Chestnutt v. Escapa et al
Filing
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OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 08/19/2015. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (d/e 20 ) is GRANTED. The claim against Defendant Escapa is DISMISSED because he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity on the cla im Plaintiff brought against him. The claims against Defendants Griffith and Mallory are DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, Plaintiff has failed to allege a § 1983 substantive due process claim against De fendants Griffith and Mallory. The case remains pending against Defendant Reed subject to Plaintiff showing good cause for the failure to serve Defendant Reed. In addition, the Court grants Plaintiff until September 4, 2015 to file a second amended complaint should Plaintiff choose to do so. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 19 August, 2015 04:27:26 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
WILLIAM L. CHESTNUTT,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAMON ESCAPA, MARITA
GRIFFITH, SONYA MALLORY,
and MARVIN REED,
Defendants.
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No. 14-3352
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint (d/e 20) filed by Defendants Ramon Escapa,
Marita Griffith, and Sonya Mallory. Plaintiff William L. Chestnutt
concedes that Defendant Escapa is entitled to prosecutorial
immunity. Therefore, the claims against Defendant Escapa are
dismissed. Because Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Griffith
and Mallory are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and fail to
state a claim for relief, the claims against them are also dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2012, the State of Illinois filed a petition for the
adjudication of wardship of Plaintiff’s two children in the Circuit
Court of Schuyler County, Illinois. See People v. Chestnutt, 2014
IL App (4th) 140278-U (Aug. 21, 2014) (unpublished opinion).1
The petition alleged that the children were neglected because they
lived in an environment injurious to their welfare. Id.
In July 2012, the state trial court adjudicated the minors
neglected. The court found that Plaintiff had been involved in
domestic violence against his wife, that his children had been
involved, and that Plaintiff refused to follow Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) and court orders barring
contact. Id. In August 2012, at the dispositional hearing, the
court granted guardianship of the children to DCFS. Id.
The Court can take judicial notice of the state court appellate decision
without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. See 4901 Corp. v. Town of Cicero, 220 F. 3d 522, 527 n. 4 (7th Cir.
2000) (district court could take judicial notice of state court order of dismissal
and accompanying settlement agreement without converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment; Henson v. SCS Credit Servs.,
29 F. 3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the district could consider
public court documents filed in an earlier state court case when deciding the
defendants’ motions to dismiss without converting the motions to dismiss into
motions for summary judgment).
1
Page 2 of 19
On November 20, 2013, the State filed a petition to terminate
Plaintiff’s parental rights. Id. Following a January 2014
termination hearing at which Plaintiff was present, the trial court
found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that
Plaintiff was unfit because he failed to make reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the
children, failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of
the children within any nine-month period following the date of
adjudication and disposition, and was depraved due to his five
felony convictions Id. ¶¶ 15, 23; see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i),
(D)(m)(ii), and (D)(i). In March 2014, after a best-interests hearing
at which Plaintiff was present, the trial court terminated Plaintiff’s
parental rights. Id.
Plaintiff appealed. On August 21, 2014, the appellate court
affirmed. Id.
In November 2014, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint in this
Court and requested that counsel be appointed to represent him.
The Court recruited counsel for Plaintiff. On March 23, 2015,
counsel for Plaintiff filed a four-count Amended Complaint (d/e
19).
Page 3 of 19
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Mallory was the DCFS case worker personally involved with
Plaintiff’s family. Am. Compl., Count I, ¶¶ 2, 3. Plaintiff was given
a list of requirements with which he would have to comply to
regain custody and control of his minor children. Count II, ¶ 4;
Count III, ¶ 4; Count IV, ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that he kept
Defendant Mallory “apprised of his whereabouts and the
availability or lack of availability of the resources required for him
to be able to work toward reunion with his children.” Count I, ¶ 5.
Shortly after the commencement of the judicial proceedings,
Plaintiff was incarcerated. Am. Compl., Count I, ¶ 4. Beginning in
December 2012, Plaintiff was incarcerated at a work camp facility
in Pittsfield, Illinois (Pittsfield Work Camp). Count II, ¶ 5; Count
III, ¶ 5; Count IV, ¶ 5. While at the Pittsfield Work Camp, Plaintiff
kept in contact with Defendant Mallory and made efforts to
continue obtaining the services DCFS indicated he was required to
obtain. Count II, ¶¶ 6, 7; Count III, ¶ 6; Count IV, ¶ 6. However,
the Pittsfield Work Camp did not offer the services required by
DCFS. Count II, ¶ 8; Count III, ¶ 7; Count IV, ¶ 7.
Page 4 of 19
In early 2013, Plaintiff was transferred from the Pittsfield
Work Camp to a facility in Jacksonville, Illinois, because Plaintiff
required treatment for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Am. Compl.,
Count II, ¶ 9; Count IV, ¶¶ 8, 9. Although the Jacksonville facility
offered the services Plaintiff needed, such as counseling and
educational services, Plaintiff was placed at the bottom of the list
because he was in the infirmary. Count II, ¶¶ 10, 11; Count IV, ¶¶
8, 10. Plaintiff continued to maintain contact with Defendant
Mallory and kept her apprised of his inability to complete the
required services. Count II, ¶ 12.
In November 2013, Plaintiff was released from incarceration.
Am. Compl., Count I, ¶ 7; Count II, ¶ 13; Count III, ¶ 8; Count IV,
¶ 11. Upon release, Plaintiff began promptly completing services
as required. Count I, ¶ 8; Count II, ¶ 14; Count III, ¶ 9; Count IV,
¶ 12. Defendant Escapa, the Schuyler County State’s Attorney,
commenced the proceeding to terminate Plaintiff’s parental rights.
Count I, ¶ 9; Count II, ¶ 15; Count III, ¶ 10; Count IV, ¶ 13. The
underlying reason for the termination proceeding was Plaintiff’s
failure to complete the required services. Count III, ¶ 11; Count
IV, ¶ 14.
Page 5 of 19
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mallory’s actions
led to a violation of Plaintiff’s protected right to parent his children.
Am. Compl., Count I, ¶ 10. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that
Defendant Mallory violated Plaintiff’s civil rights by determining
Plaintiff made unsatisfactory progress toward reunification with
his children despite there being no way for the service plan goals to
be achieved. Count I, ¶ 11.
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that the actions of Defendant
Escapa led to a deprivation of Plaintiff’s protected right to parent
his children. Am. Compl., Count II, ¶ 17. Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendant Griffith, DCFS Regional Counsel, violated Plaintiff’s civil
rights by “allowing him additional time to make reasonable
progress toward the return of his children after he was released
from prison” (although it appears that this is a scrivener’s error
and Plaintiff means that Defendant Griffith violated his
constitutional rights by “not allowing” him additional time to make
reasonable progress). Count II, ¶ 18.
In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Marvin
Reed, the Warden for the Pittsfield Work Camp, denied Plaintiff the
ability to complete the required services because Reed made the
Page 6 of 19
decision not to offer the courses and counseling required by DCFS.
Am. Compl., Count III, ¶¶ 2, 12; Count IV, ¶¶ 2, 15. Defendant
Reed has not yet been served and is not a party to the pending
Motion to Dismiss.2
Plaintiff alleges he has suffered great emotional distress as a
result of being deprived of his right to parent his children. Am.
Compl., Count I, ¶ 12; Count II, ¶ 19; Count III, ¶ 13; Count IV, ¶
16. As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of $50,000, an
order requiring Defendant Mallory and Defendant Griffith to allow
additional time for the completion and satisfaction of the service
plan, an order allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to complete the
service plans as required, and an order requiring the Pittsfield
Work Camp to offer the classes required by DCFS. Prayer for
Relief, Counts I, II, III, IV.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss under (12)(b)(6) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, Defendants also assert that this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, which implicates Rule 12(b)(1).
United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins has directed Plaintiff
to show cause why the case should not be dismissed as to Defendant Reed for
want of prosecution. See August 13, 2015 Text Order.
2
Page 7 of 19
When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, this Court accepts
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Long v. Shorebank
Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court may
view any evidence submitted on the issue of jurisdiction to
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. However,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the jurisdictional
requirements have been met. Center for Dermatology & Skin
Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2014).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th
Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only provide
a short and plain statement of the claim showing he is entitled to
relief and giving the defendants fair notice of the claims. Tamayo
v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and
construing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. However, the
complaint must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim
Page 8 of 19
for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007). Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows the
Court to reasonably infer that the defendants are liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or supporting
claims with conclusory statements is insufficient to state a cause
of action. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, Defendant Escapa argues that he is
entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Memorandum at 11 (d/e 21).
Plaintiff concedes that Defendant Escapa is entitled to
prosecutorial immunity from damages. Resp. at 2 (d/e 23).
Because Plaintiff only seeks damages from Defendant Escapa, the
Court finds that Defendant Escapa is entitled to prosecutorial
immunity, and the claims against him are dismissed. See Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (a prosecutor is immune
from a civil suit for damages when “initiating a prosecution” and
“presenting the State’s case”).
Defendants Mallory and Griffith raise three arguments in
their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint: (1) Plaintiff
Page 9 of 19
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2)
this Court is without jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine; and (3) Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from litigating the
issue of the termination of his parental rights. The Court will
address the jurisdictional argument first.
A.
Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two United
States Supreme Court cases in which the losing party in state
court filed a suit in federal court complaining of an injury caused
by the state court judgment rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and seeking review and rejection of the
state court judgment. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
The United States Supreme Court held that the district courts
lacked subjection-matter jurisdiction to decide the cases because
only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a
state court judgment. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 476; see also Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
Page 10 of 19
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal claims in two
circumstances: where (1) a plaintiff requests that the federal
district court overturn an adverse state court judgment; or (2) the
claims were not raised in state court or do not, on their face,
require review of the state court’s decision but the claims are
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment. Brown v.
Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012). When determining
whether a claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court
judgment, the district court considers the cause of the alleged
injury. Id. If the claim alleges the injury was caused by the state
court judgment, the claim is inextricably intertwined. If the claim
alleges an independent prior injury that the state failed to remedy,
the claim is not inextricably intertwined and is not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Brown, 668 F.3d at 442; see also Long,
182 F.3d at 555 (finding that the plaintiff’s claims alleging
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act were
independent from the eviction proceeding litigated in state court
and were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
However, if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with
the state court judgment, the claim is barred under RookerPage 11 of 19
Feldman only if the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise
the issue in state court. Brown, 668 F. 3d at 442. If the plaintiff
could not have raised the claim in state court, the claim is not
barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. Moreover, “the fact that the
plaintiff’s pursuit of his federal claims could ultimately show that
the state court judgment was erroneous [does not] automatically
render Rooker-Feldman applicable.” Long, 182 F.3d at 556.
In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that his
claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff
asserts that the injury was not caused by the state court judgment
but by being denied additional time to make reasonable progress
toward the return of his children after he was released from prison.
Resp. ¶ 6. Plaintiff further claims that he is not seeking to relitigate the termination of his parental rights. Id. ¶ 7.
In the Amended Complaint Plaintiff seeks essentially two
forms of relief. First, Plaintiff asks this Court to issue an order
requiring that he be given additional time to complete the service
plan. This type of relief would require this Court to take action
that would essentially overturn the state court’s judgment.
Because Plaintiff’s parental rights have been terminated, any order
Page 12 of 19
by this Court requiring that Plaintiff be given additional time to
complete the service plan would require the state court judgment
be vacated. Therefore, any claim by Plaintiff that seeks this relief
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rainey v. Samuels,
130 F. App’x 808, 809 (7th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (finding the
claim “barred in major part by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”
where the injury about which the plaintiff complained—
termination of parental rights—was inflicted by the state court’s
judgment and the relief sought was cancellation of the judgment).
Plaintiff also seeks money damages for alleged constitutional
violations committed by Defendants Mallory and Griffith. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Mallory violated his civil rights by
determining that he made unsatisfactory progress toward
reunification when there was no way he could achieve the service
plan goals. He alleges that Defendant Griffith violated his civil
rights by not allowing him additional time to make progress after
his release from prison. However, the harm alleged is the loss of
his right to parent his children, which was caused by the court
order terminating his parental rights. See Golden v. Helen Sigman
& Ass’s, Ltd., 611 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the
Page 13 of 19
plaintiff’s claim that he lost custody of his child based, in part, on
the bias of the court-appointed child representative was barred by
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the only injury the plaintiff
alleged to have suffered—alienation of the child’s affection and a
reduction of his custodial rights—flowed from the state-court
custody order). As such, this claim is inextricably intertwined with
the state court judgment. And, because Plaintiff had a reasonable
opportunity to raise the claim in state court, and did so, the claim
is barred by Rooker-Feldman. See People v. Chestnutt, 2014 IL
App (4th) 140278-U, ¶ 20 (noting Plaintiff’s testimony before the
trial court that he could not participate in services while in prison);
¶¶ 31-34 (rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that he was failed by the
system because he could not take classes while in prison).
B.
Even if Rooker-Feldman Does Not Bar the Damages Claim,
Plaintiff has Failed to State a Claim for Relief
The Court recognizes that there are some cases that hold that
a plaintiff can sue to vindicate a right independent of the state
court decision and, therefore, not implicate the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply where the
Page 14 of 19
plaintiff alleges that the people involved in the state court decision
violated an independent right of the plaintiff); Brokaw v. Weaver,
305 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that the RookerFeldman doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff’s claim that the
people involved in the decision to remove her from her home and
parents and subject her to the custody of the DCFS violated her
federal constitutional rights). Even if Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Mallory and Griffith were not barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine, the Court would also find that Plaintiff failed to
state a claim for relief.
To state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States; and (2) the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th
Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has identified the applicable constitutional
right as the right to parent his children. See Am. Compl., Count I,
¶ 10.
Parents have a fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children
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pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). This
fundamental right is not absolute, however, and “must be balanced
against the state’s interest in protecting children from abuse.”
Siliven v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir.
2011). Nonetheless, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the government from interfering in familial
relationships unless the government adheres to the requirements
of procedural and substantive due process.” Croft v.
Westmoreland Cnty. Children and Youth Servs., 103 F. 3d 1123,
1125 (3d Cir. 1997).
The appropriate standard for stating a substantive due
process claim in this context is not clear. Some courts hold that
when abusive executive action3 has been alleged, liability attaches
only where the executive action is “so ill-conceived or malicious
that it ‘shocks the conscience.’” Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d
368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (involving a substantive due process claim
against a Department of Human Services social worker) (quoting
DCFS is under the Executive Branch. See
www.cyberdriveillinois.com/publications/handbook/execbranch.pdf (last visited
August 18, 2015).
3
Page 16 of 19
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). The
Seventh Circuit has held that the “shocks the conscience” test does
not apply in the context of taking and holding a child in protective
custody. Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463,
479 (7th Cir. 2011) (wherein the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants continued to hold their child in protective custody
when they knew they had no reason to do so). That is, where a
party challenges the seizure and placement of a child in protective
custody, the seizing party must have had reasonable suspicion of
past or imminent danger of abuse. Id.
In this case, Plaintiff is not challenging that his children were
taken into and held in protective custody, which suggests that
Hernandez would not apply. Nonetheless, regardless of the
appropriate standard, Plaintiff simply alleges that Defendant
Mallory was wrong to conclude that Plaintiff did not make
satisfactory progress toward reunification and Defendant Griffith
should have given Plaintiff more time to complete services. At
most, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest negligence by Defendants
Mallory and Griffith in their duties. Negligence does not give rise
to liability under § 1983. Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773
Page 17 of 19
(7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege any intentional
conduct by Defendants, nor can such allegations be inferred from
the pleadings. See Rangel v. Reynolds, 607 F. Supp. 2d 911, 924
(N.D. Ind. 2009) (finding that, to state a plausible § 1983 claim, the
plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant intentionally
and unlawfully deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right).
Therefore, the Court finds that, even if Plaintiff’s claims are not
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff has not stated a
cognizable substantive due process claim against Defendants
Mallory and Griffith.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e
20) is GRANTED. The claim against Defendant Escapa is
DISMISSED because he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity on
the claim Plaintiff brought against him. The claims against
Defendants Griffith and Mallory are DISMISSED for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, Plaintiff has failed
to allege a § 1983 substantive due process claim against
Defendants Griffith and Mallory. The case remains pending
against Defendant Reed subject to Plaintiff showing good cause for
Page 18 of 19
the failure to serve Defendant Reed. In addition, the Court grants
Plaintiff until September 4, 2015 to file a second amended
complaint should Plaintiff choose to do so.
ENTER: August 19, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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