Ball v. State of Illinois et al
Filing
27
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/14/2018. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, d/e 24 is GRANTED. Judgment to be entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot. This case is TERMINATED, with the parties to bear their own costs. The Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. (SEE WRITTEN SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION) (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 16 March, 2018 09:57:46 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
XAVIER BALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFF KORTE, et al.
Defendants.
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16-3063
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Pickneyville Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging inhumane conditions of
confinement arising from his incarceration at Western Illinois
Correctional Center. The matter comes before this Court for ruling
on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 24). The
motion is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not file a response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment despite the Court
granting him additional time to do so. See Text Order entered
October 30, 2017. Therefore, the Court will consider the facts
asserted in Defendant’s motion as undisputed for purposes of this
ruling. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (if a party fails to properly address
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another party’s assertion of fact, the court may consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion).
Plaintiff was housed in segregation at Western Illinois
Correctional Center (“Western”) from November 12, 2015 through
February 12, 2016. UMF 1, 5. Defendant Korte was the Warden.
UMF 2. While so incarcerated, Plaintiff testified that the water from
the faucet in his cell was gray with a foul odor when turned on.
UMF 7. If Plaintiff allowed the water to run for approximately 30
seconds, then the water would turn clear without odor. Id. Plaintiff
was able to drink the water. Pl.’s Dep. 11:3-4.
Plaintiff also testified that the plumbing in his cell caused
bodily waste from an adjacent cell to come into his toilet. UMF 5.
The plumbing issues did not cause the toilet to overflow and any
waste remained in the toilet. UMF 6.
On one occasion, on a date Plaintiff cannot remember, Plaintiff
woke up to a foul smell, vomited, and hit his head on a wall
because he was weak. UMF 8. Plaintiff testified that he had access
to medical and mental health care for any issues that arose. Pl.’s
Dep. 18:22-21:21.
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Plaintiff testified that he told Defendant Korte about these
issues, but he does not remember the dates he did so. UMF 10.
Defendant Korte allegedly responded that he would look into the
issue. Id. Plaintiff also wrote a letter to Defendant Korte dated
December 14, 2015. (Doc. 25-3 at 4). Plaintiff filed a grievance
dated November 29, 2015. Id. at 2-3.
Plaintiff’s counselor responded to the grievance, and Plaintiff
thereafter sent the grievance to the Administrative Review Board
(“ARB”). The ARB returned the grievance to Plaintiff, indicating that
Plaintiff needed to attach the grievance officer’s and Warden’s
response. Id. at 1.
ANALYSIS
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must show
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent towards an
objectively serious risk of harm. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765,
773 (7th Cir. 2008). A prison condition is objectively serious if “a
prison official’s act or omission result[ed] in the denial of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan,
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511 U.S. 832, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006).
Jail conditions may be uncomfortable and harsh without
violating the Constitution. See Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640,
642 (7th Cir.1997); Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th
Cir.1996) (“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,
but neither does it permit inhumane ones[.]” (citing Farmer, 511
U.S. at 832)). Therefore, “extreme deprivations are required to
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Henderson v.
Sheahan, 196 F.3d 849, 845 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Hudson, 503
U.S. at 9). Conditions of confinement that would not independently
violate the Constitution, if endured simultaneously, may establish a
sufficiently serious deprivation, but “only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need….” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304
(1991).
The exposure to human waste can be sufficient to show an
objectively serious deprivation. Cf. Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d
923, 923-25 (7th Cir. 2007) (feces smeared on walls of cell);
Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139-140 (7th Cir. 1989) (same);
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DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Exposure
to human waste…evokes both the health concerns emphasized in
Farmer, and the more general standards of dignity embodied in the
Eighth Amendment.”).
Plaintiff had running water in his cell and any bodily waste
from the adjacent cell remained in the toilet. Plaintiff does not
allege he was denied cleaning supplies, but if the waste never left
the toilet, he would not have needed them. Further, the fact that
Plaintiff’s toilet did not overflow for the 90 days or so he remained
in the cell, and because he does not allege he was denied a working
toilet, no reasonable inference exists that his toilet was not
functional, or that the plumbing was wholly ineffective in
performing its primary function. With respect to the gray and foulsmelling water, Plaintiff testified that the problem resolved itself
within 30 seconds if he allowed the faucet to run.
Plaintiff’s situation is readily distinguishable from the cases
where courts have found a sufficiently serious deprivation with
regards to exposure to human waste. Compare Vinning-El v. Long,
482 F.3d 923, 923-25 (7th Cir. 2007) (feces and blood smeared on
walls, water covered the floor, sink and toilet did not work, and
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prisoner denied basic cleaning supplies); Johnson v. Pelker, 891
F.2d 136, 139-140 (7th Cir. 1989) (prisoner denied cleaning
supplies while housed in cell with feces smeared on walls and no
running water). At best, Plaintiff can show that he was forced to
endure foul odors, but this, on its own, does not suggest that
Plaintiff was unable to maintain adequate hygiene or sanitation
while housed in the cell. Therefore, the Court finds that no
reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff suffered the requisite
deprivation.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff could show the requisite deprivation,
he cannot hold Defendant Korte liable just because Defendant Korte
was in charge. “Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on
personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not
attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). A government official may not be
held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior, that is,
for the unconstitutional acts of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). To be held liable, a government
supervisor “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve
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it, condone it, or turn a blind eye….” Vance, 97 F.3d at 993
(quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff must, instead, show that Defendant Korte acted with
deliberate indifference. Liability attaches under the Eighth
Amendment when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
No inference arises that Defendant Korte knew about the
conditions via the grievance process—Plaintiff neither submitted the
grievance as an emergency, nor does the record disclose that he
sent it to the grievance officer. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code §§
504.810(d); 504.840 (a warden initially reviews grievances
submitted on an emergency basis, otherwise the normal process
requires submission to the grievance officer before the warden
reviews a grievance).
The letter Plaintiff sent describes the plumbing issue as “the
toilet problem” without reference to the faucet or any other issues.
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Based on that description, Defendant Korte would not have been
able to infer that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm.
Finally, Plaintiff cannot establish when he spoke with
Defendant Korte personally because he testified that he does not
remember. The record does not contain any other evidence that
suggests Defendant Korte was aware of a substantial risk to
Plaintiff’s safety, or that he consciously disregarded it.
Accordingly, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could
conclude that Defendant Korte violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [24] is
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions not addressed below are denied as moot,
and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their
own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00
filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
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appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing
that a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable
person could suppose…has some merit” from a legal
perspective). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be
liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the
outcome of the appeal.
ENTERED:
March 14, 2018.
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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