Coleman v. Korte et al

Filing 29

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/21/16. Defendant Teel's Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 22 is GRANTED. Defendant Teel is dismissed from this lawsuit without prejudice. Clerk is directed to terminate Defendant Teel.(SW, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 21 July, 2016 09:16:10 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JEFF KORTE, et al.
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Defendants. )
ANTHONY J. COLEMAN, JR.
a/k/a LENARD WRIGHT,

15-3209

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought the present lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging failure to protect and
deliberate indifference to a serious mental health need for events
that allegedly during his incarceration at Western Illinois
Correctional Center. The matter comes before this Court for ruling
on the Defendant Teel’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 22).
The motion is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
Defendant Teel filed her motion for summary judgment on
February 2, 2016. (Doc. 22). Defendant Teel sent Plaintiff notice of
the motion the same day, which included the relevant portions of
Rule 56 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the
consequences of failure to respond. (Doc. 23). In addition, the
Clerk sent Plaintiff notice of the motion, again detailing the
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consequences for failure to respond. (Doc. 26). In the Text Order
entered June 28, 2016, the Court sua sponte granted Plaintiff an
additional 21 days to file a response.
Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant’s motion, nor did
he file a motion requesting additional time. Therefore, the Court
will consider Defendant Teel’s assertions of fact as undisputed for
purposes of ruling on the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (if a
party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, the
court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion).
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 20, 2015. (Doc. 1). In his
Complaint, he alleges that Defendant Teel, a psychologist, failed to
meet with him for four (4) days during a crisis situation. Plaintiff
states that he filed a grievance about this delay, but that the
grievance was “still pending with the grievance officer” at the time
he filed the lawsuit. Id. at 10, ¶ 23. Plaintiff attached the relevant
grievance, dated June 21, 2015, to his Complaint. (Doc. 1-1). None
of the other grievances attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint mention
Defendant Teel. See id. at 6-8, 12-19.
Records from the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) disclose
that Plaintiff’s counselor answered Plaintiff’s grievance on June 25,
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2016. (Doc. 22-1 at 3). The grievance officer received the grievance
on July 2, 2015, and Chief Administrative Officer (in this case, the
Warden) concurred in the decision to deny the grievance on August
25, 2015. Id. at 4.
ANALYSIS
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and therefore the
burden of proof lies with the defendants. Turley v. Rednour, 729
F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court must hold an evidentiary
hearing if a disputed issue of material fact exists, see Pavey v.
Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008), but where none is
present, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and the issue of
exhaustion may be decided as a matter of law. Doss v. Gilkey, 649
F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013). The purpose of this requirement is to
“alert the state to the problem and invite corrective action.” Turley,
729 F.3d at 649 (internal citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit
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has adopted a strict compliance standard to exhaustion, and to
exhaust remedies “a prisoner must properly use the prison’s
grievance process.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.
2006). In other words, “a prisoner must file complaints and appeals
in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules
require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).
If the prisoner fails to follow the grievance procedures, “the prison
administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the
prisoner's claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Id.; see Dole,
438 F.3d at 809 (quoting same). “The ‘applicable procedural rules’
that a prisoner must properly exhaust are defined not by the PLRA,
but by the prison grievance process itself.” Maddox v. Love, 655
F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
218 (2007)).
The Illinois Administrative Code establishes the grievance
procedures for Illinois Department of Corrections inmates. Inmates
unable to resolve their issues informally with prison staff may file a
written grievance on a form provided by the prison. 20 Ill. Admin.
Code § 504.810(a). The grievance must be filed “within 60 days
after the discovery of the incident, occurrence, or problem that gives
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rise to the grievance.” Id. § 504.810(a). A grievance officer,
however, shall consider a grievance filed outside of the 60-day time
period if the inmate “can demonstrate that a grievance was not
timely filed for good cause….” Id. A grievance officer considers
each grievance and submits a recommendation to the Chief
Administrative Officer, who notifies the inmate of his decision. Id. §
504.830(d). An inmate may appeal the CAO’s decision to the
Director, but must do so within 30 days of the decision. Id. §
504.850(a). Once an appeal is received, the Administrative Review
Board reviews the appeal and provides the Director with a written
report of its findings and recommendations. Id. § 504.850(e).
Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that the grievance process as
it relates to Defendant Teel was ongoing at the time he filed this
lawsuit. An inmate may not exhaust administrative remedies while
a lawsuit is pending. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th
Cir. 2004) (to prevent subversion of the “negotiate now, litigate
later” principle espoused in the PLRA, “it is essential to keep the
courthouse doors closed until [efforts to resolve the matter outside
of court] have run their course.”). Therefore, the Court finds that

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Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies prior to
filing suit as required by the PLRA.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Teel’s
Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies [22] is GRANTED. Defendant Teel is
dismissed from this lawsuit without prejudice. Clerk is
directed to terminate Defendant Teel.
ENTERED: July 21, 2016.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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