Stennis v. Godinez et al

Filing 10

MERIT REVIEW ORDER entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/27/2016. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, d/e 3 is GRANTED. Based upon his prison trust fund ledger, the initial partial filing fee is waived. Plaintiff 9;s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If the Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal with the Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). If the Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. This case is CLOSED. (MAS, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 27 July, 2016 11:50:10 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEITH STENNIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALVADOR GODINEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

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) No.: 16-3151-SEM-TSH
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MERIT REVIEW ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court for a merit review, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of Plaintiff Keith Stennis’ claims.
I.
MERIT REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, the Court is
required to carefully screen a complaint filed by a plaintiff who
seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court must dismiss a
complaint, or a portion thereof, if the plaintiff has raised claims that
are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The test for
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determining if an action is frivolous or without merit is whether the
plaintiff can make a rational argument on the law or facts in
support of the claim. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A complaint fails to state a claim for relief if the complaint does not
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
In reviewing the complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true and liberally construes them in plaintiff’s favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory
statements and labels are insufficient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Schatz v.
Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.
2012)(holding that, in order to determine if a complaint states a
plausible claim, the court must take non-conclusory, nonspeculative facts as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the
pleader’s favor, and isolate and ignore statements that simply
rehash claim elements or offer only legal labels and conclusions).
Instead, sufficient facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d
418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation omitted).
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II.
ANALYSIS
Stennis is currently a civil detainee at the Illinois Department
of Human Services’ Treatment and Detention Facility in Rushville,
Illinois (”Rushville”). However, the alleged constitutional wrongs
committed against him did not occur at Rushville.
Instead, Stennis alleges that the constitutional wrongs that
were committed against him and that form the basis for this suit
occurred at the Western Illinois Correctional Center (“Western
Illinois”). Stennis alleges that he was denied mandated sex-offender
specific treatment while he was incarcerated at Western Illinois
from November 2010 through February 2014. Stennis contends
that, had he received sex offender treatment at Western Illinois, he
would have been further along in the treatment program at
Rushville and that he could have been released sooner from
Rushville. Stennis also claims that he should have been transferred
to Rushville sooner so that he could have received the proper
treatment and so that he could have been released sooner.
Stennis’ Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The United States Supreme Court has held that, for
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detainees, “due process requires that the conditions and duration of
confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which persons are committed.” Seling v. Young, 531
U.S. 250, 265 (2001). The Supreme Court has also opined that
involuntarily committed mentally challenged persons have a
substantive due process right to “conditions of reasonable care and
safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such
training as may be required by these conditions.” Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has extended and summarized Youngerberg to include those
individuals committed because they are sexually violent: “(a)
committed persons are entitled to some treatment, and (b) what
that treatment entails must be decided by mental-health
professionals.” Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir.
2012(internal quotation omitted). In other words, the Seventh
Circuit has held that “Youngerberg holds that, under the due
process clause, detainees are entitled to non-punitive programs
designed using the exercise of professional judgment . . . .” Id. at
883.
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However, the same sort of protection is not available to
prisoners. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme
Court held that liberty interests in the prison context “will be
generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes [an]
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 483-84. Stennis’ inability to
access treatment programs is not an “atypical and significant
hardship” in comparison to the ordinary incidents of his life as a
prisoner. Richmond v. Cagle, 920 F. Supp. 955 (E.D. Wis. 1996)
(holding that there is no right to sex offender treatment programs);
Patrick v. Raemisch, 550 F. Supp. 2d 859, 864 (W.D. Wis. 2008)
(same). “Although it may be desirable to provide prisoners with
access to sex offender programming, incarcerated persons have no
constitutional right to such programming . . . .” Pettigrew v. Frank,
2008 WL 4265327, * 3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 28, 2008). “Denying
prisoners access to rehabilitative programs is simply not an
‘atypical and significant hardship’ under Sandin.” Id.
Here, Stennis’ only claim is that Defendants violated his
Constitutional rights while he was an IDOC prisoner at Western
Illinois when they failed to provide him with approved sex offender
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treatment so that he could be released from Rushville sooner.
Stennis had no constitutional right to such sex offender treatment
while he was at Western Illinois. Therefore, Stennis’ Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis [3] is GRANTED. Based upon his prison trust fund
ledger, the initial partial filing fee is waived. The agency
having custody of Plaintiff is directed to make monthly
payments of twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s
income credited to Plaintiff’s account to the Clerk of Court.
The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall forward these
payments each time Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00 until
the filing fee is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court is directed
to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff’s place of confinement,
to the attention of the Trust Fund Office.
2.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a

claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any further amendment to the Complaint
would be futile because Plaintiff’s claim is not cognizable.
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3.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must

file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty (30) days of
the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave
to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues he plans
to present on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff
does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00
appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.
4.

This case is, therefore, closed, and the Clerk of the

Court is directed to enter a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58. All pending motions are DENIED as
moot.

ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2016
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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