Young et al v. Sproat et al
Filing
17
OPINION: Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (d/e 7 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/16/2016. Brewer fails to state a federal claim against the remaining Defendants, and, therefore, the claims against Patricia Kaidell, Christopher Matoush, James Frank, Joy Oakley, Tania Boerckel, Judge Jarman, ElizabethWilson, John Evans, Dennis Atterbury, and the DEA are DISMISSED. Plaintiff Young fails to state a claim against any Defendants and all of Plaintiff Young's claims are DISMISSED. This case is now in the process of service. SEE Written Opinion. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/16/2016. (ME, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 18 February, 2016 03:04:27 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DOUGLAS YOUNG and CORALIE
BREWER,
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)
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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JOSHOUA SPROAT, BONNIE
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LINDENHOUR, KIMBERLY ALLEN, )
PATRICIA KAIDELL, SCOTT
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LONGKNECKER, KELLI BRUHN, )
CHRISTOPHER MATOUSH,
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JAMES FRANK, JOY OAKLEY,
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TANIA BOERCKEL, JUDGE
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JARMAN, ELIZABETH WILSON,
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JOHN EVANS, DENNIS
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ATTERBURY, AND DRUG
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ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
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Defendants.
)
No. 15-3332
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (d/e 7). The Motion is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff Coralie Brewer is granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis against Defendants Joshoua
Sproat, Kimberly Allen, Bonnie Lindenhour, Scott Longknecker, and
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Kelli Bruhn on a familial relations substantive due process claim
(Count I) and against Defendants Lindenhour and Bruhn on a
procedural due process claim (Count II) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff Douglas Young fails to state a claim against any
Defendants and all of Plaintiff Young’s claims are DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2015, Plaintiffs filed, pro se, a “Notice of Tort
Claim,” which the Court interpreted as a Complaint (d/e 1), and a
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (d/e 2). On December 8,
2015, the Court granted Plaintiff Coralie Brewer leave to proceed in
forma pauperis against Defendants Joshoua Sproat, Kimberly Allen,
Bonnie Lindenhour, and Kelli Bruhn on Brewer’s familial relations
substantive due process claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim. The Court dismissed Plaintiff Brewer’s claims against the
remaining Defendants without prejudice and with leave to replead.
The Court also dismissed Plaintiff Douglas Young’s claims against
all of the Defendants without prejudice and with leave to replead.
The Court cautioned Plaintiffs that an Amended Complaint
completely replaces the original Complaint and that the Amended
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Complaint must contain all of Plaintiffs’ claims against all of the
Defendants.
On December 16, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint
(d/e 6) and a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (d/e
7). The Amended Complaint contains the following allegations,
which are taken as true for purposes of this Opinion only.
In October 2013, Defendants Bonnie Lindenhour, an
investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS), and Kelli Bruhn, a family intact counselor with Catholic
Charities Family, allegedly removed Brewer’s children from Brewer’s
care without a warrant or consent. Plaintiffs allege that Lindenhour
also lied under oath. It appears, although it is not specifically
alleged, that a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(705 ILCS 405/2-1 et seq.) remains pending regarding Brewer’s
children.
Defendant Joshoua Sproat, a child welfare specialist with
Family Services Center, allegedly opened a criminal file relating to
Plaintiff Young’s past without court permission and which
purportedly harmed Brewer’s case relating to her children. Sproat
also allegedly gave Brewer an illegal drug test and lied under oath.
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Defendant Kimberly Allen, a DCFS investigator, allegedly made
false accusations that Brewer’s child was sexually abused when the
child was not sexually abused. Allen also allegedly said that Brewer
abused her children when Brewer did not do so. Plaintiffs allege
that Allen badgered Brewer’s children by making them lie.
Defendant Patricia Kaidell, a supervisor with Family Services
Center, allegedly told Brewer that Brewer’s children would be home
with Brewer in six months if Brewer did what Brewer had to do,
such as taking domestic violence and parenting classes.
Defendant Scott Longknecker, a Family Services Center
supervisor, allegedly told Sproat to lie under oath and terminate
Brewer’s visits by giving Brewer an illegal drug test. Longknecker
also allegedly threatened Brewer’s brother, who has custody of
Brewer’s children, that if the rest of Brewer’s family sees the
children, Sproat will take the children away.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Christopher Matoush,
Montgomery County State’s Attorney, had the Drug Enforcement
Agency write false statements against Plaintiff Young.
Defendants James Frank and Joy Oakley allegedly called
Brewer’s caseworker and made false allegations.
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Defendant Tania Boerckel allegedly called Sproat and told him
to open Plaintiff Young’s file from 2006 without a judge’s consent.
Defendant Judge Jarman allegedly listened to DCFS’s lies and
never heard Plaintiff Brewer’s side of the story.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Elizabeth Wilson, Montgomery
County Assistant State’s Attorney, accepted what DCFS told her,
listened to DCFS’s lies, and used Brewer’s probation and juvenile
case against her. In May 2015, Wilson allegedly threated to give
Brewer three years in prison for Plaintiff Young’s past.
Defendant Attorney John Evans allegedly lied under oath.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Public Defender Dennis
Atterbury did not stand up for Brewer’s Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendment rights and did not defend her at all.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Drug Enforcement
Agency wrote a false statement against Plaintiff Young as grounds
to keep Brewer’s children from her.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (d/e 7).
When a plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his or her
complaint is subject to review by the district court. See 28 U.S.C. §
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1915(e)(2); Estrada v. Reed, 346 F. App’x 87, 90 (7th Cir. Sept. 1.
2009) (unpublished disposition) (noting that the “district court must
screen the complaint of any plaintiff who would like to proceed in
forma pauperis”). Moreover, the district court shall dismiss the
case if the court determines that the action is frivolous or
malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see also Rowe v. Shake,
196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the “district court
may screen the complaint prior to service on the defendants, and
must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim”) (citing 28
U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)). When screening a complaint to determine
whether it states a claim, the court applies the same standard used
to evaluate dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Arnett v Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir.
2011) (applying the Rule12(b)(6) standard when reviewing a
dismissal under §1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim).
To state a claim for relief, plaintiffs need only provide a short
and plain statement of the claim showing they are entitled to relief
and giving the defendants fair notice of the claims. Tamayo v.
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Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). A court
construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all
reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. Id. Pro se pleadings are
liberally construed. See Ambrose v. Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615,
618 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that “[t]he question for us is whether
the petition adequately presents the legal and factual basis for the
claim, even if the precise legal theory is inartfully articulated or
more difficult to discern.”).
A complaint must, however, set forth facts that plausibly
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges facts
from which a court can reasonably infer that the defendants are
liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or
supporting claims with conclusory statements is insufficient to
state a cause of action. Id.
In this case, to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiffs must allege (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the alleged
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deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of
state law. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,
822 (7th Cir. 2009). Parents have a fundamental right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children
pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). The right is not
absolute, however, and “must be balanced against the state’s
interest in protecting children from abuse.” Siliven v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “[t]he
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
government from interfering in familial relationships unless the
government adheres to the requirements of procedural and
substantive due process.” Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children &
Youth Servs., 103 F. 3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997).
A liberal construction of Brewer’s allegations suggests that she
alleges that certain Defendants deprived Brewer of her parental
rights based on knowingly false information and removed the
children from Brewer’s care without a hearing. Brewer therefore
states a deprivation of a constitutional right. Such allegations state
a constitutional claim. See Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928-29 (noting that
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removal of the child without an investigation and predeprivation
hearing absent exigent circumstances violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) (citing Brokaw v. Mercer
County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000)); Brokaw, 235 F.3d at
1012 (finding substantive due process claims based on allegations
that the defendants knew the allegations of child neglect were false
or withheld material information and caused or conspired to cause
the minor’s removal of the home and separation from his parents);
Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 479-80 (7th
Cir. 2011) (the parents stated a familial relations substantive due
process claim where they alleged that the defendants continued to
hold their child in protective custody when the defendants knew
they had no reason to do so); Sebesta v. Davis, No. 12 C 7834, 2013
WL 5408796 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2013) (mother stated a familial
relations substantive due process claim when she alleged facts
suggesting that the defendants had no reasonable basis to indicate
her for neglect); Evans ex rel. Evans v. Richardson, No. 08 C 5593,
2010 WL 1194272, at *6 (N.D. Ill. March 19, 2010) (finding the
plaintiffs alleged a violation of plaintiffs’ substantive due process
right to familial relations when the defendants allegedly took the
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child into protective custody without evidence of abuse, without a
court order prior to removal, and allegedly with no petition with the
court after removal, and then coerced the parents into signing a
restrictive safety plan). Brewer makes such allegations against
Defendants Sproat, Allen, Lindenhour, Longknecker, and Bruhn.
Brewer has also alleged that the purported deprivation was
committed by persons acting under color of law.1 Plaintiff Brewer
alleges that Allen and Lindenhour are state workers. While Sproat,
Longknecker, and Bruhn are not state workers, a liberal
construction of Plaintiff Brewer’s allegations suggests that Sproat,
Longknecker, and Bruhn purportedly conspired with the state
workers to deprive Plaintiff Brewer of her fundamental right to
parent her children. Private parties can be found liable under
§ 1983 if they conspired with a state actor. See, e.g., Thurman v.
Village of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (a private
actor acts under color of law if he reaches an understanding with a
state official to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights and
The Court assumes the claims are brought against these Defendants in their
individual capacity because an official capacity suit against a state actor would
be a suit against the state and be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1009 (“Federal suits against state officials in the official
capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment[.]”).
1
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the private individual willfully participated in joint activity with the
state or its agents).
Brewer fails to state a claim, however, against the other
Defendants. Judge Jarman is entitled to judicial immunity for his
judicial acts. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1015 (finding a judge is entitled
to absolute judicial immunity for his judicial acts unless he acted in
the clear absence of jurisdiction, even if the action is erroneous,
malicious, or in excess of his authority). Moreover, Matoush and
Wilson are entitled to absolute immunity for acts within the scope
of their prosecutorial duties. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 431 (1976) (a prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for
damages when “initiating a prosecution” and “presenting the State’s
case”). Similarly, witnesses, like Defendant Evans, who testify in
judicial proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity from liability
in damages. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983);
Stinson v. Gauger, 799 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that
the immunity extends to preparation to testify at trial).
Plaintiff Brewer’s claim against the DEA is essentially a claim
against the United States, and she cannot bring a §1983 suit
against the United States because §1983 applies to state actors, not
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federal actors. See Taylor v. Hayes, No. 3:04-CV-694-DRH, 2006
WL 1540824, at * 2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2006), report &
recommendation adopted by 2006 WL 1528886 (S.D. Ill. June 1,
2006). Plaintiff Brewer fails to allege any facts against the DEA
suggesting any other cause of action might exist against the DEA
(and for which the United States has waived sovereign immunity).
See, e.g., id.
In addition, Brewer’s allegations against Kaidell, Matoush,
Wilson, Boerckel, Evans, and Atterbury do not state any federal
claim that the Court can discern. Furthermore, Kaidell, Boerckel,
Evans, and Atterbury are not state actors, and Plaintiff Brewer has
not alleged facts to suggest a conspiracy between these non-state
actors and state actors so as to support a § 1983 claim. See Sow v.
Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 304-05 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting
that to allege conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege facts suggesting
“conspirators have an agreement to inflict injury or harm upon
[her].”). Even liberally construing Brewer’s allegations, the Court
finds that Brewer fails to state a claim against these Defendants.
Finally, Brewer’s allegations that Frank and Oakley made false
allegations to Brewer’s case worker do not state a claim because
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Frank and Oakley are not state actors and Plaintiff Brewer does not
allege facts to suggest that Frank and Oakley conspired with state
workers to deprive Plaintiff Brewer of her children. Therefore,
Plaintiff Brewer fails to state a § 1983 claim against Frank and
Oakley.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff Young has failed to state
a claim against any of the Defendants. The only specific references
to Plaintiff Young relate to a prior criminal file of his that was used
in the child neglect case. Plaintiff Young does not allege facts to
suggest that he has a familial relationship with the children. See,
e.g., Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 2012) (involving
stepfather’s substantive due process claim for an alleged violation of
the right to familial relations); Gausvik v. Perez, 239 F.Supp.2d
1067, 1096 (E.D. Wash. 2002) (finding that the boyfriend of the
child’s mother who had lived with the child for all 14 years of the
child’s life had a federal due process right to familial association
with the child), rev’d on other grounds 345 F.3d 813 (9th Cir.
2003). Young does not allege facts suggesting he suffered a
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States or that such deprivation was committed by a person
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acting under the color of state law. Therefore, all of Young’s claims
against the Defendants are dismissed for failure to state a claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (d/e 7) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff Brewer is granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis against Defendants Joshoua Sproat, Kimberly Allen,
Bonnie Lindenhour, Scott Longknecker, and Kelli Bruhn on a
familial relations substantive due process right claim (Count I) and
against Defendants Lindenhour and Bruhn on a procedural due
process claim (Count II) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brewer fails to
state a federal claim against the remaining Defendants, and,
therefore, the claims against Patricia Kaidell, Christopher Matoush,
James Frank, Joy Oakley, Tania Boerckel, Judge Jarman, Elizabeth
Wilson, John Evans, Dennis Atterbury, and the DEA are
DISMISSED. Plaintiff Young fails to state a claim against any
Defendants and all of Plaintiff Young’s claims are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:
1)
This case is now in the process of service. Brewer is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before
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filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Brewer need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
2)
The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing
each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from
service to file an Answer or a Motion to Dismiss. If Defendants have
not filed Answers or Motions to Dismiss or appeared through
counsel within 90 days of the entry of this order, Brewer may file a
motion requesting the status of service.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS
DIRECTED TO: 1) ATTEMPT SERVICE ON DEFENDANTS
PURSUANT TO THE STANDARD PROCEDURES; AND, 2) SET AN
INTERNAL COURT DEADLINE 60 DAYS FROM THE ENTRY OF
THIS ORDER FOR THE COURT TO CHECK ON THE STATUS OF
SERVICE AND ENTER SCHEDULING DEADLINES.
LASTLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT IF A DEFENDANT FAILS
TO SIGN AND RETURN A WAIVER OF SERVICE TO THE CLERK
WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE WAIVER IS SENT, THE COURT
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WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO EFFECT FORMAL
SERVICE THROUGH THE U.S. MARHSAL'S SERVICE ON THAT
DEFENDANT AND WILL REQUIRE THAT DEFENDANT TO PAY
THE FULL COSTS OF FORMAL SERVICE PURSUANT TO
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4(d)(2).
ENTER: February 16, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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