Great West Casualty Company v. Ross Wilson Trucking et al
Filing
48
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 9/1/2017. The Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, d/e 34 is DENIED. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 01 September, 2017 04:21:28 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
GREAT WEST CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROSS WILSON TRUCKING;
TRANSPORT SERVICES OF
SULLIVAN, IL, LLC; MARK J.
MUNCY; STEVAN SCHMELZER;
and SHELLY SCHMELZER,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 3:16-CV-03253
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff Great West Casualty
Company’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (d/e 34). Plaintiff
asks the Court to find that Plaintiff has no obligation to defend or
indemnify Defendants Ross Wilson Trucking, Transport Services of
Sullivan, IL, LLC (Transport Services), or Mark J. Muncy for the
allegations in the underlying lawsuit filed by Defendants Stevan
Schmelzer and Shelly Schmelzer. Because Plaintiff has failed to
Page 1 of 22
demonstrate that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
the Motion is DENIED.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The standard for a Rule 12(c)
motion is the same as the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Lodholtz v. York Risk Servs.
Group, Inc., 778 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2015). That is, the Court
asks “whether the pleadings state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face.” Andy Mohr Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., --F. 3d ---, 2017 3695355, *8 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2017). The Court
draws “all reasonable inferences and facts in favor of the
nonmovant, but need not accept as true any legal assertions.”
Wagner v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 840 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir.
2016). The Court may consider only the pleadings—the complaint,
the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits. N.
Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449,
452 (7th Cir. 1998); see also 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.
3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) (on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Page 2 of 22
Rule 12(b)(6), the court may also consider documents referred to in
the complaint that are central to the claim).
II. BACKGROUND
The Court takes the following background from the Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment, the exhibits attached thereto, and the
Answers.
A.
Transport Services and Ross Wilson Trucking Enter Into
an Independent Contractor Agreement for Owner-Operator
Transport Services and Ross Wilson Trucking entered into an
“Independent Contractor Agreement for Owner-Operator”
(Agreement) dated January 1, 2012. Compl., Ex. 2 (d/e 1-3). The
Agreement provides that Transport Services is:
a for[-]hire motor carrier of property holding licenses from
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(“FMCSA”) as well as various state regulatory agencies, is
engaged in the business of providing transportation
services for shippers, and intends to contract with
CONTRACTOR, on a non-exclusive basis for the lease of
motor vehicle equipment as set forth herein and for the
performance of certain tasks[.]
Agreement at 1. The Agreement identifies Ross Wilson Trucking as
the “CONTRACTOR.” The Agreement reflects that Ross Wilson
Trucking hauls under the authority of Transport Services.
Page 3 of 22
The Equipment leased includes a 2012 Peterbilt tractor, model
386, and a 2016 Peterbilt tractor, model 579 (the latter added to the
Agreement in May 2015). Agreement, App. A. Ross Wilson
Trucking was required, under the Agreement, to furnish qualified
drivers to operate all Equipment leased pursuant to the Agreement.
Agreement ¶ 8E.
To put the Agreement in context, the Court notes that a motor
carrier like Transport Services can own its own trucking equipment
or can enter into a written lease with the owner of trucking
equipment. See Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Medina, 645 F.3d 928,
931 (7th Cir. 2011); see also 49 C.F.R. § 376.11 (providing the
conditions under which an authorized carrier may perform
authorized transportation with equipment it does not own). Under
the written lease, the owner of the equipment (in this case, Ross
Wilson Trucking) “grants the use of equipment, with or without a
driver, for a specified period to an authorized carrier for use in the
regulated transportation of property, in exchange for
compensation.” 49 C.F.R. § 376.2(e) (defining “lease”); see also
Clarendon, 645 F.3d at 931. The written lease must provide that
the:
Page 4 of 22
authorized carrier lessee shall have exclusive possession,
control, and use of the equipment for the duration of the
lease. The lease shall further provide that the authorized
carrier lessee shall assume complete responsibility for
the operation of the equipment for the duration of the
lease.
49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1).
In this case, the Agreement contains such a provision, which
provides that, for the term of the Agreement, the Equipment is
under Transport Service’s exclusive possession, use, and control
and that Transport Services assumes full responsibility for the
operation of said equipment as to all third parties and the public at
large. Agreement ¶ 3B. The Agreement also provides, however, that
Ross Wilson Trucking could lease or “trip” other carriers when the
Equipment was not being used by Transport Services. Id. ¶ 13B.
Ross Wilson Trucking agreed to remove any signs or other
identification on the Equipment containing Transport Services’
name or motor carrier identification number when Ross Wilson
Trucking was not operating under Transport Services’ operating
authorities or otherwise operating in service of Transport Services
pursuant to the Agreement. Id. ¶ 13C.
Page 5 of 22
The Agreement addresses which party is required to provide
the necessary insurance:
INSURANCE. It is recognized that the United States
Department of Transportation and various other
regulatory bodies require the carrier under whose
certificates or permits leased Equipment is being
operated to be responsible to the public with respect to
such Equipment while the same is being operated under
its authority. TRANSPORT SERVICES will file, or has on
file, with the United States Department of Transportation
and any other regulatory body having jurisdiction over its
operations, evidence of insurance in such amounts as
may be required by law or regulation of said agencies,
and will continuously maintain in effect insurance in
such amount.
CONTRACTOR shall secure, at its sole expense,
insurance in the minimum amount of $1,000,000
combined single limits covering bob-tail and deadheading1 on the Equipment leased herein and shall
furnish TRANSPORT SERVICES with a certificate naming
TRANSPORT SERVICES as an additional insured
thereunder. In addition, CONTRACTOR will carry, at its
sole expense, its own insurance coverage on the
Equipment leased for collision, fire, theft and other
occurrence or catastrophe, and TRANSPORT SERVICES
shall be named as an insured thereunder also.
Agreement ¶ 7G. In addition, the Agreement requires that Ross
Wilson Trucking carry, at its own expense, Commercial General
1
Bob-tailing is the operation of a tractor without a trailer and dead-heading is
the operation of a tractor while pulling an empty trailer. See St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Frankart, 69 Ill. 2d 209, 212 (1977).
Page 6 of 22
Liability Coverage, Commercial Automobile coverage, and Workers’
Compensation Coverage. Id. ¶ 8A.
Finally, the Agreement contains the following indemnification
provision, which Defendants assert constitutes an “insured
contract”:
As between TRANSPORT SERVICES and CONTRACTOR
only, without any regard or effect upon the obligations of
TRANSPORT SERVICES to any third party,
CONTRACTOR agrees to be responsible for, indemnify,
defend and hold TRANSPORT SERVICES harmless from
any and all claims of any nature, losses, personal injury,
death, and/or damage to cargo or other property, and/or
claim for any such loss or occurrence which may arise
from or in connection with the operations performed or to
be performed pursuant to this Agreement, however
arising, without regard to fault or negligence on the part
of CONTRACTOR. This is to include, but is not limited
to, attorneys’ fees and any other expenses incurred in
defending or prosecuting any claim arising as a result of
any of the above or operation of the Equipment leased
herein.
Id. ¶ 14.
B.
Plaintiff Issues Non-Trucking Use Policy
Plaintiff issued a Non-Trucking Use policy of Commercial Auto
Insurance to the “Independent Contractors of Transport Services of
Sullivan IL, LLC” for the policy period November 1, 2015 to
November 1, 2016 (the Policy). Compl. ¶ 16. There is no dispute
Page 7 of 22
that Ross Wilson Trucking is an independent contractor of
Transport Services. See Pl. Mem. at 2 (d/e 34-1).
The Policy provides for coverage as follows:
A. COVERAGE
We will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as
damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage”
to which this insurance applies, caused by an “accident”
and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of
a covered “auto” only while:
1.
A covered “auto” is not used to carry property
in any business; and
2.
A covered “auto” is not used in the business of
anyone to whom the “auto” is rented, leased or
loaned.
Compl. ¶ 17, Ex. 3 (d/e 1-5, p. 46 of 64). For liability claims,
covered “autos” under the Policy are identified with the symbol “59,”
which is further defined as follows:
59= INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR COMMERCIAL
AUTOS. Only those trucks, tractors and “trailers2” on file
with us that are leased by the “motor carrier” shown in
the Declarations under this symbol and only while under
a written lease agreement of thirty (30) days or more.
This includes only those “autos” for which a premium
has been paid for the coverages offered by the policy and
The Policy defines “trailer” as including “a semitrailer or a dolly used to
convert a semitrailer into a “trailer.” “Trailer” does not include a shipping
container but does include the chassis used to transport it.” Compl. ¶ 19 n.2,
Ex. 3 (d/e 1-4, p. 59 of 64).
2
Page 8 of 22
only while the lease is in force. If the lease is cancelled or
expires then no coverage shall apply.
Id. ¶ 18, Ex. 3 (d/e 1-4, p. 18 of 69), (d/e 1-5, p. 44 of 64). The
Policy defines “insureds” to include the following:
1. WHO IS AN INSURED
The following are “insureds”:
a.
You for any covered “auto”3.
b.
Anyone else while using with your permission a
covered “auto” you own, hire or borrow except:
(1)
c.
The owner, or any “employee”, agent or driver
of the owner, or anyone else from whom you
hire or borrow a covered “auto”.
***
The owner or anyone else from whom you hire or
borrow a covered “auto” that is a “trailer” while the
“trailer” is being used exclusively by you and:
(1)
is not used to carry property in any business;
and
(2)
is not used in the business of anyone to whom
the “auto” is rented, leased or loaned.
However, Who is an Insured does not include
anyone engaged in the business of transporting
property by “auto” for hire who is liable for your
Plaintiff agrees that the word “you” in the Policy refers to Ross Wilson
Trucking. See Mem. at 2-3 (noting that “You” refers to the independent
contractors of Transport Services and admitting that Ross Wilson Trucking is
an independent contractor); at 7 (noting that “You” refers to Ross Wilson
Trucking).
3
Page 9 of 22
conduct.
Id. ¶ 19, Ex. 3 (d/e 1-5, p. 46 of 64). The Policy also contains
certain exclusions. One exclusion is the non-trucking use
exclusion:
15. MOTOR CARRIER OPERATIONS
This insurance does not apply to:
a.
A covered “auto” while used to carry property in any
business; or
b.
A covered “auto” while used in the business of
anyone to whom the “auto” is rented, leased or
loaned.
Id. ¶ 20, Ex. 3 (d/e 1-5, p. 50 of 64).
The Policy also contains another exclusion. The Policy
provides that the insurance does not apply to liability assumed
under a contract or agreement. Compl., Ex. 3 (d/e 1-5, p. 47 of 64).
This exclusion does not apply, however, to liability for damages that
are:
a.
Assumed in a contract or agreement that is an
“insured contract” provided the “bodily injury”
or “property damage” occurs subsequent to the
execution of the contract or agreement; or
b.
That the “insured” would have in the absence
of the contract or agreement.
Page 10 of 22
Id. The Policy defines an “insured contract” to include:
5. That part of any other contract or agreement
pertaining to your business . . . under which you assume
the tort liability of another to pay for “bodily injury” or
“property damage” to a third party or organization. Tort
liability means a liability that would be imposed by law in
the absence of any contract or agreement[.]
Id. (d/e 1-5, p. 58 of 64). The Policy further provides that an
“insured contract” does not include that part of any contract or
agreement:
c.
That holds a person or organization engaged in the
business of transporting property by “auto” for hire
harmless for your use of a covered “auto” over a
route or territory that person or organization is
authorized to serve by public authority.
Id.
C.
The Underlying Lawsuit
On or about March 18, 2016, Stevan Schmelzer and Shelly
Schmelzer filed a lawsuit titled Stevan Schmelzer and Shelly
Schmelzer v. Mark J. Muncy, Ross Wilson Trucking, and Transport
Services of Sullivan, United States District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois, Case No. 16-cv-290 (the Underlying Lawsuit).
Compl. ¶ 11; see also Ex. 1, Am. Compl. for Bodily Injury (d/e 1-2).
The complaint in the Underlying Lawsuit alleges the following.
Page 11 of 22
Muncy was an agent, servant, or employee of Ross Wilson
Trucking and Transport Services. See Compl., Ex. 1, Am. Compl.
for Bodily Injury ¶¶ 11, 12 (Underlying Complaint) (d/e 1-2). At
around 6:00 p.m. on January 14, 2016, while acting in the scope of
his agency or employment, Muncy operated a 2012 Peterbilt semi
tractor owned by Ross Wilson Trucking on Route 130 in Richland
County, Illinois. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 15. Muncy was towing a semi
tanker trailer that was owned by Transport Services. Id. ¶ 16.
Muncy attempted to back his semi tractor and trailer from Route
130 into a private drive and did so in a fashion that the tanker
trailer was completely blocking the southbound lane of the
roadway. Id. ¶ 17. Stevan Schmelzer was operating a vehicle on
Route 130 and collided with the semi tanker trailer. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.
The Schmelzers allege that Muncy was negligent and his negligence
caused injury and damages to the Schmelzers. Id. ¶¶ 20, 21, 24.
D.
Transport Services Requests a Defense and Indemnity
Transport Services sent notice of the collision to Plaintiff and
requested a defense and indemnity in the Underlying Lawsuit from
Plaintiff pursuant to the Policy. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff concluded
Page 12 of 22
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Transport Services, Ross
Wilson Trucking, or Muncy. Compl. ¶ 15.
E.
Plaintiff Files Suit Seeking Declaratory Judgment
In September 2016, Plaintiff filed a four-count Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment against Ross Wilson Trucking, Transport
Services, Muncy, and the Schmelzers. Plaintiff alleges that (1) the
subject loss falls outside of the non-trucking coverage grant (Count
I); (2) the subject loss is an excluded trucking loss (Count II); (3)
Transport Services is not an insured under the Policy (Count III);
and (4) Transport Services is not entitled to supplemental payments
toward its defense (Count IV). Plaintiff seeks a declaration that
Plaintiff does not have a duty to defend or indemnify any party with
regard to the allegations of the Underlying Lawsuit.
Ross Wilson Trucking, Transport Services, and Muncy filed an
answer and affirmative defenses (d/e 32). The three affirmative
defenses raised are illusory coverage, ambiguity, and waiver and
estoppel. The Schmelzers also filed an answer and affirmative
Page 13 of 22
defenses (d/e 30). The affirmative defenses raised are improper
venue4 and illusory coverage.
On March 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings (d/e 34) at issue herein.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts that the Policy provides coverage only to an
insured and only for the risk that a covered auto will be in an
accident when that auto is not engaged in the business of trucking.
Plaintiff asserts that the complaint in the Underlying Lawsuit
alleges that Ross Wilson Trucking and Muncy were engaged in the
business of trucking for Transport Services. Plaintiff also argues
that Transport Services is not an insured under the Policy.
Because this Court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship, the Court must apply state law to the substantive
issues in the case. Lodholtz, 778 F.3d at 639. Plaintiff asserts, and
no party disputes, that Illinois law applies.
On February 22, 2017, this Court denied the Schmelzer’s Motion to Dismiss
or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Action. Opinion (d/e 33) (finding venue
proper in the Central District of Illinois).
4
Page 14 of 22
Under Illinois law, an insurer’s duty to defend is broader than
the duty to indemnify. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 125 (1992). To determine whether the insurer
has a duty to defend, the court looks at the allegations in the
underlying complaint and compares those allegations to the
relevant provisions of the insurance policy. Id. at 107-08. If the
facts alleged in the underlying complaint fall within, or potentially
fall within, the policy’s coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend.
Id. at 108; see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co.,
144 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1991) (in a declaratory action, courts in Illinois
will find a duty to defend even if only one theory alleged in the
underlying complaint is potentially within the policy’s coverage). An
insurer does not have a duty to defend where “‘it is clear from the
face of the underlying complaint that the allegations fail to state
facts which bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy’s
coverage.’” Connecticut Indem. Co. v. DER Travel Serv., Inc., 328
F.3d 347, 349 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 73).
The court construes the underlying complaint liberally in favor of
the insured. Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d
404, 407 (2004).
Page 15 of 22
The construction of an insurance policy is a question of law.
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 480 (1997). In
construing an insurance policy, the court must ascertain and give
effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in their
agreement. Hobbs v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d
11, 17 (2005). If the terms of the policy are clear and
unambiguous, then the court gives the terms their plain and
ordinary meaning. See Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins.
Servs. Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d 407, 416 (2006). Conversely, if the terms of
the policy are susceptible of more than one meaning, then the court
considers the terms ambiguous and construes the policy strictly
against the insurer who drafted the policy. Rich v. Principal Life
Ins. Co., 226 Ill. 2d 359, 371 (2007). Illinois courts construe the
insurance policy as a whole, taking into account the type of
insurance purchased, the nature of the risks involved, and the
overall purpose of the contract. Id.
A.
Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings on
the Ground that the Subject Loss is Not a Covered Loss
The Policy excludes coverage for:
a.
A covered “auto” while used to carry property in any
business; or
Page 16 of 22
b.
A covered “auto” while used in the business of
anyone to whom the “auto” is rented, leased or
loaned.
Compl., Ex. 3 (d/e 1-5, p. 50 of 64). Plaintiff argues that the
subject loss is not a covered loss under the Policy because the
Underlying Complaint alleges that Muncy was acting within the
scope of his agency or employment as a trucker at the time of the
accident. Plaintiff also notes that the Underlying Complaint alleges
that Muncy was towing a semi tanker trailer owned by Transport
Services at the time of the accident.
Liberally construing the Underlying Complaint in favor of the
insureds, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
that the subject loss is not a covered loss. First, there are no
allegations in the Underlying Complaint indicating whether the semi
tractor was being used to carry property. Therefore, it is not clear
that subsection (a) would apply to exclude coverage.
Second, Plaintiff has not shown that subsection (b) applies.
The Underlying Complaint alleges that, at all relevant times, Muncy
was an agent, servant, or employee of Ross Wilson Trucking and
Transport Services. The Underlying Complaint also alleges that
Page 17 of 22
Muncy was acting within the course and scope of his agency or
employment with Ross Wilson Trucking and Transport Services.
The allegations pertaining to Muncy’s agency, employment or
course of his agency or employment can be construed, however, as
seeking relief under different theories of recovery. As noted above,
the underlying complaint is liberally construed in favor of the
insured. Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 74. And, if the underlying complaint
alleges multiple theories of recovery, an insurer still has a duty to
defend even if only one theory is within the coverage of the policy.
Pekin Ins. Co. v. Centex Homes, 2017 IL App (1st) 153601, ¶ 34. In
this case, the Underlying Complaint can be read to allege that
Muncy was acting in the course of his agency or employment with
Ross Wilson Trucking and Transport Services or just within the
course of his agency or employment with Ross Wilson Trucking but
not Transport Services. If Muncy was acting solely within the scope
of his employment or agency with Ross Wilson Trucking, subsection
(b) would not apply because the covered auto (the semi tractor) was
not being used in the business of anyone (i.e. Transport Services) to
whom the semi tractor was rented, leased, or loaned.
Page 18 of 22
The Independent Contractor Agreement provides that the
Equipment was under the exclusive possession, use, and control of
Transport Services during the term of the agreement, which would
suggest that the semi tractor must have been used in the business
of Transport Services. However, the Agreement also provides that
Ross Wilson Trucking could lease or “trip” to other carriers when
the Equipment was not being used by Transport Services. Compare
Registration/licensing of Transport Services provision (d/e 1-3, ¶
3B) with Subleasing/Trip Leasing/Etc. provision (d/e 1-3 ¶ 13B).
Therefore, the Agreement does not conclusively show that the
covered auto was being used in the business of Transport Services.
In addition, while the Underlying Complaint alleges that
Muncy was towing a semi tanker trailer owned by Transport
Services, there are circumstances under which a truck driver is not
towing a trailer in the business of the trailer owner. For example, in
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Frankart, 69 Ill. 2d 209, 216
(1977), which contained a similar exclusionary provision to the one
at issue herein, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the policy
would exclude coverage for an accident that occurred when the
tractor was pulling an empty trailer if the trailer was being used in
Page 19 of 22
the business of a lessee. The Illinois Supreme Court further found,
based on the evidence presented, that the assignment for the lessee
continued at least until the owner-driver returned to the point
where the haul originated, to the terminal from which the haul was
assigned, or to the owner-driver’s home terminal from which he
customarily obtained his next assignment. Id. at 218 (concluding
that the exclusion applied because, during the driver’s return trip to
his home, the tractor-trailer continued to be used in the business of
lessee). Here, no facts about a Transport Services or other job
assignment are alleged in the Underlying Complaint. If Muncy
operated the semi tractor (the covered auto) while pulling an empty
trailer and was not using the semi tractor in the business of
Transport Services or anyone to whom the semi tractor was rented,
leased or loaned, the Policy may provide coverage. Therefore, at
this stage of the litigation, the Underlying Complaint appears to
allege facts that would potentially fall within the Policy’s coverage.
Consequently, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that it has no duty to
defend on the ground that the subject loss was not a covered loss.
Page 20 of 22
B.
Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings on
the Ground that Transport Services is Not an Insured
Plaintiff also argues that Transport Services is not entitled to a
defense or indemnification from Plaintiff because Transport Services
is not an insured under the Policy.
Plaintiff argues that Transport Services is not a named
insured. Plaintiff further notes that Transport Services is sued in
the Underlying Lawsuit on the theory that Transport Services is
liable for the conduct of Ross Wilson Trucking. The Policy excludes
from the definition of “insured” “anyone engaged in the business of
transporting property by ‘auto’ for hire who is liable for your [Ross
Wilson Trucking’s] conduct.” Therefore, according to Plaintiff,
Transport Services cannot be an insured.
However, no determination has been made whether Transport
Services is liable for Ross Wilson Trucking’s conduct so it is not
established that the exclusion applies. Moreover, the Court has
insufficient information at this point to determine whether
Transport Services is an insured under an “insured contract.”
Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Transport Services is
not an insured.
Page 21 of 22
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (d/e 34) is DENIED.
ENTER: September 1, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 22 of 22
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?