Goza v. Rainmaker Campground, Inc. et al

Filing 19

OPINION (See Written Opinion): For the above reasons, Defendant City of Litchfield's Motion to Dismiss (d/e 14 ) is DENIED. The City is ORDERED to file an answer to the Plaintiff's complaint by November 18, 2014. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 11/03/2014. (VM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 03 November, 2014 06:34:15 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ADAM GOZA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAINMAKER CAMPGROUND,
INC., EDWARD A. WUTTKE,
WENDY L. WUTTKE, CITY OF
LITCHFIELD, IL, JOHN DOE 1,
JOHN DOE 2, JOHN DOE 3,
JOHN DOE 4, JOHN DOE 5,
JOHN DOE 6,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 14-3264

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant City of Litchfield’s Motion to
Dismiss (d/e 14). Because the Plaintiff, Adam Goza has sufficiently
alleged that he was legally disabled for a period of time after his
injury, tolling the statute of limitations on his claim, the
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

Page 1 of 8

I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Rainmaker Campground operates a private
campground at Lake Lou Yaeger, outside of Butler, Illinois. See
Complaint, d/e 1 ¶¶13-14. Defendant City of Litchfield is a
municipality that controls Lake Lou Yaeger and the surrounding
land. Id. ¶ 7. On September 1, 2012, the Plaintiff, Adam Goza, was
injured while swimming in Lake Lou Yaeger when he dove from a
dock into shallow water. Id. ¶¶12, 18-20. As a result, Goza
“suffered severe and permanent harm including paralysis.” Id. ¶
24. On August 22, 2014, Goza filed suit against Rainmaker, the
individuals who own and operate Rainmaker (Defendants Edward
Wuttke, Wendy Wuttke, and John Does 1-3), the City, and John
Does 4-6, who are described as “political subdivisions, entities,
departments, agencies or employees or agents” of the City. Id. ¶¶ 56, 8. Goza claims that his injuries were the result of the negligence
of the Defendants in failing to warn patrons of the danger presented
by the shallow water and otherwise maintain the lake in a safe
condition. Id. ¶¶ 26-29. The City now moves to dismiss the claims
against it and John Does 4-6 on the grounds that those claims are
Page 2 of 8

barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided by 745 ILCS
10/8-101 for suits against government entities. See Defendant City
of Litchfield’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), d/e 14.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if a complaint does not
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “[B]ecause the period of limitations is an affirmative
defense[,] it is rarely a good reason to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir.
2004). Therefore, “[o]nly when the plaintiff pleads itself out of
court—that is, admits all the ingredients of an impenetrable
defense—may a complaint that otherwise states a claim be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 2004).
In determining whether a complaint can survive a motion to
dismiss, the Court can consider “the allegations that are contained
in [the complaint] and all reasonable inferences drawn from [the
Page 3 of 8

complaint] in favor of the nonmovant.” Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d
1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, “[t]he facts asserted in
the memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, but not
contained in the complaint, are relevant to the extent that they
‘could be proved consistent with the [plaintiff’s] allegations.’” Id.
(quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
III. ANALYSIS
The City argues that Goza’s claims against the City and John
Does 4-6 are barred by Illinois statute. In general, the statute of
limitations for personal injury claims in Illinois is two years. See
735 ILCS 5/13-202. However, Illinois’ Tort Immunity Act provides
that a suit against a “local entity or any of its employees for any
injury” will be barred “unless it is commenced within one year from
the date that the injury was received or the cause of action
accrued.” 745 ILCS 10/8-101. The City contends that Goza’s claim
must be dismissed because Goza was injured on September 1,
2012, but he did not file his lawsuit until August 22, 2014—almost
two years later. See Motion, d/e 14 at 4.
Goza responds that his injury rendered him legally disabled
Page 4 of 8

for a period of time after the accident, tolling the statute of
limitations. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant City of Litchfield’s
Motion to Dismiss (“Response”), d/e 16 at 2-4. Under the “Minors
and Persons under Legal Disability” statute of limitations, if a
person entitled to bring a personal injury action “is under a legal
disability, then he or she may bring the action within 2 years after .
. . the disability is removed.” 735 ILCS 5/13-211. A person is
considered legally disabled if he or she is “entirely without
understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions
regarding his person and totally unable to manage his [or her]
estate or financial affairs.” Hochbaum v. Casiano, 686 N.E.2d 626,
631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). On the other hand, “a person is not legally
disabled if he or she can comprehend the nature of the injury and
its implications.” Basham v. Hunt, 773 N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002). The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he
purpose of tolling provisions for legal disability . . . is to protect the
rights of those who are not competent to do so themselves.” Bruso
by Bruso v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 687 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ill. 1997).
If a legally disabled plaintiff files suit against a government
Page 5 of 8

entity, both the Tort Immunity Act and the Minors and Persons
under Legal Disability statute apply to his claim, and the Illinois
courts apply a “compromise” between the two statutes. See
Basham, 773 N.E.2d at 1223 (citing Ferguson v. McKenzie, 780
N.E.2d 660 (Ill. 2001)); McKinnon v. Thompson, 758 N.E.2d 316,
318 (Ill. App. 2001). Under the Minors and Persons under Legal
Disability statute, the period of limitations does not begin to run
until after the plaintiff’s legal disability ends, but the Tort Immunity
Act has the effect of shortening the two-year period of limitations
provided by the Minors and Persons under Legal Disability statute
to one year, because the plaintiff is filing suit against a
governmental entity. See Basham, 773 N.E.2d at 1223 (finding that
plaintiff who had been legally disabled for approximately a month
after being injured in an accident had filed her personal injury
lawsuit within the one-year statute of limitations provided by the
Tort Immunity Act when she sued more than a year after the time of
the accident but less than a year after her legal disability ended).
In this case, Goza states that as a result of his injury, “he
suffered severe and permanent harm including paralysis.”
Page 6 of 8

Complaint, d/e 1 at 5. Goza further explains in his response to the
City’s motion to dismiss that after his accident, he spent several
months recovering in hospitals. See Response, d/e 16 at 3.
Furthermore, he states that “Plaintiff has short term memory loss,
anxiety and severe depression. Plaintiff has to have assistance in
making financial decisions and assistance in paying bills.” Id. If
Goza is able to prove that those allegations are true, he may have
been legally disabled under the Minors and Persons under Legal
Disability statute for a sufficient period of time to bring his filing
date within the one-year period of limitations provided by the Tort
Immunity Act. Therefore, the Court finds that dismissal of Goza’s
claim under the one-year statute of limitations would be premature
at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Defendant City of Litchfield’s Motion to
Dismiss (d/e 14) is DENIED. The City is ORDERED to file an
answer to the Plaintiff’s complaint by November 18, 2014.
ENTER: November 3, 2014.
Page 7 of 8

s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 8 of 8