Goza v. Rainmaker Campground, Inc. et al
Filing
49
OPINION (See Written Opinion): The Rainmaker Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (d/e 44 ) and Motion to Dismiss Count II of Defendant City of Litchfields Cross-Claims (d/e 47 ) are DENIED. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/31/2015. (VM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 31 March, 2015 01:22:06 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
ADAM GOZA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAINMAKER CAMPGROUND,
INC., EDWARD A. WUTTKE,
WENDY L. WUTTKE, CITY OF
LITCHFIELD, IL, REX A.
BRAWLEY, REX A. BRAWLEY
1994 TRUST, JOHN DOE 1,
JOHN DOE 2, JOHN DOE 3,
JOHN DOE 4, JOHN DOE 5,
JOHN DOE 6,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 14-3264
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court are Defendants Rainmaker Campground,
Inc., Edward A. Wuttke, and Wendy L. Wuttke’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (d/e 44) and Motion to Dismiss
with Prejudice Count II of Defendant City of Litchfield’s CrossClaims (d/e 47). Because the Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to
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state a claim for relief, the Defendants’ motions are DENIED.1
I. BACKGROUND
On September 1, 2012, the Plaintiff, Adam Goza, was injured
when he dove from a dock while swimming in Lake Lou Yaeger,
outside of Butler, Illinois. See Third Am. Compl., d/e 42 ¶¶ 15, 2122. Goza alleges that he “struck his head on an underwater
obstruction or other unknown object or surface.” Id. ¶ 22. Goza
further claims that the dock was “surrounded by shallow water.”
Id. ¶ 23. As a result of his injury, Goza “suffered severe and
permanent harm including paralysis.” Id. ¶ 27.
On August 22, 2014, Goza sued Defendant Rainmaker
Campground, Inc., which operates a private campground at Lake
Lou Yaeger, and Defendants Edward A. Wuttke and Wendy L.
Wuttke, who are named as “directors, officers, employees, agents, or
ostensible agents” of Rainmaker Campground. Id. ¶¶ 5, 16-17.
Goza also brought claims against the City of Litchfield, a
The Court recognizes that the Defendants have requested oral argument on
their motion to dismiss. However, the Court can resolve the motion on the
briefs, so oral argument is unnecessary. See L.R. 7.1 (stating that the court
has discretion to schedule oral argument on a motion or to decide the motion
“upon the pleadings and the motion papers without benefit of oral argument”).
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1
municipality that controls Lake Lou Yaeger and the surrounding
land. Id. ¶ 9. Goza later amended his complaint to add Defendants
Rex Brawley and the Rex Brawley Trust, which are allegedly the
“lessor, licensee and/or permittee” of the property on which the
Rainmaker Campground operates. Id. ¶ 12. Goza claims that his
injuries were the result of the negligence of the Defendants in failing
to warn patrons of the danger presented by the shallow water and
other possible underwater obstructions and “fail[ing] to maintain
the premises in a reasonably safe condition.” Id. ¶¶ 29-32.
The City of Litchfield filed an answer to Goza’s amended
complaint that includes a cross-claim against Rainmaker
Campground, Wendy Wuttke, and Edward Wuttke (the “Rainmaker
Defendants”). See Def. City of Litchfield’s Answer and Affirmative
Defenses to Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. and Cross-Claims Against CoDef.s, d/e 45. The City alleged that it had entered into a lease
agreement with Rex Brawley and his late wife regarding the
property upon which Rainmaker Campground is located. See id. at
28. The City further stated that Rex Brawley was the owner of
Rainmaker Campground, Inc., that Wendy Wuttke is Brawley’s
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daughter, and that Edward Wuttke is Wendy Wuttke’s husband.
Id. According to the City, the Wuttkes operate the Rainmaker
Campground on Brawley’s behalf due to Brawley’s advanced age.
Id. The City brought cross-claims against Brawley, the Wuttkes,
and Rainmaker Campground for indemnification and contribution,
based on the theory that those Defendants actually controlled Lake
Lou Yaeger, meaning that if any negligence had caused Goza’s
injuries, that negligence was Brawley’s, the Wuttkes’, and
Rainmaker Campground’s. Id. at 28-31.
The Rainmaker Defendants now move to dismiss Goza’s claims
against them on the grounds that they did not owe a duty of care to
Goza. See Mot. to Dismiss, d/e 44. They also move to dismiss the
City of Litchfield’s cross-claim for indemnification because, they
argue, they could not have been negligent regarding Goza’s injury
because they did not owe him a duty of care. See Mot. to Dismiss
Cross-Claim, d/e 47.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if a complaint does not
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
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to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). In determining whether a complaint can survive a
motion to dismiss, the Court can consider “the allegations that are
contained in [the complaint] and all reasonable inferences drawn
from [the complaint] in favor of the nonmovant.” Dausch v. Rykse,
52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS
The Rainmaker Defendants argue that any danger that existed
at Lake Lou Yeager was open and obvious, meaning that they did
not have a duty to warn Goza about that danger. In Illinois, the
danger presented by bodies of water is generally considered to be
open and obvious. Jackson v. TLC Assocs., Inc., 706 N.E.2d 460,
464 (Ill. 1998). However, the open and obvious nature of the danger
presented by a body of water is not dispositive of whether a party
that controls the body of water owes a duty to exercise reasonable
care. Id. at 463. Court must still analyze the following factors to
determine whether a defendant owes a duty: (1) “the likelihood of
injury,” (2) “the reasonable foreseeability of such injury,” (3) “the
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magnitude of guarding against the injury,” and (4) “the
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.” Id.
Furthermore, if a body of water presents dangers beyond those
normally associated with water—which consist of the risks of
drowning and of being injured from diving into shallow water—then
a defendant may owe a duty to warn of those unique dangers. See
id. at 464 (holding that the owner of a swimming facility may have
owed a duty to warn of the danger presented by an underwater pipe
used by the owner to moderate the water level); Duffy v. Togher, 887
N.E.2d 535, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (finding that the defendant may
have owed a duty to warn of the danger presented by an unusually
designed swimming pool that looked deeper than it actually was);
Ward v. Mid-Am. Energy Co., 729 N.E.2d 861, 863-64 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000) (holding that the defendant owed a duty to warn of dangerous
underwater currents caused by a dam that was in the defendant’s
control); but see Suchy v. City of Geneva, 8 N.E.3d 565, 577 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2014) (distinguishing Ward and finding that the
defendants did not owe a duty to warn of dangerous water
conditions caused by the presence of a dam); Bezanis v. Fox
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Waterway Agency, 967 N.E.2d 393, 400-01 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(finding that a defendant did not owe a duty to warn of shallow
water in a lake, even though the shallows were 400 feet from shore).
Additionally, a defendant is more likely to owe a duty to warn of
these unique dangers if he is operating a commercial swimming
area, because in that case, “patrons ha[ve] the right to assume that
the facility was properly prepared for their use and that [the
defendant] ha[s] taken appropriate measures to make it safe.”
Jackson, 706 N.E.2d at 464.
Here, Goza sufficiently alleges that his injury may have been
the result of underwater conditions within the Rainmaker
Defendants’ control that would not have been open and obvious.
Goza alleges that he was injured by “an underwater obstruction or
other unknown object or surface.” Third Am. Compl., d/e 42 ¶ 22.
At this stage, Goza is only required to “give enough details about
the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds
together,” or in other words, to show that he could have hit his head
on an underwater obstruction, not that he did. Swanson v.
Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Goza’s allegation
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that he could have struck his head on a concealed object within the
Defendants’ control is plausible, and therefore sufficient to survive
Rule 12(b)(6). Furthermore, if any concealed, dangerous condition
had existed, the Rainmaker Defendants would more likely have
owed a duty to warn of that danger because they operated a
commercial swimming facility where patrons should have been able
to assume that such hidden dangers did not exist. See Jackson,
706 N.E.2d at 464. Therefore, Goza sufficiently states a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
must be denied. Because there is still a possibility that the
Rainmaker Defendants were negligent, their motion to dismiss the
City of Litchfield’s cross-claim for contribution must also be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Rainmaker Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (d/e 44) and Motion to
Dismiss Count II of Defendant City of Litchfield’s Cross-Claims (d/e
47) are DENIED.
ENTER: March 31, 2015.
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s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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