Stevens et al v. Department of Human Services, Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility et al
Filing
11
OPINION entered by Judge Michael M. Mihm on 5/1/15. IT IS ORDERED:1. Plaintiffs' petitions to proceed in forma pauperis are denied 2 , 3 because Plaintiffs fail to state a federal claim. 2. This case is dismissed, without prejudice. All other pending motions are denied as moot 9 , 10 . (See Full Written Opinion).(VP, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 01 May, 2015 01:34:55 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAM J. STEVENS and
GEORGE K. MARTIN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RUSHVILLE TREATMENT
AND DETENTION CENTER,
DR. SEAN JUMPER,
MS. SHARLENE CARAWAY, and
LIBERTY HEALTH CARE, INC.,
Defendants.
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) 14-CV-3328
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OPINION
MICHAEL M. MIHM, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiffs are detained in the Rushville Treatment and
Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons
Act. They seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis on their claims
that they should be paid for working at the facility, should have
access to educational programs to better themselves, and should be
conditionally released.
The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and
fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who,
within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without
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legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster
v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972).
Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma
pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim, even if part of the filing fee is paid. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in forma
pauperis only if the allegations state a federal claim for relief. In
reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations
as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor. Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2103).
Plaintiffs contend that they should be paid money for the jobs
they perform at the facility instead of the “points” awarded to them,
which can be only be used at the commissary. They assert that
they are unable to accumulate the money necessary to buy clothes
and shoes that fit properly. One of the Plaintiffs1 asserts that he
has been unable to buy special diabetic shoes and is still waiting to
see a foot doctor. Plaintiffs argue that they should not have to rely
on their loved ones for financial support, nor should they be
required work in order to buy items at the commissary. Although
1
Which Plaintiff has the foot problem is unclear.
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residents are not forced to work, “if a resident expects to have
anything around here, we have no choice but to work . . . .”
(Complaint p. 5.)
Plaintiffs have no constitutional right to be paid, in points or
dollars, for the work they perform at the facility. See Vanskike v.
Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)(prisoner has no
constitutional right to a job in prison, nor a constitutional right to
compensation for work performed). Defendants are not violating
the law by conditioning rewards (i.e., points) on the performance of
productive tasks at the facility.
Plaintiffs do have a constitutional right to basic human
necessities such as adequate food, clothing and medical care. Sain
v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2008). But the deprivation must be
serious and the defendants must be deliberately indifferent to that
deprivation before the Constitution is violated. No plausible claim
for relief is stated by Plaintiffs’ allegations of ill-fitting clothing or
their desire to purchase amenities.
One of the Plaintiffs might be able to state a claim about the
lack of special shoes for his diabetic condition or his need to see a
foot doctor, depending on the circumstances, but those allegations
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belong in a separate case against the individuals who have denied
the shoes or the appointment with a specialist.
Plaintiffs also seem to allege general dissatisfaction with their
mental health treatment. Plaintiffs are constitutionally entitled to
adequate treatment for the mental disorders that keep them
detained, but the mental health professionals decide what that
treatment is. Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1081 (7th Cir.
2003)(“(a) committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and
(b) what that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health
professionals”). Professional judgment cannot be disturbed unless
the judgment is so far afield from acceptable bounds that
professional judgment has not been exercised at all. See Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)(decisions by professionals at
mental health facility deserve deference and violate the Constitution
only if no professional judgment exercised). Plaintiffs’ general and
vague dissatisfaction with the treatment provided does not state a
claim for the violation of a federal right.
Plaintiffs also contend that they should have access to
educational and vocational programs to acquire the skills necessary
to acclimate to society once they are released. It is hard to argue
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with that contention, but that decision is left to the lawmakers, not
to the Court. The Constitution does not entitle Plaintiffs to such
programs. See Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir.
2000)(quoting Garza v. Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir.
1982)(“There is no constitutional mandate to provide educational,
rehabilitative, or vocational programs, in the absence of conditions
that give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”); Antonelli v.
Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996)("[P]articipation in a
rehabilitative program is a privilege that the Due Process Clause
does not guarantee.") The plaintiffs in Zimmerman and Antonelli
were convicted prisoners, but the Court sees no legal basis for
reaching a different conclusion with regard to civil detainees. See
Elliott v. Baker, 2008 WL 4876871 *2 (N.D. Ill. 2008)(not published
in F.Supp.2d)(“The federal Constitution does not require state
authorities to provide convicted prisoners educational,
rehabilitative, or vocational opportunities . . . . The Court is
unaware of any authority, nor does Elliott cite any, suggesting that
the rules are different for civilly committed persons.”); Cooke v.
Johns, 2013 WL 4500668 (E.D.N.C. 2013)(unpublished)(“As a civil
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detainee, plaintiff has no constitutional right to educational,
vocational, or rehabilitative programs.”)(collecting cases).
To the extent Plaintiffs seek conditional release, they are
challenging their confinement, a challenge which must first be
pursued in their state circuit court cases, pursuing all available
appeals. Only after exhausting state court remedies may Plaintiffs
seek release in federal court, through a federal habeas corpus
action. See, e.g., DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
2000)(federal challenges to the fact or duration of confinement must
be pursued in habeas action, not in an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiffs’ petitions to proceed in forma pauperis are
denied (2, 3) because Plaintiffs fail to state a federal claim.
2.
This case is dismissed, without prejudice. All other
pending motions are denied as moot (9, 10).
ENTERED: 05/01/2015
s/ Michael M. Mihm
MICHAEL M. MIHM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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