Davis v. Graves
Filing
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MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 8/25/2016. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This dismissal shall count as one of the Plaintiff' s three allotted "strikes" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This case is CLOSED. Plaintiff must still pay the full filing fee of $350.00 even though his case is dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must f ile a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION)(MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 26 August, 2016 01:48:48 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JERMAINE J. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGE LESLIE GRAVES,
Defendant.
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No. 16-cv-3233
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
Plaintiff filed this case pro se from the Sangamon County Jail.
The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. This statute requires the Court to review a
complaint filed by a prisoner to identify the cognizable claims and to
dismiss part or all of the complaint if no claim is stated.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts
must be provided to "'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
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face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoted
cite omitted).
On August 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (d/e 1) against
Sangamon County Circuit Court Judge Leslie Graves. Plaintiff is
awaiting trial on charges of first degree murder and armed robbery
in Sangamon County Case No. 14-cf-194, and Judge Graves is the
presiding judge.1 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in the state court
case.
Plaintiff alleges that he filed two motions in the state court
case that Judge Graves denied without “proper case law or
competing facts.” See Compl. at p. 7, ¶ 9. Plaintiff does not attach
copies of the motions to the Complaint but provides a description of
the motions.2 Id. at p. 5-7, ¶¶ 2-6. The first motion asked for an
investigation of certain recordings by someone other than the
Springfield Police Department or the State’s Attorney’s office. The
second motion asked that the State make the recordings available
to Plaintiff, as well as provide suitable facilities for inspection,
See http://records.sangamoncountycircuitclerk.org/sccc (last visited August
25, 2016). A court may take judicial notice of documents in the public record.
Olson v. Champaign Cnty., Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1096 n.1 (7th Cir. 2015).
1
2
Plaintiff advises the Court in a separate document that he will send copies of
the motions once he possesses more stamped envelopes. See d/e 3.
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testing, copying, and photographing such material. Plaintiff
expresses his belief that the recordings were tampered with and
incomplete. Plaintiff also believes that Judge Graves will not be
neutral and holds a vendetta against him. Id. at p. 7, ¶ 10.
For relief, Plaintiff asks for a new ruling on the two motions
and a change of venue. Id. at p. 7, ¶ 11. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks
an:
order of judgment of restoration of the court records as
provided in the Act3 and the investigation and testing by
a specialist of the recordings and if possible a change of
place of trial.
Id. at p. 8. Plaintiff does not seek money damages.
Plaintiff alleges in a separate document, which the Court
construes as part of the Complaint, that his constitutional rights to
a fair trial and equal protection of the law have been violated. See
d/e 3. Therefore, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s Complaint as
being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The acts by Judge Graves about which Plaintiff complains are
judicial acts. See, e.g., Hollins v. Vandersnick, No. 07-4037, 2007
3
This is apparently a reference to 720 ILCS 5/32-8, tampering with public
records. Section 32-8(e) provides: “Any party litigant who believes a violation of
this Section has occurred may seek the restoration of the court record as
provided in the Court Records Restoration Act.”
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WL 2937073 at *1 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2007) (noting that a judge’s
rulings during a hearing are acts performed in a judge’s judicial
capacity). A judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for her
judicial acts unless she acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction,
even if the action is erroneous, malicious, or in excess of her
authority. Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.
2000).
Until 1996, this doctrine of judicial immunity shielded judicial
officers only from money damages but not from prospective
injunctive relief. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
In 1996, Congress amended § 1983 to provide that “in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c),
Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1983). The Third Circuit has described the added
language as follows:
The ... amendatory language to § 1983 does not expressly
authorize suits for declaratory relief against judges.
Instead, it implicitly recognizes that declaratory relief is
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available in some circumstances, and then limits the
availability of injunctive relief to circumstances in which
declaratory relief is unavailable or inadequate.... A review
of the legislative history confirms this reading of the
amendment. The Senate Report accompanying the
amendment suggests that the amendment's purpose was
to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–43, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d
565, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984)(holding that judicial
immunity was not a bar to awards of attorney’s fees and
costs or to demands for injunctive relief), not to alter the
landscape of declaratory relief.
Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 197–98 (3d
Cir. 2000); see also, e.g., Sargent v. Emons, 582 F. App'x 51, 53 (2d
Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“Claims for injunctive relief under section
1983 against judges acting in their official capacity are therefore
barred by absolute judicial immunity as long as declaratory relief
remains available, the judge did not exceed her jurisdiction, and the
plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory judgment was violated.”)
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against a judicial officer.
Under § 1983, he is not entitled to that relief because he does not
allege that a declaratory decree was violated, that declaratory relief
is unavailable, or that Judge Graves acted in excess of her
authority.
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Even if this Court were to assume that declaratory relief is
unavailable and injunctive relief is not barred under § 1983, the
intervention Plaintiff seeks is inappropriate. The policies underlying
judicial immunity suggest that immunity should be granted where,
as here, a litigant seeks an injunction compelling a judge to alter
her former decision. See Johnson v. State of N.J., 869 F. Supp.
289, 294 (D.N.J. 1994) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967)) (noting that the policies governing judicial immunity suggest
such immunity should be applied in a case where a litigant seeks to
injunction compelling a judge to alter his former decision because a
judge should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants will file
lawsuits against him).
Moreover, Plaintiff cannot show an entitlement to injunctive
relief or that the risk of injury to him is great and immediate. See
Clarry v. Hatch, No. 04-CF-4167-JPG, 2005 WL 3234394, at *2-3
(S.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2005) (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
499 (1974)) (noting that to obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must
show that he has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer
irreparable injury without the requested relief). Plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law. He can appeal the state court decisions
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and, to the extent he believes Judge Graves is biased, seek to have
her disqualified. Clarry, 2005 WL 3234394, at * 3 (plaintiff failed to
make the requisite showing that he was entitled to injunctive relief).
Plaintiff has not provided any basis for this Court’s intervention in
the state court case. Therefore, considerations of comity and
federalism counsel against the requested intervention. See Clarry
2005 WL 3234394, at *3 (the plaintiff’s claim asking that the
district court enjoin further proceedings before the state court judge
and transfer the action to another venue was dismissed for want of
equity where “considerations of comity and federalism . . . strongly
counsel against the requested intervention”).
Finally, even if the Court interpreted Plaintiff’s complaint as
seeking a writ of mandamus rather than a claim under § 1983, this
Court does not have the authority to issue a mandamus against
state court judge to direct her in the performance of her duties. See
In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the
court did not have power under the All Writs Act to “issue
mandamus to a state judicial officer to control or interfere with
state court litigation”); Davis v. Spoden, No. 09-CV-002-BBC, 2009
WL 483180, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2009) (“Federal district courts
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lack jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to direct state courts
in the performance of their duties.”)
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1)
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
2) Any amendment to the Complaint would be futile because
Judge Graves is immune from suit and, even if she were not
immune from Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief, considerations
of comity and federalism counsel against the requested
intervention. This case is therefore closed. The clerk is directed to
enter a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
3)
This dismissal shall count as one of the plaintiff's three
allotted “strikes” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g).
4)
Plaintiff must still pay the full filing fee of $350 even
though his case has been dismissed. The agency having custody of
Plaintiff shall continue to make monthly payments to the Clerk of
Court, as directed in the Court's prior order.
5)
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
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judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose
to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.
6)
The clerk is directed to record Plaintiff's strike in the
three-strike log.
7)
If not already done, the clerk is directed to grant
Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis for the purpose
of allowing Plaintiff to pay the filing fee in installments.
ENTERED: August 25, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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