U.S. Bank National Association et al v. Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C. et al

Filing 36

OPINION BY RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge: The Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) (d/e 30 ) is DENIED. The Court's Opinion and Order of August 15, 2016 (d/e 28 ) is not a final judgment and may be appealed following the issuance of a judgment in this consolidated action. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 10/25/2016. (MJC, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 26 October, 2016 04:00:16 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as
Trustee, successor-in-interest to Bank of
America, N.A., as Trustee, successor-in-interest
to Wells Fargo, N.A., as Trustee, for the
Registered Holders of Credit Suisse First Boston
Mortgage Securities Corp., Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-C4,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
and
)
)
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as
)
Trustee for the Registered Holders of the Mezz
)
cap Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C5,
)
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, )
Series 2007-C5,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
LONDRIGAN, POTTER & RANDLE, P.C., an
)
Illinois corporation; PERKINS COIE, a
)
Washington limited liability partnership;
)
SCOTT & SCOTT, P.C., and Illinois
)
corporation; and SGRO, HANRAHAN, DURR
)
& RABIN, LLP, an Illinois limited liability
)
partnership; and
)
SPRINGFIELD PRAIRIE PROPERTIES, LLC,
)
an Illinois limited liability company; ROBERT
)
W. EGIZII, an individual; THOMAS EGIZII, an )
individual; MICHAEL EGIZII, an individual;
)
RODNEY EGIZII, an individual; JODI
)
BAPTIST, an individual; JOHN PRUITT, an
)
individual; CLYDE BEIMFOHR, an individual;
)
EEI HOLDING CORPORATION, an Illinois
)
corporation; and EGIZII PROPERTY
)
MANAGERS, LLC, an Illinois limited liability
)
company,
)
)
Defendants.
)

NO.

15-3195
(Consolidated with 153199)

OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
This is a consolidated action.
In an Opinion and Order entered on August 15, 2016, the Court
Allowed the Motion to Dismiss the four Law Firms named as Defendants
and the Law Firms were terminated as Parties.
The Court Allowed in part and Denied in part the Motions to Dismiss
the claims asserted against the Borrower, its Members and Related Entities.
Now, the Plaintiffs seek to appeal the dismissal of the claims asserted
against the Law Firm Defendants while the claims against the other
Defendants are proceeding in this Court.
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
It is denied.
I.
The Plaintiffs in both cases are real estate mortgage investment
conduits. In the Complaints, the Plaintiffs allege the Trustees possess
customary powers to hold, manage and dispose of assets for the benefit of

the A Note Holder’s beneficiaries.
The Defendants in the first (now-dismissed) case, Number 3:15-cv03195, include the following law firms: Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C;
Perkins Coie; Scott & Scott, P.C. and Sgro, Hanrahan, Durr & Rabin
(collectively, “Defendants” or “Law Firms”).
The Plaintiffs also filed a Verified Complaint against the Borrower
and its individual Members/Partners, Indemnitor/Guarantor and other
entities. See U.S. Bank National Association, et al., v. Springfield Prairie
Properties, LLC; Robert W. Egizii; Thomas Egizii; Michael Egizii; Rodney
Egizii; Jodi Baptist; John Pruitt; Clyde Beimfohr; EEI Holding Corporation;
and Egizii Property Managers, LLC, Case Number 3:15-cv-03199
(“Borrower Complaint”).1 Following the Court’s ruling on the Motions to
Dismiss, this portion of the consolidated case is all that remains.
II.
The Plaintiffs seek certification, pursuant to Rule 54(b), that there is

Springfield Prairie Properties, LLC will generally be referred to as “the
Borrower.” Robert W. Egizii will be referred to as “Egizii.” The other
individual Defendants, along with Egizii, are referred to as “the Members.”
1

3

no just reason to delay the enforcement of this Court’s Order granting the
Law Firm Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Rule 54(b) provides in part:
When an action presents more than one claim for
relief–whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or thirdparty claim–or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise,
any order or other decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of
the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties’ rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “The rule says that the court may direct the entry of
a final judgment upon the satisfaction of the conditions set forth in the
rule, not that he must do so.” Continental Cas. Co. v. Anderson Excavating
& Wrecking Co., 189 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Piecemeal appeals are “disfavored” in the federal system.
See id. In determining whether to permit such an appeal, the Court should
balance “the advantage of allowing an immediate appeal against the
advantage of delaying the appeal until the pending claims can be resolved
so that all can be decided in a single appeal at a later time.” Id.
4

The Plaintiffs claim there is no just reason to delay certification and
allow appeal of the portion of the Order granting dismissal. The action
involves multiple claims against multiple parties. It would promote sound
judicial administration by giving the parties finality over claims that are
separate and distinct from the remaining claims against different parties.
Additionally, the claims against the Law Firms were separate and
distinct from the remaining claims against the other Defendants. None of
the claims in the Complaint against the Law Firms seek any relief from the
Borrower, its Members or the related Defendants. The surviving Complaint
does not seek relief against the Law Firms. Accordingly, the claims are
entirely separate and distinct from each other. The Plaintiffs contend that
the fact that the two lawsuits were originally filed separately strongly
suggests that neither lawsuit contains parties or claims that were essential
or necessary to the other.
The Plaintiffs further allege there is no relationship, or very little
relationship, between the relief sought in the Law Firm Lawsuit and that
sought in the Borrower Lawsuit.

The Law Firm Lawsuit seeks a

5

constructive trust, against only the Law Firms, over the retainer funds and
trust funds received by the Law Firms from the Borrower.

It seeks

additional liability related to the receipt of those funds. The Borrower
Lawsuit seeks contract damages against the Borrower, Guarantors and
related Defendants.
Accordingly, there is no chance that the need for review of the Court’s
dismissal of all claims of the Law Firm Lawsuit will be mooted by further
action that may occur in connection with the claims of the Borrower
Lawsuit. Moreover, there is no chance the court of appeals will have to
consider the same issue a second time if certification is granted. The
Plaintiffs contend there is no reason to delay a final resolution in the Law
Firm Lawsuit. Such a delay will only be a hardship on the parties.
For all of these reasons, the Plaintiffs seek certification of the Court’s
Order dismissing Counts I through IV of the Complaint in the Law Firms
Lawsuit, as a final order under Rule 54(b).
The Court notes that although the claims in the two cases were
different, many of the factual allegations in support of the claims are very

6

similar or the same as the Court discussed in the Order on motions to
dismiss. As the Law Firms allege, moreover, future developments in this
case could moot the need to review the Court’s ruling in the other case.
Because the Plaintiffs are entitled to only recovery, a recovery in this case
would reduce or eliminate any recovery the Plaintiffs could demand from
the Law Firms.
Additionally, as the Law Firms note, allowing an appeal under Rule
54(b) may result in a waste of appellate judicial resources because there
may be an appeal following a judgment on the remaining allegations in this
case. The Court concludes it would be more efficient for the Seventh
Circuit to resolve all claims in a single appeal.
For these reasons, the Court does not believe that certification of an
appeal under Rule 54(b) is warranted at this stage of the proceedings. An
appeal of the dismissal of the claims in the Law Firm Lawsuit can be heard
at the conclusion of this case. The Court is unable to determine that there
is no just reason for delay pursuant to Rule 54(b).
Ergo, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification of Appeal pursuant to

7

Rule 54(b) [d/e 30] is DENIED.
The Court’s Opinion and Order of August 15, 2016 [d/e 28] is not a
final judgment and may be appealed following the issuance of a judgment
in this consolidated action.
ENTER: October 25, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge

8