Roof v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 18

OPINION: Roof's Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 11 ) is DENIED and the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Affirmance (d/e 16 ) is GRANTED. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/22/2016. (ME, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 22 March, 2016 04:03:07 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
GERALD LEE ROOF,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.
)

No. 14-cv-3189

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Gerald Lee Roof appeals from the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of Roof’s application for supplemental
security income. Having reviewed the record and the briefs, the
Court finds that the decision denying Roof’s application was
supported by substantial evidence. Roof’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 11) is DENIED. The Commissioner’s Motion for
Summary Affirmance (d/e 16) is GRANTED, and the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

Page 1 of 29

I.

Background
Roof is 29 years old. He applied for supplemental social

security income on September 30, 2011. Roof alleged that he is
disabled under Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. The
Act defines disability as the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment or combination of impairments that can be
expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
On January 30, 2013, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane
Raese Flebbe held a video hearing and heard testimony from Roof,
Roof’s psychotherapist Ron Kanwischer, and vocational expert
Amanda Ortman.
A.

Roof’s testimony

At the hearing, Roof testified that “stress” and “pressure and
having to be places at a certain time and accomplish things in a
certain timeframe” provoke in him “severe anxiety that leads to
nausea and vomiting” (R. 63). Roof testified that he has “lots” of
obsessions: “it’s hard for me to walk through doors certain ways”;
“It’s hard for me to say certain words or talk about certain types of
Page 2 of 29

things.”; “I have to … close door handles a certain way. … if I don’t
… my anxiety skyrockets and it turns into severe anxiety and that’s
what gets me to not be able … to do anything” (R. 64). Roof
explained that attempts to neutralize his thoughts or compulsions
are not often successful: his thoughts “trigger the compulsions and
the compulsions trigger more thoughts and it’s just a big cycle of
obsessions and compulsions” (R. 64-65). Roof testified, “I have to
wash my hands a certain way. It takes me … three to five minutes.
I’ve got to wash my hands a certain way, shake them off a certain
way, dry them a certain way, exit the bathroom a certain way. And
if I mess any of those up it starts all over again. … I have to do it all
over again until I feel like I got it right” (R. 67) Roof said that he
cannot usually deal with anything else while he is having his
thoughts or compulsions: “Anything that I would be doing would
take five times as long … if I were to finish it [at all] because a lot of
the time[] … I’ll get frustrated and shut myself down trying to deal
with the obsessions and compulsions and the feelings of extreme
anxiety that I’m having” (R. 69).
Roof sought treatment for his symptoms in 2008. Roof
testified that he sought treatment because “I wasn’t able to get out
Page 3 of 29

of bed for, you know, sometimes a day and a half. I didn’t leave the
house … sometimes at all for a week” (R. 63). After several years of
treatment, Roof testified, his condition has improved, though he is
“afraid to backslide back to that” (R. 63, 65). “[O]ne of my biggest
concerns,” Roof said, “is the possibility [of my worst symptoms]
coming back” (R. 78).
Roof testified that he attended high school but did not finish
11th grade (R. 60); that he has no special vocational training (R.
61); that he previously worked part-time doing dishes and making
pizza while in school (R. 69-70); that he has been volunteering at a
local radio station for about 10 years (R. 61); that he volunteers at
the station once a week for 3 hours at a time (R. 62); and that he
has not tried to work anywhere besides the station since 2003 (R.
70, 80).
Roof testified that he lives alone in a house; that he drives 6
days a week; that he goes to the grocery store; that he cooks food in
the microwave; that he generally does not vacuum, mow his yard,
or shovel snow; and that his grandfather usually does his laundry
(R. 71-72).

Page 4 of 29

Roof testified that he still misses and has to reschedule
appointments because of his condition, although he has not “so
much” had to miss his scheduled broadcasts at the radio station (R.
65). The radio station, Roof said, is a place where he is “very
comfortable …. It’s one of the only places that I’m actually remotely
what I would describe [as] comfortable in my day-to-day life” (R. 6566).
Roof testified that he sleeps from 2:00 AM to 11:00 AM or
noon—though it is a “relatively restless” sleep (R. 66). On a typical
day, Roof said, “If I’m feeling decent that day I’ll get up … go to the
bathroom … check my text[s] to see if anybody got a hold of me for
anything, watch TV, get a hold of my grandpa … go to Springfield
and hang out with him for a little bit” (R. 66-67). Roof said that he
visits his grandfather 3-4 times per week, and they usually watch
TV and talk (R. 67). But, on some days, Roof said, he “[w]on’t get
out of bed until 5:00 in the afternoon because I’m … worried about
what’s going to happen when I get out of bed and I’m worried about
what I need to do that day” (R. 78).
Roof testified that he has had a girlfriend for almost 2 years (R.
67). They met at a bar in downtown Springfield (R. 72-73). They
Page 5 of 29

see each other daily and often watch TV together (R. 68). Roof said
that his rituals do “get in the way” when he spends time with his
girlfriend: “she’ll be ready to go and I’ll have to – you know, I’ll have
things I have to do before I [leave] the house. … I try not to let it get
out how bad it is … because I don’t want her to think I’m a weirdo.
… I’ll usually let her either go out[side] first or I’ll go out a few
minutes before she does so that I can accomplish … closing the
door a certain way, getting in my car and starting it a certain way
so that she doesn’t see fully … she knows I have these problems but
… I don’t like to bring them up” (R. 68-69).
Roof testified that he does not have any hobbies, but he does
like technology, likes to “read stuff on the Internet” (R. 69), plays
computer Solitaire (R. 74), and maintains an email account and a
Facebook page (R. 73). Roof said he spends a few hours per day on
the computer, and more on his smartphone—perhaps another hour
(R. 74). Roof testified that he goes downtown once a month to see
shows, and that he and his girlfriend go out to eat downtown (R.
73). In the past 2 years, Roof said, he has left Illinois only once: a
trip Indianapolis to see a concert by the heavy metal group Danzig
(R. 75).
Page 6 of 29

The ALJ was plainly skeptical about Roof’s alleged disability.
“[Y]ou’re describing a number of activities that seem like[,] if you
can do those things why wouldn’t you be able to work,” the ALJ
asked Roof (R. 76). “If you can go to a club or a bar or a concert
and be in a group of strangers once a month to hear a band play, if
you and your girlfriend can go out to eat, you get in the car and
drive six days a week, you use the computer and focus and look
things up and read about technology and respond to emails and
answer phone calls and text people, why would I say you’re not able
to work?” (R. 76)
Roof responded, “There’s no pressure there. There’s …
nothing that scares me about certain things like that. … [And] I do
get sick when I go out to places like going to clubs to see concerts. I
will throw up on the way there. I will throw up there. Sometimes I
throw up in the bathroom. … But again there’s no pressure, there’s
no stress … I’m able to do those things because of the lack of stress
and responsibility” (R. 76).
The ALJ prodded Roof further. “If you’re able to manage these
symptoms when you want to in order to see your girlfriend daily …
then why could you not manage them in order to go to work daily if
Page 7 of 29

that was important enough? If it’s important enough to go to a
concert so you’ve learned to deal with some symptoms to
overcome…” (R. 77).
Roof responded, “Well, the dealing with that involves throwing
up. … I don’t hide everything from her …. she still sees it. …
[A]gain there’s not a whole lot of stress or pressure there. We’re
just sitting around watching TV” (R. 77).
B.

Kanwischer’s testimony

Ron Kanwischer—a Clinical Professional Counselor and Roof’s
psychotherapist since 2008—testified that he sees Roof once per
month or so. At first, Kanwischer said, Roof was unable even to
“come in the door because he was out in the parking lot vomiting
because his anxiety was so severe” (R. 42). But after aborting the
first few attempts to meet, Roof was finally able to enter the
building to be evaluated.
Kanwischer testified that in 2008 Roof “probably ha[d] one of
the worst cases of OCD I’ve ever seen,” though Roof’s condition is
“better now” (R. 42, 56). Kanwischer testified that Roof suffers from
an “irrational fear that if he revealed some of his rituals [to his
caregivers] something bad would either happen to his pets or his
Page 8 of 29

family” (R. 42). Also due Roof’s “reluctan[ce]” to share information
with his caregivers, it took time to learn “just how disturbed [Roof]
is in some ways,” and Kanwischer generally speaks to Roof’s
grandfather during each of Roof’s visits “to gain his perspective on
what’s going on” (R. 42). Although Kanwischer was able to identify
some of Roof’s rituals—such as often needing to touch objects with
only the left hand and having to perform a certain ritual upon
seeing a certain word in the newspaper or before entering an
automobile—Kanwischer testified, “I don’t even probably know the
extent of everything that goes on” (R. 43). Kanwischer testified that
Roof missed a recent appointment “because he had to do certain
rituals before he left … [and] couldn’t get out of his apartment door”
(R. 44).
Kanwischer testified that Roof’s growing tension and anxiety
overwhelms him, sometimes leading to vomiting, and that
performing the appropriate ritual relieves the tension (R. 44).
Sometimes, though, “th[e] scenario repeats itself multiple times and
[he] becomes incapacitated” (R. 44). Over time, Kanwischer
testified, Roof’s condition has improved: “He no longer vomits every
time he comes in. He subjectively reports that his ritual behavior is
Page 9 of 29

reduced but it’s still at a point where I think that he’s pretty much
homebound” (R. 45). Pushed on this point, Kanwischer
acknowledged, “[H]e’s not totally incapacitated. He can get out for
hours at a time. [But] what will happen [is] he’ll be able to do brief
st[i]nts, an hour, two hours, three hours, maybe four hours at
most, but then there’s always a ritual involved somewhere and
mostly, again, it involves fear and that something bad will happen”
(R. 46).
Regarding Roof’s ability to work, Kanwischer opined, “What I’m
afraid of … is that it will create a circular pattern of … getting a job
but then losing it and that repeating itself over time to the point
where no employer will hire him because his record will be so poor”
(R. 47). Roof would likely lose any job he were to get, Kanwischer
testified, because Roof “will either not be able to perform a
particular task because he won’t be able to focus or concentrate
because his anxiety will be so high. … He’ll lose the ability to pay
attention to what he’s doing. … [H]e most likely then will leave
whatever environment he’s in to perform the ritual. … [T]hat could
be extremely disruptive … in most job situations” (R. 47).

Page 10 of 29

The ALJ asked Kanwischer how to reconcile the assertion that
Roof is too disabled to work with the fact that Roof engages in
activities such as volunteering at the radio station and going out
with a girlfriend—activities that in the ALJ’s view “reflect … maybe
still some problems but they don’t reflect much more than
moderate” (R. 49). Kanwischer responded that Roof “finds unique
circumstances that he can function in. … He is able to sustain
these kinds of activities for hours at a time … but sustaining much
[more] interaction with people, with doing things he’s not familiar
with … produces a lot more anxiety” (R. 50).
The ALJ asked Kanwischer, “[W]hat would be the problem with
having a job where he worked independently … not part of a team,
not doing work where … other people were waiting down the line for
his work to be finished … if he had an independent job [without]
public contact … and [he] was not a member of a team but worked
on his own duties[?]” (R. 50-51). Kanwischer responded that such a
job “would make intuitive sense,” but that Roof’s anxiety varies
from week to week, sometimes preventing him from leaving the
house (R. 51-52). Kanwischer testified that even an unskilled job
involving no public interaction “would work against [Roof]. I think
Page 11 of 29

that what would happen is most likely he would fail in it and then
fall into this kind of repeated pattern of failing…” (R. 58).
C.

Ortman’s testimony

The ALJ asked Vocational Expert Amanda Ortman to assume
that Roof has moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or
pace and is limited to jobs that do not require complex or detailed
job processes and have little in the way of change in job process
from day to day. The ALJ also asked Ortman to assume that the
work should not involve fast-paced hourly production demands, but
only daily outputs, and that the work should not involve more than
occasional interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.
Ortman testified that a substantial number of jobs exist that
someone like Roof could perform, such as dining room attendant,
kitchen helper, and order clerk. Ortman testified that, if Roof were
further limited to no interaction at all with the public, he would not
be able to perform the order clerk position, but he could still
perform the jobs of dining room attendant or kitchen helper, and he
could also perform the job of a shipping and routing clerk. Ortman
further testified that a limitation that Roof should work
independently and not on a team would not eliminate his ability to
Page 12 of 29

perform any of those jobs. But, Ortman said, Roof would not be
able to perform those jobs if Roof: (a) would be likely to miss 2 or
more days of work per month; (b) were off task for 20 percent or
more of the day; or (c) were to miss 2 hours of work once per week
on average.
D.

The ALJ’s findings

The ALJ found that Roof has not been disabled as defined by
the Social Security Act since Roof filed his application for disability
benefits on September 30, 2011. In reaching this finding, the ALJ
used the traditional 5-step evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920.
At Step 1, the ALJ found that Roof has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since September 30, 2011. At Step 2,
the ALJ found that Roof has severe impairments in the form of
generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder.
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Roof does not have an
impairment or a combination of impairments that meet or medically
equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ found that Roof has a “mild
restriction” in the “activities of daily living,” and “moderate
Page 13 of 29

difficulties” in “social functioning” and “concentration, persistence
or pace” (R. 18).
At Step 4, the ALJ found that Roof has the residual
functioning capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional
levels with the following limitations: because of his mental
impairments and symptoms, Roof may during times of symptom
exacerbation have moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace when attempting complex or detailed tasks—
limiting Roof to jobs that do not require complex or detailed job
processes, that have little day-to-day change in job process, that
involve daily output quotas rather than fast-paced production
demands, and that involve only occasional work interaction with
the general public, coworkers, and supervisors. The ALJ also found
that Roof does not have any past relevant work.
Finally, at Step 5, the ALJ found that jobs exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Roof can perform, given his
age, education, work experience, and residual functioning capacity.
(See the vocational expert’s testimony described above.)
Essentially, the ALJ determined that Roof’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause
Page 14 of 29

Roof’s claimed symptoms—but that Roof’s statements regarding the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were
not fully credible. In the ALJ’s view, the evidence did not support
the degree of limitation Roof alleged. The ALJ noted that Roof lives
independently, drives 6 days a week, goes to the grocery store,
volunteers at a radio station, uses his smartphone and computer
for 4 hours a day, visits his grandfather 3-4 times a week, has a
girlfriend whom he met at a bar and with whom he goes out to eat
occasionally and to a show monthly—and that his reported stress
and vomiting does not stop him from these activities, nor from
traveling to Indianapolis to see a concert as he had done 6 months
before the hearing. “It appears,” the ALJ wrote, “[that Roof] is able
to function in public, even in larger venues and among strangers,
when he chooses”; that Roof could “manipulate a fair amount” of
the “symptoms/actions” in his life; and that Roof’s condition had
“improved with medication management and therapy” (R. 22).
In reaching her conclusions, the ALJ did not accept Dr.
Kanwischer’s opinion that Roof could perform no work. The
treatment reports, the ALJ wrote, “show [that Roof] is doing better
than alleged”—and Dr. Kanwischer’s testimony that Roof cannot
Page 15 of 29

leave home for a week at a time and cannot get out of bed for a day
or so was not supported by the treatment reports in the record or
by Roof’s own testimony at the hearing (R. 23). The ALJ also gave
significant weight to Roof’s “global assessment of functioning” (GAF)
scores, which had “remained consistently in the mild to moderate
range” (R. 22). Roof, the ALJ concluded, did not meet his burden of
presenting credible evidence that he is unable to perform and
sustain full-time work.
Regarding Roof’s employment opportunities, the ALJ found
that Roof is capable of making a successful adjustment to work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The ALJ
noted that the vocational expert had identified jobs that someone
with Roof’s vocational profile and residual functioning capacity
could perform—jobs that do not involve fast-paced hourly
production demands, day-to-day change, or complex or detailed job
processes, and that involve only occasional interaction with the
public, co-workers, and supervisors.
Roof appealed the ALJ’s decision, but the Appeals Council
denied the appeal, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of
the Commissioner.
Page 16 of 29

II.

Legal Standard
On appeal, the Court assesses whether the Commissioner’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence
is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate” to support the decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). If the Commissioner’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute
its own judgment. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir.
1986).
In ruling on a claimant’s application, an ALJ must sufficiently
articulate her evaluation of the evidence so that the reviewing court
may follow the reasoning and confirm that the ALJ considered all
the important evidence. Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 971 (7th
Cir. 1996). In other words, the ALJ must “build an accurate and
logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion.” Clifford v.
Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
III.

Issues
Roof argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Kanwischer’s

opinons, that the ALJ improperly discredited Roof’s testimony, and

Page 17 of 29

that the ALJ erred in making her residual functional capacity
findings and in presenting hypotheticals to the vocational expert.
A.

The ALJ properly rejected Kanwischer’s opinions.

The ALJ rejected Kanwischer’s opinions because the treatment
reports showed Roof doing better than alleged and because Roof’s
actual activities were consistent with his moderate RFC scores and
not consistent with Kanwischer’s testimony. But Roof argues that,
contrary to the ALJ’s finding that the record contradicts
Kanwischer’s opinion, the record actually supports Kanwischer’s
opinion.
Roof says that the ALJ’s finding that Roof’s treatment reports
do not support Kanwisher’s testimony is “simply wrong” (d/e 13 at
17). Roof cites a treatment report from 2011 that describes Roof’s
anxiety as often “incapacitating” (R. 362). However, the word
“incapacitating” in that report is a reference to Roof’s own
description of his symptoms, not the treatment provider’s diagnosis
or evaluation. And indeed, Roof acknowledges that his anxiety
improved with treatment.
But although his anxiety may have improved, Roof says that
his obsessions and compulsions have not improved, and that they
Page 18 of 29

still interfere with his daily activities. It is clear from the record,
Roof says, that he has episodic symptoms that interfere with his
ability: to attend work on a schedule, to focus his attention and
concentration, and to persist and complete needed tasks. Roof
argues that the ALJ’s belief that Roof could “manipulate” his
symptoms was unsupported by any medical evidence and in fact
reveals a failure to understand that mental illness can be episodic—
a common failure that the Seventh Circuit has criticized:
[A] person who suffers from a mental illness will have
better days and worse days, so a snapshot of any single
moment says little about her overall condition. … Even if
we accept the March 2007 treatment note as evidence
that Punzio enjoys a few “good days,” that evidence still
offers no support for the ALJ’s finding that her mental
illness does not prevent her from holding a job. After all,
the vocational expert testified that no employer would
hire Punzio to perform unskilled work if her mental
illness limits her abilities even just 20 percent of the
time—or if she experiences as few as three “bad days” a
month that cause her to miss work.
Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011). Further, Roof
says, the ALJ compounded her mistake by concluding that one’s
behavior at home is evidence of whether one is employable. Voigt v.
Colvin, 781 F.3d 871, 878 (7th Cir. 2015) (ALJ erred in “thinking
that how one uses his time at home is compelling evidence of
Page 19 of 29

whether or not one is employable”). Just because Roof can perform
certain activities of daily living, Roof says, that does not mean he
can work. Punzio, 630 F.3d at 712.
The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision to credit other
evidence over Kanwischer’s testimony was supported by evidence
that a reasonable person might accept as adequate. Far from
having improperly relied on a “snapshot” of Roof’s condition, the
ALJ observed that Roof’s GAF scores reflected mild-to-moderate
symptoms. As Roof notes, GAF scores address functioning only at a
specific point in time. But Roof’s GAF scores—which indicated
mildly-to-moderately severe limitations—were consistent. The ALJ
reasonably credited the mild-to-moderate severity reflected by the
GAF scores over Hanwischer’s testimony and reasonably considered
the discrepancy between Hanwischer’s testimony and Roof’s
treatment notes. See Perales, 402 U.S. 289 (evidence from
treatment reports can outweigh contrary testimony). In concluding
that Roof’s treatment reports showed he was doing “better than
alleged” (R. 23) and better than as described by Kanwischer, the
ALJ essentially found that a conflict existed between Hanwischer’s
testimony and the medical records—and that this conflict justified a
Page 20 of 29

conclusion that the testimony overstated Roof’s functional
limitations.
Roof also argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently address the
factors required by Social Security Rule 06-3p, including
Kanwischer’s 4-year history with Roof, Kanwischer’s detailed
articulation of and support for the reasons for his opinions, and
Kanwischer’s years of experience and expertise as a counselor. A
proper evaluation of the SSR 06-3p factors, Roof says, would
support Kanwischer’s opinions, not the ALJ’s findings.
But SSR 06-03p does not require ALJs to explicitly discuss
each of the factors used to weigh opinions by a provider who, like
Kanwischer, does not technically qualify as an “acceptable medical
source” under the Rule. Rather, the ALJ “generally should” explain
the weight given to such an opinion so that the reviewing court can
“follow the [ALJ’s] reasoning.” Social Security Rule 06-03p. And
even when evaluating the opinion of a provider who does qualify as
an “acceptable medical source,” the ALJ need only “minimally
articulate[] his reasons—a very deferential standard that [the
Seventh Circuit] has … deemed lax.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408,
415 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Here, the Court finds that
Page 21 of 29

the ALJ sufficiently articulated her reasons for discrediting
Kanwischer’s testimony.
B.

The ALJ provided adequate support for her credibility
finding.

The ALJ found that Roof’s statements regarding the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not fully
credible. Roof argues that this finding was unsupported and is
contrary to law.
The ALJ’s credibility finding must be upheld as long as it is
“not patently wrong, is supported by substantial evidence, and is
sufficiently detailed that [the Court] is able to trace its path of
reasoning.” Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 747 (7th Cir.
2005). The Court shows significant deference to the ALJ’s findings
about witness credibility because “the ALJ is in the best position to
observe witnesses” and the ALJ’s assessment may involve
“inarticulable elements that leave no trace that can be discerned in
[any] transcript.” Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir.
1994) (quotation omitted). The Court will not review the ALJ’s
credibility determinations unless the determinations lack any
explanations or support in the record. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d
Page 22 of 29

408, 413-14 (7th Cir. 2008); Shauger v. Astrue, 675 F.3d 690, 696
(7th Cir. 2012) (ALJ must support credibility findings with evidence
from record). But if a credibility finding rests on objective factors or
on fundamental implausibilities—rather than on a claimant’s
demeanor or other subjective factors—the reviewing court has
“greater freedom” to evaluate the ALJ’s findings. Schomas v.
Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
Here, Roof says, the ALJ’s credibility assessment of Roof was
not based on Roof’s demeanor or other subjective factors—rather, it
was based on Roof’s activities and on the ALJ’s finding that Roof
manipulates his symptoms to do certain activities. Thus, Roof says,
the Court has greater leeway to evaluate the ALJ’s credibility
assessment.
Roof argues that the ALJ evaluated Roof’s daily activities as
the primary factor in determining that Roof was not credible, but
that the ALJ did not analyze the other six factors in Social Security
Rule 96-7p, such as the “location, duration, frequency, and
intensity of the individual’s pain or other symptoms,” and factors
that “precipitate and aggravate the symptoms.” Social Security
Rule 96-7p. In particular, Roof says, the ALJ did not consider
Page 23 of 29

Roof’s problem with rituals and compulsions, which were shown in
the psychiatric treatment notes and Kanwischer’s treatment notes,
and which were the primary focus of the testimony at Roof’s
hearing.
But the ALJ did note the duration, frequency, and intensity of
Roof’s symptoms and the precipitating and aggravating factors of
Roof’s anxiety, in addition to the effectiveness of his treatment, the
psychotherapy Roof received, the measures Roof took to relieve his
symptoms, and Roof’s functional limitations and restrictions caused
by his symptoms (R. 20-21). Further, even if the ALJ had omitted
one or more of the SSR 96-7p factors, omitting “an evidentiary basis
for the credibility finding” is not fatal if “the record provides
adequate support for the ALJ’s credibility finding.” Jens v.
Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 2003). An ALJ complies with
SSR 96-7p if the ALJ states “specific reasons that are supported by
the record” for the credibility finding. Skarbek v. Barnart, 390 F.3d
500, 505 (7th Cir. 2004). Specifically identifying “which [particular]
statements were not credible” is not required. Shideler v. Astrue,
688 F.3d 308, 312 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, the Court finds that the
ALJ provided adequate support for her credibility finding.
Page 24 of 29

Roof also argues that the ALJ’s characterization of his
testimony regarding his daily activities is inaccurate. The ALJ
wrote that Roof reported that he lives independently and is
independent with his personal care, while Roof says that he had
actually reported getting nervous about even changing his clothes
and that his grandfather must remind him to bathe, to change
clothes, and to take his medicine (R. 177-78). But the selfassessment report Roof cites was completed in 2009. In 2011, Roof
reported being able “to do his daily ta[s]ks” and to “take care of
himself” (R. 427). And at the hearing in 2013, Roof testified that,
on a typical day, “If I’m feeling decent that day I’ll get up … go to the
bathroom … check my text[s] to see if anybody got a hold of me for
anything, watch TV, get a hold of my grandpa … go to Springfield
and hang out with him for a little bit” (R. 66-67). Roof also testified
that he drives 6 days per week, sees his girlfriend daily, and goes
grocery shopping and prepares food for himself. It was reasonable
for the ALJ to describe Roof as living independently and being
generally independent with respect to personal care.

Page 25 of 29

C.

The ALJ’s residual functioning capacity assessment
accurately addressed Roof’s limitations.

Roof argues that the ALJ’s residual functioning capacity (RFC)
assessment failed to sufficiently address his functional limitations.
The ALJ found that Roof has moderate limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace when attempting complex or detailed tasks—
limiting Roof to jobs not requiring complex or detailed job
processes. The ALJ’s findings, Roof says, do not address reviewing
state agency psychologist Dr. Lionel Hudspeth’s finding that Roof
had moderate impairment in his ability to tolerate supervision,
maintain regular attendance, or complete work tasks punctually (R.
384-85). Rather, Roof says, the ALJ assumed no impairment in
these areas—perhaps, Roof suspects, due to the ALJ’s assumption
that Roof’s behavior is volitional.
The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC findings are consistent
with the findings of Dr. Hudspeth that Roof cites. The ALJ’s finding
that Roof has moderate limitations with respect to persistence and
pace is analogous to Dr. Hudspeth’s finding that Roof had moderate
impairment in his ability to complete work tasks punctually.
Moreover, Dr. Hudspeth’s recommendation that Roof “would be best
Page 26 of 29

served by having low pressure work assignments” (R. 386) mirrors
the ALJ’s comments almost exactly. Indeed, if anything, the ALJ’s
findings ascribed to Roof a greater degree of limitation than Dr.
Hudspeth’s findings. Dr. Hudspeth concluded that Roof had only
mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning (R. 380), whereas
the ALJ found moderate difficulties. Dr. Hudspeth wrote that Roof
did not have “any significant social or behavioral impediment to the
work environment” and that Roof had no significant limitation
interacting appropriately with the general public or getting along
with co-workers (R. 385-86), whereas the ALJ limited Roof to only
occasional contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the general
public. Finally, Dr. Hudspeth found that Roof did not have any
significant limitation responding appropriately to changes in a
workplace setting, whereas the ALJ limited Roof to jobs having little
day-to-day change in job process. The Court therefore finds that
the ALJ’s RFC findings accurately addressed Roof’s limitations.
D.

The ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert
adequately oriented the expert to the totality of
Roof’s impairment.

Roof also argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational
expert failed to adequately orient the expert to the totality of Roof’s
Page 27 of 29

impairment. An ALJ must provide a vocational expert with a
complete picture of a claimant’s residual functioning capacity, and
a claimant’s limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace
require hypothetical questions to a vocational expert that
adequately capture those limitations. Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d
805, 813 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, Roof says, the ALJ’s hypothetical failed to advise the
vocational expert about Roof’s significant deficiencies in persistency
and pace—deficiencies that result in an inability to sustain activity
within a schedule and complete tasks in a timely manner. Roof
says that, when the appropriate limitations are considered, Roof
cannot be found capable of performing the jobs that the ALJ found
Roof capable of performing.
But the ALJ specifically asked the vocational expert to assume
that there would be “periods of symptom exacerbation” and that
any work “should not involve fast paced hourly production demand
but rather requires … work that is done on a daily output”—and the
vocational expert nevertheless found that such a person could
perform such work (R. 81). The Court finds that the ALJ’s

Page 28 of 29

hypothetical to the vocational expert adequately oriented the expert
to the totality of Roof’s impairment.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons above, Roof’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(d/e 11) is DENIED and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary
Affirmance (d/e 16) is GRANTED. The decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
ENTER: March 22, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 29 of 29