Young et al v. Sproat et al
Filing
89
OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 05/24/2017. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. The Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 77 ) filed by Defendants Joshua Sproat and Scott Longanecker is GRANTED. The case remains pending against Defendants Bonnie Landwehr and Kim Allen, who have a motion for summary judgment pending. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 24 May, 2017 02:17:00 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
CORALIE BREWER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSHUA SPROAT, BONNIE
LANDWEHR, KIM ALLEN, and
SCOTT LONGANECKER,
Defendants.
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No. 15-3332
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 77) filed by Defendants Joshua Sproat and Scott
Longanecker. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant Longanecker’s
request for summary judgment, and the Court accepts Plaintiff’s
concession. Defendant Sproat is also entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiff presented no admissible evidence that
Defendant Sproat acted under color of law or deprived her of a
constitutional right, and Defendant Sproat is entitled to absolute
immunity for the claim that he lied under oath and presented drug
tests results in court.
Page 1 of 14
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2015, Plaintiff Coralie Brewer filed pro se an
Amended Complaint (d/e 6) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that numerous defendants deprived her of her parental rights and
removed her children from her care without a hearing. Plaintiff
alleged that, in October 2013, an investigator with the Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and a counselor with
Catholic Charities removed Plaintiff’s children from her home
without a warrant or consent. It appeared, although was not
specifically alleged, that a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-2 et seq.) remained pending at that time
regarding Plaintiff’s children.1 Plaintiff sought compensatory
damages of $10 million, punitive damages, and such injunctive,
declaratory, or other relief as may be appropriate. Am. Compl. at 6
(the request for injunctive and declaratory relief was part of the preprinted complaint form Plaintiff used and Plaintiff does not identify
any injunctive or declaratory relief sought).
According to Plaintiff’s deposition, attached to the Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 77-2), Plaintiff’s parental rights were terminated on September
30, 2016 in Montgomery County Case Nos. 13-JA-11, 13-JA-12, 13-JA-13, and
13-JA-14 (the juvenile court cases).
1
Page 2 of 14
As is relevant to the pending motion, Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant Joshua Sproat, a child welfare specialist with Family
Service Center2, allegedly opened a criminal file relating to Douglas
Young, Plaintiff’s boyfriend, without court permission and which
purportedly harmed Plaintiff’s case relating to her children. Plaintiff
admits the criminal file refers to Montgomery County, Illinois,
Circuit Court Case No. 2006CF45 pertaining to Douglas Young.
See Undisputed Fact No. 9 (d/e 77); Pl. Resp. at 2 (d/e 80). Sproat
also allegedly gave Plaintiff an illegal drug test and lied under oath.
Plaintiff admits that, by alleging that Defendant Sproat lied under
oath, she means that he lied under oath to the judge in open court
in the juvenile court cases. Undisputed Fact No. 17 (d/e 77); Pl.
Resp. at 3 (d/e 80).
Defendant Scott Longanecker, a Family Service Center
supervisor, allegedly told Sproat to lie under oath and terminate
Plaintiff’s visits by giving Plaintiff an illegal drug test. Longanecker
also allegedly threatened Plaintiff’s brother, who had custody of
The parties do not address but appear to agree that Family Service Center is
not a state agency. See also http://www.service2families.com/about (“Family
Service Center is a licensed non-profit social-service agency located in Central
Illinois.”) (last visited May 24, 2017).
2
Page 3 of 14
Plaintiff’s children, that if the rest of Plaintiff’s family sees the
children, Sproat will take the children away.
This Court found that a liberal construction of Plaintiff’s
complaint suggested that she stated a claim of a deprivation of a
constitutional right—the fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of her children pursuant
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—against
various defendants, including Sproat and Longanecker. See
Opinion at 8-9, 14 (d/e 17) (finding Plaintiff stated a familial
relations substantive due process right claim against Defendants
Sproat and Longanecker). The Court noted that Defendants Sproat
and Longanecker were not state workers but that a liberal
construction of the Amended Complaint suggested that Sproat and
Longanecker purportedly conspired with state workers to deprive
Plaintiff of her constitutional right. Id. at 10. In July 2016, United
States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins appointed counsel
to represent Plaintiff. See July 15, 2016 Text Order.
On January 30, 2017, Defendants Sproat and Longanecker
filed the Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 77) at issue herein.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has no admissible evidence to show
Page 4 of 14
that either of them acted under color of law by conspiring with a
state actor to deprive Plaintiff of her fundamental right to parent
her children. In addition, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no
evidence that Defendant Longanecker did anything that deprived
Plaintiff of her “family rights.” Id. at 11. Finally, Defendants argue
that summary judgment is proper against Defendant Sproat
because it was permissible for Sproat to open a criminal file relating
to Young, Plaintiff voluntarily submitted to Sproat’s request for a
drug test, and Sproat is entitled to absolute immunity even if he
lied under oath in the child custody case.
Plaintiff does not oppose the granting of summary judgment
on behalf of Defendant Longanecker. Resp. at 4 (d/e 80). The
Court accepts Plaintiff’s concession and grants summary judgment
in favor of Defendant Longanecker.
Plaintiff also does not dispute that Sproat was within his
rights to review a prior, public court file and that Plaintiff
voluntarily submitted to a drug test that she did not believe was
legal. Plaintiff summarily argues, however, that she has pled and
supported a § 1983 claim for interference with familial relationship
Page 5 of 14
against Defendant Sproat. Id. at 5.3 Plaintiff also argues that
Defendant Sproat is not entitled to absolute immunity for
performing the investigative functions of a case worker, such as
requesting a drug test and relying on knowingly inaccurate
information. Plaintiff does not directly address Defendants’
argument that Plaintiff lacks admissible evidence to show that
Defendant Sproat conspired with state actors.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant
believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). No genuine issue of material fact exists if a
reasonable jury could not find in favor of the nonmoving party.
3
Plaintiff also argues that she has sufficiently pled and supported a claim for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Resp. at 5 (d/e 80). However,
while the initial complaint contained such a claim, the amended complaint did
not. Therefore, this Court will not address any intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
Page 6 of 14
Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.
2007). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the
nonmoving party's favor. Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550
(7th Cir. 2008).
If the movant can show the absence of some fact the nonmovant
would have to prove at trial, the nonmovant must come forward
with evidence to show that a genuine issue exists. Alexander v. City
of S. Bend, 433 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2006). However, the
nonmovant “need only produce evidence sufficient to potentially
persuade any reasonable jury.” Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839
F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original).
III. ANALYSIS
Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof (1) of the
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a person acting under the color of state law. See Pittman ex rel.
Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir.
2014); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822
Page 7 of 14
(7th Cir. 2009). The conduct of private actors can constitute state
action where private actors conspire with state actors to deprive a
person of constitutional rights; the state compels the discriminatory
action; the state controls a nominally private entity; the state is
entwined with the private entity’s management or control; the state
delegates a public function to a private entity; or there is such a
“close nexus between the state and the challenged action that
seemingly private behavior reasonable may be treated as that of the
state itself.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No.
7, 570 F.3d 811, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing cases). The plaintiff
must “identify a sufficient nexus between the state and the private
actor to support a finding that the deprivation committed by the
private actor is fairly attributable to the state.” L.P. v. Marian
Catholic High Sch., 852 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Defendant Sproat focuses on whether Plaintiff submitted any
evidence to show that Defendant Sproat, a child welfare specialist
with Family Service Center, conspired with state actors. Plaintiff
testified at her deposition as follows regarding her belief that
Defendant Sproat conspired with others:
Page 8 of 14
Q.
So in terms of anything that Joshua Sproat did that
you believe interfered with your rights, do you think
he was working with anyone else to do that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay. Tell me who you think he was working with.
A.
The State’s Attorney.
Q.
Okay. And how would you—how would you prove
that or how would you suggest that you know that?
A.
Because every time when he come [sic] up to court
he’d go straight over to the State’s Attorney’s office.
Q.
Okay. But you never heard anybody say anything
that Joshua Sproat was doing things the State’s
Attorney told him to do, right?
A.
I never heard that, no.
Q.
Okay. You don’t know anybody that claims to have
heard something like that, right?
A.
No, I don’t claim that.
Q.
Okay. So it’s just your belief that doesn’t have any
real proof that Joshua Sproat was doing things that
the State’s Attorney told him to do, right.
A.
They were all working together.
Q.
Okay. I know that you believe that. I want to know
why you believe it in terms of has somebody told
you that?
A.
I do—yes.
Page 9 of 14
Q.
Okay. Who told you that?
A.
My ex-paramour that I was with, Doug Young.
Q.
Okay. And Doug Young told you that he has some
evidence that the State’s Attorney and Joshua
Sproat are working against you together?
A.
He just told me that they were working against me
where I couldn’t get my kids back.
Q.
Okay. He didn’t tell you why he believed that, did
he?
A.
No.
Q.
Okay. Anybody else other than the State’s Attorney
do you think was telling Joshua Sproat what to do
in terms of violating your rights?
A. No.
Pl. Tr. at 51-53 (d/e 77-2); see also Undisputed Fact No. 18 (d/e
77); Pl. Resp. to Undisputed Fact No. 18 (d/e 80).
In her response to the Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff provides no additional material facts and submitted no
affidavits or other evidence to show that Defendant Sproat
conspired with state actors. In fact, Plaintiff does not even provide
any argument about whether Defendant Sproat acted under color of
law. Therefore, Plaintiff has forfeited her § 1983 claim against
Defendant Sproat. See Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v.
Page 10 of 14
Foxx, 815 F.3d 1068, 1078 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that the
plaintiffs waived their claims in counts 9, 14, 15, and 16 by failing
to respond in any way to the arguments advanced by the
defendants in the defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
Even if the claims were not forfeited, Plaintiff, as the
nonmoving party, “must point to specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial, and inferences relying on mere speculation
or conjecture will not suffice.” Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779,
786 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has failed to point to any specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial. Because Plaintiff has presented
no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Defendant
Sproat acted under color of law, Defendant Sproat is entitled to
summary judgment.
In addition, even assuming Defendant Sproat was acting
under color of law, Plaintiff has not identified a genuine issue of fact
regarding whether Defendant Sproat deprived her of a
constitutional right. As noted above, Plaintiff alleged that
Defendant Sproat violated her rights by reviewing a criminal file
relating to Douglas Young without court permission, giving Plaintiff
an illegal drug test, and lying under oath at the juvenile court
Page 11 of 14
hearings. In her response to the motion for summary judgment,
however, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant Sproat was
within his rights to review a prior, public court file of Douglas
Young. Pl. Resp. at 4. Plaintiff also does not dispute that she
voluntarily submitted to the drug test after consulting with her
attorney. Resp. at 4; see also Undisputed Fact No. 15; Pl. Resp. at
3. Given Plaintiff’s concessions, Defendant Sproat’s review of
Young’s public file and request that Plaintiff submit to a drug test
could not have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1982) (section 1983
“punishes wrongful conduct”).
Plaintiff also does not dispute that Defendant Sproat
presented Plaintiff’s positive drug test results to the judge in the
juvenile court cases although she does contest the veracity of his
presentation to the court. See Undisputed Fact No. 13; Pl. Resp. at
3. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Sproat is not entitled to absolute
immunity for his conduct outside the courtroom, which she
describes as the request for the drug test and Sproat’s knowing
reliance on “inaccurate information,” which appears to be a
Page 12 of 14
reference to his presentation of the drug test results to the juvenile
court. See Resp. at 7.
Defendant Sproat is entitled to absolute immunity from
damages for acts in court, including allegedly lying under oath and
presenting allegedly false drug test results to the juvenile court
judge. “Prosecutors and witnesses are absolutely immune from
liability in damages on account of their acts in court.” Millspaugh
v. Cnty. Dept. of Public Welfare of Wabash Cnty., 937 F.2d 1172,
1175-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that “social workers and like
public officials are entitled to absolute immunity in child custody
cases on account of testimony and other steps taken to present the
case for decision by the court”); see also Pelham v. Albright, No.
3:11 CV 99, 2012 WL 1600455, at *7 (N.D. Ind. May 4, 2012)
(finding absolute immunity protected Department of Child Services
attorney and case manager alleged to have conspired to place false
testimony and information known to be false before a court). In
addition, Plaintiff has presented no evidence supporting the
allegation that the drug test results were false. For all of these
reasons, the Court finds that Defendant Sproat is entitled to
summary judgment.
Page 13 of 14
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Motion for Summary Judgment
(d/e 77) filed by Defendants Joshua Sproat and Scott Longanecker
is GRANTED. The case remains pending against Defendants
Bonnie Landwehr and Kim Allen, who have a motion for summary
judgment pending.
ENTER: May 24, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 14 of 14
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