Morrissette v. Boyd et al
Filing
6
MERIT REVIEW OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/29/16. Plaintiff's motion 5 is DENIED with leave to renew. IT IS ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO: 1) Attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standardprocedures; 2) Set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this order for the court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines; and, 3) Enter the Court's standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. (SW, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 29 July, 2016 09:30:08 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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QUENTIN R. BOYD, et al.
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Defendants. )
DORIEN MORRISSETTE,
16-3140
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Lincoln Correctional Center, brings the present lawsuit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force and conditions-ofconfinement claims for events that allegedly occurred during his
incarceration at Jacksonville Correctional Center. The matter
comes before this Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C. §1915A.
In reviewing the complaint, the Court takes all factual allegations as
true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v.
Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory
statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be
provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
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Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal
citation omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at Jacksonville
Correctional Center (“Jacksonville”) several prison guards “bum
rushed” him because they misinterpreted a song he was singing to
himself as a threat. Plaintiff alleges that he was then handcuffed
and physically dragged through the mud in such a manner that his
“entire clothes came off.” Plaintiff alleges he received scrapes to his
legs, body, and private areas. Plaintiff alleges a nurse only
examined his feet and did not document his injuries.
Plaintiff alleges that he was then placed in segregation for
seven (7) days while jail officials investigated the incident. Plaintiff
alleges that for at least a portion of the time spent in segregation, he
was without shoes. Eventually, Plaintiff alleges that he was found
guilty of a minor infraction (insolence) and transferred to a different
minimum security facility.
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ANALYSIS
Excessive Force
In Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force, the relevant
inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6
(1992) (citation omitted); see DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th
Cir. 2000) (applying Hudson). In making this determination, the
court may examine several factors, “including the need for an
application of force, the relationship between that need and the
force applied, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible
officers, the efforts made to temper the severity of the force
employed, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner.”
Dewalt, 224 F.3d at 619. Significant injury is not required, but “a
claim ordinarily cannot be predicated on a de minimis use of
physical force.” Id. at 620 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10).
“Thus, not every push or shove by a prison guard violates a
prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that the need for force was
completely unnecessary as he was not being disruptive at the time
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the jail officials “bum rushed” him, and that he was otherwise
compliant with the officials’ commands. An incident report
attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint states that the video of the incident
shows Plaintiff “putting his hands up in a surrender positions when
staff were applying restraints.” (Doc. 1-1 at 1).
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff states an Eighth
Amendment claim for excessive force against Defendants Boyd,
John Doe, and Jane Doe.
Conditions-of-Confinement
Plaintiff alleges that he should not have been confined to
segregation, and, while there, he was deprived of shoes. The
duration of Plaintiff’s segregated confinement lasted seven (7) days,
and does not appear to have lasted longer than was necessary for
prison officials to investigate the allegations pending against him.
See Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2005) (no
constitutional violation for temporary segregation for an alleged
violation of a disciplinary rule. Such a situation is analogous to an
arrest without a warrant pending a probable cause hearing).
The standard for analyzing a conditions-of-confinement claim
in the corrections context is well-established: a prison official is
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liable for denying a prisoner of his or her basic human needs, but
only if the official is aware of and deliberately indifferent to an
objectively serious risk of harm. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765,
773 (7th Cir. 2008). The court must first determine whether the
conditions at issue were “sufficiently serious” such that “a prison
official's act or omission result[ed] in the denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
832, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gillis
v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). Jail conditions may
be uncomfortable and harsh without violating the Constitution. See
Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997). “The
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither
does it permit inhumane ones[.]” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,
590 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Therefore,
“extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 849, 845 (7th
Cir.1999) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).
The Seventh Circuit recently noted that conditions-ofconfinement claims require “deprivations of essential food, medical
care, or sanitation.” Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 786 (7th Cir.
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2015) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981))
(emphasis in original). Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of shoes,
but does not otherwise allege any facts that would show that he
suffered a deprivation serious enough to trigger constitutional
concerns. Plaintiff alleges he was given “segregation clothing” and
that he was given food, although he did not want to eat it. Plaintiff
does not allege that the conditions were unsanitary. Therefore, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a conditions-ofconfinement claim.
Medical Treatment
Inmates are entitled to adequate medical care under the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the prison official acted with
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Id. at 105.
Claims of negligence, medical malpractice, or disagreement with a
prescribed course of treatment are not sufficient. McDonald v.
Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Pyles v. Fahim, 771
F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014), and Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d
675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)). Rather, liability attaches when “the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
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or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Plaintiff alleges he received scrapes and bruises, but these
injuries do not suggest that he suffered from an objectively serious
medical condition. See King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“An objectively serious medical need is one that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor's attention.” (internal quotations omitted));
see also Roberts v. Samardvich, 909 F. Supp. 594, 606 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (one-inch laceration was not a “serious medical need” absent
evidence that the wound was life-threatening or posed a risk of
needless pain or lingering disability, and where laceration bled only
for a short time and was treated with hydrogen peroxide and a
bandage); Williams v. Elyea, 163 F. Supp. 2d 992, 997 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (quarter-inch laceration in mouth not serious medical need
where it was not actively bleeding, not red, and had no discharge).
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Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent. Plaintiff was taken to
the healthcare unit for examination within a relatively short time
after the incident and he was examined by the nurse. Though
Plaintiff alleges that the nurse did not document his injuries,
Plaintiff does not allege that he had any lasting medical effects from
the injuries he alleges. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Pursuant to its merit review of the complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds the Plaintiff states claim
for excessive force against Defendants Boyd, John Doe,
and Jane Doe. All remaining defendants shall be
dismissed. Any additional claims shall not be included in
the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a
party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15.
2) Plaintiff filed a Motion to Request Counsel [5]. The
Plaintiff has no constitutional or statutory right to
counsel in this case. In considering the Plaintiff’s motion,
the court asks: (1) has the indigent Plaintiff made a
reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively
precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty
of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate
it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir.
2007), citing Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th
Cir.1993). Plaintiff has not shown that he made a
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reasonable effort to obtain counsel on his own. A plaintiff
usually does this by attaching copies of letters sent to
attorneys seeking representation and copies of any
responses received. Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the
first prong, the Court does not address the second.
Plaintiff’s motion [5] is DENIED with leave to renew.
3) This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants
before filing any motions, in order to give Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.
Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an
appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this
time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing
each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60
days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have
not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 90
days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After Defendants have
been served, the Court will enter an order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
5) With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the
address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that
Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to
the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not
known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This
information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained
only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the
public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
6) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date
the waiver is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not
an answer. The answer should include all defenses
appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and
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subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims
stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth
Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed
by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is
necessary or will be considered.
7) Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need
not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that
Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's
document electronically and send a notice of electronic
filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing
shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local
Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not
available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed
accordingly.
8) Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose
Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Counsel for
Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.
9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing
address or phone number will result in dismissal of this
lawsuit, with prejudice.
10)
Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants’ counsel
an authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is
directed to sign and return the authorization to
Defendants’ Counsel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO:
1) Attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard
procedures;
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2) Set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of
this order for the court to check on the status of service
and enter scheduling deadlines; and,
3) Enter the Court's standard qualified protective order
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
Lastly, it is ordered that if a Defendant fails to sign and
return a waiver of service for the clerk within 30 days after the
waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshal’s Service on that
Defendant and will require that Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d)(2).
ENTERED:
July 29, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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