Pettit v. City of Springfield et al

Filing 11

OPINION: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (d/e 6 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Defendant City of Springfield, Illinois. Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson. Plaintiff's request for leave to file an amended complaint is GRANTED. If Plaintiff choo ses to file an amended complaint, he shall do so by March 3, 2017. Defendants are DIRECTED to file a response to Plaintiff's amended complaint, or if no amended complaint has been filed, to the remaining claims in Plaintiff's Complaint, by March 17, 2017. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/17/2017. (MJC, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 22 February, 2017 03:12:23 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
OF THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LOREN D. PETTIT,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, )
a municipal corporation, KENNY )
WINSLOW, Chief of the
)
Springfield Police Department,
)
individually and in his official
)
capacity, LIEUTENANT
)
CHRISTOPHER MUELLER,
)
individually and in his official
)
capacity, and LIEUTENANT
)
GREGORY WILLIAMSON,
)
individually and in his official
)
capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Civil No. 16-03075

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (d/e 6) filed by
Defendants City of Springfield, Illinois, a municipal corporation,
Kenny Winslow, Christopher Mueller, and Gregory Williamson
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
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IN PART. Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint fails
to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant City of
Springfield, Illinois. Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a
cognizable claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
against Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson. All other
claims brought by Plaintiff Loren D. Pettit survive Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts come from Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court
accepts them as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Tamayo v.
Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff, an African-American, was employed by the
Springfield Police Department from 2004 until his termination on
June 10, 2014. Defendant Winslow, the Chief of Police for the
Springfield Police Department, notified Plaintiff on or about
November 14, 2013, that Plaintiff was being temporarily suspended
and placed on administrative assignment pending the completion of
an internal affairs investigation. During that investigation,
Defendants Mueller and Williamson, Lieutenants with the
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Springfield Police Department, conducted or directed a search of
Plaintiff’s home. The search was conducted without Plaintiff’s
knowledge or consent, and the police officers who searched
Plaintiff’s home did not have a valid search warrant at the time of
the search. The investigation which led to the search of Plaintiff’s
home was authorized by Defendant Winslow.
On May 5, 2014, Defendant Winslow informed Plaintiff that
the Springfield Police Department intended to file formal charges
against Plaintiff for allegedly violating City of Springfield Civil
Service Rule 6.1(I) by using alcohol or other controlled substances
on the job or reporting to work under the influence of such
substance. Despite having performed his duties as a police officer
in a competent and satisfactory manner, Plaintiff was informed by
Defendant Winslow on July 10, 2014, that he was being terminated
from his employment as a police officer with the Springfield Police
Department. Plaintiff alleges that he was discharged because he is
African-American. Officers charged with violating Service Rule
6.1(I) or committing similar misconduct who were not AfricanAmerican were not terminated.
On March 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a three-count Complaint
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against Defendants. Count I contains claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Count II contains claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, presumably based on an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Count III contains
race discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Defendants filed their Motion to
Dismiss and their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
(d/e 7) on May 16, 2016, arguing that Plaintiff had failed to state
claims upon which relief could be granted. Although it is not
expressly stated, the wording of the Complaint suggests that each of
Plaintiff’s claims is directed at all four Defendants, and the Court
has conducted its analysis of the Complaint and the Motion to
Dismiss under that assumption.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are claims to “redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
1343(a)(3). Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction over all of
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Plaintiff’s claims because they all arise under federal statutes. See
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.”).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows a
court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged
misconduct. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007). A plaintiff’s complaint must suggest a right to relief,
“raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of
Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). “The required level of
factual specificity rises with the complexity of the claim.” McCauley
v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2011). When
faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as
true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Roberts v. City of
Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). “[L]egal conclusions
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and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim
are not entitled to this presumption of truth.” McCauley, 671 F.3d
at 616.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint Does Not State a
Cognizable Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

In 1977, Congress enacted a law stating that “[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This statutory
provision “affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race.” Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 172 (1976). However, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 “does not create a
private right of action against state actors.” Campbell v. Forest
Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., Ill., 752 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2014).
Indeed, a municipality who violates rights protected by 42 U.S.C. §
1981 is liable only under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733 (1989).
Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that Defendants Winslow,
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Mueller, and Williamson are being sued in both their individual and
official capacities. See Complaint (d/e 1), ¶¶ 7-8. Although
individual defendants can be held liable under § 1981, see Smith v.
Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 899 (7th Cir. 2012), overruled on other
grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2016), Plaintiff’s Complaint states that the complained of conduct
by Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson was conducted
“under the color of state law and in the course and scope of their
employment.” Complaint, ¶ 7; see also id., Count II, ¶ 23. Nowhere
does Plaintiff allege that Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and
Williamson took actions that fell outside the scope of their roles as
state actors. Accordingly, there is no alleged basis to hold
Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. Jett and Campbell dictate a dismissal of Count I of
Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Defendant City of Springfield, a
municipality, and Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson,
three police officers allegedly acting under the color of state law.
Plaintiff does not dispute this result. See Pl. Resp. Mot. to Dismiss
(d/e 9), ¶ 1. Accordingly, Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed, in its entirety, without prejudice.
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B.

Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint States Cognizable
Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendants
Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson.

Before analyzing the sufficiency of the claims in Counts II and
III of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court notes that with respect to
Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Title VII claims, Defendants have attempted to
interject factual allegations not contained in the Complaint into the
Court’s analysis on whether the claims satisfy the applicable
pleading standards. Specifically, Defendants attached affidavits by
Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson, documents relating
to an order of protection, and a collective bargaining agreement
between Defendant City of Springfield and Police Benevolent and
Protective Association Unit No. 5 to its memorandum in support of
its motion to dismiss. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the Court may consider “only the allegations made on the
face of the complaint.” Feigl v. Ecolab, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 846,
848 (N.D. Ill. 2003). “Documents that a defendant attaches to a
motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are
referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.”
Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431
(7th Cir. 1993). If the Court takes note of facts or documents
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outside the pleadings, the Court must “convert the defendant’s
12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment and afford the
plaintiff an opportunity to submit additional evidentiary material of
his or her own.” Id.
Here, the Court chooses not to consider the additional factual
allegations in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or the
documents attached to the memorandum as exhibits. None of
these documents were referenced in Plaintiff’s Complaint; therefore,
the exception outlined in Venture Associates that would make the
documents part of the pleadings does not apply. The Court also
declines to convert Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss to a motion for
summary judgment. Indeed, such an exercise would ultimately
prove unfruitful, as Plaintiff has denied the additional factual
allegations contained in Defendants’ memorandum. See Pl. Resp.
Mot. to Dismiss, ¶ 2.
The Court now turns to the question of whether Plaintiff’s §
1983 claims survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Federal law
imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
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person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983. In order to state a cognizable § 1983 claim, the
plaintiff “must assert the violation of a federal right.” Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). The
plaintiff must also assert that the person who violated his rights
acted under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980). When a § 1983 claim is based on an alleged violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege two elements: “(1) that
the officers’ conduct constituted a search or seizure and (2) that the
search or seizure was ‘unreasonable.’” White v. City of Markham,
310 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Court construes Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims as being based
upon an alleged violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments stemming from a search of Plaintiff’s home
by Defendants Mueller and Williamson. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims should be dismissed because they are
untimely. The problem with Defendant’s argument is that it relies
on an alleged fact not contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint: the date of
the alleged search. Because the Court has excluded the additional
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factual allegations made by Defendants in their Motion to Dismiss,
the Court cannot dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on
untimeliness because Plaintiff has not set forth a date on which the
alleged search occurred. Defendants are free to pursue this
position on summary judgment if the facts adduced through
discovery indicate that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are untimely.
In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Mueller and Williamson conducted or directed a search of his home
without his knowledge or consent and that the search was
conducted without a valid search warrant. Complaint, ¶ 11. This
single allegation is sufficient to satisfy the two elements of a Fourth
Amendment claim—that their conduct constituted a search and
that the search was unreasonable. See Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d
1070, 1081 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A warrantless entry into a private
home constitutes a search and presumptively is unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no
factual allegations that would allow the Court to find that the
officers who searched Plaintiff’s home did not need a valid search
warrant to do so. Therefore, assuming that Defendants Mueller and
Williamson conducted the search of Plaintiff’s home, the factual
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allegations regarding the search indicate a right to relief against
them that is more than merely speculative. However, even if
Defendants Mueller and Williamson merely directed other officers to
conduct the search, Plaintiff has still pleaded a valid § 1983 claim
against them. See Backes v. Village of Peoria Heights, Ill., 662 F.3d
866, 870 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] supervisor may still be personally
liable for the acts of his subordinates if he approves of the conduct
and the basis for it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The same
rationale supports a § 1983 claim against Defendant Winslow, as
the search was conducted pursuant to an investigation he
authorized. See Complaint, ¶ 11.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant City of Springfield
fails, however. A municipality “may not be sued under § 1983 for
an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see
also Kimbrew v. Evansville Police Dep’t, 867 F. Supp. 818, 830 (S.D.
Ind. 1994) (applying Monell to a § 1983 claim against a municipality
based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment). Liability
against a municipality is present only where the injury is the result
of a policy or custom of the municipality, whether enacted by
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lawmakers or by public officials whose acts “may fairly be said to
represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Plaintiff has not
alleged that the search of his home was the result of any policy or
custom adopted by Defendant City of Springfield, nor has Plaintiff
alleged that any of the other Defendants are policymakers for
Defendant City of Springfield. Accordingly, Plaintiff has pleaded no
cognizable § 1983 claim against Defendant City of Springfield based
on the search of Plaintiff’s home by Defendants Mueller and
Williamson. Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, without
prejudice, as to Defendant City of Springfield.
C.

Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint States a Cognizable
Title VII Claim Against Defendant City of Springfield,
Illinois.

Defendants cite the four elements that a plaintiff must
establish under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), to prevail on a discrimination claim where there is no direct
evidence of discrimination, arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged
facts sufficient to satisfy those elements. But as the Supreme Court
has since held, the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas “is
an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Therefore, “under a
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notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to
plead facts establishing a prima facie case” of discrimination. Id. at
511; see also Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th
Cir. 2014) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513-15) (“Title VII claims
are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.”). Although
Swierkiewicz was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Twombly and Iqbal, the Seventh Circuit has applied Swierkiewicz in
cases that postdate Iqbal. See, e.g., Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Neither Iqbal nor
Twombly overruled Swierkiewicz, and it is our duty to apply the
Supreme Court’s precedents unless and until the Supreme Court
itself overrules them.”).
Defendants also cite Gates v. Catepillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680
(7th Cir. 2008), in arguing that Plaintiff has not satisfied his
pleading requirement as to the “similarly situated employee”
element of a Title VII claim based on indirect evidence of
discrimination. This argument again misconstrues Plaintiff’s
burden in pleading his Title VII claims by taking the incorrect
position that Plaintiff need satisfy the elements of a prima facie case
of discrimination based on indirect evidence in his Complaint. In
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addition, because Gates is a case in which summary judgment was
granted in favor of the defendant employer, it is of limited value
here. Plaintiff’s burden in stating a cognizable Title VII claim is not
the same as his burden in avoiding summary judgment on that
claim. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511. Further, as with
Defendant’s factual allegations regarding the date of the alleged
search of Plaintiff’s home, the Court has excluded Defendant’s
assertions regarding the circumstances of Plaintiff’s alleged
violation of a civil service rule in ruling upon Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss.
Having covered what Plaintiff did not have to allege to meet his
burden in pleading his Title VII claims and what the Court will not
consider in determining the sufficiency of these claims, the Court
can now turn to what Plaintiff did have to allege. Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint
must contain more than a “general recitation of the elements of the
claim,” there is a “minimal pleading standard for simple claims of
race or sex discrimination.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084. For a Title
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VII race discrimination claim, a plaintiff need only allege that the
employer took a specific adverse employment action against him
because of his race. Carlson, 758 F.3d at 827. Indeed, “once a
plaintiff alleging illegal discrimination has clarified that it is on the
basis of her race, there is no further information that is both easy to
provide and of clear critical importance to the claim.” E.E.O.C. v.
Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2007).
In Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., the Seventh Circuit held that
the plaintiff had adequately stated claims for racial discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act. 614 F.3d 400, 405-07 (7th Cir. 2010).
The plaintiff included in her complaint the type of discrimination
alleged, the identities of those who allegedly discriminated against
her, and when the alleged discrimination occurred. Id. at 405. The
Seventh Circuit held that this information is all the plaintiff needed
to include in her complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss
alleging a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See id. The Seventh Circuit has applied Swanson to the pleading
requirements to Title VII discrimination claims. See Huri v. Office
of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cnty., 804 F.3d 826,
833 (7th Cir. 2015). Because employers “are familiar with
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discrimination claims and know how to investigate them,” extensive
factual allegations are not needed to put an employer on notice.
Carlson, 758 F.3d at 827.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated from
his employment because he is black, that he was terminated by
Defendant Winslow, and that he was terminated on June 10, 2014,
after having been notified on May 5, 2014, that the Springfield
Police Department intended to file formal charges against him for
violating City of Springfield Civil Service Rule 6.1(I). Based on the
relevant Seventh Circuit precedent, these allegations are sufficient
to state a Title VII racial discrimination claim. Further, Plaintiff
also alleges that he performed his duties in a competent and
satisfactory manner and that non-black officers with the Springfield
Police Department charged with the same or similar misconduct as
he was were not terminated. The Complaint sufficiently puts
Defendant City of Springfield on notice of the basis for Plaintiff’s
Title VII claim and suggests a right to relief above the speculative
level. Whether Plaintiff can supply evidence establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination, assuming direct evidence of
discrimination is not present, is a question to be determined at a
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later stage in the proceedings.
Plaintiff has not stated a Title VII claim as to Defendants
Winslow, Mueller, or Williamson, however. “Individual people who
are agents of the employer cannot be sued as employers under Title
VII.” Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir.
2012); see also Gastineau v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 493–
94 (7th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir.
1995). Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by the Springfield
Police Department. Plaintiff does not allege that he was employed
by Defendants Winslow, Mueller, or Williamson, three of employees
of Defendant City of Springfield. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not
stated a cognizable Title VII claim against Defendants Winslow,
Mueller, or Williamson. Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint is
dismissed, without prejudice, as to Defendants Winslow, Mueller,
and Williamson.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e
6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Count I of
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Count
II of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as
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to Defendant City of Springfield, Illinois. Count III of Plaintiff’s
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Defendants
Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson. Plaintiff’s request for leave to
file an amended complaint is GRANTED. If Plaintiff chooses to file
an amended complaint, he shall do so by March 3, 2017.
Defendants are DIRECTED to file a response to Plaintiff’s amended
complaint, or if no amended complaint has been filed, to the
remaining claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint, by March 17, 2017.

ENTER: February 17, 2017.
/s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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