Young et al v. Sproat et al

Filing 90

OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 06/16/2017. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Defendant Landwehr and Allen's Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 84 ) is GRANTED. Because all of Plaintiff's claims against all of the defendants have now been resolved, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment. This case is CLOSED and all pending deadlines and hearings are VACATED. (DM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 16 June, 2017 11:44:44 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
CORALIE BREWER,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JOSHUA SPROAT, BONNIE
LANDWEHR, KIM ALLEN, and
SCOTT LONGANECKER,
Defendants.

No. 15-3332

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Summary
Judgment (d/e 84) filed by Defendants Bonnie Landwehr and Kim
Allen. Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 1, 2015, Plaintiff Coralie Brewer filed a pro se
Complaint. On December 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint seeking compensatory damages of $10 million, punitive
damages, and such injunctive, declaratory, or other relief as may be
appropriate.
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As is relevant to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff
alleged that Defendant Landwehr, an investigator with the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), removed
Plaintiff’s children from Plaintiff’s care without a warrant or consent
and lied under oath. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Allen, a DCFS
investigator, made false accusations that one of Plaintiff’s children
was sexually abused and that Plaintiff abused her children.
Plaintiff also alleges that Allen badgered Plaintiff’s children by
making them lie.
After a merit review, this Court found that Plaintiff stated a
familial relations substantive due process claim against Defendant
Landwehr and Defendant Allen and a procedural due process claim
against Defendant Landwehr all pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
July 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins
appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff.
In April 2017, Defendants Landwehr and Allen filed their
Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants assert that they are
entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff’s claims are barred
by the statute of limitations and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of
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Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)
(holding that the United States Supreme Court is the only federal
court that may review judgments entered by state courts in civil
litigation). In the alternative, Defendants assert they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
II. FACTS
The following facts are taken from Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Facts.
Plaintiff is a resident of Litchfield, Illinois in Montgomery
County. Plaintiff gave birth to four children—E.F., S.F., J.F., and
H.F. In 2013, the Montgomery County State’s Attorney initiated
juvenile abuse and neglect cases for each of Plaintiff’s four children.
On October 30, 2013, DCFS received a report of abuse or
neglect involving Plaintiff and her children, E.F., S.F., J.F., and H.F.
It was reported that Plaintiff had allowed her paramour, Scott
Stewart, to have contact with her children in violation of a nocontact order by the Montgomery County Circuit Court.
Defendants assert, but Plaintiff denies, that the children,
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s mother all confirmed that Stewart had been
in the home. Plaintiff also denies that E.F. indicated that Stewart
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hit the children and called them names and that J.F. alleged that
Stewart “hit him all over.”
The Montgomery County State’s Attorney and DCFS personnel
determined that DCFS should take protective custody of the
children and the State’s Attorney would begin shelter-care
proceedings. On October 31, 2013, DCFS took protective custody of
each of the children. Defendant Landwehr picked up S.F. and E.F.
from school and J.F. and H.F. from daycare. Defendant Landwehr
and the children went to McDonalds to eat and then to the
Litchfield Family Practice for Healthworks. Thereafter, H.F. was
dropped off with a relative in Greenville, J.F. was taken to a
licensed foster home in Brighton, and S.F. and E.F. were delivered
to a maternal uncle’s home in Brighton. Defendant Allen was not
present and did not participate in taking protective custody of the
children.1
On November 1, 2013, the Montgomery County State’s
Attorney filed an application for shelter care for each of Plaintiff’s
In the summary judgment briefs, the parties do not discuss Allen’s role in this
case. For the sake of context only, the Court notes that Plaintiff testified that
Allen informed Plaintiff of the allegations, interviewed the children, and
attended the first couple of hearings prior to the State filing the application for
shelter care on November 1, 2013 and before Plaintiff’s children were removed.
See Pl. Dep. at 12-22 (d/e 85-1).
1

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four children. That same day, the judge presiding over the juvenile
cases entered Orders of Temporary Custody for each of the four
minor children and granted custody to DCFS with authority to
place. In its Orders, the Court found probable cause existed for the
State’s petition because Plaintiff had allowed her children to have
contact with Scott Stewart.
Plaintiff received notice of the State’s applications for shelter
care and the court hearing regarding the temporary custody order.
Plaintiff was present for the juvenile court proceedings and was
represented by counsel.
Defendant Landwehr also attended the shelter-care hearing
where DCFS was granted temporary custody and found to have
probable cause. However, Landwehr has no recollection of whether
she testified at the shelter-care hearing. Plaintiff believes, however,
that Defendant Landwehr provided dishonest testimony to the
Montgomery County Court on November 1, 2013 and that
Landwehr’s dishonest testimony directly led to Plaintiff’s children
being removed from Plaintiff’s care and custody. See Pl. Aff. at ¶ 4
(d/e 88-1).

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Plaintiff’s last contact with either Defendant Landwehr or
Defendant Allen occurred on November 1, 2013. Plaintiff admits
that she brought this lawsuit to challenge the judge’s decision
ordering the removal of the children from her home. Plaintiff also
asserts, however, that paragraph 15 of Defendants’ statement of
undisputed facts does not articulate all of the reasons she brought
the suit before the Court.
As a result of DCFS’s investigation, Plaintiff was indicated for
substantial risk of physical injury/environment injurious to health
and welfare by neglect. On September 2, 2016, Plaintiff’s parental
rights were terminated.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that no
genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of
the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the movant
believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). No
genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could not
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find in favor of the nonmoving party. Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the
nonmoving party's favor. Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d
639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment on the basis of a
statute of limitations defense is proper where (1) the statute of
limitations has run, and the plaintiff’s claim is barred as a matter of
law and (2) no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the
accrual or tolling of the statute of limitations. See Massey v. United
States, 312 F.3d 272, 276 (7th Cir. 2002); S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp.,
677 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2734 at 647-48 (1973)).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment
because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations
and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Defendants argue in the
alternative that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

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A two-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff's claims
against Defendants Landwehr and Allen. Ray v. Maher, 662 F.3d
770, 772 (7th Cir. 2011) (because federal law does not set the
limitation period in § 1983 actions, the court looks to the limitation
period for personal injury actions under state law) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(a)); Bryant v. City of Chi., 746 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 2014)
(noting that, in Illinois, § 1983 actions are subject to the two-year
statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/13-202). The statute of
limitations generally begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know that her constitutional rights have been violated.
Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff alleges conduct by Defendants Landwehr and Allen
that occurred on October 31, 2013 and November 1, 2013. Plaintiff
admits that her last contact with either Landwehr or Allen occurred
on November 1, 2013. Plaintiff did not file suit until December 1,
2015, two years and one month later.
Plaintiff acknowledges that her Complaint was filed beyond the
statute of limitations but asserts that the statute of limitations
should be equitably tolled until the date the state court proceeding
concluded in September 2016. Plaintiff asserts that she was
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involved in the juvenile proceedings and “had reason to believe that
a remedy was at hand pending the outcome of the state
proceedings.” Resp. at 3 (d/e 88).
Illinois law also governs equitable tolling in this case. See Ray,
662 F.3d at 772 (state tolling rules apply in a § 1983 action);
Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 2016). Under
Illinois law, equitable tolling may apply where the defendant actively
misled the plaintiff, the plaintiff was prevented from asserting her
rights in some extraordinary way, or the plaintiff mistakenly
asserted her rights in the wrong forum. See Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill.
2d 603, 614 (2000); Rosado, 832 F.3d at 717 (applying Illinois law).
In addition, a plaintiff must act diligently to file her suit. Rosado,
832 F.3d at 717. That is, the plaintiff must file the lawsuit
promptly after the circumstances justifying the delay no longer
exist. Rosado, 832 F.3d at 716.
Plaintiff does not argue that Defendants actively misled her or
that she mistakenly asserted her rights in the wrong forum.
Therefore, the Court interprets Plaintiff’s argument as one asserting
that she was prevented from asserting her rights in some
extraordinary way. Extraordinary barriers to filing include suffering
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from a legal disability, an irremediable2 lack of information, or a
situation where the plaintiff could not learn the identity of the
proper defendants through the exercise of due diligence. See Griffin
v. Willoughby, 369 Ill.App.3d 405, 416 (2006); Thede v. Kapsas, 386
Ill.App.3d 396, 403 (2008). Plaintiff does not allege or present any
facts suggesting that she suffered a legal disability, that a lack of
information was irremediable, or that she could not learn the
identity of the proper defendants through the exercise of due
diligence.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s stated reasons for failing to file within the
statute of limitations—her participation in the pending state
juvenile court litigation and her belief that she might obtain relief in
that forum—do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Landwehr and Allen center
around the initial removal of Plaintiff’s children from Plaintiff’s
home and the state court’s subsequent temporary custody orders,
which found probable cause and an immediate and urgent
necessity to remove the minors from the home. Plaintiff seeks $10

Some courts cite this word as “irredeemable.” See Thede, 386 Ill. App. 3d at
403.
2

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million in damages in this lawsuit—relief the state court could not
have granted to her in the juvenile proceedings—and filed this
lawsuit approximately nine months before the state court
proceedings concluded. These facts belie Plaintiff’s bare assertion
that she was prevented from asserting her rights due to the
pendency of the state court proceedings and her belief that the
juvenile proceedings would provide her relief. The Court finds that
Plaintiff’s participation in the state court proceedings and belief that
a remedy was at hand pending the outcome of the state proceedings
simply do not constitute the type of “extraordinary barrier” Illinois
courts recognize as sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. See
Thede, 386 Ill.App.3d at 403 (affirming summary judgment where
the record belied the plaintiff’s assertion that, but for the language
in the consent form, she would have timely filed suit against the
physician where she filed an untimely suit against the hospital as
well).
Because Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Landwehr and
Allen are barred by the statute of limitations, the Court need not
address Defendants’ argument that the claims are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine or address qualified immunity. The Court
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notes, however, that issue preclusion, not Rooker-Feldman, may
have been the more proper argument to the extent Plaintiff claims
that Defendant Landwehr lacked probable cause to remove
Plaintiff’s children. See Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 748 (7th
Cir. 2002) (finding that where the plaintiffs complained of an injury
caused by the underlying taking of their child by DCFS and not the
state court’s subsequent temporary custody order, the suit
implicated the preclusion doctrine, not the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, and further finding that issue preclusion barred the claim
that the agents lacked probable cause to remove the children). In
addition, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that Defendants testified
falsely before the juvenile court judge, the Court notes that
“witnesses are absolutely immune from liability in damages on
account of their acts in court.” Millspaugh v. Cnty. Dept. of Public
Welfare of Wabash Cnty., 937 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that “social workers and like public officials are entitled to
absolute immunity in child custody cases on account of testimony
and other steps taken to present the case for decision by the
court”); see also Pelham v. Albright, No. 3:11 CV 99, 2012 WL
1600455, at *7 (N.D. Ind. May 4, 2012) (finding absolute immunity
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protected Department of Child Services attorney and case manager
alleged to have conspired to place false testimony and information
known to be false before a court). However, Defendants do not
make that argument.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant Landwehr and Allen’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 84) is GRANTED. Because all
of Plaintiff’s claims against all of the defendants have now been
resolved, the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment. This case is
CLOSED and all pending deadlines and hearings are VACATED.
ENTER: June 16, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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