Eberhardt v. Graves et al
Filing
24
OPINION: Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint 8 is DISMISSED with prejudice. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. This case is CLOSED. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/7/2016. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 08 July, 2016 08:14:00 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DON FRANK EBERHARDT,
Plaintiff,
v.
RUDOLPH BRAUD, JR., JUDGE,
Defendant.
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No. 16-cv-3080
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on a Merit Review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff Don Frank Eberhardt has failed to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. In addition, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Therefore, the
Second Amended Complaint (d/e 8) is DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint (d/e 1)
and an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying
Fees and Costs (d/e 2). On March 24, 2016, United States
Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins issued a Report and
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Recommendation (d/e 4) recommending that the Motion to Proceed
in District Court Without Prepaying Fees and Costs be denied, the
federal claims be dismissed with prejudice, and the state law claims
be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. In
particular, Judge Schanzle-Haskins found that Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations;
Sections 241, 242, and 371 of Title 18 of the United States Code did
not authorize private individuals to bring civil lawsuits for violation
of the statutes; and the allegations of “Judicial Malversation”
implicated Illinois’ policy of absolute judicial immunity from suit.
Judge Schanzle-Haskins also found that part of the relief Petitioner
sought—to have every order made by the state court judge
nullified—was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Instead of filing an objection to the Report and
Recommendation, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (d/e 5) on
April 8, 2016. On April 15, 2016, Judge Schanzle-Haskins entered
an Opinion (d/e 7) granting Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint containing all of claims and defendants Plaintiff intended
to include. Judge Schanzle-Haskins expressed concern that
Plaintiff had omitted from the Amended Complaint certain
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allegations and claims contained in the original Complaint and
wanted to give Plaintiff a chance to assert all of his claims against
all of the defendants in one pleading.
On April 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended
Complaint (d/e 8). The Second Amended Complaint is 31 pages
long and is brought only against Defendant Rudolph Braud, Jr., a
Sangamon County Associate Judge. Plaintiff brings the claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and complains of violations of his
First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
the United States Constitution. On May 24, 2016, Judge SchanzleHaskins granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis. Opinion (d/e 16).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), this Court must dismiss an in
forma pauperis action at any time if the Court determines that the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks
monetary damages against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Having reviewed the Second Amended
Complaint, this Court finds that dismissal is warranted because
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
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In addition, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief against a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When screening a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court
applies the same standard used to evaluate dismissals under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Arnett v
Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying the
Rule12(b)(6) standard when reviewing a dismissal under
§1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim). To state a claim for relief,
a plaintiff need only provide a short and plain statement of the
claim showing he is entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair
notice of the claims. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081
(7th Cir. 2008). A court construes the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as
true and construing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Id. Moreover, pro se pleadings are liberally construed. See
Ambrose v. Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating
that “[t]he question for us is whether the petition adequately
presents the legal and factual basis for the claim, even if the precise
legal theory is inartfully articulated or more difficult to discern”).
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A complaint must, however, set forth facts that plausibly
demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plausible claim is one that alleges facts
from which a court can reasonably infer that the defendants are
liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or
supporting claims with conclusory statements is insufficient to
state a cause of action. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff complains of
Judge Braud’s handling of Plaintiff’s dissolution of marriage case,
Sangamon County Circuit Court Case No. 2010-D-859. Plaintiff
asserts that his ex-wife, Aura Monica Eberhardt, a Romanian
national, was still married to another man when she married
Plaintiff. As such, according to Plaintiff, his marriage to Aura was
invalid. Plaintiff tried to bring this evidence before Judge Braud but
Judge Braud would not allow Plaintiff to question his “Accuser” in
any meaningful way, obtain and present evidence, or call witnesses.
Second Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff also complains that Judge Braud
did not allow Plaintiff “unfettered, unshackled legal representation,”
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did not hold a hearing before Plaintiff’s property was seized, and did
not protect Plaintiff from the harm of losing his business. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that the testimony Plaintiff gave in the
dissolution of marriage case on August 5, 2011 has been withheld
from him by the court reporter and that Judge Braud “had the
power to tamper with, suppress, delete, and/or remove the Official
Court Transcripts.” Second Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff also
complains that Judge Braud forced Plaintiff to sign a real estate
contract under threat of contempt of court. Id. For relief, Plaintiff
seeks relief from all orders made by Judge Braud in violation of the
law and monetary damages of $1 million. Id. at 29.
A court may take judicial notice of documents in the public
record. Olson v. Champaign Cnty., Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1096 n.1
(7th Cir. 2015). A search of the Sangamon County Circuit Clerk’s
website shows that judgment of dissolution was entered October 18,
2011 by Judge Braud in Case No. 2010-D-859. See Sangamon
Court Circuit Court website
http://records.sangamoncountycircuitclerk.org/sccc/DisplayDocke
t.sc (last visited July 7, 2016). Plaintiff appealed, and the judgment
was affirmed. See In re Marriage of Eberhardt, 2012 IL App (4th)
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111144-U (2012). The Sangamon County case was assigned to
another judge on October 9, 2013.
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief for several reasons.
First, this Court lacks jurisdiction to void the state court orders,
which is part of the relief Plaintiff seeks. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); see also Young v. Murphy, 90
F. 3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1996) (except for limited exception, such
as habeas corpus, a district court lacks the authority to review final
judgments of state courts); Sheetz v. Norwood, 608 F. App’x 401,
404 (7th Cir.2015) (“The defendants are correct that the domesticrelations exception would bar [the plaintiff] from seeking to ‘void’
the state court’s custody orders”).
Second, Judge Braud is entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
A judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for his judicial acts
unless he acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction, even if the
action is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of his authority.
Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000).
Here, Judge Braud acted within his jurisdiction because he had
jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of marriage case. See Ill. Const.
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1970,art. VI, § 9 (“Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction . . . .”); Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 8 (“The
Supreme Court shall provide by rule for matters to be assigned to
Associate Judges”); S. Ct. R. 295: (providing that the chief judge of
the circuit may assign an associate judge to hear any matter except
a felony case, although the supreme court may authorize a circuit
judge to make a temporary assignment of an individual associate
judge to conduct trials of felony cases). Moreover, Plaintiff
complains of acts taken by Judge Braud in his judicial capacity.
See, e.g., Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2006)
(finding the judges were entitled to absolute immunity for claims
that they conspired with others to destroy the plaintiff financially
and drive her out of the country by manipulating the divorce
proceedings); Sanchez-Figuroa v. Bergmann, No. 15-cv-560, 2015
WL 4365495, at * 5 (S.D. Ill. 2015) (finding the judge was entitled to
absolute judicial immunity for claim that he conspired with others
to delay and alter the transcripts of the proceeding).
Finally, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Although a plaintiff is not required to negate an
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affirmative defense in his complaint, dismissal is appropriate when
the complaint contains sufficient facts to establish the affirmative
defense. Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 847
(7th Cir. 2008); Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 767 (7th
Cir. 2003).
Section 1983 has a two-year statute of limitations in Illinois.
Woods v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 768
(7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff complains of events that occurred in 2010
through 2012 but did not file suit until March 18, 2016. Moreover,
Judge Braud was no longer involved with Plaintiff’s dissolution case
after October 2013. Therefore, the §1983 claims are barred by the
statute of limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In addition,
Plaintiff seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
(d/e 8) is DISMISSED with prejudice. All pending motions are
DENIED AS MOOT. This case is CLOSED.
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ENTER: July 7, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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