Myers v. Bennett
OPINION: Judge Bennett's Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9 ) is GRANTED. The Complaint (d/e 1 ) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. CASE CLOSED. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/04/2017. (MJC, ilcd)
Thursday, 05 October, 2017 09:08:20 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARK D. MYERS,
ALLEN F. BENNETT,
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Judge Allen
Bennett’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9) for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the
reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
In September 2016, Plaintiff Mark Myers filed a Complaint
against Judge Allen Bennett. (d/e 1). The following facts, except
where indicated, come from the Complaint. At this stage in the
proceedings, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true.
Kubiak v. City of Chi., 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016).
Page 1 of 23
On September 15, 2015, Matthew Beyers brought suit against
Myers under Illinois’s Stalking No Contact Order Act1 in Beyers v.
Myers, Shelby County Circuit Court Case No. 15-OP-102
(hereinafter referred to as “state case”).2 As indicated by public
records, the Court entered an emergency stalking no contact order
against Myers. The Complaint does not indicate the restrictions
specified by the stalking no contact order.
On September 28, 2015, Myers was served with a Summons
for an October 1, 2015, hearing. Myers appeared at the hearing pro
se and Beyers appeared with counsel. During the hearing, Judge
Bennett granted Myers’s request for time to obtain an attorney and
gave Myers three weeks to respond. Compl. at 5, ¶ 4. Judge
Illinois’s Stalking No Contact Order Act allows circuit courts to issue stalking
no contact orders that restrict the defendant’s contact with the petitioner,
prohibit the defendant from stalking petitioner, and prevent the defendant from
being in certain areas, which can include the defendant’s own property. 740
ILCS 21/80 (2015). The court may issue an emergency stalking no contact
order based upon the allegations in a filed petition and without the presence of
the defendant. 740 ILCS 21/95 (2015). After the order is issued, the
defendant must be served by summons a copy of the petition, the order, and
notice of any hearings. 740 ILCS 21/60 (2015).
2 The Complaint references the state case number and county but does not
contain the petitioner’s name. Myers’s Response to the Motion to Dismiss
indicates the petitioner’s name is Beyers (See d/e 13 at 7). Public records
show the name of the petitioner as Matthew T. Beyers and the name of the case
as Beyers v. Myers. The Court takes judicial notice of petitioner’s name and
the case name.
Page 2 of 23
Bennett also extended the duration of the existing stalking no
contact order. The order (at least as of October 1, 2015) restricted
Myers’s access to Myers’s property (consisting of approximately 2.5
acres of real estate), three Shelby County school buildings, and a
restaurant located in Shelby County. Compl. at 5, ¶ IV; Plaintiff’s
Amended Response to the Motion to Dismiss (Response) at 4 (d/e
13). Myers asserts that Judge Bennett based the decision to extend
the existing stalking no contact order solely upon Beyers’s claims.
Following the hearing, an officer escorted Myers from the
courtroom. Judge Bennett, Beyers, and Beyers’s attorney remained
in the courtroom. They engaged in conversation that Myers could
Sometime following the October 1, 2015, hearing, Myers
obtained an attorney. After Myers’s attorney requested to take
certain depositions, Beyers’s attorney moved to dismiss the case.
Compl. at 5, ¶ IV. Judge Bennett granted that motion.
On May 10, 2016, Myers requested a copy of the official
transcript from the October 1, 2015, hearing. In June 2016, Myers
received a copy of the transcript. Myers noted significant
discrepancies between the events of the October 1 hearing and the
Page 3 of 23
information reflected in the transcript. The Complaint does not
specify the exact nature of the discrepancies, but Myers’s Response
states that Judge Bennett deleted the following comment from the
transcript: “This is about a land dispute. You understand that
don’t you!” Plaintiff’s Response at 9.
Myers objected to the contents of the transcript to the court
reporter. Myers later received a second, modified version of the
transcript from the court reporter, which also contained errors
similar to the discrepancies found in the first transcript. The court
reporter advised Myers that Myers’s concerns had been submitted
to a supervisor, that the matter had been turned over to Judge
Bennett, and that Judge Bennett controlled an audio tape of the
October 1 hearing.
On June 10, 2016, Judge Bennett called Myers. Myers’s
attorney did not participate in the phone call. The phone call lasted
ten minutes. Myers asserts that the purpose of Judge Bennett’s
call was to “intimidate, threaten, and harass” Myers because of
Myers’s objections to the court transcript.
On June 10, 2016, Judge Bennett was assigned as the judge
on a separate lawsuit against Myers.
Page 4 of 23
Myers asserts that Judge Bennett violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
depriving Myers of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Specifically, Myers states that Judge Bennett violated
Myers’s Fourteenth Amendment rights at the October 1 hearing
because, in violation of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules on Civil
Proceedings in the Trial Court (Illinois Supreme Court Rules), Judge
Bennett proceeded with the hearing when Myers had insufficient
time to prepare for the hearing. Myers also contends that Judge
Bennett violated Myers’s due process rights because the hearing
resulted in restrictions to Myers’s liberty, freedom of movement, and
property rights. Similarly, Myers alleges that Judge Bennett’s
conversation with Beyers and Beyers’s attorney immediately after
the October 1 hearing violated Myers’s due process rights because
Myers was not present for the discussion. Myers further alleges
that the June 10, 2016, phone call violated Myers’s First
Amendment rights, due process rights, and the Illinois Supreme
Court Rules because the call took place without Myers’s attorney
and prevented Myers from redressing his grievances. Myers seeks
judgment for compensatory damages, the costs of suit, and punitive
Page 5 of 23
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit
under federal question jurisdiction. Under the well-pleaded
complaint rule, the federal question forming the basis of the court’s
jurisdiction must appear in the complaint as part of the plaintiff’s
claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). Myers brings his suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a federal civil cause of action for
deprivation of rights. Additionally, the Complaint asserts violations
of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. Therefore, the Complaint establishes the
Court’s federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of a
complaint. Bonnstetter v. City of Chi., 811 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir.
2016). A sufficient complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the
claims by requiring the plaintiff to provide a short and plain
statement of the claims showing the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Additionally,
a properly stated claim must raise its allegations above speculation
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and “must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief.”
Id. at 752. A plausible claim alleges facts from which the court can
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Merely repeating the elements of a cause of
action or supporting claims with conclusory statements is
insufficient to state a cause of action. Id.
However, the standards for pro se complaints are considerably
relaxed. Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027
(7th Cir. 2013). Pro se complaints must be liberally construed and
are held to “a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751.
A motion to dismiss must be decided based on facts stated in
the complaint. Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010).
When the Court considers a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded
facts corresponding to the plaintiff’s claims are accepted as true
and the court makes “all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 481.
However, a court addressing a motion to dismiss may consider
certain documents beyond the complaint. First, the court may
consider any exhibits attached to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ.
Page 7 of 23
Pro. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); Moranski v.
General Motors Corp., 433 F.3d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Any
written instrument attached to the complaint is considered part of
the complaint.”); Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir.
1988) (exhibits attached to the complaint are incorporated into the
pleading for purpose of Rule 12(b) motion).
Second, the Court may consider the plaintiff’s response to a
motion to dismiss and other statements and materials that are
referenced in the complaint and that are essential to the plaintiff’s
claims. Heng v. Heavner, Beyers & Mihlar, LLC, 849 F.3d 348, 35354 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that a court may, when ruling on a
motion to dismiss, consider materials or elaborations in a plaintiff’s
trial brief or response to a motion to dismiss consistent with the
pleadings); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1367 n.2 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding that a court may consider facts submitted in a pro se
plaintiff’s brief opposing a motion to dismiss when the facts are
consistent with the allegations in the complaint). A plaintiff
opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “may submit materials
outside the pleadings to illustrate the facts the party expects to be
Page 8 of 23
able to prove.” Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th
Finally, the court may consider information that is subject to
judicial notice. Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766, 773-74 (7th Cir.
2012) (a court may take judicial notice of matters within the public
record that are not subject to reasonable dispute without converting
a pending motion into a motion for summary judgment).
According to these principles, in considering the Motion to
Dismiss, the Court considers, in addition to the Complaint, the
statements in Myers’s Response and the exhibits attached thereto
that are consistent with the allegations in the Complaint.
Judge Bennett argues that Myers fails to allege facts sufficient
to state a claim for relief. Judge Bennett further argues that he is
protected by the judicial immunity doctrine because the alleged
misconduct occurred while he performed a judicial function within
Judicial immunity protects Judge Bennett from civil
Page 9 of 23
Absolute judicial immunity protects “[a]cts carried out in a
judicial capacity, whether based on statute, rule or inherent
authority.” Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir.
1989). Judicial immunity exists to preserve judicial independence
in the decision-making process. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 363 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)).
To support this policy, “the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be
construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.”
Id. at 356. Accordingly, the protection applies even if the judge
acted maliciously, made a grave error, or exceeded his authority.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 359; Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1991)
(“If judicial immunity means anything, it means that a judge will
not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error
. . . or was in excess of his authority.”); Newman v. State of Ind.,
129 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1997). Immunity extends to errors of
law or procedure and applies even when a plaintiff alleges that the
judge acted with malice, corruption, or bad faith. Mireles, 502 U.S.
at 11; Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, for the purpose of determining whether immunity
applies, the relevant act is not the specific action of the judge
Page 10 of 23
(which may have involved an error or a transgression of his
authority), but the general nature of the act. Id. at 13 (“[T]he
relevant inquiry is the nature and function of the act, not the act
itself. In other words, we look to the particular act’s relation to a
general function normally performed by a judge . . . .”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f only the particular
act in question were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge
in excess of his authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because
an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally
performed by a judge.” Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(judge’s order to police officer to use excessive force to bring
attorney into court was entitled to immunity because normal
judicial function includes directing police officers to bring
individuals to court). Only when a judge acts in the “clear absence
of all jurisdiction” is he subject to liability. Stump, 435 U.S. at 35657.
A judge’s action qualifies for absolute judicial immunity if it
meets a two-part test: first, the act “must be within the judge’s
jurisdiction.” Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 759. Second, the act “must
be performed in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Id.
Page 11 of 23
Section 1983 provides a plaintiff the right to sue for damages
resulting from civil rights violations caused by someone who used
the color of law in a way that deprived the plaintiff of “any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983; Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 758. However, § 1983 did
not abolish the doctrine of judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at
355. Therefore, judges have a “right to be free from suit for civil
damages if their actions qualify for absolute judicial . . . immunity.”
Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 758.
Judge Bennett acted within his jurisdiction.
To be protected by immunity, a judge must have acted with
subject matter jurisdiction. Polzin v. Gage, 636 F.3d 834, 838 (7th
Cir. 2011). That is, the judge must have acted as a judge. Homola
v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1995).
Judge Bennett had subject matter jurisdiction over the state
case. The Stalking No Contact Order Act clearly establishes that
circuit courts have the authority to issue stalking no contact orders.
740 ILCS 21/45 (2015). As a judge in the Circuit Court of Shelby
County, Illinois, Judge Bennett had the authority to preside over
and make decisions affecting the state case against Myers.
Page 12 of 23
Although Myers argues that Judge Bennett exceeded subject matter
jurisdiction by violating the Illinois Supreme Court Rules on Civil
Proceedings in the Trial Court,3 procedural errors do not remove a
judge’s power to hear a case. See Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 760
(finding that circuit court judge retained subject matter jurisdiction
in a criminal law matter for an ex parte phone call to an appeals
court judge despite the circuit judge’s procedural error about his
authority once defendant filed appeal). Therefore, Judge Bennett
acted with subject matter jurisdiction.
Judge Bennett acted within his judicial capacity.
Judge Bennett acted within his judicial capacity, the second
element of judicial immunity. Judicial capacity refers to the
functional nature of the act. Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 759. To
determine whether the judge acted within his capacity, courts
consider the nature of the act itself, i.e. whether it is a function
normally performed by a judge, the nature of the parties’
interactions with the judge, and the expectations of the parties.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 761.
The Complaint does not assert the way in which Judge Bennett violated any
Illinois Supreme Court Rule of Civil Proceeding in the Trial Court.
Page 13 of 23
Judge Bennett acted within his judicial capacity at
the October 1, 2015 hearing.
In presiding over the October 1, 2015 hearing, Judge Bennett
acted within his judicial capacity, including when he granted
Myers’s extension of time to find an attorney and when he extended
the stalking no contact order. Presiding over hearings, granting
extensions of time to respond to pleadings, and issuing and
extending stalking no contact orders are all functions normally
performed by a judge in his official capacity. Further, by appearing
before Judge Bennett and making requests about the case, the
parties dealt with Judge Bennett in his capacity as a judge.
Myers asserts that Judge Bennett acted without judicial
capacity because Judge Bennett violated Myers’s civil rights and the
Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Civil Proceedings in the Trial Court
because Judge Bennett had no authority to extend the order of no
contact at the October 1 hearing. Even if Judge Bennett erred in
extending the order after he continued the hearing to allow Myers to
obtain an attorney, judicial immunity still applies. Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967) (judge was immune from liability for
unconstitutional conviction resulting in civil rights violations).
Page 14 of 23
Judicial decisions that unfairly or wrongly impact a party’s property
or freedom are protected by immunity if the judge had jurisdiction
and acted within his judicial capacity. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 363
(holding that a judge, who granted a mother’s request to sterilize
her daughter without the daughter’s knowledge or consent, was
protected by judicial immunity even though the results were unfair
to the daughter). Therefore, even if Judge Bennett’s decisions at the
October 1 hearing violated Myers’s rights, that fact does not deprive
Judge Bennett of immunity.
Judicial immunity protects Judge Bennett’s alleged
October 1 ex parte communication with Beyers and
Judicial immunity protects Judge Bennett’s alleged October 1
ex parte communication with Beyers and Beyers’s attorney. An ex
parte communication is “a generally prohibited communication
between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not
present.” Sheehy v. Brady's This Is It, No. 2:12 CV 477, 2013 WL
3319684, at *11 (N.D. Ind. 2013). An ex parte communication
benefits one party and occurs without notice to or argument by an
adverse party. Black’s Law Dictionary 597 (7th ed. 1999).
Page 15 of 23
Myers asserts that the conversation immediately after the
October 1 hearing among Judge Bennett, Beyers, and Beyers’s
attorney is an ex parte communication because it occurred without
Accepting as true that the interaction was an ex parte
communication, that fact alone is insufficient to show that Judge
Bennett acted outside of his judicial capacity. See Dellenbach, 889
F.2d at 762 (“[T]he ex parte nature of the alleged call . . . does not,
without more, transform that communication into a nonjudicial
act.”). “Courts and judges often act ex parte.” Stump, 435 U.S. at
363 n.12 (finding judge acted within his judicial capacity by
granting an order in an ex parte proceeding to sterilize petitioner
when petitioner was a child). Judicial capacity includes informal
and ex parte communications that arise within a judge’s
jurisdiction. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (“[T]he
informal and ex parte nature of a proceeding has not been thought
to imply that an act otherwise within a judge’s lawful jurisdiction
was deprived of its judicial character.”).
Myers does not assert that Judge Bennett issued any orders or
made judicial decisions pertaining to the state case after Myers left
Page 16 of 23
the courtroom. Nor does the Complaint allege any facts to indicate
that the communication was administrative, managerial, or
otherwise nonjudicial. See, e.g., id. at 227-228 (courts distinguish
“between judicial acts and the administrative, legislative, or
executive functions that judges may . . . perform.”); Supreme Court
of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719
(1980) (no judicial immunity for promulgating a code of conduct for
attorneys); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 25 L.Ed. 676
(1880) (no judicial immunity for discriminating on the basis of race
in selecting jurors). The Complaint merely states that the
communication occurred. The nature of the conversation, which
was in the courtroom immediately following a hearing involving the
parties and in a matter presided over by Judge Bennett, indicates
that Beyers and his attorney were dealing with Judge Bennett in an
official capacity. See Eades, 810 F.2d at 726; Dellenbach, 889 F.2d
at 760. Without additional facts to suggest that the conversation
was a nonjudicial act, the allegation of the ex parte communication
alone is insufficient to strip Judge Bennett of immunity.
Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 761-62.
Page 17 of 23
Myers suggests that the ex parte communication violated Rule
63 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules. Rule 63 establishes that a
judge should not allow an ex parte communication except when
required for scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies
that do not concern the substantive issues of the case, but the
judge may only allow such ex parte communications when the
judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or
tactical advantage as a result and the judge promptly notifies the
other parties of the substance of the communication and allows an
opportunity to respond. IL Code of Jud. Conduct R. 63(A)(5).
However, even if the ex parte communication constituted
procedural error or exceeded Judge Bennett’s authority, judicial
immunity is not overcome. Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 759; Stump,
435 U.S. at 361; McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir.
1972) (judge immune from liability for conduct that “may well have
violated state and/or federal procedural requirements regarding
contempt citations”). Therefore, the alleged ex parte
communication following the October 1 hearing is protected by
Page 18 of 23
Judge Bennett performed or oversaw the alleged
changes to the October 1 hearing transcript in his
The alleged changes to the October 1 hearing transcript are
similarly protected by judicial immunity. Judicial immunity applies
to a presiding judge’s changes to a trial transcript. “Supervising the
preparation of the record of trial, while a task ordinarily delegated
to the court’s officers and counsel, is clearly within the general
responsibility of the court.” Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 761.
In Eades v. Sterlinske, judicial immunity barred a plaintiff’s
claim that a judge dictated false alterations to a trial transcript and
docket sheet to reflect a special verdict conference that never
occurred. 810 F.2d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1987). The judge acted
within his judicial capacity because the judge presided over the trial
and post-trial proceedings as part of his normal duties and the
judge’s actions involved post-trial proceedings in which the plaintiff
dealt with the judge in the judge’s official capacity. Id. at 726.
Like the judge in Eades, Judge Bennett presided over the
hearing as part of his normal judicial duties and had jurisdiction to
do so. Even if Judge Bennett altered the transcript in error or in
excess of his authority, he is not deprived of immunity. Scruggs v.
Page 19 of 23
Moellering, 870 F.2d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (judicial immunity for
judge who allegedly falsified trial transcript because preparation of
the record is a judicial act beacuse “[d]etermining the composition
of the appellate record entails a number of decisions that require
skill and judgment”); Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 759 (“judicial acts
concerning the preparation and ultimate transfer of papers and
transcripts to the appellate court qualify as judicial acts for which
the grant of absolute immunity is functionally appropriate.”). Judge
Bennett acted in his judicial capacity in examining and preparing
the transcript. See id. at 761.
Judicial immunity protects Judge Bennett’s phone
conversation with Myers.
Myers further alleges that the June 10, 2016, phone call was
an ex parte communication made to “intimidate, threaten, and
harass” Myers. Myers asserts that his attorney was not on the call
and that Judge Bennett made the call from a private residence (d/e
13 at 2, 5, 7, 9).
Myers has not established a sufficient basis to overcome
judicial immunity. The fact that Judge Bennett made the call after
the hearing whose transcript was the subject of the call does not
Page 20 of 23
indicate that he did not act within his judicial capacity. In
Dellenbach, the trial court judge’s call to the appellate judge after
the case was pending in the appellate court did not strip the trial
court judge of immunity because the call was regarding a matter
tried in his court and thus the judge did not act “in the clear
absence of jurisdiction.” 889 F.2d at 760. During the call in this
case, Judge Bennett and Myers discussed a case over which Judge
Bennett presided and to which Myers was a party. During the
course of a case, it is a normal judicial function for a judge to
explain or discuss the nature of a judicial decision or hearing with a
party. See Talbot v. Connors, No. 15-cv-12393, 2016 WL 369688,
at *1 (E.D. Mich., Feb. 1, 2016) (collecting cases). The fact that the
phone conversation occurred without Myers’s attorney or without
opposing counsel did not change the nature of Judge Bennett’s
As for Myers’s allegations that the call took place from a
private residence, valid judicial acts are often performed outside of
the courtroom. Judicial immunity is not defeated merely because
the judge performed the act outside of the courtroom, such as in
chambers or in his home instead of in the courtroom. Lopez v.
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Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980); McAlester,
469 F.2d at 1282. Placing the call from a private home did not
change the nature of Judge Bennett’s conduct.
Finally, even if Judge Bennett erred in making the call, such
an error, even a grave procedural error, does not preclude
immunity. Dellenbach, 889 F.2d at 759. Although Judge Bennett
also presided over a separate pending case involving Myers, nothing
in the Complaint suggests that the phone call implicated the
Judge Bennett acted within his jurisdiction and judicial
capacity at all relevant times and throughout the actions alleged in
the Complaint. Therefore, Judge Bennett is protected from liability
by judicial immunity for all of Myers’s claims.
Because Judge Bennett is protected from liability by judicial
immunity, the Court need not address Judge Bennett’s alternative
argument for dismissal that the Complaint does not state a claim
for relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Page 22 of 23
For the reasons stated herein, Judge Bennett’s Motion to
Dismiss (d/e ) is GRANTED. The Complaint (d/e 1) is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. CASE CLOSED.
ENTER: October 4, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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