Young et al v. Sproat et al
Filing
5
OPINION: Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 2 is GRANTED IN PART. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiffs the Standard Civil Rights Complaint Packet (Non-Prisoner). The Motion to Request Counsel 3 is DENIED without prejudice and with leave to refile. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/8/2015. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 08 December, 2015 04:36:22 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DOUGLAS YOUNG and CORALIE
BREWER,
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
JOSHOUA SPROAT, DEPARTMENT)
OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY
)
SERVICES, COUNTY OF
)
MONTGOMERY, PATRICIA
)
KAIDELL, SCOTT LONGKNECKER,)
BONNIE LINDENHOUR,
)
CHRISTOPHER MATOUSH,
)
JAMES FRANK, JOY OAKLEY,
)
TANIA BOERCKEL, KELLI BRUHN,)
JUDGE JARMAN, ELIZABETH
)
WILSON, JOHN EVANS,
)
DENNIS ATTERBURY,
)
KIMBERLY ALLEN, AND DRUG
)
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY,
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 15-3332
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (d/e 2) and Motion to Request Counsel
(d/e 3). Plaintiffs’ motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is
GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff Coralie Brewer may proceed in forma
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pauperis against Defendants “Joshoua” Sproat, Kimberly Allen,
Bonnie Lindenhour, and Kelli Bruhn on Brewer’s familial relations
substantive due process claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim. Plaintiff Brewer’s claims against the remaining Defendants
are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to replead.
Plaintiff Douglas Young’s claims against all of the Defendants are
DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to replead. Plaintiffs’
Motion to Request Counsel (d/e 3) is DENIED without prejudice
and with leave to replead.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2015, Plaintiffs filed, pro se, a “Notice of Tort
Claim,” which this Court interprets as a Complaint. The Complaint
contains the following facts.
In October 2013, the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) removed Plaintiff Brewer’s children from her
care after DCFS received notice that Brewer was allegedly harming
her children. The Complaint does not explain Plaintiff Young’s role
in the case, other than that he is Brewer’s fiancé. The Complaint
does not allege that Plaintiff Young is the father of the children.
Page 2 of 17
Plaintiff Brewer claims that she is being denied the fundamental
right to be with and parent her children, to receive updates on how
her children are doing, and to have visits with her children.
Plaintiff Brewer alleges that Sproat—a subsequent filing by
Plaintiffs indicates that Sproat works for Family Service Center1 in
Springfield, Illinois (see d/e 4)—fabricated evidence and lied under
oath to keep Brewer’s children away from Brewer. In particular,
Sproat lied and said Brewer failed a drug test when Brewer had
actually passed the drug test.
Brewer also alleges that Sproat conspired with others to harm
Brewer, falsified evidence, and mispresented facts to the state court
judge, Judge Jarman, in an effort to keep Brewer’s children from
her. She further alleges that Patricia Kaidell (also of Family Service
Center, see d/e 4), Scott Longknecker (Sproat’s supervisor), and
Sproat knew or should have known that Judge Jarman would rely
on the false testimony, fabrication, and false documents to make
the adjudication.
Family Service Center is a licensed non-profit social service agency. See
www.service2families.com.
1
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In addition, Sproat and Longknecker allegedly knew early on
that Brewer’s children were not sexually abused, but Sproat failed
to properly investigate, which caused Brewer to lose more time with
her children. Brewer further alleges that Sproat used information
from Brewer’s ex-spouse, James Frank, and his partner, Joy
Oakley, without any further investigation into the truth or accuracy
of the information.
Brewer also makes allegations against numerous other
individuals. Brewer alleges that DCFS investigator Kimberly Allen
filed a false and slanderous petition against Brewer and used false
and slanderous information to keep Brewer’s children away from
Brewer. See d/e 4 (identifying that Allen works for DCFS). DCFS
worker Bonnie Lindenhour and Catholic Charities worker Kelli
Bruhn allegedly falsely accused Brewer—under oath and by
affidavit—of harming Brewer’s children. See d/e 4 (identifying
where Lindenhour and Bruhn work). Brewer alleges that Tania
Boerckel placed a call to DCFS and made false statements.
Additionally, Brewer asserts that Montgomery County is being
sued “for such failure to train its employees.” Compl. at 5 (d/e 1).
Christopher Matoush (Montgomery County State’s Attorney, see d/e
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4) allegedly had the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) write a false
statement against Plaintiff Young. Brewer asserts that Matoush,
Elizabeth Wilson (Montgomery County Assistant State’s Attorney,
see d/e 4), John Evans (an attorney, see d/e 4), Judge Jarman,
Longknecker, the DEA, Sproat, and Dennis Atterbury (an attorney,
see d/e 4) are all working together to keep Brewer’ children from
coming home. Plaintiffs seek damages in the amount of $10 million
and punitive damages.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. When a
plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his or her
complaint is subject to review by the district court. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2); Estrada v. Reed, 346 F. App’x 87, 90 (7th Cir. Sept. 1.
2009) (unpublished disposition) (noting that the “district court must
screen the complaint of any plaintiff who would like to proceed in
forma pauperis”). Moreover, the district court shall dismiss the
case if the court determines that the action is frivolous or
malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see also Rowe v. Shake,
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196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the “district court
may screen the complaint prior to service on the defendants, and
must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim”) (citing 28
U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)). When screening a complaint to determine
whether it states a claim, the court applies the same standard used
to evaluate dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Arnett v Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir.
2011) (applying the Rule12(b)(6) standard when reviewing a
dismissal under §1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim).
To state a claim for relief, plaintiffs need only provide a short
and plain statement of the claim showing they are entitled to relief
and giving the defendants fair notice of the claims. Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). A court
construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,
accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all
reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor. Id. Pro se pleadings are
liberally construed. See Ambrose v. Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615,
618 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that “[t]he question for us is whether
the petition adequately presents the legal and factual basis for the
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claim, even if the precise legal theory is inartfully articulated or
more difficult to discern.”).
A complaint must, however, set forth facts that plausibly
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges facts
from which a court can reasonably infer that the defendants are
liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or
supporting claims with conclusory statements is insufficient to
state a cause of action. Id.
In this case, to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiffs must allege (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of
state law. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816,
822 (7th Cir. 2009). Parents have a fundamental right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children
pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). The right is not
absolute, however, and “must be balanced against the state’s
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interest in protecting children from abuse.” Siliven v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “[t]he
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
government from interfering in familial relationships unless the
government adheres to the requirements of procedural and
substantive due process.” Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children
and Youth Servs., 103 F. 3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997).
To the extent Plaintiff Brewer alleges that certain Defendants
made knowingly false statements to deprive Brewer of her parental
rights, Brewer states a deprivation of a constitutional right.
Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims
based on allegations that the defendants knew the allegations of
child neglect were false or withheld material information and
caused or conspired to cause the minor’s removal of the home and
separation from his parents); Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v.
Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2011) (the parents stated a
familial relations substantive due process claim where they alleged
that the defendants continued to hold their child in protective
custody when the defendants knew they had no reason to do so);
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Sebesta v. Davis, No. 12 C 7834, 2013 WL 5408796 at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 26, 2013) (mother stated a familial relations substantive due
process claim when she alleged facts suggesting that the defendants
had no reasonable basis to indicate her for neglect); Evans ex rel.
Evans v. Richardson, No. 08 C 5593, 2010 WL 1194272, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. March 19, 2010) (finding the plaintiffs alleged a violation of
plaintiffs’ substantive due process right to familial relations by
taking the child into protective custody without evidence of abuse,
without a court order prior to removal, and allegedly with no
petition with the court after removal, and conditioning contact with
the child on supervised visits). Brewer makes such allegations
against Sproat, Allen, Lindenhour, and Bruhn.2
Specifically, Plaintiff Brewer alleges that Sproat fabricated
evidence and lied under oath to keep Brewer’s children away from
her. Sproat allegedly lied and said Brewer failed a drug test when
she had not. He also allegedly conspired with others to harm
The Court assumes the claims are brought against these Defendants in their
individual capacity because an official capacity suit against a state actor would
be a suit against the state and be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1009 (“Federal suits against state officials in the official
capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment[.]”).
2
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Brewer, falsify evidence, and misrepresent facts in court to keep
Brewer’s children from her.
Plaintiff Brewer also alleges that DCFS investigator Allen, filed
a false and slanderous petition against Brewer and used false
information to keep Brewer’s children from her. Similarly, DCFS
employee Lindenhour and Catholic Charities employee Bruhn
allegedly made false statements under oath accusing Brewer of
harming her children. Therefore, Plaintiff Brewer has alleged the
deprivation of a constitutional right by these Defendants.
Plaintiff Brewer has also alleged that the purported deprivation
was committed by persons acting under color of law. Plaintiff
Brewer alleges that Allen and Lindenhour are state workers. While
Sproat and Bruhn are not state workers, a liberal construction of
Plaintiff Brewer’s allegations suggests that Sproat and Bruhn
purportedly conspired with the state workers to deprive Plaintiff
Brewer of her fundamental right to parent her children. Private
parties can be found liable under § 1983 if they conspired with a
state actor. See, e.g., Thurman v. Village of Homewood, 446 F.3d
682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (a private actor acts under color of law if he
reaches an understanding with a state official to deprive the
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plaintiff of her constitutional rights and the private individual
willfully participated in joint activity with the state or its agents).
Plaintiff Brewer has also stated a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress against these four Defendants. A
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires that a
plaintiff allege (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
defendants; (2) that the defendants either intended to or knew that
there was a high probability that their conduct would cause severe
emotional distress; and (3) the conduct caused severe emotional
distress. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 269 (2003) (quoting
McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 86 (1988)). Liberally construing
Brewer’s allegations, the Court finds that she has stated an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendants
Sproat, Allen, Lindenhour, and Bruhn based on the allegations that
they lied and used false information to take and keep Plaintiff
Brewer’s children from her.
Brewer fails to state a claim, however, against the other
Defendants. Judge Jarman is entitled to judicial immunity for his
judicial acts. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1015 (finding a judge is entitled
to absolute judicial immunity for his judicial acts unless he acted in
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the clear absence of jurisdiction, even if the action is erroneous,
malicious, or in excess of his authority). The claim against DCFS is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Ryan v. Ill. Dep’t of Children
and Family Servs., 185 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1999) (as an agency
of the state, DCFS is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity).
Additionally, Brewer only pleads conclusions of law against
Montgomery County. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
Furthermore, Plaintiff Brewer’s claim against the DEA is
essentially a claim against the United States, and she cannot bring
a §1983 suit against the United States because §1983 applies to
state actors. See Taylor v. Hayes, No. 3:04-CV-694-DRH, 2006 WL
1540824, at * 2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2006), report & recommendation
adopted by 2006 WL 1528886 (S.D. Ill. June 1, 2006). Plaintiff
Brewer fails to allege any facts against the DEA suggesting another
cause of action might exist against the DEA (and for which the
United States has waived sovereign immunity). See, e.g., id.
The allegations against Matoush, Wilson, Evans, Longknecker,
DEA and Atterbury—that they are all working together to keep
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Brewer’s children from coming home—are too speculative and
implausible, as pleaded, to state a claim. To the extent Brewer
attempts to allege a conspiracy regarding Matoush, Wilson, Evans,
Longknecker, and Atterbury, she must allege facts suggesting that
the “conspirators have an agreement to inflict injury or harm upon
[her].” Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 304-05 (7th Cir.
2011). Furthermore, Longknecker cannot be held liable solely
because he is Sproat’s supervisor. See League of Women Voters of
Chi. v. City of Chi., 757 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2014) (Section 1983
does not allow liability under a theory of respondeat superior).
Even liberally construing Brewer’s allegations, the Court finds that
Brewer fails to state a claim against these Defendants.
Additionally, Plaintiff Brewer alleges that Boerckel placed a
call to DCFS and made false statements but provides no other
allegations pertaining to Boerckel. Plaintiff Brewer’s supplemental
submission (d/e 4) does not shed any additional light on Boerckel’s
role in the case. Plaintiff Brewer also lists Kaidell as a Defendant
but does not specifically make allegations against Kaidell. Kaidell is
named in a paragraph along with Longknecker and Sproat, but the
allegations in that paragraph appear to relate solely to Sproat.
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Therefore, Kaidell role in this case is unclear. Without any
additional allegations about Boerckel and Kaidell, Plaintiff Brewer
fails to state a claim against them.
Plaintiff Brewer’s allegations against Frank and Oakley—that
Sproat used information from them without further investigation—
does not state a claim against Frank and Oakley for deprivation a
constitutional right by a person acting under color of law or for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, Plaintiff
Brewer fails to state a claim against Frank and Oakley.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff Young has failed to state
a claim against any of the Defendants. The only specific reference
to Plaintiff Young is the allegation that Matoush wrote a false
statement against Young. As noted above, Young does not allege
that any of the children are his. Plaintiff Young does not allege
facts suggesting he suffered a deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States or that such deprivation
was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
Therefore, all of Plaintiff Young’s claims against the Defendants are
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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Finally, Plaintiffs request counsel. This Court has the
discretion to recruit counsel to represent a civil litigant who cannot
afford counsel. Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013).
When faced with a motion to appoint counsel, the Court first
considers whether the indigent plaintiff has made a reasonable
attempt to obtain counsel or has been effectively precluded from
doing so. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). If so,
the Court then considers whether, given the difficulty of the case,
the plaintiff is competent to litigate it himself or herself. Id.
Here, Plaintiffs have not indicated whether they contacted any
attorneys or organizations seeking representation and do not attach
documents to their Motion showing that they have asked several
attorneys to represent them. In addition, Plaintiffs do not allege
that they have been effectively precluded from making a reasonable
attempt to obtain counsel. Therefore, the Motion is denied without
prejudice to refiling.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis (d/e 2) is GRANTED IN PART. Upon
review of the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff Brewer has
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stated a familial relations substantive due process right claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a state law intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim against the following Defendants: Joshoua Sproat,
Kimberly Allen, Bonnie Lindenhour, and Kelli Bruhn. The case will
proceed only on that claim against those Defendants. Plaintiff
Brewer fails to state a claim against the remaining Defendants, and
the claims against DCFS, Montgomery County, Patricia Kaidell,
Scott Longknecker, Christopher Matoush, James Frank, Joy
Oakley, Tania Boerckel, Judge Jarman, Elizabeth Wilson, John
Evans, Dennis Atterbury, and the DEA are DISMISSED without
prejudice. Plaintiff Young fails to state a claim against any
Defendants and all of Plaintiff Young’s claims are DISMISSED
without prejudice. To the extent Plaintiff Brewer believes she can
state a claim against the dismissed Defendants, and to the extent
Defendant Young believes he can state a claim against any
Defendant, Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an Amended
Complaint. Plaintiffs are advised that an Amended Complaint
completely replaces the original Complaint. The Amended
Complaint must contain all of Plaintiffs’ claims against all of the
Defendants. Plaintiffs may want to use the Court’s form Complaint
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(although they do not have to do so). The Clerk is DIRECTED to
send Plaintiffs the Standard Civil Rights Complaint Packet
(Non-Prisoner). If Plaintiffs want to file an Amended Complaint,
they shall file the Amended Complaint on or before December 22,
2015. If Plaintiffs do not do so, the Court will assume that Plaintiff
Brewer intends to proceed only on her claims against the four
Defendants, and the Court will direct service on those four
Defendants. The Motion to Request Counsel (d/e 3) is DENIED
without prejudice and with leave to refile.
ENTER: December 8, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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