Chapman v. Simplex Inc
Filing
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OPINION: The Court finds that the Defendant has fair notice of the Plaintiff's claims. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II or Strike Paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 22 5 is DENIED. This action is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins for the purpose of scheduling a discovery conference. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION). Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 1/27/2015. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 27 January, 2015 03:58:05 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MELVIN K. CHAPMAN, SR.,
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Plaintiff,
v.
SIMPLEX, INC.,
Defendant.
NO. 14-3296
OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Melvin K. Chapman, Sr., filed this Complaint asserting
employment discrimination and civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (Title VII). Pending before the Court is the Motion of Defendant
Simplex, Inc., to Dismiss Count II or Strike Certain Paragraphs of the
Complaint.
I. FACTS1
Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, these
facts are taken from the Complaint and are presumed true for purposes of this
motion. The Court further draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
1
Plaintiff Melvin K. Chapman, Sr., a black male, is a former employee
of Defendant Simplex, Inc. The Defendant is a corporate entity engaged
in the business of manufacturing load banks and fuel supply systems that
work in conjunction with backup power control and delivery. It contracts
with the United States Government and private businesses.
On or about March 13, 2006, the Plaintiff began his employment
with the Defendant as a welder. On June 2, 2007, he was promoted to
Computer Aided Design (CAD) Technician. The Plaintiff was the only
black CAD Technician.
On August 23, 2013, the Plaintiff was provided with a performance
appraisal that evaluated him as outstanding in attendance and adequate in
all other areas of performance assessment. The same day, at 3:45 p.m., the
Plaintiff was informed that he was being discharged due to a reduction in
force coupled with low performance/productivity. The Plaintiff was a good
worker, had never been disciplined by the Defendant and had never been
told he was a low performer.
Plaintiff. See Thulin v. Shopko Stores Operating Co., LLC, 771 F.3d 994, 995
(7th Cir. 2014).
2
The Plaintiff was given a termination document to sign to which was
added the letters “RIF” after the Plaintiff had signed it. Around the time
of the Plaintiff’s termination he had been working overtime.
The
Defendant offered shifting reasons for the Plaintiff’s termination, stating
once that performance was not a factor while at another time saying that
low performance was a factor.
II.
In Count II, the Plaintiff asserts the Defendant intentionally
discriminated against him in violation of Title VII by denying economic
opportunities based on his race. The Defendant contends this claim must
be dismissed because his EEOC charge alleged only termination based on
race and age. The Plaintiff did not raise any other claims with the EEOC.
The Defendant asserts other allegations are outside the scope of the
charge. Paragraphs 10 and 11 allege discrimination based on race when
awarding raises, awarding pay increases, providing training opportunities
and providing upgraded equipment.
Paragraph 12 states, “Plaintiff was subjected to racial prejudice in the
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workplace; for example, a non-Black CAD Technician made a noose and
displayed it next to his desk and referred to Black people as ‘monkeys.’”
Paragraph 22 includes the allegation that Plaintiff was denied
economic opportunities based on race.
The Defendant contends these claims relating to disparate treatment,
hostile work environment and the denial of economic opportunities must
be dismissed because they exceed the scope of the EEOC charge.
Alternatively, the Defendant asserts the paragraphs should be stricken.
The Plaintiff prepared Charge No. 440-2014-02973 without the
assistance of counsel.
That charge provides, in part, “During my
employment, I have been subjected to different terms and conditions of
employment, including, but not limited to, lower wages than my coworkers.”
The scope of an administrative charge brought against an employer
is determined by considering the claims that were brought to the EEOC’s
attention. See Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093, 1100 (7th Cir.
2013).
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Additionally, even claims that were not part of the EEOC charge
might be used as circumstantial evidence of the discriminatory act that is
included in the charge. See Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 560-61
(7th Cir. 2014).
Upon drawing all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court finds
that the Defendant has fair notice of the Plaintiff’s claims. The Court
declines at this stage to dismiss Count II or strike paragraphs 10, 11, 12
and 22.
Ergo, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II or Strike
Paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 22 [d/e 5] is DENIED.
This action is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom
Schanzle-Haskins for the purpose of scheduling a discovery conference.
ENTER: January 27, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge
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