Logan v. City of Lincoln, Illinois
Filing
21
OPINION BY SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 17 ) is DENIED. The Final Pretrial Conference set for September 5, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. is VACATED and RESET to September 1, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. The ca se remains set for a Jury Trial on September 19, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. The parties are directed to review and comply with the Court's Standing Order on Final Pretrial Conferences, Exhibits, and Jury Instructions. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered on 7/20/2017. (MJC, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 20 July, 2017 04:08:02 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
KEVIN LOGAN,
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Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LINCOLN, ILLINOIS,
Defendant.
No. 15-3325
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Defendant City of Lincoln, Illinois has filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment (d/e 17). Because genuine issues of material
fact remain, the Motion is DENIED.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Kevin Logan worked for Defendant as a laborer in
Defendant’s Streets and Alleys Department until Defendant
terminated Plaintiff’s employment in April 2014. In November
2015, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant under the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Plaintiff
alleged that Defendant violated the ADA by failing to engage in the
interactive process, refusing to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable
accommodation, and terminating Plaintiff’s employment because of
his disability.
In April 2017, Defendant filed its Motion for Summary
Judgment. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish that
he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA or that
his employment was terminated because of his disability.
In his response, Plaintiff states that he is not claiming that he
was fired because of a disability. Pl. Resp. at 13, n. 3 (d/e 19).
Instead, Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to accommodate
Plaintiff’s disability and, had Defendant made the accommodation,
Plaintiff’s employment would have not have been terminated. Id.
The dispute on summary judgment centers on whether operating
commercial vehicles and equipment/machinery1 are essential
functions of the laborer position held by Plaintiff.
II. FACTS
The Court takes the following facts from the parties’
Statement of Undisputed Facts and other materials in the record.
Defendant uses the terms “equipment” and “machinery” interchangeably.
The Court will use the term “machinery.”
1
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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited
materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”).
In February 1999, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as a
laborer in its Streets and Alleys Department. The duties and
responsibilities of the street department laborer position in place
throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant are contained in
the Position Description, which provides as follows:
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF WORK:
Under direct supervision, performs maintenance and
repair of roads, bridges, signs, road striping, and related
functions by semiskilled operation of tools, equipment,
and light and heavy vehicles.
EXAMPLES OF WORK BUT NOT LIMITED TO:
1. Repairs, replaces and patches bituminous, concrete
and other road surfaces; repairs and clean[s] culverts,
storm grates, gutters[;] fills low places and ruts in
shoulders; repair and paint guard rails; performs hand
mowing and trimming; straightens, erects and cleans
traffic signs and signals; trim and remove trees; plow
snow, salt roads and shovel [handicap] ramps.
2. Operate trucks, tractors, mowing machines, snow
plows, salt spreaders, compressors, motor graders,
loaders, backhoes and other equipment as assigned.
3. Assist in servicing equipment such as trucks,
tractors, mowing machines, snow plows, salt spreaders,
compressors and other street equipment; lubricates and
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make[s] minor adjustments, and minor reports of
assigned equipment.
4. Performs routine housekeeping duties by cleaning,
maintaining stock piles of materials and other task[s]
associated with the general care of work area and
equipment; performs normal security measures in work
area.
5. Directs traffic where road repairs are being made.
6. Perform other duties as required or assigned which
are reasonably within the scope of the duties
enumerated above.
In addition, under the heading “Desirable Requirements,” the
Position Description lists the following: “Requires possession of an
Illinois Class ‘B’ commercial driver[’]s license with appropriate
endorsements or to be able to have one within 30 days of hire.”
In December 2013, Plaintiff injured his left eye. Plaintiff
never returned to work after suffering the eye injury. At no time,
however, did Plaintiff lose his Class B commercial driver’s license.
Plaintiff received treatment for his eye from Dr. William W.
Yang. On February 25, 2014, Dr. Yang sewed Plaintiff’s left eye
shut in an attempt to get the scar on the eye to heal. Plaintiff’s eye
was sewn shut for two weeks. Following the removal of the
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stiches, Plaintiff’s vision was a little blurry, and he could not see
well enough to read.
On March 6, 2014, Mayor Keith Snyder sent Plaintiff a letter
informing him that his Family Medical Leave would be exhausted
as of March 10, 2014, and that Defendant expected Plaintiff to
return to work on March 11, 2014 with medical documentation
from his physician certifying that he was fit to return to work. In
the alternative, Plaintiff could request additional leave
accompanied by medical documentation identifying, among other
things, Plaintiff’s expected return date.
On March 7, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an Employee FMLA
Leave Request to Defendant requesting that he either return to
work with restrictions or have his leave extended to June 3, 2014.
Around the same time that Plaintiff submitted the Employee FMLA
Leave Request, Defendant sent Plaintiff for an examination by Dr.
Daniel Brownstone.
On March 11, 2014, Defendant sent correspondence to Dr.
Brownstone and Dr. Yang requesting specific information. The
letter stated, in part, as follows:
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The City of Lincoln operates a public works department
which provides service to the City’s citizens. In order to
provide these services, laborers are required to drive
vehicles, operate heavy machinery including, but not
limited to[,] backhoes and street sweepers, repair
streets, as well as perform other duties. Laborers are
required to maintain a commercial driver’s license (so
that they can drive trucks that require a commercial
driver’s license to operate) as a condition of employment.
It is the City’s understanding that [Plaintiff’s] eye
condition precludes him from currently driving any
vehicle that would require a driver to possess a
commercial driver’s license.
Defendant asked the doctors for information regarding Plaintiff’s
eye condition, whether the eye condition interfered with Plaintiff’s
ability to perform the duties of his job, and how long the eye
condition would interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to do his job.
Around March 19, 2014, Defendant received a response from
Dr. Yang. Dr. Yang informed Defendant that Plaintiff’s left eye
vision was 20/200 which, from his understanding, would not allow
Plaintiff to have a commercial driver’s license for operating
machinery and vehicles. Dr. Yang could not provide a date by
which he expected Plaintiff to be able to return to driving and
operating machinery, noting that such estimation “is highly
dependent on his ability to heal.” Finally, Dr. Yang advised that:
“Currently, there are no steps that I can recommend that
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[Defendant] take to allow [Plaintiff] to return to work. However, if
there are any activities that would allow him to perform his job
with one functional eye, that would be perfectly reasonable with
our current situation.”
Around March 19, 2014, Defendant received a response from
Dr. Brownstone. Dr. Brownstone informed Defendant that
Plaintiff’s left eye vision was 20/100 and he was not legal to drive
any vehicle that required a commercial driver’s license. He stated
that Plaintiff could still drive on a regular license because only one
eye is required to drive legally in Illinois. Dr. Brownstone further
opined that Plaintiff should not be allowed to operate any
machinery that required depth perception because the vision in
Plaintiff’s left eye was so impaired. Dr. Brownstone could not
predict when Plaintiff would be able to drive commercial vehicles or
operate machinery. Finally, Dr. Brownstone advised that Plaintiff
would be on long-term disability the remainder of the year “unless
his job description can be modified to the point where he is not
required to drive commercial vehicles and operate heavy
machinery.”
Page 7 of 19
On March 26, 2014, Mayor Snyder sent a letter to Plaintiff
advising him that his request for an extension of leave was denied.
Mayor Snyder offered Plaintiff an opportunity to attend a meeting
on March 31, 2014, at which Plaintiff could suggest any
accommodations that would allow Plaintiff to perform the essential
functions of his job. Alternatively, if there were no such
accommodations, Plaintiff could explain why Defendant should not
terminate Plaintiff’s employment.
On March 31, 2014, a meeting was held at Mayor Snyder’s
office between Plaintiff, Mayor Snyder, Village Administrator Sue
McClaughlin, the City Attorney, and two union representatives.
During the meeting, Plaintiff handed Mayor Snyder, McClaughlin,
and the City Attorney a copy of the ADA. Mayor Snyder pushed
the document back to Plaintiff and said, “you weren’t hurt on the
job. It’s not my responsibility to accommodate you.”
Mayor Snyder recalls making a statement to that effect,
although he does not recall that he made it during the March 31,
2014 meeting. Mayor Snyder explains that the statement was
made in the context of Plaintiff requesting light-duty status.
Defendant’s Street and Alley Department had a policy that
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employees injured on the job would perform light duty work until
released from a doctor’s care. In any event, Plaintiff was told at the
meeting that he was not going to be accommodated because he
was not hurt on the job.
At the time of the meeting, the vision in Plaintiff’s left eye was
20/100. Plaintiff expected that he needed one more procedure
performed on his eye to improve his vision to 20/30 in his left eye.
Plaintiff is not sure if that surgery was scheduled at the time the
meeting took place. No decision was made on whether to
terminate Plaintiff’s employment during the meeting.
On April 17, 2014, Plaintiff gave Defendant a letter from Dr.
Yang. Plaintiff asserts, but Defendant disputes, that Dr. Yang
released Plaintiff to return to work without restriction. The same
day Plaintiff presented Dr. Yang’s letter, Defendant directed
Plaintiff to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation with Dr. Dru
Hauter. On April 21, 2014, Dr. Hauter provided Defendant with
written documentation indicating that Plaintiff was fit to return to
duty with the only limitation being “no commercial driving.”
Defendant notified Plaintiff via letter dated April 23, 2014, that his
employment was terminated effective April 24, 2014.
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In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff
submitted an affidavit stating that he would often go more than a
month without driving a commercial vehicle in his job as a laborer.
Affidavit ¶ 21 (d/e 19-1). Moreover, in the 15 years Plaintiff
worked for Defendant, there was never an instance when all of the
people who were working needed to drive a commercial vehicle at
the same time. Id. ¶ 19. In fact, at one point in time, the
department had nearly twice as many workers as commercial
vehicles. Id.
III. JURISDICTION
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff
asserted claims based on federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States”). Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the
claim occurred within the judicial district of this Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (a civil action may be brought in “a judicial
district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred”).
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IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant
believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). No genuine issue of material fact exists if a
reasonable jury could not find in favor of the nonmoving party.
Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.
2007). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the
nonmoving party’s favor. Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d
639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016).
V. ANALYSIS
The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge . . .
and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42
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U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer’s failure to make a reasonable
accommodation to the known physical limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability constitutes discrimination
unless the employer can demonstrate undue hardship. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Basith v Cook Cnty., 241 F.3d 919, 927
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting that two distinct categories of disability
discrimination claims exist under the ADA: (1) disparate treatment
claims and (2) failure to accommodate claims).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation for his disability. See Pl. Rep. at 13 (d/e 19). To
ultimately succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove that (1) he is
a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware
of his disability; and (3) Defendant failed to reasonably
accommodate the disability. Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 753
F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2014).
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA. See Def. Mot. at 14. Defendant argues,
however, that Plaintiff is not a “qualified individual” as that term is
used in the ADA.
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Determining whether an individual with a disability is
“qualified” requires a two-step inquiry. Plaintiff has the burden of
showing that (1) he satisfies the prerequisites of the position, such
as educational background, experience, and skills; and (2) that he
could perform the essential functions of the laborer position with
or without a reasonable accommodation. See Budde v. Kane Cnty.
Forest Pres., 597 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(m) (defining the term “qualified” with respect to an
individual with a disability)); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty.
Schs., 100 F. 3d 1281, 1284 (7th Cir. 1996).
The parties do not appear to dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the
prerequisites for the position. Defendant argues, however, that
Plaintiff cannot come forth with any evidence to show that, at the
time of the adverse action, he could perform the essential functions
of the laborer position with or without a reasonable
accommodation. Def. Mot. at 11. Specifically, Defendant asserts
that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff cannot perform the
essential functions of operating trucks, tractors, mowing
machines, snow plows, salt spreaders, compressors, motor
graders, loaders, backhoes, and other equipment with or without
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reasonable accommodation. Id. Defendant points out that
Plaintiff had significant vision loss in his left eye and that Plaintiff’s
own doctor and an independent medical evaluator opined that
Plaintiff could not operate trucks or machinery. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that the Motion for Summary Judgment
“boils down” to whether driving a commercial vehicle is an
essential function of the job. Pl. Resp. at 12. Plaintiff argues that
this issue is a disputed question of fact for the jury.
Plaintiff does not argue that operating machinery is not an
essential function of the laborer job. In fact, Plaintiff does not
address the operation of machinery at all. However, the Court
finds a question of fact remains whether Plaintiff could perform the
essential function of operating machinery. While Dr. Yang and Dr.
Brownstone opined that Plaintiff could not operate machinery, Dr.
Hauter subsequently determined that Plaintiff’s only limitation
pertained to commercial driving. Therefore, because a genuine
issue of fact remains whether Plaintiff can perform the essential
function of operating machinery, summary judgment is
inappropriate on this issue. See, e.g., Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d
896, 905 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding the plaintiff survived summary
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judgment motion where he raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether he could perform the essential functions of the job).
The Court also finds that, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, a genuine issue of fact remains whether
commercial driving is an essential function of the laborer position.
An essential function is a fundamental job duty of the employment
position the individual holds. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). The term
does not include “marginal functions of the position.” Id. A job
function may be considered essential for several reasons,
including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the reason the
position exists is to perform that function; (2) the limited number
of employees available among whom the performance of that job
function can be distributed; and/or (3) the function is highly
specialized so that the employee is hired for his or her expertise or
ability to perform the particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2).
The type of evidence that may be considered in determining
whether a function is essential includes, but is not limited to:
(i) The employer’s judgment as to which functions are
essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising
or interviewing applicants for the job;
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(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the
function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job;
and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in
similar jobs.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Basith, 241 F.3d at 928 (written
job descriptions that that do not fall within § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii) “are
clearly instances of the employer’s judgment as to which functions
are essential”). Whether a task is an essential function of the job
is a question of fact. Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir.
2016).
Several of the relevant factors support a finding that driving a
commercial vehicle is an essential function of the laborer job.
Defendant states that driving a commercial vehicle is an essential
function. The written job description identifies the “distinguishing
features of work” as including the operation of light and heavy
vehicles.
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However, Plaintiff has also presented evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that driving a commercial vehicle is not
an essential function of the laborer position. The Position
Description lists possession of an Illinois Class B commercial
driver’s license as a “desirable requirement,” not a mandatory
requirement. The Position Description—which lists the operation
of light and heavy vehicles as a distinguishing feature of the job—
does not indicate which vehicles require a commercial driver’s
license, how many commercial vehicles are in the department, or
how often those vehicles are used. A reasonable inference can be
drawn that some of the vehicles used by the laborers do not
require a commercial driver’s license.
Plaintiff submitted his Affidavit indicating that in the 15 years
he worked as a laborer, there was never an instance where all of
the people who were working needed to drive a commercial vehicle.
In addition, driving a commercial vehicle was something Plaintiff
did fairly infrequently and it was typical that he would not drive a
commercial vehicle during the course of an entire month. See
Basith, 241 F.3d at 929 n. 2 (noting that the amount of time spent
performing the function is a factor used to determine whether the
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task is an essential function) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii)).
An activity is not essential “if it [is] so small a part that it could be
reassigned to other employees at a negligible cost to the employer.”
Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, 769 F.3d 958, 962 (7th
Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment and finding factual issues
remained whether wheeling nursing home residents to and from
the beauty parlor was an essential part of the hairdresser’s job
where the plaintiff presented evidence that the task was a small
part of her job).
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Court finds that questions of fact remain whether Plaintiff could
perform the essential function of operating machinery and whether
operating a commercial vehicle was an essential function of the
laborer position. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 17) is DENIED. The Final Pretrial Conference set
for September 5, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. is VACATED and RESET to
September 1, 2017 at 2:00 p.m. The case remains set for a Jury
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Trial on September 19, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. The parties are directed
to review and comply with the Court’s Standing Order on Final
Pretrial Conferences, Exhibits, and Jury Instructions.
ENTER: July 20, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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