Sigler v. United States of America

Filing 10

OPINION: Petitioner Laura Sigler's Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody 4 is DENIED. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 8/25/2015. (GL, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 26 August, 2015 10:36:45 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LAURA J. SIGLER,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent.
)

No. 14-3166

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Before the Court is Petitioner Laura Sigler’s Amended Motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by
a Person in Federal Custody (d/e 4). Because the Motion is
untimely and is not subject to equitable tolling, the Motion is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2012, a single-count indictment was filed that
charged the Petitioner with one count of knowingly using a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a
visual depiction of such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)

Page 1 of 15

and (e). See Sigler v. United States, No. 3:12-cr-30038 (C.D. Ill.)
(“Criminal Case”), Indictment, d/e 9. On December 6, 2012, the
Petitioner pled guilty before Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore to
the indictment pursuant to a written Plea Agreement. See Criminal
Case, Plea Agreement, d/e 28. Following the guilty plea, the
Petitioner was sentenced to the custody of the United States Bureau
of Prisons for 262 months on April 15, 2013, and judgment was
entered on April 17, 203. See Criminal Case, Judgment, d/e 45.
The Petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal of her sentence
within her deadline to appeal of May 1, 2013, 14 days after entry of
judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i)). However, the Petitioner
did send several letters to the Court beginning on August 2, 2013.
See Criminal Case, Letters from Def., d/e 50, 54, 56. In the
Petitioner’s first letter to the Court, she stated that she wished to
appeal her sentence because her counsel had been ineffective and
she was not in the right state of mind to fully understand the
ramifications of her plea agreement. See Criminal Case, Letter from
Def., d/e 50. The Petitioner also stated that she told her attorney
that she wished to appeal, but that he responded that she had
waived her appeal rights in her plea agreement and that the appeals
Page 2 of 15

deadline had passed. Id. Furthermore, the Petitioner complained
that she received an unfair sentence compared to her co-defendant
and that she should have been examined by a psychiatrist prior to
sentencing. Id. Lastly, she requested that an attorney be appointed
to help her file an appeal based on the case of Alleyne v. United
States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which held that any
factor that increases a defendant’s statutory minimum sentence
must be decided by a jury. Id.
The Court ordered the parties to respond to the issues raised
in the Petitioner’s letter. Criminal Case, Text Order of Aug. 2, 2013.
Both the Government and the Petitioner’s attorney stated that the
Court did not have jurisdiction in the criminal case to address the
Petitioner’s complaints, as the appeals period had passed. Criminal
Case, Resp. Letters, d/e 52, 53. After reviewing the parties’
responses, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen the
Petitioner’s case and instead directed the Clerk of Court to send the
Petitioner a form to submit a § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct a Sentence. Criminal Case, Text Order of Aug. 26, 2013.
The Petitioner did not file a § 2255 motion at that time.
Instead, she sent a second letter to the Court on October 17, 2013,
Page 3 of 15

requesting any transcripts that might exist for her case. Criminal
Case, Letter from Def., d/e 54. On January 28, 2014, the Petitioner
sent another letter re-raising many of the same issues that she
raised in her first letter and requesting an extension of time to file
an appeal. Criminal Case, Letter from Def., d/e 55. The Court
issued an opinion holding that the Petitioner’s appeal deadline of
May 1, 2013, had long passed and that she had not requested an
extension within the required time period. Criminal Case, Op. of
Jan. 28, 2014, d/e 57. The Court again directed the Clerk of Court
to send the Petitioner a § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct a Sentence form. The Petitioner still did not file her § 2255
Motion at that time. Instead, she sent another letter to the Court
on February 10, 2014, in which she argued that she received an
unfair sentence because the Court had a conflict of interest because
it sentenced both the Petitioner and her co-defendant. Criminal
Case, Letter from Def., d/e 56.
On June 3, 2014, the Petitioner opened this case by filing a
Motion Under § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a
Person under Federal Custody. Mot., d/e 1. In addition to the
arguments raised in the letters the Petitioner previously mailed to
Page 4 of 15

the Court in her criminal case, the Petitioner claims in her habeas
motion that she was not aware that she could testify on her own
behalf. Am. Mot., d/e 4. The Petitioner’s original motion was not
signed and did not clearly state what relief the Petitioner was
seeking, so on September 23, 2014, the Court ordered the Petitioner
to file a corrected habeas motion by November 10, 2014, or face
dismissal of her case. See Text Order of Sept. 23, 2014. In
response to the Court’s order, the Petitioner filed a second § 2255
Motion on October 14, 2014. Mot., d/e 3. However, the Petitioner
again failed to complete the last page of the Motion and failed to
sign the Motion. See id. at 13. The Court again ordered the
Petitioner to submit a completed § 2255 Motion by November 10,
2014, or face dismissal of her case. Text Order of Oct. 15, 2014.
The Petitioner submitted her Amended Motion on October 30,
2014. Am. Mot., d/e 4. After seeking two extensions, the
Government filed a Response to the Petitioner’s Amended Motion on
February 3, 2015. See Government’s Resp. to/Mot. to Dismiss
Pet’r’s § 2255 Motion, d/e 8. The Government argued that the
Petitioner’s Motion should be denied both because it was filed
outside the one-year statute of limitations and because it was
Page 5 of 15

barred by the waiver of collateral attack contained within the
Petitioner’s Plea Agreement. See id. at 5-6; Criminal Case, Plea
Agreement, d/e 28 ¶ 23. The Petitioner’s original date for filing a
reply was March 6, 2015. See Text Order of Jan. 26, 2015. After
the Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply on
February 20, 2015 (d/e 9), the Court granted the Petitioner an
extension until March 20, 2009 to file her reply. Text Order of Feb.
23, 2015. However, the Petitioner never filed a reply.
II. ANALYSIS
A §2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence
may be brought by a “prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released
upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(a). A
one-year period of limitation applies to § 2255 petitions. The oneyear period begins to run from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
Page 6 of 15

the movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)-(4).
Here, subsection (1) is the only subsection that could apply, as
there was no impediment to filing an application created by
governmental action, the Petitioner is not asserting a newly
recognized constitutional right, and the Petitioner has not alleged
that there was a later, post-sentencing date on which the factual
predicate of the Petitioner’s claims could have been discovered.
Therefore, the limitations period ran from one year after the date
the Petitioner’s judgment became final. The Petitioner’s conviction
and sentence became final on May 1, 2013, but she did not file her
§ 2255 motion until June 3, 2014, more than one year later,
outside the statute of limitations. As a result, the Petitioner’s
motion is barred unless it is subject to equitable tolling.
Page 7 of 15

Equitable tolling can allow a Court to hear an untimely § 2255
motion, but the doctrine only applies in limited circumstances.
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645, 650 (2010). Equitable tolling
saves an otherwise untimely habeas petition if the petitioner can
establish that (1) she had been pursuing her rights diligently, and
(2) some extraordinary circumstance prevented her from filing her
petition on time. Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
The extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely filing must
have been “far beyond the litigant’s control.” United States v.
Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the
Petitioner must show that she acted with reasonable diligence
during the entire period of time she seeks to have tolled. See id.;
Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2nd Cir. 2000); Valverde v.
Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000) (the petitioner must
show diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary
circumstances began; if he does not do so, “the link of causation
between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is
broken, and the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not
prevent timely filing”). Because of these strict standards,

Page 8 of 15

“[e]quitable tolling is rarely granted.” Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d
732, 734 (7th Cir. 2008).
The United States Supreme Court analyzed the level of activity
required to constitute diligence in Holland v. Florida. 560 U.S. at
650-54; see also Taylor v. Michael, 724 F.3d 806, 810-11 (7th Cir.
2013) (commenting that Holland illustrates a diligent pursuit of
rights in the face of extraordinary circumstances in the habeas
context). In Holland, the attorney appointed to represent the
petitioner in all state and federal postconviction proceedings failed
to timely file the petitioner’s federal habeas petition and was
unaware of when the limitations period expired. Holland, 560 U.S.
at 635-36, 652. The Supreme Court noted that these facts alone
might suggest simple negligence, which does not warrant tolling the
period of limitation. Id. at 652. However, the attorney also failed to
(1) timely file the petition despite the petitioner’s repeated letters
emphasizing the importance to do so and identifying the applicable
legal rules; (2) inform the petitioner when the state supreme court
decided his case, despite the petitioner’s many requests for that
information; and (3) communicate with his client over a period of
years, despite the petitioner’s numerous requests that counsel
Page 9 of 15

respond to the petitioner’s letters. Id. The Court found that the
attorney’s failures prejudiced the petitioner because the petitioner
lost his one opportunity to challenge his imprisonment and death
sentence by way of a federal habeas petition. Id. at 653.
In ruling in favor of the petitioner, the Court noted the
petitioner’s diligence, which included writing numerous letters to
his attorney and contacting the state courts and their clerks in an
effort to have his attorney removed from his case. Id. In addition,
when the petitioner learned of the expiration of his one-year statute
of limitations five weeks after it passed, he immediately wrote out
his own pro se habeas petition and mailed it to the court the next
day. Id. The Supreme Court found that this level of diligence was
sufficient to equitably toll the limitations period, such that the
petitioner’s habeas motion could be considered by the district court,
even though it had been filed five weeks after the expiration of the
one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 653-54.
In contrast to Holland, the petitioner in Taylor, who similarly
had trouble communicating with his attorney, failed to demonstrate
diligent pursuit of his rights. Taylor, 724 F.3d at 811. In Taylor,
the petitioner made several unsuccessful attempts to contact his
Page 10 of 15

attorney about filing a habeas motion. Id. However, unlike the
petitioner in Holland, the petitioner in Taylor did not show that he
made a substantial effort to become familiar with the timeliness
requirements, which resulted in him not filing his petition until
three months after his filing window had closed. Id. Additionally,
the petitioner failed to make any effort to confirm the due date of
his federal habeas petition despite having several months to do so.
Id. Finally, although the Court recognized that the petitioner likely
was not familiar with the law, the court found that a lack of
familiarity with the law is not a circumstance that justifies equitable
tolling. Id. (citing Tucker, 538 F.3d at 735).
Here, the Petitioner would need to equitably toll a sufficient
period of time between May 1, 2013 and June 3, 2014, when the
Petitioner filed her federal habeas petition, to bring her filing within
the one-year limitations period. Even though the Petitioner filed her
petition only slightly more than one month beyond her one-year
deadline, the Court cannot equitably toll the Petitioner’s limitations
period to make her filing timely. The Petitioner has shown neither
that she was diligently pursuing her rights nor that some
extraordinary circumstance prevented her from filing her federal
Page 11 of 15

habeas petition on time. Unlike the petitioner in Holland, the
Petitioner has not shown that she was diligent regarding her habeas
petition’s due date, that she previously sought assurance that her
claims would be preserved for habeas review, nor that her attorney
disadvantaged her in filing a habeas petition. The Petitioner took
no action until over three months after her sentence became final,
at which point she sent a letter to the Court complaining about her
attorney. See Criminal Case, Letter from Def., d/e 50. Her other
letters also do not demonstrate diligence either, as the letters
simply repeated her earlier complaints and continued to not follow
the proper procedure that the Court had presented to the Petitioner
by mailing her the habeas motion form. See Criminal Case, Letter
from Def., d/e 54, 56.
The Petitioner claimed that her attorney disadvantaged her in
not filing an appeal, but attorney negligence is generally not an
extraordinary circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling. See
Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to
equitably toll the period of limitations for a petitioner whose
attorney missed the filing deadline by one day due to mental
incapacity); Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 566 (7th Cir.
Page 12 of 15

2001) (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the limitations period
should be equitably tolled because the delays were due to an
incompetent attorney). A client, even one who is incarcerated, must
oversee and take responsibility for her attorney’s actions and
failures. Modrowski, 322 F.3d at 968. The Petitioner also cannot
claim that her lack of representation during post-judgment
proceedings prevented her from filing her habeas petitions, as a
petitioner’s lack of legal expertise and counsel during the applicable
period does not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting
equitable tolling. See, e.g., Tucker, 538 F.3d at 735 (“[S]tanding
alone, lack of legal expertise is not a basis for invoking equitable
tolling.”); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1999)
(“[N]either a plaintiff’s unfamiliarity with the legal process nor his
lack of representation during the applicable filing period merits
equitable tolling.”).
The Court acknowledges that the Petitioner did make some
attempt to pursue her rights by sending several letters to the Court
in her criminal case. However, the Court twice sent habeas motion
forms to the Petitioner, and the Petitioner did not promptly file her
habeas motion. In the latter of the Court’s orders to send a habeas
Page 13 of 15

motion to the Petitioner, the Court expressly warned the Petitioner
to be aware of the one-year statute of limitations imposed on
habeas petitions. See Criminal Case, Op. of Jan. 28, 2014, d/e 57
at 5-6. The Petitioner still did not submit her motion until more
than four months later. The Court finds that such a delay cannot
be considered “diligence,” and that the Petitioner’s efforts were
instead comparable to the unsuccessful attempts of the petitioner
in Taylor. Because the Petitioner has shown neither that
extraordinary circumstances outside her control prevented her from
timely filing her petition nor that she diligently pursued her claim,
the Petitioner’s motion cannot be subject to equitable tolling. As a
result, the Petitioner’s petition is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255
Proceedings For the United States District Courts, this Court
declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. Reasonable jurists
would not dispute that this action is barred by the applicable period
of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

Page 14 of 15

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Laura Sigler’s
Amended Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (d/e 4) is
DENIED. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

ENTER: August 25, 2015.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 15 of 15