Mackel v. Jumper et al

Filing 48

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/12/16. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike 45 is GRANTED as detailed above. Defendants' Motion for Leave to File Documents Under Seal 37 is GRANTED. Defendants' Motion for S ummary Judgment 36 is GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. Allpending motions not addressed in this Opinion are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. (SW, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 12 July, 2016 11:23:45 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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SHAN JUMPER, et al.
)
Defendants. )
DAVID MACKEL,

14-3114

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently civilly committed at
Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility, brought the present
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourteenth
Amendment Claims for failure to provide adequate mental health
treatment. The matter comes before this Court for ruling on the
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 36). The
motion is granted.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Motion to File Documents Under Seal (Doc. 37)
Defendants filed a Motion to File Documents under seal. (Doc.
37). Defendants seek to file a copy of Plaintiff’s treatment records
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from Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility under seal.
Plaintiff has not opposed this motion.
Nonetheless, the Court must make its own determination as to
whether good cause exists for sealing the record. See Bond v.
Utreras, 585 F.3d 106, 1068 (7th Cir. 2009); Citizens First National
Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 944 (7th
Cir. 1999)(court must makes its own determination whether good
cause exists for sealing the record, despite the parties’ agreement);
CDIL Local Rule 5.10(2)(“The Court does not approve of the filing of
documents under seal as a general matter. A party who has a legal
basis for filing a document under seal without a prior court order
must electronically file a motion for leave to file under seal.”).
Upon review, the documents in question detail Plaintiff’s
mental health treatment and diagnosis for the relevant time period.
The documents also contain tangential information not relevant to
these proceedings and disclosure of this information into the public
realm serves no legitimate interest. Accordingly, Defendants’
Motion for Leave to File is granted. (Doc. 37).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Response. (Doc. 45). In this
motion, Plaintiff seeks to strike his previous response to the
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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 43). The
Defendants have raised no objection to this motion. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s motion is granted to the extent that it seeks the Court to
consider only the response filed on January 21, 2016. (Doc. 46).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
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FACTS
Plaintiff is civilly committed at Rushville Treatment and
Detention Facility (“Rushville” or “TDF”) pursuant to the Illinois
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. §
207/1 et seq. At all times relevant, the Defendants were employed
at the TDF and part of Plaintiff’s treatment team.
Treatment at the TDF is voluntary. A resident must consent
to treatment before treatment can begin and may withdraw such
consent at any time by notifying TDF officials that he no longer
consents or by not attending treatment sessions. Generally
speaking, each stage in the treatment plan is designed to
incorporate and apply skills learned during previous stages of
treatment. Advancement through the program is determined on an
individualized basis.
This lawsuit revolves around Plaintiff’s enrollment in, and
subsequent removal from, a treatment group known as Disclosure
Group. UMF 106. The Defendants were the co-facilitators of this
particular group, and Plaintiff’s enrollment began in 2011. UMFs
37-38. Plaintiff does not dispute the majority of undisputed facts
presented by the Defendants. Compare (Doc. 36), with (Doc. 46).
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Beginning in the early part of 2012, Plaintiff’s treatment team
noted that Plaintiff seemed receptive to feedback from others, but
continued to struggle with certain aspects of his treatment. In
particular, Plaintiff struggled with thinking errors and minimization
of the harm that he caused. UMFs 41, 42. Plaintiff was also
encouraged to refrain from using inappropriate humor and making
side comments while others were speaking during group sessions.
UMF 43. Plaintiff showed some improvement during 2012, but his
treatment team noted that he continued to struggle with engrained
distortions and a lack of accountability. UMFs 48, 50-55.
In October 2012, Plaintiff became less receptive to feedback
following a change in his housing situation that resulted in the
reassignment of his long-time roommate. Plaintiff demonstrated
increased defensive behavior, lack of accountability, and disruptive
group behavior. UMFs 56-58. Plaintiff also missed a Disclosure
Group session. UMF 59.
Defendants addressed Plaintiff’s behavior and informed him of
his group members’ frustrations with his conduct.1 UMF 60.
Plaintiff disputes allegations regarding his romantic involvement with a
former roommate, but does not dispute that these concerns were
communicated to him. See (Doc. 46, ¶ 60).
1

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Plaintiff thereafter identified treatment goals to work on and agreed
to a two-week probationary period to work on same.2 UMFs 62, 63.
Plaintiff failed to show progress towards these goals during his
probationary period and was thereafter referred to the Power to
Change Group. UMFs 64-67.
Plaintiff’s participation in Disclosure Group was deferred
pending successful completion of the Power to Change group. UMF
74. Defendants made this decision because, in their opinion,
Plaintiff could reap no further benefits from Disclosure Group until
he addressed underlying issues the Power to Change group was
designed to address. UMF 68, 69-71. Plaintiff’s treatment status
did not change as a result of this referral—he retained a primary
therapist and was still receiving treatment. UMF 72.
Plaintiff attended one session of the Power to Change group
in November 2012. UMF 79. Several times thereafter, he indicated
a desire to withdraw consent for treatment and demonstrated this
desire by failing to attend group sessions in December 2012 and
January 2013. UMFs 77, 78, 82, 84. Plaintiff was placed on nonPlaintiff does not dispute that these goals were made, but states that he only
told Defendants what “they wanted to hear to get them off my back.” See (Doc.
46, ¶ 62).
2

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treatment status in January 2013 for failure to participate in any
treatment offering. UMF 85.
Plaintiff reengaged in the treatment process in March 2013 by
enrolling in Tactics group. UMF 86. He continued to participate in
some group treatment through May 2013, including the Power to
Change group, but he later withdrew from that group. UMFs 87-89.
After completion of Tactics group, Plaintiff stopped participating in
groups. UMFs 90-91.
Plaintiff was moved to non-treatment status in June 2013.
UMF 92. Plaintiff admits that he has “pretty much” been on nontreatment status since that time. UMF 156. Plaintiff admits his
treatment team has discussed with him a plan to reengage in
treatment, but Plaintiff is not currently participating in sex-offender
treatment. UMFs 157-166.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff is entitled to adequate treatment for his serious
mental disorder, as determined by an appropriate professional
exercising professional judgment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (decisions by professionals working at mental
health institution are afforded deference and violate the
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Constitution only if professional judgment not exercised). Plaintiff
is not entitled to dictate the treatment he receives. Plaintiff's
constitutional rights are violated only if the treatment decisions are
a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.”
Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s removal from Disclosure Group was not a rash
decision. Plaintiff demonstrated behavior that the Defendants
deemed detrimental to his progress in treatment, and the
Defendants attempted to address those problems with Plaintiff
before any decision to remove him from Disclosure Group was
made.
After several months of demonstrated detrimental behavior,
the Defendants placed Plaintiff on a probationary status with the
understanding that unless Plaintiff showed improvement in specific
areas his participation in Disclosure Group would be deferred.
Plaintiff did not show improvement and now admits that he only
agreed to the specified goals to “get [the defendants] off his back.”
(Doc. 46, ¶ 62). Only then was Plaintiff removed from Disclosure
Group.

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At that point, the Defendants outlined what Plaintiff needed to
do to return. Plaintiff appeared agreeable to that route at first, but
later withdrew his consent to create some form of negotiating
leverage to dictate the specific type of treatment he wanted. Pl.’s
Dep. 58:23-59:4. From that point on, Plaintiff’s participation in
treatment was sporadic at best.
Nothing in the record now suggests that the Defendants failed
to exercise appropriate professional discretion in making the
treatment decisions that ultimately led to this lawsuit. Accordingly,
the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that the
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike [45] is GRANTED as detailed
above.
2) Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Documents Under
Seal [37] is GRANTED.
3) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [36] is
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed in this Opinion are denied
as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to
bear their own costs.
4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
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entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:

July 12, 2016.

FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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