Barrett v. Scott
Filing
12
OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/5/16. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss § 2241 Petition 7 is GRANTED. Petitioner's § 2241 Motion 1 is DISMISSED without prejudice. THIS CASE IS CLOSED. (SW, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 05 July, 2016 01:00:18 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DONNIE R. BARRETT,
Petitioner,
v.
GREGG SCOTT,
Respondent.
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No. 16-cv-3073
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
In March 2016, Petitioner Donnie R. Barrett filed a Petition
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 For Writ of Habeas Corpus (d/e 1). The
Court construed the Petition as a Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
because Petitioner is a pretrial detainee awaiting a jury trial on a
civil commitment petition. See Order (d/e 5). Respondent Gregg
Scott, the director of the Rushville Treatment and Detention
Facility, has filed a Motion to Dismiss § 2241 Petition (d/e 7).
Because Petitioner seeks to enjoin the state court proceedings and
has not exhausted his state court remedies and because no
extraordinary circumstances are present, the Court abstains from
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considering Petitioner’s claims. The Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED, and the § 2241 Motion is DISMISSED without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 9, 2007, the State of Illinois filed a Sexually Violent
Person Petition against Petitioner, who was completing a term of
imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. See § 2241
Motion at 7 (d/e 1); see also Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act, 725 ILCS 207/1, et seq. On that same date, a Morgan County
Circuit Court judge entered an Order for Detention and
Transporting Respondent to Probable Cause Hearing. See id. at 6.
Counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner. Id.
On August 14, 2007, the state court judge found probable
cause to believe that Petitioner was a sexually violent person and
ordered Petitioner detained by the Department of Human Services.
See § 2241 Motion at 10 (d/e 1) (docket sheet); see also Morgan
County Circuit Court website
http://judici.com/courts/cases/case_history.jsp?court=IL069015J
&ocl=IL069015J,2007MR51,IL069015JL2007MR51D1 (last visited
July 5, 2016). Petitioner is currently being held at the Rushville
Treatment and Detention Center.
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Between August 2007 and June 2016, Petitioner waived his
statutory speedy trial rights1 twice (November 2007, October 2013);
requested and obtained new counsel (November/December 2007);
obtained new counsel again after counsel withdrew (June 2015);
sought continuances of the case or agreed to continuances (October
21, 2008; December 30, 2008; March 3, 2009; May 5, 2009; June
30, 2009; May 18, 2010; December 7, 2010; December 17, 2012);
obtained experts (October 5, 2010, July 22, 2011); refused to be
transported to court (March 16, 2010, June 30, 2016); conducted
discovery; and filed numerous motions. See id. On May 4, 2016,
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Sexually Violent Persons
petition for violation of the speedy trial provision of the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act. Id.; see 725 ILCS 207/35. The
jury trial is currently set for July 12, 2016. Id.
On March 17, 2016, Petitioner filed his § 2241 Motion
challenging the nine-year delay between the filing of the petition
and his trial, which has still not commenced. Petitioner raises
See 725 ILCS 207/35 (providing that the trial on a petition under the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act must be held no later than 120 days after the
probable cause hearing but providing that delay occasioned by the person
subject to the petition extends the time as does a continuance of the trial date
for good cause).
1
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three grounds for relief: (1) the nine-year delay in holding
Petitioner’s trial violates Petitioner’s right to procedural due process
under the U.S. Constitution; (2) the state court lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition because the state statute
requires a trial be held no later than 120 days after the probable
cause hearing;2 and (3) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of
counsel because counsel allowed the case to be delayed nine years.
§ 2241 Mot. (d/e 1). Petitioner demands immediate release. Id.
In May 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss § 2241
Petition. Respondent asserts that this Court should abstain from
considering Petitioner’s claims and dismiss Petitioner’s § 2241
Motion without prejudice. Specifically, Respondent argues that
because Petitioner has not presented his constitutional speedy trial
claim to the state trial court and no extraordinary circumstances
are present, the Court should abstain from considering the claim.
II. ANALYSIS
Absent exceptional circumstances, a federal court must
abstain from interfering with ongoing state court proceedings that
But see Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (federal habeas relief is
not available for violations of state law) (citing cases); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(providing for habeas corpus relief of prisoner “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”).
2
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are judicial in nature, involve important state interests, and provide
an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims. See Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (involving an attempt to enjoin
pending state proceedings to enforce a state’s criminal laws);
Stroman Realty, Inc. v. Martinez, 505 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2007)
(setting forth the relevant test for determining when the Younger
abstention doctrine applies). The Younger abstention doctrine
applies to civil commitment proceedings. Sweeney v. Bartow, 612
F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 2010). Exceptional circumstances include
when the pending state court proceeding is motivated by a desire to
harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the plaintiff will be
irreparably harmed without immediate relief. FreeEats.com, Inc. v.
Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 596-97 (7th Cir. 2007).
“Relief for state pretrial detainees through a federal petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is generally limited to speedy trial and
double jeopardy claims, and only after the petitioner has exhausted
state-court remedies.” Olsson v. Curran, 328 F. App’x 334, 335
(7th Cir. 2009). The exception for speedy trial and double jeopardy
claims is necessary because, without immediate federal
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intervention, the challenge would become moot. Sweeney, 612 F.3d
at 573.
The courts appear to distinguish, however, between speedy
trial claims where the petitioner seeks to enforce his right to speedy
trial by asking the federal court to order that a trial take place—in
which case the court should not abstain if the petitioner has
exhausted his state court remedies—and speedy trial claims where
the petitioner seeks to enjoin the pending state court proceedings
based on a speedy trial claim—in which case the court should
abstain. See Powell v. Saddler, No. 12 C 2928, 2012 WL 3880198,
at * 6 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (finding petitioner could
raise his speedy trial claim by way of federal habeas corpus because
he sought a trial on the three-year old indictment and made
repeated demands for trial in the state courts and his habeas
petition did not seek to “abort a state proceeding” or “disrupt the
orderly functioning of state judicial processes”); Neville v. Cavanagh,
611 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing Braden and
finding the district court properly abstained even though the
petitioner presented to the state courts his Interstate Agreement on
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Detainers Act claim regarding the failure to try him before returning
him to federal custody where the petitioner sought dismissal of the
indictments)). In this case, Petitioner has not demanded a trial in
the state court or asked this Court to order that a trial take place.
Instead, Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the ongoing state court
proceeding. Therefore, because Petitioner seeks to abort the state
court proceeding, this Court will abstain.
Moreover, Petitioner has not exhausted his state court
remedies. The state court docket sheet reflects that Petitioner
raised in the state court a statutory speedy trial claim, which
appears to remain pending, but Petitioner has not provided any
evidence to show that his constitutional claim has been presented
to the state courts. See Olsson, 328 F. App’x at 335 (dismissal on
Younger abstention ground proper where the petitioner had not
exhausted his state court remedies); Tran v. Bartow, 210 F. App’x
538, 540 (7th Cir. 2006) (district court properly dismissed § 2241
petition for failure to exhaust where the petitioner could have, but
did not, present his claims to the Wisconsin courts by obtaining a
ruling on his motion to dismiss and then seeking a discretionary
appeal).
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Finally, Petitioner has not shown extraordinary
circumstances—such as harassment or bias—to justify this Court
enjoining the state court proceedings. Although the delay has been
lengthy, the docket sheet suggests that Petitioner is responsible for
that delay in light of the numerous continuances sought and agreed
to, the time taken to obtain experts and conduct discovery, the
filing of numerous motions, obtaining new counsel, and refusing to
be transported to court. See Thomas v. Barrow, No. 10-cv-0613,
2011 WL 3516035, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 11, 2011) (dismissing
petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies where the
Wisconsin courts had not had the opportunity to rule on whether
petitioner’s pretrial detention was in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States and finding the “extreme amount of time
that had passed without a trial” did not warrant exercising federal
pretrial habeas jurisdiction, particularly where the docket showed
petitioner was responsible for a majority of the delay).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
§ 2241 Petition (d/e 7) is GRANTED. Petitioner’s § 2241 Motion
(d/e 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice. THIS CASE IS CLOSED.
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ENTER: July 5, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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