Adams et al v. Scott et al

Filing 70

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 59 is DENIED. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reopen Discovery 62 is DENIED. Defendant's Motion to Strike 67 is DENIED. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 53 55 are GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION.) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/1/2017. (GL, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 01 March, 2017 10:16:59 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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)
)
Plaintiff,
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v.
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GREGG SCOTT, et al.
)
Defendants. )

AN’DRE ADAMS, et al.

14-3338

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Nine civilly committed plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging that
officials at the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility burdened
the practice of their religious faith in violation of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act and the First Amendment.
Only Plaintiffs Adams, Steen, and LaRue now remain as active
litigants. The matter comes before this Court for ruling on the
Defendants’ respective Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 53,
55). The motions are granted.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 59) and a
Motion to Reopen Discovery (Doc. 62). Plaintiffs did not attach a
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copy of the disputed discovery to their motion to compel, nor did
they file the motion within 14 days of the unsatisfactory response,
as required by the Court’s Scheduling Order. See (Doc. 33 at 8, ¶
19). These failures notwithstanding, Plaintiffs allege in their motion
that they did not send the interrogatories in question to Defendants
until April 4, 2016, approximately 60 days after discovery closed.
See Text Order entered December 11, 2015 (extending discovery
deadline to February 8, 2016). Plaintiffs do not explain why these
requests could not have been made sooner. Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Compel is denied.
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Re-Open Discovery (Doc. 62) asks the
Court to reopen discovery to allow Plaintiffs an opportunity to
tender and receive responses to the interrogatories cited in their
motion to compel. For the same reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’
motion (Doc. 62) is denied.
Defendant Simpson filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 67).
Defendant Simpson alleges that an exhibit attached to Plaintiffs’
motion to reopen discovery should have been filed separately
because it is a response to a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs reference this document in their motion to reopen
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discovery. See (Doc. 62 at 3, ¶ 17). Therefore, the Court sees no
reason to strike the exhibit. Defendant’s motion is denied.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).

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FACTS
Plaintiffs are nondenominational Christians who identify
“speaking the word” and assembly with other nondenominational
believers, among other things, as central tenets of their faith. TDF
officials do not appear to have ever offered a nondenominational
Christian group service at the facility, but, prior to April 2013,
residents were allowed to share their nondenominational beliefs at
the Christian (Baptist) group service. Residents were also permitted
to attend, without giving prior notice to TDF officials, as many
group services per week as they were so inclined, including those of
other faiths.
In April 2013, the volunteer pastor in charge of the Christian
service informed residents that he would assume all preaching
duties at the group services. As a result, Plaintiffs were no longer
allowed to share their views in front of the group. The basis for the
pastor’s decision, as stated in a letter sent to residents, cited
concerns from TDF officials that group participation in the services
had reached a point where such participation was “counterproductive [to] the goals of the therapy programs.” (Doc. 60-3 at 7).
In addition, Plaintiff Adams testified at his deposition that other
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residents had filed grievances about nondenominational Christians
speaking at the group services. Adams Dep. 35:21-36:2. Plaintiff
Steen identified the prohibition on sharing his opinion at the
services as the sole basis for his participation in this lawsuit. Steen
Dep. 58:9-59:2.
A couple months later, TDF officials changed the policy
regarding attendance at group religious services as the lack of
advance notice regarding the number of attendees at a given service
caused overcrowding, staffing, and security issues. On or about
July 24, 2013, Rushville officials distributed a memo to TDF
residents that outlined the new policy as follows:
You may enroll in only one religious service at a time and
enrollment is approved on a first-come, first-served basis
until the service is at full capacity. If you wish to change
to a different service, you must resubmit your Religious
Group Enrollment form to the Religious Services
Coordinator and upon receipt of an approved copy; you
may attend the next available service. No more than one
change may be submitted in any calendar year absent
the approval of the Program Director. No bags or nonreligious items may be brought to any religious service,
only those materials pertaining to the service you are
attending.
(Doc. 54-2 at 2). According to the memo, Rushville provided group
religious services for the following faiths: Christian; Jehovah
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Witness; Mennonite; Jewish; Muslim; Zen Buddism; and Satanic.
TDF officials approved the Plaintiffs’ respective requests to attend
the Christian service. (Doc. 60-1 at 21-23).
Plaintiff Steen testified that he had no desire to attend services
other than those held for his Christian faith. Steen Dep. 35:10-11
(“I’ve never had a desire to participate in another service.”). Plaintiff
Adams and Plaintiff LaRue testified that the new policy prohibited
them from attending multiple services, but that such attendance
was not a requirement of their faith. LaRue Dep. 17:7-19:16 (could
not attend both Christian and Mennonite services, but his faith
requires only that he assemble with other nondenominational
believers); Adams Dep. 26:8-28:21 (attendance at Muslim services
is beneficial, but it does not further his practice of
nondenominational Christianity).
Plaintiffs requested the formation of a nondenominational
Christian group service. TDF policy also allows for the formation of
new group religious services, but the policy requires specifics
regarding the nature of any proposed group and the types of
activities to be conducted during group meetings. The requested
services need not be affiliated with any particular religion.
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According to a grievance Plaintiff filed, Defendant Billingsley
denied the request and stated “that the Tuesday evening Christian
service meets the needs of this facility for Christian service.” (Doc.
60-1 at 9). Defendant Scott alludes in his affidavit that the request
may have been denied on the grounds that it took the form of a
petition, not a proposal. (Doc. 54-1 at 5-6, ¶ 20). The former is
considered contraband. Plaintiffs provided a copy of a document
that appears to request a “resident oriented service” with a list of
signatures, but the document does not specifically request a
nondenominational Christian service. (Doc. 60-4 at 15).
Defendant Simpson, in her capacity as Grievance Examiner,
denied grievances Plaintiff filed regarding the formation of a
nondenominational Christian service. Defendant Simpson
responded to the grievances as follows:
My understanding of a non-denominational church
service is one that reflects the wishes, beliefs, and
cultural background of the participants without being
formally aligned with an established religion, like
Christianity or Methodist for example. The potential
problem is how the non-denominational standards will be
determined by which the group will abide and practice.
What I anticipate is a power struggle emerging among
those involved. Residents are permitted a reasonable
opportunity to pursue their religious beliefs within the
framework of an established religion.
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(Doc. 60-1 at 13).
TDF officials also denied Plaintiffs’ requests to obtain
electronic media directly from religious organizations. The relevant
TDF policy does not prohibit receipt of CDs and DVDs, but the
items must be purchased from a commercial vendor, factory sealed,
and may not be in a rewritable or recordable format. According to
Defendant Simpson’s response to one of Plaintiff Adams’ grievances,
the policy seeks to prevent “unwanted materials from entering the
facility that are determined [to be] harmful to the Program’s goals.
(An example would be pornography found embedded on rewritable
discs).” Id. at 16.
Finally, Plaintiffs testified that they would like to be allowed to
have “feasts” to celebrate the Easter and Christmas holidays similar
to the celebration TDF officials allow Muslims to have at the end of
Ramadan. TDF officials allow religious groups to have celebratory
feasts during religious holidays if the groups fund the celebrations
themselves.

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ANALYSIS
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) prohibits governmental imposition of a “substantial
burden on the religious exercise” of a confined individual, even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). In establishing a
claim under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
showing (1) that he seeks to engage in an exercise of religion; and,
(2) that the challenged practice substantially burdens that exercise
of religion. Id. § 2000cc–2(b); Holt v. Hobbs, --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct.
853, 862 (2015).
“Religious exercise,” as defined in the statute, means “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
Requests for religious accommodation “must be sincerely based on
a religious belief and not some other motivation.” Holt, 135 S. Ct.

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at 162. Defendants do not argue that group services are not a
religious exercise, or that Plaintiffs’ beliefs are not sincerely held.
RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden,” but recent
Supreme Court decisions frame the relevant inquiry as whether the
inmate was required to “engage in conduct that seriously violates
his religious beliefs.” Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (quoting Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775
(2014)); see Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 2015)
(applying the Holt and Hobby Lobby standards). In so ruling, the
Supreme Court “articulate[d] a standard much easier to satisfy”
than the longstanding jurisprudence interpreting RLUIPA in light of
First Amendment rights.1 Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 364.
The July 2013 policy that limits attendance at group religious
services to one service per week had no effect on Plaintiff Steen as
he testified that he does not desire to attend any other service.
Plaintiffs Adams and LaRue testified that they wanted to attend
multiple services, but that it was not a requirement of their religion.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Holt and Hobby Lobby, courts
interpreted “substantial burden” for RLUIPA purposes as “one that necessarily
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious
exercise…effectively impracticable.” Schlemm, 784 F.3d at 364; see also
Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 876 (7th Cir. 2009) (RLUIPA has been
“interpreted with reference to Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence.”).
1

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Insofar as Plaintiffs sought to congregate with other
nondenominational Christians, the policy allowed for them to enroll
in the same group service, which they did.
The pastor’s decision to assume all preaching duties at the
Christian service may have imposed some burden upon the
Plaintiffs’ ability to “spread the word” in accordance with their
religious beliefs, but Plaintiffs, by their own definition, were not
bound to any one particular denomination’s service. To that end,
the TDF policy allowed for Plaintiffs to request participation in
another group service (e.g. Mennonite service on Friday nights) that
may have been more compatible with their religious tenets.
The Court recognizes that, arguably, none of the
denominational services offered at the TDF would have been a
perfect fit for the Plaintiffs’ nondenominational practice. If Plaintiffs
were unable to find a suitable group service already offered, policy
permitted them to request formation of a new religious group. The
policy in question requires that those making the request outline
the parameters under which they will govern themselves. Plaintiffs
made an attempt to request a new group service, but the

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documents in the record contain only a request for a vaguely
defined “resident based group service.”
Plaintiffs have failed to point to any provision within the TDF
policies that requires them to engage in conduct that seriously
violates their religious beliefs. Accordingly, the Court finds that no
reasonable juror could conclude that the TDF policies in question
placed a substantial burden upon Plaintiffs’ religious practice.
Assuming Plaintiffs could show a substantial burden, RLUIPA
does not require courts to “blind themselves to the fact that the
analysis is conducted in [an institutionalized] setting.” Holt, 135 S.
Ct. at 866. Holt recognizes that security is a compelling
government interest at any institutional facility. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at
867 (recognizing prison security is a compelling state interest).
Justice Sotomayor points out in her concurring opinion that
nothing in Holt precludes deference to officials’ expertise in
maintaining security “when prison officials offer a plausible
explanation for their chosen policy that is supported by whatever
evidence is reasonably available to them.” Id. at 867 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).

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RLUIPA “‘requires the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the
challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose
sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.’” Holt,
135 S. Ct. at 863 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779).
Courts must “‘scrutinize the asserted harm of granting specific
exemptions to particular religious claimants’ and ‘look to the
marginal interest in enforcing’ the challenged government action in
that particular context.” Id. (quoting same).
Here, the application of the TDF policy restricting attendance
at multiple group services had no effect on the Plaintiffs’ core
religious tenets. Even so, Defendants offered evidence that the
number of residents confined at the TDF has grown significantly in
recent years, and, without advance notice, security staff is unable
to determine the appropriate measures to maintain safety and
security.
With respect to the inability to speak or preach at the
Christian service, Defendants offered evidence that Plaintiffs’
requests to speak at a group service, or to engage in religious
discussion, could be accommodated through formation of a new
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religious group if Plaintiffs submitted a specific proposal. The
requirement for specificity provides officials with an opportunity to
assess the sincerity of the requestor’s religious beliefs and also
ascertain any safety and security concerns that may arise in
granting the request for a new group. This is consistent with the
holding in Holt. Id. at 866-67 (RLUIPA affords officials “ample
ability” to maintain security and permits officials to question the
authenticity of an individual’s religious beliefs in the context of a
request for religious accommodation).
Defendant Simpson alluded to issues that could arise with
respect to a religious group formed without adequate guidelines in
her grievance response, but nothing therein, or within the TDF
policy, precludes the formation of Plaintiffs’ desired religious group
upon a properly submitted proposal. Moreover, Defendant Scott
stated in his proposal that these types of requests are now handled
by committee rather than by Defendant Billingsley, with whom
Plaintiff Adams took issue in his grievance.
Finally, with respect to the CDs and DVDs Plaintiffs seek to
possess, Defendants argue that requiring the discs to be in a nonrewritable and non-recordable format and ordered from a
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commercial vendor prevents residents from smuggling contraband,
such as pornographic images, into the facility. Plaintiffs have not
provided any evidence that the electronic media they seek to obtain
complies with this rule, and the Court sees no less restrictive
means in preventing such contraband from entering the facility.
Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could find
that Defendants violated Plaintiffs rights under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
First Amendment Claims
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits
government-imposed burdens upon an individual’s religious
practice. Unlike the RLUIPA analysis, any restriction on Plaintiff’s
ability to practice his religion need only be “reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest,” which includes, among other
things, institutional security. Cf. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664,
669 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
In determining the constitutionality of a restriction, a court must
consider four factors: “(1) whether the restriction is rationally
related to a legitimate and neutral government objective; (2) whether
there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open
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to the inmate; (3) what impact an accommodation of the asserted
right will have on [staff] and other [residents]; and, (4) whether
there are obvious alternatives to the [restriction] that show that it is
an exaggerated response to [penological] concerns.” Id. (citing
Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2004)).
As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not shown that the TDF
policies in question placed a substantial burden on any identified
core belief. The TDF policies appear rationally related to legitimate
government objectives in reducing overcrowding, determining
appropriate staffing needs, and eliminating the introduction of
contraband into the facility.
Plaintiffs have alternative means through which they can
exercise their religious beliefs through personal study,
conversations with other residents outside of a group religious
service, and through religious CDs and DVDs available at the TDF
library. Plaintiff Adams also admitted that other residents at the
Christian service filed grievances regarding the nondenominational
Christians speech at the service. The Court can reasonably infer
that the content of such speech was viewed as detrimental to those
who belong to that particular religious denomination. Finally,
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nothing suggests the policies in place were an exaggerated response
to penological concerns as it relates to Plaintiffs’ situations.
Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
rights.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel [59] is DENIED. Plaintiffs’
Motion to Reopen Discovery [62] is DENIED.
2) Defendant’s Motion to Strike [67] is DENIED.
3) Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment [53][55] are
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs. All
pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is
terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs.
4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
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$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:

March 1, 2017.

FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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