Coleman v. Korte et al
Filing
8
MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/20/2015. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff states Eighth Amendment claims for failure to protect against Defendant Megginson and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Jane Doe and Defendant Teel. Plaintiff is given 30 days to file an amended complaint to include more facts regarding his procedural due process claim. Defendants Vinc ent, Schutte, Ruiz, Stolworthy, Goins and Harney are dismissed. Defendant Korte shall remain a defendant at this time for purposes of identifying Defendant Jane Doe. Plaintiff's Motion, d/e 5 is DENIED with leave to renew. This case is now in the process of service. Rule 16 Deadline 12/21/2015. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 26 October, 2015 12:55:48 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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JEFF KORTE, et al.
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Defendants )
ANTHONY J. COLEMAN, JR.,
15-3209
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings the present lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging procedural due process and
failure to protect claims relating to events that occurred while he
was incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center. The
matter comes before this Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C.
§1915A. In reviewing the complaint, the Court takes all factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts
must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
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face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal
citation omitted).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Accept Supplemental Exhibit seeking
the Court to accept an exhibit referenced in his Complaint, but
inadvertently omitted therefrom. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff’s Motion is
granted. The Court will consider the exhibit attached therein for
purposes of this merit review screening.
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges that he was placed into disciplinary
segregation at Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”)
following a self-reported incident involving another inmate who had
spit at Plaintiff and called Plaintiff derogatory names. Plaintiff
alleges he reported this incident to Defendant Harney who then
issued a disciplinary report against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that the Adjustment Committee (comprised of
Defendant Vincent and Defendant Schutte) found him guilty of the
alleged offense following a disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff alleges that
the Adjustment Committee denied Plaintiff’s request for Defendant
Harney to appear as a witness at the hearing. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Korte signed off on this decision despite learning
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Plaintiff’s version of the events via letter sent shortly after Plaintiff
was sent to segregation.
Plaintiff feared attack from the inmate involved in the spitting
incident while he was in segregation. Plaintiff alleges he conveyed
these fears via letter to Defendant Megginson (Internal Affairs) and
in person to Defendant Teel (psychologist). Plaintiff alleges he was
never interviewed by Internal Affairs.
ANALYSIS
Procedural Due Process
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Vincent, Schutte, and Korte
violated his due process rights by failing to call a requested witness
and by finding him guilty despite knowledge of his version of the
events. “A prisoner challenging the process he was afforded in a
prison disciplinary proceeding must meet two requirements: (1) he
has a liberty or property interest that the state has interfered with;
and (2) the procedures he was afforded upon this deprivation were
constitutionally deficient.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939
(7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s initial placement in disciplinary segregation pending
a hearing does not implicate due process concerns as prisons have
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a legitimate security interest in not allowing one suspected of a
disciplinary rule to roam free within the facility. See Holly v.
Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2005) (analogizing temporary
segregation for an alleged violation of a disciplinary rule to an arrest
without a warrant pending a probable cause hearing).
According to exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff
received 15 days in segregation and a demotion to “C Grade” as a
result of the disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff may be able to allege a
sufficient deprivation to trigger due process concerns, however, a
person already confined may not create a federal claim “by citing
small, incremental deprivations of physical freedom.” Thielman v.
Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2002). Instead, Plaintiff’s liberty
interest is balanced against the ordinary incidents of his
confinement. Id. Only those restrictions that impose an “atypical
and significant hardship” will trigger due process concerns. Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Plaintiff could possibly state a claim against Defendants Korte,
Vincent, and Schutte for their roles on the Adjustment Committee.
Therefore, Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint
detailing the conditions he endured while placed in disciplinary
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segregation. Because the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not
yet implicate due process concerns, the Court does not address
Plaintiff’s other allegations.
Failure to Protect
The Eighth Amendment imposes upon prison officials the duty
to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). The duty requires
prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal quotations omitted). To
succeed on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show (1) “that
he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm,” and, (2) prison officials acted with “deliberate
indifference” to that risk. Id. at 834.
For purposes of satisfying the first prong, “it does not matter
whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources,
any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk
of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his
situation face such a risk.” Id. at 843. Plaintiff alleges that he
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faced a risk of serious harm from a particular prisoner. Liberally
construed, Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong.
Next, Plaintiff must allege that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to this risk. Deliberate indifference is more than
negligence, but does not require the plaintiff to show that the
defendants intended to cause harm. Mayoral v. Sheehan, 245 F.3d
934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). Liability attaches under the Eighth
Amendment when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff alleges that he was released back into general
population after informing Defendant Megginson of a specific threat
to his safety. Plaintiff never received a response. Furthermore, the
fact that Plaintiff feared the same person with whom he had already
been in an altercation creates an inference that prison officials were
aware of the problem and chose to ignore it. On these grounds, the
Court cannot rule out a failure to protect claim against Defendant
Megginson.
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Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
To state a claim for inadequate medical care, the Plaintiff must
allege that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
A need for mental health treatment could be considered an
objectively serious medical need. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jane Doe failed to arrange a
meeting with a psychologist after Plaintiff told her that he was
feeling suicidal. Plaintiff alleges that he was and is currently
prescribed anxiety medication. Plaintiff alleges that four (4) days
elapsed before he was seen by Defendant Teel. Based upon this,
Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need against Defendant Jane Doe and Defendant
Teel. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010)
(delay in treatment can support a claim for deliberate indifference to
a serious medical need).
Remaining Defendants
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Ruiz, Stolworthy, or
Goins personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations
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and should be dismissed. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991
(7th Cir. 1996) (“[L]iability [under § 1983] does not attach unless the
individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional
deprivation.” (citations omitted)).
Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Harney issued a
false disciplinary report do not state a claim. Defendant Harney’s
constitutional liability ceased when Plaintiff was provided a hearing
on the allegations. See Hadley v. Peters, 841 F. Supp. 850, 856
(C.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th
Cir. 1984)). Therefore, Defendant Harney should be dismissed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1)
Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff states the
following claims: Eighth Amendment claims for failure to
protect against Defendant Megginson and deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Jane
Doe and Defendant Teel. Plaintiff is given 30 days to file an
amended complaint to include more facts regarding his
procedural due process claim. If Plaintiff chooses to file an
amended complaint, he must include all allegations against all
defendants. Piecemeal amendments are not permitted. Any
additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at
the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause
shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2)
Defendants Vincent, Schutte, Ruiz, Stolworthy,
Goins, and Harney will be dismissed. Defendant Korte shall
remain a defendant at this time for purposes of identifying
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Defendant Jane Doe. See Donald v. Cook County Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1996).
3)
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Request Counsel [5]. The
Plaintiff has no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in
this case. In considering the Plaintiff’s motion, the court asks:
(1) has the indigent Plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to
obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and
if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff
appear competent to litigate it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503
F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer v. Haas, 990
F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir.1993)). Plaintiff has shown that he
made a reasonable attempt to secure counsel on his own.
Plaintiff’s correspondence with the Court at this point,
however, has been appropriate. Given the relative simplicity of
Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff is capable of
representing himself at this time. Plaintiff’s Motion [5] is
DENIED with leave to renew.
4)
This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants
before filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice
and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed
before Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will
generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit
any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise
directed by the Court.
5)
The Court will attempt service on Defendants by
mailing each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have
60 days from the date the waiver is sent to file an Answer. If
Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel
within 90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a
motion requesting the status of service. After Defendants have
been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and
dispositive motion deadlines.
6)
With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at
the address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that
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Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to the
Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not known,
said Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be
used only for effectuating service. Documentation of
forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and
shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by
the Clerk.
7)
Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the
date the waiver is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not
an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate
under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings
shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion. In
general, an answer sets forth Defendants' positions. The Court
does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until
a motion is filed by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the
answer is necessary or will be considered.
8)
This District uses electronic filing, which means that,
after Defense counsel has filed an appearance, Defense counsel
will automatically receive electronic notice of any motion or
other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not
need to mail to Defense counsel copies of motions and other
papers that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk. However, this
does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery
requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff
must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to
Defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to
the Clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are attached to
and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not
begin until Defense counsel has filed an appearance and the
Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the
discovery process in more detail.
9)
Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to
depose Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Counsel for
Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.
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10) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in
writing, of any change in his mailing address and telephone
number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in
mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this
lawsuit, with prejudice.
11) If a Defendants fails to sign and return a waiver of
service to the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the
Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service
through the U.S. Marshal's service on that Defendant and will
require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
12) Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants' counsel
an authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is
directed to sign and return the authorization to Defendants'
counsel.
13) The clerk is directed to enter the standard order
granting Plaintiff's in forma pauperis petition and assessing an
initial partial filing fee, if not already done, and to attempt
service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures.
ENTERED:
October 20, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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