Holloway v. Griffin et al
Filing
23
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/9/2016. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 18 . Judgment to be entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff. This case is terminat ed, with the parties to bear their own costs. If the Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). If the Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 09 February, 2016 09:14:07 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TYRONE HOLLOWAY,
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
v.
ROB GRIFFIN, et. al.,
Defendants.
14 -CV-3209
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and incarcerated at Graham
Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §1983 alleging a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
claim based on the denial of a prison job.[1]. The matter is before
the Court for ruling on the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. [18].
The dispositive motion was filed on May 20, 2015. [18]. The
Court sent notice to the Plaintiff advising him the motion had been
filed and admonishing Plaintiff that a failure to respond would
result in the Court accepting the Defendants’ statement of facts as
true. [d/e 28].
1
The Plaintiff then filed a motion for an extension of time to file
a response which was granted by the Court. [8], October 14, 2015
Text Order). However, the November 6, 2015 deadline has come
and gone and Plaintiff has filed nothing further.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a material
dispute through specific cites to admissible evidence, or by showing
that the nonmovant “cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the [material] fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). If the movant
clears this hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply rest on his or her
allegations in the complaint, but instead must point to admissible
evidence in the record to show that a genuine dispute exists. Id.;
Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011).
“In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the
constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must
come forward with sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of
material fact to avoid summary judgment.” McAllister v. Price, 615
2
F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010). At the summary judgment stage, the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
with material factual disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists when a reasonable juror
could find for the nonmovant. Id.
FACTS
During the relevant time period, Plaintiff was incarcerated at
Graham Correctional Center. Defendant Cecil Polley was the
Warden at the facility, and Defendant Rob Griffin was a Lieutenant
working as the Internal Affairs and Intelligence Supervisor. (Def.
Und. Fact #1-3).
Plaintiff and Inmate RK were incarcerated in Housing Unit 20
on September 12, 2013. (Def. Und. Fact # 4). The Plaintiff is an
African-American, and Inmate RK is Caucasian. During a routine
shakedown of the unit, officers found a large amount of sandpaper
in the common area. (Def. Und. Fact #5). Defendant Griffin placed
both the Plaintiff and Inmate RK on Investigative Status while he
conducted an investigation. (Def. Und. Fact # 6, 7). As a result,
both inmates were terminated from their prison jobs. (Def. Und.
3
Fact # 10). Plaintiff had been working as a Unit Porter in Housing
Unit 20, while Inmate RK was working as an Autobody Student.
(Def. Und. Fact # 8, 9).
Defendant Griffin interviewed the Plaintiff and four other
inmates. (Def. Und. Fact # 11). Some claimed Inmate RK sold the
sandpaper to the Plaintiff, while others denied either inmate was
involved with the incident. (Def. Und. Fact # 12, 13). Due to the
conflicting reports, Defendant Griffin decided not to issue any
disciplinary reports and released both inmates from Investigative
Status on September 20, 2013. (Def. Und. Fact # 14, 15).
Placement Officer Vernon DeWitt says an inmate released from
Investigative Status will not necessarily go back to the housing unit
they came from. Instead, they will be placed wherever there is
available room. (Def. Und. Fact # 16). Consequently, Plaintiff was
moved to Housing Unit 18 and Inmate RK was moved to Housing
Unit 22. (Def. Und. Fact # 17, 18).
The Housing Unit Porter job is selected by staff members.
Correctional Officers request which inmates they want to be porters
from the inmates living on the particular unit. (Def. Und. Fact # 19,
21). The Officers will contact the Placement Officer who will then
4
make the assignment. (Def. Und. Fact # 23). Since the Plaintiff was
no longer living in Housing Unit 20, he was no longer eligible to be a
porter on that unit. (Def. Und. Fact # 20).
For other jobs at Graham Correctional Center, the inmate
makes a request and a Placement Officer fills out a “Vote Sheet.”
(Def. Memo.,Pol. Aff., p. 1; Def. Und. Fact # 29). The Inmate’s
Counselor, Clinical Services Supervisor, Assignment Officer, a
Psychologist, an Internal Affairs representative, and the Assistant
Warden of Operations will then vote to either approve or deny the
request. (Def. Memo.,Pol. Aff., p. 1; Def. Und. Fact # 30). If there is
a specific reason for denying the job request, it is written in the
comments section of the Vote Sheet. (Def. Und. Fact # 40).
The Warden does not “vote,” but does have final say in
whether an inmate is approved for a job. (Def. Memo.,Pol. Aff., p. 1).
Warden Polley says if the Internal Affairs representative or the
Assistant Warden vote no, Warden Polley defers to their judgment
and denies the job request. (Def. Und. Fact # 39).
In November of 2013, Plaintiff requested a job as a Healthcare
Unit Attendant. Officer Billy Goodman filled out the vote sheet. (Def.
Und. Fact #31). Defendant Graham did not vote on the request.
5
(Def. Und. Fact # 32). Instead, Officer Duane Clinard voted as the
Internal Affairs representative. (Def. Und. Fact # 33).
On November 26, 2013, the Plaintiff’s request for the
Healthcare Unit job was denied. (Def. Und. Fact # 28). The reason
cited was “[d]oes not match criteria.” (Def. Und. Fact # 36). The
criteria for the job included “at least four years form projected out
date, no staff assaults, no mental health issues, no active Security
Threat Group (“STG,” i.e. gang) affiliation, no major discipline in the
past 2 years, no sexual offenses, no weapons violations, must be
capable of understanding Healthcare Unit rules and job duties.”
(Def. Und. Fact # 37). At the time the Vote Sheet was considered,
Plaintiff was listed with an active STG affiliation. (Def. Und. Fact #
38).
Defendant Warden Polley signed off on the denial of Plaintiff’s
job request noting staff members voted 4-2 against the request.
(Def. Und. Fact # 42). Those voting against the job included the
psychologist, security staff, and the Assistant Warden. (Def. Und.
Fact # 42).
6
A student inmate who is placed on Investigative Status, but
does not receive a disciplinary ticket, will return to school if there is
room in the relevant class. (Def. Und. Fact # 24). Therefore, Inmate
RK returned to his autobody class on September 21, 2013. (Def.
Und. Fact # 25). Since autobody students receive training in
painting, Inmate RK was assigned to a job as a Painter on October
9, 2013. (Def. Und. Fact #26, 27).
ANALYSIS
The Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a
constitutional violation based on the failure to assign him to a
prison job after his release from Investigative Status. “Racial
discrimination in the administration of state prisons violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bell v.
Osafo, 2010 WL 3283025, at *6 (C.D.Ill. Aug. 18, 2010) citing Black
v. Lane, 824 F.2d 561, 562 (7th Cir.1987). “However, a person
bringing an action under the Equal Protection Clause must show
intentional discrimination against him because of his membership
in a particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly as an
individual.” Bell, 2010 WL 3283025, at *6 citing Huebschen v.
Department of Health and Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th
7
Cir.1983). Specifically, Plaintiff must provide evidence that he “is a
member of a protected class,” that he was “similarly situated” to
individuals who were not in the protected class, and he “was treated
differently” from those individuals. McNabola v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 513 (7th Cir.1993). “When there is no evidence
of discriminatory conduct, summary judgment on an equal
protection claim should be granted.” Bell, 2010 WL 3283025, at *6
citing Wilson v. Schomig, 863 F.Supp. 789, 794 (N.D.Il.1994) (The
district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on an equal protection claim because there was no
evidence of any racially discriminatory conduct by defendant when
assigning an inmate to a prison job).
Although the Plaintiff, an African-American, was not able to
find a job after his release from Investigative Status, Inmate RK, a
Caucasian, did go back to his position as an Autobody Student and
found a new job. However, the Defendants note the inmates were
not similarly situated. For instance, there were different
qualifications for the relevant jobs. A Housing Unit Porter could
only be selected from inmates living on the unit, but this restriction
did not apply to autobody students. In addition, the application
8
and selection process for an autobody student verses a porter were
completely different.
More importantly, Defendants state the Plaintiff was not reassigned to a job for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. For
instance, both the Plaintiff and Inmate RK were moved to different
units after their release from Investigative Status due to availabity.
Since Plaintiff was no longer on Unit 20, he was not eligible for the
same porter job. The Plaintiff also failed to meet the requirements
for a job as a Healthcare Unit Attendant since he was still identified
as an active gang member when he applied for the job.
Finally, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated the Defendants
were involved in his allegations. A defendant must be “personally
responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right” in order to
be liable under §1983. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740
(7th Cir.2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651
(7th Cir.2001). In this case, there is no evidence Defendant Griffen
was involved in the decision to deny the Plaintiff a porter job or a
job in the Healthcare Unit. In addition, there is no evidence
Defendant Polley was involved in the decision to deny Plaintiff the
porter job.
9
Based on the uncontroverted evidence before the Court, the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.[18]
IT IS ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted
pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 56. [18] The clerk of the court is
directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiff. This case is terminated, with the parties to bear their
own costs.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal
in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues the Plaintiff will
present on appeal to assist the court in determining whether
the appeal is taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c);
See also Celske v Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir.
1999)(an appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a
statement of his grounds for appealing so that the district
judge “can make a reasonable assessment of the issue of good
faith.”); Walker v O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.
2000)(providing that a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a
10
reasonable person could suppose…has some merit” from a
legal perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be
liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the
outcome of the appeal.
ENTER:
February 9, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?