Sanders v. Springfield Police Department et al
Filing
14
ORDER AND OPINION: The defendants' motion to dismiss (d/e 7 ) is GRANTED, and Sanders's complaint (d/e 1 ) is DISMISSED without prejudice. If Sanders seeks leave to file an amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) , he shall include sufficient facts in his proposed amended complaint to show that he is entitled to relief. For record-keeping purposes, the City of Springfield is substituted as a defendant in place of the Springfield Police Department, and the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to update the case caption accordingly. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/15/2016. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 15 June, 2016 11:45:10 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JOHN M. SANDERS ,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
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v.
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SPRINGFIELD POLICE
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DEPARTMENT, TYLER LYNN, )
DAVID DYER, and ZACHARY )
ROAN,
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Defendants.
)
No. 3:16-cv-3007
ORDER AND OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff John Sanders has filed a lawsuit against the
Springfield Police Department and three of its officers, alleging that
the defendants violated Sanders’s constitutional rights during
Sanders’s drunk driving arrest in February 2014. The defendants
have filed a motion to dismiss (d/e 7).
I.
The Court substitutes the City of Springfield as a
defendant in place of the Springfield Police Department.
Although Sanders’s complaint names as defendants three
Springfield police officers and the Springfield Police Department, the
motion to dismiss has been filed by the three officers and, instead of
the Springfield Police Department, the City of Springfield itself. The
City explains that the Springfield Police Department is not a legal
entity that exists separately from the City, and so the City files the
motion on the Department’s behalf.
In responding to the motion to dismiss, Sanders does not
challenge the City’s designation of itself as the proper defendant.
And the Court agrees that the City, not the Department, is the
properly named defendant in this context. See Meek v. Springfield
Police Dep’t, 990 F.Supp. 598, 601 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (dismissing
Springfield Police Department as defendant after plaintiff conceded
Department was not an “entity” that could be sued and was “merely
an organizational division of the City”). The Court will direct the
Clerk of the Court to substitute the City as a defendant in place of
the Department and update the case caption accordingly. In this
opinion, the Court will refer to the three officers and the City,
collectively, as the defendants.
II.
The Court dismisses Sanders’s complaint because his
claims are barred or because Sanders has failed to state
facts showing that he is entitled to relief.
A civil complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
Page 2 of 11
P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must
include facts that, accepted as true, are sufficient “to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the
pleaded facts “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A pleading that offers merely
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action” will not withstand a motion to dismiss, and
neither will a complaint that tenders “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation and
alteration omitted). The allegations in the complaint “must actually
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing
allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.
Servs., 536 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted,
emphasis in original).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court construes the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts as true
all well-pleaded alleged facts, and draws all possible inferences in
Page 3 of 11
the plaintiff’s favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081
(7th Cir. 2008). Further, the Court has a “duty to construe [a] pro
se complaint liberally.” McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th
Cir. 2010). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal
quotation omitted). Yet, a pro se plaintiff must still follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541
F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008). Further, the Court need not ignore
factual allegations that undermine the plaintiff’s claim. Hamilton v.
O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1992).
Here, Sanders was arrested by Springfield Police Department
officers on February 11, 2014. He pleaded guilty to driving under
the influence and illegal lane usage. Sanders now claims that his
constitutional rights were violated in connection with his arrest.
Interpreting the complaint liberally—as required, because
Sanders is acting pro se—the Court construes the complaint to
raise four separate claims. Specifically, the complaint alleges that
three Springfield Police Department officers entered Sanders’s home
without a warrant and:
Page 4 of 11
(1)
“arrested or seized [Sanders] without probable cause to
believe that [Sanders] had committed, was committing or
was about to commit a crime” (d/e 1 at 5);
(2)
“searched [Sanders] or his property without a warrant
and without reasonable cause” (id.);
(3)
“conspired together to violate one or more of [Sanders]’s
civil rights” (id.); and
(4)
“seized [Sanders’s] personal vehicle from [his] property,”
without a warrant (id.).
Sanders asks for $10,000 in damages.
Although some of Sanders’s claims raise related issues, the
Court assesses the four claims separately.
A.
Sanders’s false arrest claim is barred by his guilty
plea.
Sanders alleges that he was unconstitutionally arrested or
seized without probable cause to believe that he had committed a
crime (d/e 1 at 5). The defendants argue that the Court should
dismiss this claim because Sanders admits in his complaint that he
pleaded guilty to driving under the influence. Therefore, the
defendants argue, Sanders’s claim is barred because it necessarily
Page 5 of 11
implies that his criminal conviction is invalid. See Tolliver v. City of
Chicago, No. 15-1924, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6632, *14 (7th Cir.
Apr. 12, 2016) (“if the plaintiff’s factual claims in the civil suit
necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction, then
Heck bars the civil suit”) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994)).
The Court agrees that a finding that the police lacked probable
cause to arrest Sanders would necessarily imply that Sanders’s
criminal conviction was invalid. See, e.g., Stoner v. Village of
Downers Grove, No. 13-1406, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102929, *9-10
(N.D. Ill. July 29, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss false arrest
claim) (“A finding that Stoner was falsely arrested would necessarily
imply that his conviction … was invalid. … Stoner’s conviction …
precludes his § 1983 false arrest claim under Heck.”); Vandenburgh
v. Ogden, No 15-6191, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12493, *19 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 3, 2016) (granting motion to dismiss false arrest claim) (“a
challenge to probable cause would necessarily imply the validity of
[the] conviction”). Therefore, Sanders’s false arrest claim must be
dismissed.
Page 6 of 11
B.
Sanders’s illegal search claim is dismissed because
Sanders has failed to state facts showing that he is
entitled to relief.
Sanders alleges that the police unconstitutionally searched
him “or” his property in connection with the arrest (d/e 1 at 5).
However, Sanders provides no details regarding the alleged search.
His illegal search claim, therefore, must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2) (requiring complaint to contain “short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (“the court shall dismiss [a pro se] case at any time if
the court determines that … the action … fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted”).
C.
Sanders’s conspiracy claim is dismissed because
Sanders has failed to state facts showing that he is
entitled to relief.
Sanders alleges that the officers “conspired together to violate
one or more” of Sanders’s civil rights (d/e 1 at 5). However, as with
his illegal search claim, Sanders has pleaded no facts in support of
his allegation that the officers conspired to violate his civil rights.
His conspiracy claim, therefore, must also be dismissed. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Page 7 of 11
D.
Sanders’s illegal seizure claim is dismissed because it
is barred by his guilty plea.
Sanders alleges that the officers unconstitutionally seized his
vehicle without a warrant. But the illegal seizure claim is barred
because, by pleading guilty to driving under the influence, Sanders
implicitly acknowledged the validity of the seizure of his vehicle.
E.g., Conlan v. King, No. 13-169, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72896,
*13-14 (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2015) (dismissing illegal seizure claim
under Heck where police seized plaintiff’s car without warrant, as
plaintiff’s claim “would necessarily call into question the validity of
his conviction” because police “may seize a car from a public place
without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that
the car itself is an instrument or evidence of crime”) (internal
quotation omitted). Finding that the seizure of Sanders’s vehicle
was illegal—as Sanders asks the Court to do—would necessarily
imply that Sanders’s conviction for driving under the influence was
invalid. Therefore, the illegal seizure claim must be dismissed
under Heck.
The defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss
Sanders’s unconstitutional seizure claim because Sanders does not
Page 8 of 11
allege that he exhausted—let alone pursued—any administrative
remedies available to him. The Court declines to address the
defendants’ administrative remedies argument because the
defendants have cited no authority in support of the argument and
because the Court finds regardless that the illegal seizure claim
must be dismissed under Heck.
E.
The City is dismissed as a defendant because Sanders
has not alleged that any violations arose from the
City’s official custom or practice.
The defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss the
City as a defendant because the complaint makes no allegations
from which a fact-finder could conclude that the alleged violations
arose from the City’s official policy or practice—a finding that would
be necessary for a Section 1983 plaintiff like Sanders to prevail
against a municipality. See Montano v. City of Chicago, 535 F.3d
558, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (“While a municipality is not vicariously
liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees, a constitutional
deprivation may be attributable to a municipality ‘when execution of
a government’s policy or custom … inflicts the injury.’”) (quoting
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 475 U.S. 796, 694 (1978)).
Page 9 of 11
The Court agrees that, even when interpreting Sanders’s
complaint in the light most favorable to Sanders, the complaint at
best accuses three officers of violating Sanders’s constitutional
rights and does not allege anything resembling a policy or custom
by the City or by the Springfield Police Department. (See
Complaint, d/e 1 at 6 (referencing “the civil rights of the
Constitution of the United States violated by Sp[ringfie]ld Police
Officer[s] Tyler Lynn, David Dyer, and Zachary Roan”).) Although it
is arguably superfluous to dismiss the City as a defendant given
that the Court will dismiss Sanders’s claims entirely, for the sake of
comprehensiveness the Court nonetheless grants the defendants’
motion to dismiss the City as a defendant.
F.
The defendants’ requests for costs is denied.
The defendants also ask the Court to “grant … their costs”
(d/e 8 at 3), presumably under Rule 54. Because the Court
dismisses Sanders’s complaint without prejudice, the Court
declines to grant costs at this time.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss (d/e
7) is GRANTED, and Sanders’s complaint (d/e 1) is DISMISSED
Page 10 of 11
without prejudice. If Sanders seeks leave to file an amended
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), he shall
include sufficient facts in his proposed amended complaint to show
that he is entitled to relief.
For record-keeping purposes, the City of Springfield is
substituted as a defendant in place of the Springfield Police
Department, and the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to update the
case caption accordingly.
ENTERED: June 15, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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