Davis v. Smart et al
Filing
13
OPINION (See Written Opinion): The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8 ) is GRANTED, and Davis's Complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/13/2015. (VM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 13 March, 2015 09:07:04 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ROGER K. DAVIS,
)
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Plaintiff,
)
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v.
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JESSE R. SMART, CHARLES W.
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SCHOLZ, BRYAN A. SCHNEIDER, )
BETTY J. COFFRIN, HAROLD D. )
BYERS, CASSANDRA B. WATSON, )
WILLIAM M. McGUFFAGE,
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ERNEST L. GOWAN, RUPERT T.
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BORGSMILLER, and JAMES
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TENUTO, all in their official
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capacities as officers and
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members of the Illinois State
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Boeard of Elections,
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Defendants.
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Civil No. 14-3224
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8).
Because the Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim for relief, the
Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
On June 23, 2014, the Plaintiff, Roger Davis, filed a statement
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of candidacy at the Illinois State Board of Elections, seeking to
appear on the ballot in the upcoming November 2014 elections as
an independent candidate for the United States Senate. Complaint,
d/e 1 at 11. The only signature Davis submitted with his
application was his own. Id. After several people filed objections to
Davis’s application based on Davis’s failure to collect signatures,
the Illinois State Board of Elections (“ISBE”) requested briefing from
the objectors and from Davis. Id. at 12-13. The objectors argued
that Davis’s candidacy could not proceed because he had not met
the requirement in 10 ILCS 5/10-3 that he submit 25,000
signatures with his application. See Objection, d/e 1 at 19-20. In
response, Davis raised a number of constitutional objections to the
signature requirement. See Davis Memorandum of Law, d/e 1 at
23-24. After reviewing the memorandums filed by the objectors and
Davis, the ISBE ruled that Davis’s application to appear on the
ballot for the U.S. Senate should be denied based on his failure to
secure the necessary signatures. See ISBE Decision, d/e 1 at 2829.
On July 25, 2014, Davis filed this lawsuit against the
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Defendants, who are all officers or members of the ISBE, seeking an
injunction of the signature requirement and placement on the ballot
for the November 2014 election. The Defendants now move to
dismiss Davis’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) based on the substantial body of case law upholding
signature requirements for election applicants.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if a complaint does not
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). In determining whether a complaint can survive a
motion to dismiss, the Court can consider “the allegations that are
contained in [the complaint] and all reasonable inferences drawn
from [the complaint] in favor of the nonmovant.” Dausch v. Rykse,
52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994).
Davis argues that the signature requirement in 10 ILCS 5/103 violates Article 1, Section 3 of the United States Constitution,
which imposes age and residency requirements for senators, and
the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for direct election of
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senators rather than appointment of senators by state
representatives. Davis also cites U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779 (1995), for the proposition that “states cannot impose
qualifications for prospective members of the U.S. Congress stricter
than those specified in the Constitution.” He further alleges that
Illinois’s restrictions burden independent candidates more than
Democratic or Republican candidates.
In the case Davis cites, Thornton, the Supreme Court struck
down an Arkansas constitutional amendment that imposed a threeterm limit on candidates for United States Congress. The Court
held that the amendment was unconstitutional because “it ha[d] the
likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and ha[d] the sole
purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly.” 514 U.S. at
836. However, the Court also reaffirmed its previous decision in
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), which upheld a California law
that required independent candidates to collect signatures equal to
5% of the votes cast in the previous election. Thornton, 514 U.S. at
828. The Court differentiated Arkansas’s term-limit amendment—
which constituted an impermissible qualification because it could
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completely bar a candidate from running the way the qualifications
in the Constitution do—from the signature requirement, which was
simply a rule to ensure that a candidate had community support,
much like the primary system for the Democratic and Republican
Parties. Id. (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 746 n.16). In other words, a
state could impose a signature requirement for independent
candidates “to assure itself that the candidate is a serious
contender, truly independent, and with a satisfactory level of
community support.” Storer, 415 U.S. at 746.
After Thornton, the Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge to
Illinois’s requirement that a new political party produce signatures
totaling 5% of the previous election’s vote count before being
allowed to place candidates on a congressional ballot. See
Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Rednour, 108 F.3d 768 (7th Cir.
1997). In Rednour, the Seventh Circuit cited Storer for the
proposition that states have “a duty to ensure that the electoral
process produces order rather than chaos.” Id. at 774 (citing
Storer, 415 U.S. at 729). The court found that the 5% petitioning
requirement was not a severe burden and that the requirement was
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justified by Illinois’s legitimate interest in ensuring that a new party
“demonstrate[] a modicum of public support” before being allowed
to “place its candidates on an election ballot.” Id. at 775.
In sum, Thornton, Storer, and Rednour all rejected Davis’s
arguments that a signature requirement constitutes an
impermissible qualification above those specified in the United
States Constitution. The 25,000 vote requirement is a valid state
measure to ensure that independent candidates “demonstrate[] a
modicum of public support” before they can be placed on an
election ballot. See Rednour, 108 F.3d at 775. Therefore, Davis’s
Complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law. The Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8) is GRANTED, and Davis’s Complaint is
DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
ENTER: March 12, 2015.
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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