Monsanto Production Supply LLC v. Rosentreter
Filing
62
ORDER AND OPINION: Rosentreter's motion (d/e 60 ) is accordingly DENIED. (SEE WRITTEN ORDER AND OPINION) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 8/31/2016. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 31 August, 2016 03:38:34 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MONSANTO PRODUCTION
SUPPLY LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICK ROSENTRETER and
DOUGLAS ROSENTRETER,
Defendants.
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No. 3:16-cv-3038
ORDER AND OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
In early 2016, Plaintiff Monsanto Production Supply LLC sued
Defendant Rick Rosentreter, a Central Illinois farmer, for allegedly
using Monsanto’s proprietary seeds without authorization,
interfering with Monsanto’s contractual relations, and being
unjustly enriched as a result (d/e 1). After Rosentreter repeatedly
frustrated Monsanto’s discovery efforts and repeatedly disobeyed
the Court’s discovery orders, Monsanto filed a motion for sanctions
(d/e 45). The Court orally granted Monsanto’s motion in July 2016
and followed up on August 9, 2016 with a written order and opinion
(d/e 57).
In that written order, the Court granted Monsanto’s request
for default judgment against Rosentreter and granted in part
Monsanto’s request for a permanent injunction against Rosentreter.
(Rather than entering a permanent injunction barring Rosentreter
from using seeds containing Monsanto’s patented biotechnology,
the Court entered a temporary injunction pending further hearing
on whether a permanent injunction would force Rosentreter to
abandon farming altogether given the ubiquity of Monsanto’s seeds
in the farming industry.)
Rosentreter has now filed a Motion for Certification of
Permissive Appeal (d/e [60]). Rosentreter asks the Court to “certify
for permissive interlocutory appeal the issue which was presented
[to the Court] on July 15, 2016” (d/e 60 at 1). Essentially,
Rosentreter seeks leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the Court’s
ruling on Monsanto’s motion for sanctions.
The relevant statute states:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order
not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of
the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an intermediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate
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termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing
such order. …
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). To certify an interlocutory appeal under
Section 1292(b), “there must be a question of law, it must be
controlling, it must be contestable, and its resolution must promise
to speed up the litigation.” Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees, 219 F.3d
674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original). The Court “may not
and should not” certify an order for interlocutory appeal under
Section 1292(b) “[u]nless all these criteria are satisfied.” Id.
Here, none of the criteria are satisfied. In the Section 1292(b)
context, “question of law” refers to “a question of the meaning of a
statutory or constitutional provision, regulation, or common law
doctrine.” Id. at 676. But there is no statutory or constitutional
provision, regulation, or common law doctrine whose meaning is at
issue here. When a party “fails to obey an order to provide or
permit discovery,” Rule 37(b) authorizes a court to “render[] a
default judgment against the disobedient party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A)(vi). Consistent with that authorization, the Court
awarded default judgment to Monsanto after Rosentreter repeatedly
disobeyed the Court’s discovery orders. Accord Newman v. Metro.
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Pier & Exposition Auth., 962 F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A
[defendant’s] failure to comply with discovery orders is properly
sanctioned … by entry of a default judgment.”). The Court’s
straightforward decision to award default judgment in Monsanto’s
favor did not require the Court to resolve a “question of law,” let
alone a “controlling” or “contestable” one.
Further, allowing Rosentreter to appeal would not expedite
this case. Because such an appeal would not present a contestable,
controlling issue of law for the Seventh Circuit to resolve in
Rosentreter’s favor, the appeal would delay, not expedite, this case’s
resolution.
In his brief, Rosentreter argues, as he has before, that he at
least partially complied with Monsanto’s discovery requests, and
that Rule 37(d) “does not provide relief for partial—or for arguably
inadequate—responses to discovery” (d/e 59 at 1), citing once again
to cases that refer to Rule 37(d). See Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd. v.
Standard Precision, 559 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir. 1977) (“subdivision
(d) of Rule 37 applies only where there has been a complete failure
to comply with discovery”); Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc.,
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516 F.2d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 1975) (“Rule 37(d) sanctions only apply
where there is a total non-compliance with discovery”).
But the Court rejected this argument when Rosentreter
presented it in his response to Monsanto’s motion for sanctions,
and for good reason: Monsanto sought default judgment not under
Rule 37(d), but under Rule 37(b), which allows a court to “render[] a
default judgment” as a sanction for failing to obey a discovery order.
As outlined at length in the Court’s August 9, 2016 order and
opinion, Rosentreter repeatedly and without justification disobeyed
this Court’s discovery orders. The Court’s default judgment award
was therefore appropriate.
Rosentreter also cites a set of cases in which the Seventh
Circuit upheld a district court’s default judgment (or dismissal)
order. See Hal Commodity Cycles Mgmt. Co. v. Kirsch, 825 F.2d
1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming denial of motion to vacate
default judgment, which district court had entered after 3 years of
defendant’s “dilatory conduct”); Newman v. Metro. Pier & Exposition
Auth., 962 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal under Rule
37(d) after plaintiff repeatedly failed to appear for her deposition);
Domanus v. Lewicki, 742 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming default
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judgment based on defendants’ “clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct” and “willfulness, bad faith, or fault”).
Rosentreter argues that his own conduct doesn’t come “even
remotely close” to the recalcitrant parties’ conduct in the cases he
cites (d/e 59 at 5). But the Seventh Circuit has said that a court
may award default judgment “as soon as a pattern of
noncompliance with the court’s discovery orders emerges,” as long
as the court remains “guided by the norm of proportionality that
guides all judicial applications of sanctions.” Newman, 962 F.2d at
591. Here, the sanction of default judgment was proportional to
Rosentreter’s pattern of noncompliance in the form of his repeated
and unjustified disobedience of the Court’s discovery orders and his
repeated lies and misrepresentations, which the Court has already
described at length. (See August 9, 2016 Order and Opinion, d/e
57.)
Rosentreter’s motion (d/e 60) is accordingly DENIED. As
stated in the Court’s August 9, 2016 order, the parties shall confer
and then inform the Court regarding a desired date for a hearing at
which the Court will hear evidence concerning (a) Monsanto’s
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damages and (b) the effect on Rosentreter of a permanent
injunction.
ENTERED: August 31, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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