makes little difference. Factual allegations that were
sufficient before Twombly and Iqbal will likely still be sufficient,
and “bare bones” affirmative defenses have always been
insufficient. See Shield Techs. Corp. v. Paradigm Positioning, LLC,
No. 11 C 6183, 2012 WL 4120440, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2012).
In any event, if an affirmative defense is defective, leave to amend
should be freely granted as justice requires under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a). See Heller Fin., 883 F.2d at 1294.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Defendants Higginson and Cordes have given White
adequate notice of the defense of qualified immunity.
Defendants Higginson and Cordes assert the defense of
qualified immunity against White’s claims of excessive force and
unreasonable seizure. White moves to strike this defense on the
grounds that Defendants’ Answer denies White’s allegations but
contains no factual allegations of its own to support the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity. (See Pl.’s Mot. Strike Affirmative
Defense, d/e 6 at 1.)
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Ordinarily, “an affirmative defense cannot merely repeat a
defendant’s denial of the allegations contained in the complaint.”
Sarkis’ Café, Inc., 2014 WL 3018002, at *4. The defense of
qualified immunity is different, however, because, once presented
with a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden
to prove that (1) the defendants’ actions violated federal
constitutional rights, and (2) “the constitutional standards
implicated were clearly established at the time in question.”
Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (providing two-step
qualified immunity analysis).
Here, Defendants Higginson and Cordes have put White on
notice of their asserted defense of qualified immunity, satisfying
the purpose undergirding Rule 8’s requirement of a “short and
plain statement” of the defense. Higginson and Cordes have
directly denied White’s allegations in Paragraphs 15 and 16 of her
Complaint, which allege the “unnecessary and unreasonable” use
of force and incarceration “without cause.” (See Answer, d/e 5 at
4.) Higginson and Cordes have also directly asserted the defense of
qualified immunity. (See id. at 6–7.) Having been given adequate
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notice of the defense at this stage, White now bears the burden to
overcome the defense. Moreover, a motion under Rule 12(f) is
usually “not a good fit for resolving issues like qualified immunity
which often turn on facts yet to be developed.” Atkins v. Pickard,
298 F. App’x 512, 513 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, White’s Motion
to Strike is denied as to Defendants Higginson and Cordes’s
qualified immunity defense.
B.
The defense of qualified immunity is not available to
Defendant City of Springfield as a municipal corporation.
In its Defense A to Count IV, the City of Springfield asserts
the defense of qualified immunity against White’s claim that the
City maintains a policy or custom of excessive force against
pregnant arrestees, stating that it is “entitled to qualified immunity
for its officers’ actions with respect to the Plaintiff.” (See Answer,
d/e 5 at 8.) White moves to strike this defense on the grounds that
the Answer denies White’s allegations but contains no factual
allegations of its own to support the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity. (See Pl.’s Mot. Strike Affirmative Defense, d/e 6 at 1.)
The City of Springfield’s affirmative defense of qualified
immunity must be struck, not because the City has given
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insufficient notice of the defense asserted, but because qualified
immunity is not available to municipal corporations.
“[M]unicipalities have no immunity from damages flowing from
their constitutional violations,” Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 657 (1980), and a “municipality may not assert the good
faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983.”
Id. at 638.
Because the defense of qualified immunity is unavailable to a
municipality as a matter of law, the City of Springfield’s Affirmative
Defense A to Count IV is struck with prejudice.
C.
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York
affords Defendant City of Springfield no immunity for an
unconstitutional policy or custom.
In its Defense B to Count IV, the City of Springfield asserts a
defense under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New
York, stating that the City “is not liable under [§ 1983] for the acts
or omissions of others.” (See Answer, d/e 5 at 8.) White moves to
strike this defense on the grounds that the Complaint contains
allegations that the City of Springfield has a pervasive and
unconstitutional policy or custom of allowing and condoning its
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police officers’ use of excessive force against pregnant arrestees.
(See Pl.’s Mot. Strike Affirmative Defense, d/e 6 at 3.)
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality cannot
be held liable for its employees’ conduct under a theory of
respondeat superior or any other principle of vicarious liability.
436 U.S. at 691. Rather, a municipality is liable under § 1983 only
where the execution of its own policy or custom directly inflicts the
constitutional injury. Id. at 694; see also Eversole, 59 F.3d at 715
(“Monell and its progeny stand for the proposition that a local
governmental entity will be responsible for the unconstitutional
actions of its employees only if those actions were taken pursuant
to official policy or custom.”).
Here, White has properly alleged that her injuries flow from
the City of Springfield’s unconstitutional policy or custom of
allowing and condoning its police officers’ use of excessive force
against pregnant arrestees. Against this claim, Monell affords no
defense. To the contrary, Monell stands for the precise proposition
that a municipality is directly liable for maintaining an
unconstitutional policy or custom. If the City meant to say that
respondeat superior liability is not available under Monell, that
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affirmative defense is unnecessary. White specifically does not
allege that the City of Springfield is vicariously liable for Sergeant
Higginson and Officer Cordes’s actions under the principle of
respondeat superior. Because Monell specifically recognizes
White’s theory of the City of Springfield’s liability—maintaining an
unconstitutional policy or custom—Monell affords the City no
defense as a matter of law. Accordingly, the City of Springfield’s
Affirmative Defense B to Count IV is struck with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Motion to Strike Defendants’
Affirmative Defenses (d/e 6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. The Court does not strike Defendants Higginson and
Cordes’s affirmative defense of qualified immunity as to Count I,
Count II, and Count III. The Court strikes both Defendant City of
Springfield’s defense of qualified immunity (Defense A) and defense
under Monell (Defense B) as to Count IV with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER: December 22, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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