Chestnutt v. Escapa et al

Filing 30

OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/07/2015. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Defendant Marvin Reed's Motion to Dismiss (d/e 26 ) is GRANTED. The claim against Defendant Reed is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint against Defendant Reed (or the appropriate defendant, depending on the claim) on or before October 21, 2015. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will dismiss this case with prejudice.(DM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 08 October, 2015 10:46:05 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
WILLIAM L. CHESTNUTT,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAMON ESCAPA, MARITA
GRIFFITH, SONYA MALLORY,
and MARVIN REED,
Defendants.

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No. 14-3352

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint (d/e 26) filed by Defendant Marvin Reed, the
former Warden of the Jacksonville Correctional Center. Because
Plaintiff William L. Chestnutt has failed to state a claim against
Defendant Reed, the Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The allegations in the Amended Complaint and the facts of
the case are more fully set forth in this Court’s August 19, 2015
Opinion granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by the other three

defendants in this case. See Opinion (d/e 25).1 In sum, Plaintiff’s
children were adjudicated neglected in July 2012. The Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) gave Plaintiff a
list of requirements with which he would have to comply in order
to have the opportunity to regain custody and control of his minor
children. However, shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was incarcerated,
first at the Pittsfield Work Camp and then at the Jacksonville
Correctional Center. Defendant Reed was at that time the warden
of the Jacksonville Correctional Center, which is the parent
institution for the Pittsfield Work Camp. See
www.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/jacksonvillecorrectionalcent
er.aspx.
Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at the Pittsfield
Work Camp, the Camp did not offer the services DCFS required
Plaintiff to complete. In early 2013, Plaintiff was transferred from
the Pittsfield Work Camp to the Jacksonville Correctional Center
because Plaintiff required treatment for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.
The Jacksonville Correctional Center offered the services Plaintiff
The Court granted Plaintiff until September 4, 2015 to file a second amended
complaint should Plaintiff choose to do so. Plaintiff did not file an amended
complaint or seek additional time to do so.
1

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needed, but inmates in the infirmary are placed at the bottom of
the list for receiving such services. Plaintiff was released from
incarceration in November 2013.
On November 20, 2013, the State filed a petition to terminate
Plaintiff’s parental rights. Following a January 2014 termination
hearing at which Plaintiff was present, the trial court found the
State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff was
unfit because he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the
conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children,
failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the
children within any nine-month period following the date of
adjudication and disposition, and was depraved due to his five
felony convictions. See People v. Chestnutt, 2014 IL App (4th)
140278-U, ¶¶ 15, 23 (Aug. 21, 2014) (unpublished opinion);
see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (D)(m)(ii), and (D)(i). In March 2014,
after a best-interests hearing at which Plaintiff was present, the
trial court terminated Plaintiff’s parental rights. Id. The appellate
court affirmed. See People v. Chestnutt, 2014 IL App (4th)
140278-U.

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In Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint, the Counts
directed at Defendant Reed, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Reed
denied Plaintiff the ability to complete the required services
because Reed made the decision not to offer the courses and
counseling required by DCFS. Am. Compl., Count III, ¶¶ 2, 12;
Count IV, ¶¶ 2, 15.
Plaintiff alleges he has suffered great emotional distress as a
result of being deprived of his right to parent his children. Am.
Compl., Count III, ¶ 13; Count IV, ¶ 16. As relief, Plaintiff seeks
damages in excess of $50,000, an order requiring the Pittsfield
Work Camp to offer the classes required by DCFS, and an order
allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to complete the service plans as
required.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendant Reed moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, this Court accepts
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Long v. Shorebank
Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). The Court may
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view any evidence submitted on the issue of jurisdiction to
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. However,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the jurisdictional
requirements have been met. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer,
Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588-89 (7th Cir. 2014).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th
Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff need only provide
a short and plain statement of the claim showing he is entitled to
relief and giving the defendants fair notice of the claims. Tamayo
v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and
construing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. However, the
complaint must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim
for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007). Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows the
Court to reasonably infer that the defendants are liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or supporting
claims with conclusory statements is insufficient to state a cause
of action. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant Reed argues that (1) the Amended Complaint is
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) the Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and (3) Plaintiff is
collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of the termination of
his parental rights.
A.

The Amended Complaint is Not Barred by the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from two United
States Supreme Court cases in which the losing party in state
court filed a suit in federal court complaining of an injury caused
by the state court judgment rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and seeking review and rejection of the
state court judgment. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
The United States Supreme Court held that the district courts
lacked subjection-matter jurisdiction to decide the cases because
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only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a
state court judgment. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 476; see also Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 291 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal claims in two
circumstances: where (1) a plaintiff requests that the federal
district court overturn an adverse state court judgment; or (2) the
claims were not raised in state court or do not, on their face,
require review of the state court’s decision but the claims are
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment. Brown v.
Bowman, 668 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2012). When determining
whether a claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court
judgment, the district court considers the cause of the alleged
injury. Id. If the claim alleges the injury was caused by the state
court judgment, the claim is inextricably intertwined. If the claim
alleges an independent prior injury that the state failed to remedy,
the claim is not inextricably intertwined and is not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Brown, 668 F.3d at 442; see also Long,
182 F.3d at 555 (finding that the plaintiff’s claims alleging
violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act were
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independent from the eviction proceeding litigated in state court
and were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
However, if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with
the state court judgment, the claim is barred under RookerFeldman only if the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise
the issue in state court. Brown, 668 F. 3d at 442. If the plaintiff
could not have raised the claim in state court, the claim is not
barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. Moreover, “the fact that the
plaintiff’s pursuit of his federal claims could ultimately show that
the state court judgment was erroneous [does not] automatically
render Rooker-Feldman applicable.” Long, 182 F.3d at 556.
In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that his
claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff
asserts that the injury was not caused by the state court judgment
but by Defendant Reed’s failure to provide the services necessary
for Plaintiff to satisfactorily complete his service plan. Plaintiff
contends that the failure to offer services in the Pittsfield Work
Camp and then being denied the opportunity to participate in the
necessary services at the Jacksonville Correctional Center violated
Plaintiff’s right to parent. Resp. ¶ 8 (d/e 29).
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Although the relief Plaintiff seeks includes a request that he
be allowed to complete the service plans as required (which would
require overturning the adverse state court judgment), Plaintiff also
seeks damages for what he claims was a violation of his civil rights
prior to the state court judgment. Because Plaintiff’s claim alleges
an independent prior injury that the state failed to remedy (the
lack of services available at the prison), the claim is not
inextricably intertwined and is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See, e.g. Brown, 668 F.3d at 442; see also Long, 182
F.3d at 555.
B.

Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim for Relief

To state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege (1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States; and (2) the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th
Cir. 2009). Plaintiff argues that the failure of the Pittsfield Work
Camp to provide the classes Plaintiff needed and Jacksonville
Correctional Center’s policy that inmates being treated for illness

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are not allowed to participate in necessary services resulted in a
violation of Plaintiff’s right to parent. Resp. ¶ 8.
Defendant Reed argues that Plaintiff has not pleaded any
facts to support his claim that Defendant Reed engaged in a
violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights. According to Defendant Reed,
Plaintiff does not identify the constitutional right upon which he
relies, the wrongful conduct in which he engaged, or any facts that
would support a claim for relief. Defendant also notes that while
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint suggests that Plaintiff was deprived
of his protected right in familial relations without due process of
law, he was provided with a hearing.
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Reed.2
“There is no constitutional mandate to provide educational,
rehabilitative, or vocational programs, in the absence of conditions
that give rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Garza v.
Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 486 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding the plaintiff had
no property or liberty interest in prison employment, increased

The Court notes that Plaintiff does not indicate whether he is suing Reed in
his official or individual capacity. Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim, the
Court need not address this further or substitute the current warden of the
Jacksonsville Correctional Center.
2

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recreation, or increased educational courses); Madyun v.
Thompson, 657 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that the
failure to provide vocational and educational training does not
violate the Constitution “in the absence of grievously debilitating
prison conditions”). Moreover, it is well settled that there is no
property or liberty interest in attending educational, vocational, or
rehabilitative courses while in prison, and institutions are not
constitutionally required to provide these programs to inmates.
Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir.2000) (prisoner
had no 14th Amendment due process claim for being transferred to
a prison where he could no longer enroll in programs that might
earn him earlier release); see also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78,
88 n. 9 (1976) (Due Process Clause not implicated by prisoner
classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs, even where
inmate suffers “grievous loss”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim against Defendant Reed.
Plaintiff may be able to state a claim for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, or the
Equal Protection Clause based on the alleged failure of the
Jacksonville Correctional Center to provide certain services to
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inmates in the infirmary. See Am. Compl. Count IV, ¶ 10
(“Inmates in the infirmary are placed at the bottom of the list for
receipt of services such as the counseling and education
requirements your Plaintiff needed”); Resp. ¶ 8 (stating that “while
he was in the Jacksonville Correctional Center for treatment of an
illness, he was not allowed to participate in the necessary
services”). Therefore, Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a second
amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant Marvin Reed’s Motion to
Dismiss (d/e 26) is GRANTED. The claim against Defendant Reed
is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff may file a
second amended complaint against Defendant Reed (or the
appropriate defendant, depending on the claim) on or before
October 21, 2015. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will dismiss
this case with prejudice.
ENTER: October 7, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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