Willis v. State of Illinois et al

Filing 12

MERIT REVIEW OPINION: (Rule 16 Deadline 8/3/2015.) The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. The clerk is directed to add the following persons as Defen dants: Sharlene Caraway, Joseph Hankins, and J.R. Reid. Defendants State of Illinois, Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, and Rooming Committee are dismissed because they are not appropriate Defendants in this action. The clerk is directed to terminate the State of Illinois, the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, and the Rooming Committee. The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/3/2015. (MJ, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 03 June, 2015 10:18:54 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MACEO WILLIS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants.

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15-CV-3037

MERIT REVIEW OPINION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and detained in the Rushville
Treatment and Detention Center, is proceeding in forma pauperis.
However, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis
"at any time" if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, the Court will review
Plaintiff’s complaint before directing service to ensure that Plaintiff
states a federal claim. In reviewing the complaint, the Court
accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in
Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir.
2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough
facts must be provided to "'state a claim for relief that is plausible
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on its face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.
2013)(quoted cite omitted).
The first part of Plaintiff’s complaint challenges his detention
in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center. That challenge
must be pursued in Plaintiff’s state civil commitment proceedings.
After Plaintiff has timely exhausted all of his state court remedies,
including appeals, he may be able to pursue a habeas action in
federal court. An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be used to
challenge the fact of Plaintiff’s confinement. See, e.g., DeWalt v.
Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 2000)(challenges to fact or
duration of confinement must be pursued in habeas action, not in
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The next part of Plaintiff’s complaint arises from an alleged
assault by Plaintiff’s roommate on Plaintiff about five days after
they were roomed together. Plaintiff alleges that he should never
have been placed in the room because the rooming committee knew
that Plaintiff’s roommate had a violent history and was mentally
unstable. Plaintiff also alleges that he was “bleeding out” from a cut
in his face but was denied access to medical care for seven hours.
Plaintiff was punished for fighting, even though he allegedly had not
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resisted in any way, and he was not given a chance to mount a
meaningful defense because he was not provided his eyeglasses so
that he could read the notice of charges.
Plaintiff states an arguable constitutional claim for the failure
to protect him from a substantial risk of serious harm. The only
individuals who might be held liable are those who personally knew
that the roommate was dangerous yet authorized or directed that
Plaintiff be placed with the roommate anyway. Kuhn v. Goodlow,
678 F.3d 552. 556 (7th Cir. 2012)( "'An individual cannot be held
liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an
alleged constitutional deprivation.'")(quoted cite omitted); Chavez v.
Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)(no
respondeat superior liability under § 1983). The “rooming
committee” cannot be sued. After counsel has appeared for the
named defendants, Plaintiff will need to send discovery requests to
defense counsel to determine the proper defendants on this claim.
Plaintiff also states an arguable claim for deliberate
indifference to his need for medical attention immediately after the
assault. Whether Dr. Bednarz was responsible for the delay cannot
be determined without a more developed record.
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A procedural due process claim may also be stated if the
punishment Plaintiff received was an “atypical and significant
deprivation.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995).
Plaintiff was punished with “close status,” but what exactly close
status meant is not clear. Miller v. Dobier held that close status
was not a serious enough deprivation to trigger procedural due
process protections. Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2011).
However, the actual conditions imposed, not the label attached to
them, determines whether the punishment was objectively serious.
A more developed record is required to make that determination.
The committee members who imposed the punishment will be
added as defendants.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds

that Plaintiff states the following federal constitutional claims: (1)
failure to protect Plaintiff from a substantial risk of serious harm of
an attack by his roommate; (2) deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
need for immediate medical treatment after the assault; (3) lack of
adequate written notice of the fighting charges against him and lack
of meaningful opportunity to present a defense, including calling
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witnesses and obtaining his medical records to corroborate his
injuries.
2.

The Court takes supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

assault and battery claim against resident Williamson. Service on
Williamson will be attempted, but Williamson is a common name.
Plaintiff may need to provide Williamson’s first name.
3.

This case proceeds solely on the claims identified in

paragraphs one and two above. Any additional claims shall not be
included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a
party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.
4.

This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before
filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
5.

The Court will attempt service on Defendants by sending

each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from
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the date the waiver of service is sent to file an Answer. If
Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel
within 90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for
Defendants, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting
deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
6.

With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant
worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said
Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
7.

Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the day

the waiver of service is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is
not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate
under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings
shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion.

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8.

Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need

not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that
Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document
electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to defense
counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on
Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. If electronic service on
Defendants is not available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed
accordingly.
9.

Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose

Plaintiff at Plaintiff's place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants
shall arrange the time for the deposition.
10. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address
or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
11.

If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will
take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S.
Marshal's service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant
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to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
12. The Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified
protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act.
13. The clerk is directed to add the following persons as
Defendants: Sharlene Caraway, Joseph Hankins, and J.R. Reid.
14. Defendants State of Illinois, Rushville Treatment and
Detention Center, and Rooming Committee are dismissed
because they are not appropriate Defendants in this action.
The clerk is directed to terminate the State of Illinois, the
Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, and the Rooming
Committee.
15. The Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants
pursuant to the standard procedures.
ENTERED: 6/3/2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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