Young v. United States of America

Filing 4

OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 07/01/2015. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Because it plainly appears from the Motion and the record of the prior proceedings that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate Plea, Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (d/e 1 ) is SUMMARILY DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to notify Petitioner of the dismissal. The Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (d/e 2 ) is DENIED AS MOOT. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability on all claims. THIS CASE IS CLOSED. (DM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 02 July, 2015 09:02:21 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
CASSANOVA YOUNG,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent.
)

No. 15-3192

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Petitioner Cassanova
Young’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate Plea, Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (d/e 1)
and Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Costs (d/e 2).
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings for the United States District Courts, this Court has
examined the motion and the record of the prior proceedings and
concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. Therefore, the
Motion is summarily dismissed. Because there is no filing fee for a

Page 1 of 12

§ 2255 Motion, Petitioner’s Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs is denied as moot.
I. FACTS
In June 2014, Petitioner and his co-defendants, Keith Williams
and Belinda Young, were charged by Indictment with various drug
offenses. See Indictment (d/e 1), United States v. Young, Central
District of Illinois Case No. 14-30024-3. In February 2015,
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Count 10 of the Indictment
before United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins
pursuant to a Plea Agreement. Count 10 charged Petitioner with
knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent to
distribute 28 grams or more of mixtures or substances containing
a detectable amount of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Id.
In the Plea Agreement (d/e 49), the Government agreed to
recommend a sentence within the applicable sentencing guideline
range. Plea Agreement ¶ 19, Case No. 14-30024-3. The
Government also agreed to move to dismiss at sentencing Counts
1 and 9 as they related to Petitioner. Id. ¶ 4. Petitioner did not

Page 2 of 12

have the right to withdraw his guilty plea if the Court did not
accept the recommendations of the parties. Id. ¶ 3.
The Plea Agreement identified the potential penalties. If
Petitioner had no prior felony drug conviction at the time of the
offense, the potential penalties included not less than 5 and not
more than 40 years’ imprisonment. Plea Agreement ¶ 10 (a), Case
No. 14-30024-3. If Petitioner had one prior felony drug conviction
at the time of the offense, the potential penalties included not less
than 10 years and not more than life imprisonment. Id. ¶ 10(b).
Petitioner waived any right he had, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851,
to require the United States Attorney’s Office to file and serve an
information stating in writing the prior felony drug convictions
that supported an enhanced sentence. Id. ¶ 24.
The Plea Agreement also contained a waiver of Petitioner’s
right to appeal and his right to collaterally attack his conviction
and sentence. The waiver of the right to appeal contained an
exception for a claim of involuntariness or ineffective assistance of
counsel. Plea Agreement ¶ 25, Case No. 14-30024-3. The waiver
of the right to collateral attack contained an exception for those
claims relating to the negotiation of the waiver, involuntariness, or
Page 3 of 12

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. ¶ 27. Petitioner signed the
Plea Agreement below a provision that stated: “I fully understand
this Agreement and accept and agree to it without reservation[.]”
Id. ¶ 36.
The Minute Entry for the Change of Plea hearing reflects that
the Court found Petitioner competent. Petitioner was advised of
his right to trial by jury, the essential elements of the charge, and
the potential penalties. The Court discussed the Plea Agreement.
Petitioner entered his plea of guilty, and the Court determined the
guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See February 10, 2015
Minute Entry, Case No. 14-30024-3. This Court has also listened
to the recording of the Change of Plea hearing. Magistrate Judge
Schanzle-Haskins conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy that
covered the details of the Plea Agreement. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
Moreover, Petitioner was sworn, the possible penalties were stated
correctly, and Petitioner stated he had no questions about the
possible penalties.
On June 15, 2015, the Court conducted the Sentencing
Hearing. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) reflected that
Petitioner faced a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 10
Page 4 of 12

years. PSR ¶ 88 (d/e 86). Petitioner objected to this paragraph on
the basis that he had been charged with two prior drug offenses
but “has no prior drug conviction at this time.” See Addendum to
the Presentence Report (d/e 86).
The Court overruled Petitioner’s objection and adopted the
Government’s and Probation Officer’s position that Petitioner was
subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum. Id. Specifically,
Petitioner was subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum
because he had a prior felony conviction for Possession of a
Controlled Substance in Sangamon County, Illinois, Circuit Court
Case No. 06-CF-514 on May 25, 2006. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B) (providing that a person convicted of a violation of
§ 841(a) involving 28 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing cocaine base after a prior conviction for a felony drug
conviction becomes final shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment not less than 10 years and no more than life
imprisonment).
In addition, the parties recognized at the sentencing hearing
that co-defendant Williams, who defense counsel argued was more
culpable than Petitioner, was sentenced to 87 months’
Page 5 of 12

imprisonment. The Government explained that Williams
cooperated and Petitioner did not, despite being given the
opportunity to do so. Defense counsel vigorously argued that the
Court should depart pursuant to § 5K2.0 of the Sentencing
Guidelines and sentence Petitioner to an 87-month term of
imprisonment. The Court sentenced Petitioner to 120 months’
imprisonment. See Judgment (d/e 83).1
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. Instead, on June 25,
2015, Petitioner filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate
Plea, Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal
Custody (d/e 1). In his Motion, Petitioner acknowledges that he
was advised that, if he had one prior felony drug conviction, he
would be sentenced to a term of not less than 10 years and not
more than life imprisonment. Mot. ¶ 8 (d/e 1). He asserts,
however, that “he was confused when he entered this plea because
he believed that the penalty to be imposed by law was a statutory
minimum of five years.” Id.

Section 5K2.0 cannot be used to depart from a statutory minimum. United
States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1992).
1

Page 6 of 12

Petitioner also claims “that his ability to contest his sentence
involved by plea agreement as to disparity of sentence as to a codefendant violates his constitutional rights and the equal
protection of law.” Id. ¶ 9. As noted above, co-defendant Williams
was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment. Co-defendant Young
has not yet been sentenced.
II. ANALYSIS
Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows a
federal prisoner to attack his sentence on the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the court was without jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A defendant may validly waive the right to
collaterally attack his conviction or sentence as part of a valid plea
agreement. Keller v. United States, 657 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (7th
Cir. 1999)). Courts generally uphold and enforce such waivers with
limited exceptions. The limited exceptions include when the plea
agreement was involuntary, the district court relied on a
Page 7 of 12

constitutionally impermissible factor at sentencing, the sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum, or the defendant claims
ineffective assistance of counsel for performance directly related to
negotiation of the plea agreement. Keller, 657 F.3d at 681(citing
Jones, 167 F.3d at 1144-45).
In this case, Petitioner waived his right to bring a collateral
attack except as to certain claims, including involuntariness and
ineffective assistance of counsel. Plea Agreement ¶ 27, Case No.
14-30024-3. Even if the Court construes Petitioner’s claim that he
was “confused” as a claim that his plea was involuntary, the Motion
and the record of the prior proceedings demonstrate that Petitioner
is not entitled to relief.2
Petitioner’s claim that he was confused when he entered his
plea is not supported by any evidence and is contradicted by the
record. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)
(“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of
Such a claim is also likely procedurally defaulted because Petitioner could
have raised the argument on direct appeal had he filed one. See Ballinger v.
United States, 379 F.3d 427, 429-30 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the petitioner
procedurally defaulted his argument that his plea was involuntary because he
could have raised the argument if he had litigated a direct appeal). Petitioner’s
direct-appeal waiver contained an exception for claims of involuntariness. See
Plea Agreement ¶ 25, Case No. 14-30024-3.
2

Page 8 of 12

veracity. The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations
unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are
contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible”);
Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1986) (“where the
record . . . reflects the defendant voluntarily entered into the plea
and . . . the section 2255 motion does not clearly present new
specific allegations, then no section 2255 evidentiary hearing is
required”). The Plea Agreement indicated that if Petitioner had a
prior felony drug conviction, his mandatory minimum sentence
would be 10 years. Petitioner was also advised of the possible
penalties at the Change of Plea Hearing. Therefore, Petitioner’s
vague, conclusory, and unsupported claim that he was confused
and thought he would receive a sentence of five years is subject to
summary dismissal.
Petitioner also challenges his “inability to contest his sentence
involved by plea agreement as to disparity of sentence as to a
codefendant violates his constitutional rights and the equal
protection of the law.” While this claim is not entirely clear, he
appears to claim that his inability to argue that his sentence is
disparate when compared to his co-defendant violates his
Page 9 of 12

constitutional rights. As noted above, the only co-defendant who
has been sentenced received 87 months. Co-defendant Williams
also had a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, but he
cooperated with the Government and the Government made a
motion for a departure for substantial assistance. The Government
represented at Petitioner’s sentencing hearing that Petitioner was
also given the opportunity to cooperate with the Government but
did not do so.
Even assuming the claim is not barred by the collateral attack
waiver and is cognizable under § 2255,3 Petitioner has not
presented any evidence suggesting that the disparity was
unwarranted. See, e.g. United States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548,
556 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the different members of the
conspiracy were not similarly situated; there is thus nothing
unreasonable about the fact that the sentences they received were
also different”). Without a motion by the Government pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the Court was required to sentence Petitioner
to the statutory mandatory minimum. United States v. Brigham,
See, e.g., Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We
have recognized that sentencing errors are generally not cognizable on
collateral review, especially when such errors can be raised on direct appeal”).
3

Page 10 of 12

977 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1992) (providing that departure from a
statutory minimum is “available only on motion of the prosecutor
under § 3553(e)”).
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255
Proceedings For the United States District Courts, the Court
declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. A certificate may
issue only if Petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner must
show that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Peterson v. Douma,
751 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). Because
the claims at issue do not satisfy this standard, the Court denies a
Certificate of Appealability on all claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because it plainly appears from the Motion and the record of
the prior proceedings that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, the
Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate Plea, Vacate, Set Aside, or
Page 11 of 12

Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (d/e 1) is
SUMMARILY DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to notify
Petitioner of the dismissal. The Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (d/e 2) is DENIED AS
MOOT. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability on all
claims. THIS CASE IS CLOSED.
ENTER: July 1, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 12 of 12